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Opening Remarks
Delivered at The China Alternative: Changing Regional 
Order in the Pacific Islands Symposium
The University of the South Pacific, Port Vila, Vanuatu
Friday 8 February 2019
Hon. Ralph Regenvanu, Member of Parliament
I feel honoured to have been invited to present a brief keynote address 
on  the occasion of this The China Alternative symposium, and wish 
to convey my thanks at the outset to the organisers for the excellent 
arrangements.
I would also like to preface my address by making the obvious point that 
the dynamic and complex geopolitics that are purported to be changing 
the regional order in the Pacific, and that are the subject of this symposium, 
are simply reflective of international geopolitics and the paradigm and 
ideological shifts that happen as the dominant world states pursue their 
own national interests.
National context
For small island developing states such as Vanuatu, however, such shifts 
provide opportunities, including opportunities for greater leverage, 
upon which their relationship with the international community and 
development partners may be predicated and adapted.
No different than for other Pacific Island countries, Vanuatu’s smallness, 
the smallness of our economy and our severe vulnerability to natural 
disasters makes such opportunities all the more valuable.
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Also no different than for any other Pacific Island country, Vanuatu’s own 
national interests are paramount in determining our relations with the 
international community and other states. 
Vanuatu’s national interest is the successful implementation of our 
National  Sustainable Development Plan 2016–2030, also known as 
The  People’s Plan 2030, which is the country’s vision and overarching 
policy framework for achieving a ‘Stable, Sustainable and Prosperous 
Vanuatu’ over the next 15 years; our locally developed adaptation of the 
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals or SDGs.
In launching its Budget Policy Priorities for 2019, for example, the 
Vanuatu Government also appealed to the international community 
and its development partners for budgetary support. This is perhaps our 
principle ‘ask’ from the international community.
To that end, it has been my key stated priority since becoming foreign 
minister just over a year ago to push reforms in the government’s internal 
workings to strengthen Vanuatu’s capacity to be clear in knowing what it 
needs from the international community, and to be able to strategically 
articulate these needs to the partners who will assist us. In particular, 
the  current review of national structures, capacity and mechanisms 
is aimed at assisting to ensure Vanuatu’s smooth transition from Least 
Developed Country status next year, in 2020.
To reiterate, resourcing our own sustainable development is our key 
national foreign policy objective.
Regional security
In spite of competing interests, Vanuatu continues to uphold a nonaligned 
foreign policy, which is most explicitly manifested in our advocacy and 
practice of principles of denuclearisation and nonmilitarisation of the 
Pacific region. Vanuatu became one of the first signatories to the South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty shortly after independence in 1980, and 
most recently signed and ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in September last year.
On the other hand, in our view, the security lens oft adopted by 
metropolitan powers in the region can also be distorting of what we feel 
is the reality, and is often seen as a drawback in relations, especially by 




This is notwithstanding the complex relationship that our more traditional 
partners like Australia, New Zealand and France have, for example, with 
the Pacific, especially in security and defence.
For Vanuatu, which is consistently ranked as the country in the world 
most susceptible to natural hazards, the adverse effects of a changing 
climate and natural disasters remain the greatest threat to our national 
security. The commitment made by Forum leaders in 2015, which is 
now enshrined in the Boe Declaration—reaffirming that ‘climate change 
remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing 
of the peoples of the Pacific’—confirms this.
I am here reminded of the humanitarian and economic cost in the 
aftermath  of Tropical Cyclone Pam in 2015, amounting to over 
60 per cent of the national GDP, and the ongoing Ambae volcanic disaster, 
which continues to cause large-scale disruption to the livelihoods of the 
approximately 10,000 inhabitants who are directly affected.
Less than two weeks ago, cabinet approved the establishment of our 
inaugural National Security Council and a draft National Security 
Strategy, which expands the more traditional concept of security to 
include climate change and disaster response, and includes the minister of 
climate change as a permanent member of the council and chiefs and civil 
society as ad hoc members.
Here I wish to acknowledge the continued support by our important 
bilateral partners, Australia, New Zealand, France and China, in building 
our national capacities to better respond to these new and emerging issues. 
Political relations and development cooperation with China
Notwithstanding the perceived unorthodox means by which China’s 
continued assistance towards Vanuatu’s development priorities and 
aspirations continues to be manifested, the simple fact is that the assistance 
is meeting a development need or priority.
Also, and in spite of the recent spotlight on China’s development assistance 
to the Pacific, including Vanuatu, China is hardly the biggest donor in the 
region, or in Vanuatu.
An important factor in Vanuatu’s continued reliance on development 
assistance from China are the less stringent processes for getting large 
infrastructure projects implemented, which make it easier for small 
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administrations like ours to seek direct assistance. However, our 
engagement with China on infrastructure projects is also stimulating us 
to be continually vigilant in updating and enforcing our own laws and in 
building our own capacities for oversight of such projects. We are pleased 
that this interactive aspect of our relationship on infrastructure projects is 
developing fast.
With China, as with our other partners, we must continue to insist on 
climate-proof and resilient infrastructure built according to national 
standards.
The party-to-party relationships between the Chinese Communist Party 
and many of the key political parties in Vanuatu, whilst unheard of in 
the history of our relations with our more traditional partners, attest 
to a  relationship that traverses differences in political ideologies and in 
cultural and bureaucratic norms, and is an interesting value-add to the 
relationship of many of our leaders with China.
And I am pleased to announce that in addition to a growing number of 
scholarships for our students to study in China and ongoing discussions on 
air services to improve air connectivity and strengthen people-to-people 
links between China and Vanuatu, we also look forward to signing a visa 
waiver agreement in the near future to ease travel restrictions between our 
countries. For Vanuatu, this is a strong evidence of a joint desire by both 
countries to further promote friendly relations between the two countries. 
Conversely, this element remains a significant missing part of our longer-
term relations with our other key Pacific partners.
China continues to be an important player on the international stage as 
a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a global leader in 
trade, and Vanuatu will continue to seek ways to increase cooperation 
with China.
Concluding remarks
To conclude, Vanuatu’s engagement with the international community 
continues to be developmental in its focus and nature, and in ensuring 
that gains of the past are safeguarded and incremental steps taken to 
expand and diversify its trade, economic and political relations.
And Vanuatu, as with other Pacific Island countries, can only hope that 




Vanuatu welcomes increased efforts by Australia and New Zealand via 
their respective ‘Pacific Step-Up’ and ‘Pacific Reset’ policies to reach out 
to the Pacific.
Vanuatu also welcomes the intention of the United Kingdom to reopen 
its high commission in Vanuatu, and warmly applauds the government 
of Japan for establishing for the very first time its permanent diplomatic 
presence here in Port Vila.
The geopolitical dynamics of our region, with which we are all well 
acquainted, provide opportunities for the region, as I have outlined in this 
address. However, they also pose significant potential threats to our island 
ways of life and cultures, and our governments need to be continually 
responsive to such threats by taking all necessary steps to proactively 
manage them.
Dame Meg Taylor, Secretary-General, 
Pacific Islands Forum
Thank you for the opportunity to provide remarks as part of this 
symposium. It is an important and timely issue for our region that requires 
us to explore a range of challenges and opportunities. This morning, I will 
aim to share some of my own reflections based on what I observe in my 
position as the secretary general of the Pacific Islands Forum. There are 
three key points that I wish to make.
Framing: The Blue Pacific
The first point I wish to stress is that the focus of the forum and its secretariat 
is on how to secure the future viability, prosperity and wellbeing of the 
‘Blue Pacific’. The forum seeks genuine partnerships with all actors who 
are willing to join us along the pathway towards that vision. Therefore, 
I reject the terms of the dilemma that presents the Pacific with a choice 
between a China alternative and our traditional partners. Unfortunately, 
this framing remains the dominant narrative in the public debate about 
our region in the context of today’s geostrategic competition.
Such a narrative tends to portray the nations of the Pacific as passive 
collaborators or victims of a new wave of colonialism. In this context, 
it is often difficult to engage in meaningful dialogue over relations with 
China without being labelled pro-China, or perhaps even as naïve. Today, 
I want to emphasise that a key challenge for the forum is to maintain 
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its solidarity as staunchly pro–Blue Pacific. The alternative we seek is an 
alternative path for development that can secure a better future for the 
people of our region.
Indeed, the search for alternative, more meaningful paths for development 
for the Pacific is not new. The founding of the Pacific Islands Forum itself 
can perhaps be understood in this way, with Pacific states working together 
to effectively exercise their newly attained sovereignty for the benefits of 
Pacific development. The ‘Pacific Way’ was perhaps the most well-known 
framing of an alternative approach to development at that time. Civil 
society, too, has often called upon each other and the leaders of the region 
to find alternative approaches to development that are consistent with 
Pacific values. In 2011, the Pacific Conference of Churches produced 
the short think piece ‘Rethinking Oceania’, or ‘Rethinking the House of 
God’, which continues to be influential amongst civil society and faith-
based organisations throughout the region.
Recently, forum leaders have reinvigorated their commitment to the 
development of the region in a manner that reflects their shared Pacific 
values and concerns. In 2017, forum leaders endorsed the Blue Pacific 
narrative as the core driver of collective action for advancing the leaders’ 
vision under the framework for Pacific regionalism. The narrative 
explicitly recognises that as the Blue Pacific, we are custodians of some 
of the world’s richest biodiversity and marine and terrestrial resources. 
Through our stewardship of the Pacific Ocean, we must do all we can to 
protect the wellbeing of Pacific peoples, and indeed Pacific nation-states 
and the ocean continent they inhabit.
To date, the Blue Pacific narrative has been successful in building solidarity 
and shifting the prevailing narrative of the region as small, dependent and 
vulnerable. Going forward, we need to build on this and develop concrete 
strategies that leverage the increased interest in our region and secure the 
future of the Blue Pacific.
Last year, the theme for the Nauru forum meeting called for a stronger 
Pacific and the need to more assertively exercise our will in determining 
the Pacific we want. The theme recognises that our developmental 
challenges are not only due to our size and remoteness, but also are the 
product of the prevailing global economic system, which has undermined 
the health of our oceans and the safety of our climate. Through its 
theme, Nauru is seeking opportunities to build on the Blue Pacific 
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narrative and reinvigorate political ownership of our regional development 
aspirations through rethinking development approaches and identifying, 
as  a  collective, opportunities for innovation. So, to summarise my first 
point: when considering the China alternative in the region, I would 
argue that we must do so from the perspective of securing our future as 
the Blue Pacific continent.
‘Friends to all’
My second point: forum leaders have made it clear on a number of 
occasions that they place great value on open and genuine relationships 
and inclusive and enduring partnerships within our region and 
beyond. A  ‘friends to all’ approach is commonly accepted, while some 
have made a more formal commitment to this principle through their 
nonaligned status.
China’s increasing diplomatic and economic presence in the region, 
coupled with its growing economic and political strength globally, 
brings both challenges and opportunities for our Blue Pacific. In general, 
forum members view China’s increased actions in the region as 
a positive development, one that offers greater options for financing and 
development opportunities—both directly in partnership with China and 
indirectly through the increased competition in our region.
Indeed, if there is one word that might resonate amongst all forum 
members when it comes to China, that word is access. Access to 
markets, technology, financing, infrastructure. Access to a viable future. 
For  example, Australia’s access to China’s markets make it the former’s 
largest trading partner in terms of both imports and exports. In 2017, 
China surpassed Australia as New Zealand’s largest trading partner for 
goods and services.
To a large extent, forum Island countries have been excluded from the 
sorts of financing, technology and infrastructure that can enable us to 
fully engage in a globalised world. Many countries see the rise of China 
and its increasing interest in the region as providing an opportunity to 
rectify this. Indeed, we have seen large increases in both financing for 
development and trade with China over the past decade or so.
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More than this, and to reiterate my first point, many Island countries see 
the current context as providing an opportunity for ensuring a Pacific that 
is (to use the words of former Kiribati president Iereme Tabai) ‘a viable 
community in our own right and at our own standard and with a feeling 
of pride and self-respect’.
To be sure, we need not only think of these opportunities in relation to 
China specifically—their market, products, technology and so on—but 
also the broader range of opportunities emerging in the context of a rising 
China. China’s presence has meant that other actors are resetting their 
priorities and stepping up engagement in the Pacific. We are also seeing 
some new partners emerging as well as the return of partners who had 
long left the region.
Therefore, the opportunities available to the Pacific are indeed many. 
Forum leaders have a keen sense of the current historical moment and 
the opportunities it brings to realise better development outcomes for 
their country and its people. We are seeing offers and counteroffers by our 
partners. Within this context, perhaps the key challenge facing the Blue 
Pacific is our ability to think through these opportunities as a collective 
rather than only considering bilateral gains. It is, of course, the prerogative 
of forum Island countries to leverage this situation for their national 
benefit. My point, however, is that it also provides an unprecedented 
opportunity to position our region for the future and secure cultural 
and ecological integrity, and generating our own wealth to ensure the 
social wellbeing of all Pacific Island people. So, to summarise my second 
point: our region is indeed crowded and complex. This provides immense 
opportunity for securing the future of the Blue Pacific.
A regional approach: Possible next steps
Finally, I wish to reflect on what might be some concrete steps that we can 
take as a region in the context of a rising China. Progressing the region 
forward towards its vision for the Blue Pacific will require long-term and 
focused political dialogue, both amongst the forum membership and with 
our partners.
More generally, the forum is already taking steps to improve its engagement 
with its partners. Last year, leaders called for a review of the meetings 




Specifically in relation to China, I think it is timely and relevant for the 
forum to commence dialogue on how it wishes to collectively engage 
with China. As I raised earlier, there is already much bilateral engagement 
between forum members and China, but the forum is best placed to take 
the lead on regional Pacific strategies for cooperation with China.
It is also appropriate to consider the merits of establishing a forum–
China dialogue, perhaps in a similar manner to the PALM (Pacific 
Islands Leaders Meeting) with Japan or the Africa–China Dialogue. 
China already has its own platform for engagement with the region, the 
China–Pacific Islands Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, 
a multibilateral grouping that enables China to meet at a high level with 
the eight leaders of those Pacific Island countries that recognise China. 
While there are diplomatic issues underpinning this forum that must 
be acknowledged, we  must not overlook the opportunities present for 
advancing the priorities of the Blue Pacific. This will require all forum 
members and a greater say in setting the agenda accordingly.
Infrastructure remains a crucial requirement for ensuring resilience 
in the Pacific. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) claims to be an 
open platform supporting greater trade and investment cooperation 
through, in particular, cooperation in major, long-term plans for regional 
development. Nine forum member countries—Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, 
Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New 
Guinea, Niue and New Zealand—have signed MOUs to cooperate with 
China’s BRI. Considering, the opportunities for collective engagement 
with the BRI merit careful analysis and discussion.
We also know that in response to China’s growing influence in the region, 
alternative infrastructure initiatives have been announced from Japan, 
the US and Australia. As the Blue Pacific, rather than playing the merits 
of one against another, we should consider exploring the potential value of 
partners working together for the benefit of the region. As I have said 
before, I would offer that channelling such assistance through the Pacific 
Resilience Facility is one of the many appropriate options for strengthening 
our will to drive our own pathways toward resilient development.
Furthermore, through the Pacific Resilience Facility we could also 
consider establishing common, regional criteria to help forum members 
assess investments to ensure they are consistent with the long-term vision 
and priorities for the Blue Pacific. The issue of infrastructure quality has 
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already been a matter of public debate. Other standards might include 
environmental, social and cultural protections mechanisms. For example, 
under the BRI, China has established an Ecological and Environmental 
Cooperation Plan, which could be used to hold Chinese investments 
to account.
Finally, 2019 presents us with an important opportunity, with Chile 
hosting APEC. In the secretariat’s 2017 State of Pacific Regionalism report, 
we raised the potential for the Pacific to be a bridge between China and 
Latin America. Extending China’s Maritime Silk Road through our Blue 
Pacific could provide opportunities for creating regional infrastructure 
and access that could inspire new markets of trade between Asia, the 
Pacific and Latin America; not to mention between Pacific Island 
countries themselves. It could also deliver much-needed infrastructure 
and technology for building Blue Pacific resilience. The 2019 APEC 
meeting could provide the catalyst for dialogue on such opportunities.
Conclusion
The themes from the last two forum meetings have strongly articulated 
leaders’ desire for a shift in the development trajectory for the Pacific, 
through the Blue Pacific narrative and through it the opportunity to 
exercise our will. This is the strategic lens through which any conversation 
over China, and the associated geopolitical and geostrategic environment 
we find ourselves in, must occur. Our political conversations and 
settlements must be driven by the wellbeing of our Blue Pacific continent 




Terence Wesley-Smith and Graeme Smith
The Pacific Islands region has entered a new period of uncertainty 
precipitated in large part by the emergence of China as a major regional 
actor as well as the reaction of more established powers to perceived 
threats to their longstanding influence. In March 2019, in the wake of 
a flurry of activity on the part of Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States aimed at countering China’s growing influence in the Pacific 
Islands, Deputy Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Cristelle 
Pratt declared that ‘great power competition is back!’ before suggesting 
that ‘Our task is to find an appropriate balance between leveraging the 
competition between partners and ensuring peace and cooperation prevails 
in our Blue Pacific’ (Pratt 2019, emphasis in original). We will argue here 
that although Island leaders have been remarkably successful at leveraging 
competition, this may not always be possible when great power strategic 
interests are at stake. Indeed, Pacific Island leaders may have no option 
but to take sides in the event that cooperation gives way to great power 
conflict somewhere in the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean.
Great power competition
In 2006 Beijing signalled heightened interest in the Pacific Islands with 
the first China–Pacific Islands Countries Economic Development and 
Cooperation Forum held in Fiji. Since then, China has become firmly 
established as a major trade, aid, investment and diplomatic partner in 
the region, and Chinese companies are increasingly active in resource 
extraction, construction and commerce. Long-established external actors 
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in the region first responded cautiously to China’s spectacular rise, perhaps 
because Beijing was at pains not to confront them directly in regional or 
global affairs. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Hu Jintao, 
even backed away from the doctrine of ‘China’s peaceful rise’ (Zheng 2005) 
on the grounds that ‘rise’ sounded threatening (Glaser and Medeiros 2007). 
An analysis of China’s foreign policy community written at the beginning of 
President Xi Jinping’s rule concluded that it was not monolithic, running the 
full spectrum of nativists and realists at one end to selective multilateralists 
and globalists at the other (Shambaugh 2013:13–44). While realists were 
thought to hold the upper hand, the author held open the possibility of 
a shift in either direction.
A number of recent developments mark the arrival of a new phase in the 
relationship, occasioned in the first instance by Xi Jinping’s more assertive 
posture on the world stage. Since assuming leadership in 2012, Xi has 
consolidated his hold on domestic power and articulated a series of highly 
ambitious initiatives, including the nationalistic ‘China Dream’ that 
imagines China ‘rejuvenated’ and restored to its proper place in the world, 
with the Belt and Road investment and infrastructure program forging 
trade corridors across vast swathes of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the 
Americas, Oceania and Europe (see, for example, Bradsher 2020). It is 
clear the nativists in China’s foreign policy community now hold sway. 
Xi’s global posture effectively marks the end of Deng Xiaoping’s influential 
foreign policy dictum of ‘hide and bide’, whereby China adopted low-
profile diplomacy and put aside any aspirations towards world leadership.
Beijing has also restructured its institutions to reflect a more proactive 
approach to diplomacy. A new aid agency (Zhang 2018) has been 
created to address shortcomings in the delivery of China’s development 
assistance—and in particular to resolve tensions and coordination problems 
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce 
and more than 20 other agencies involved in China’s foreign aid system 
(Zhang and Smith 2017). Significantly for Pacific Island nations with 
large Chinese populations, the organisation responsible for managing 
Chinese communities abroad, the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, 
was merged into the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD). 
This move to subsume a long-established government department within 
a party organ is both part of a broader trend of greater CCP control in 
matters designated as ‘core’ to the national interest (the offices of ethnic 
and religious affairs were also integrated with the UFWD) and part of 
more assertive and racialised nationalism that views overseas Chinese 
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as ‘all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation bounded by Chinese 
blood’ (Groot 2017). Binding these bureaucratic shifts is a change in the 
CCP’s framing of diplomacy as ‘major country diplomacy with Chinese 
characteristics’, which ‘aims to foster a new type of international relations 
and build a community with a shared future for mankind diplomacy’ 
(Xinhua 2017:6, 17). In the same report, delivered in October 2017 at 
the 19th CCP National Party Congress, President Xi made it clear that 
the ‘defining feature’ of ‘Chinese characteristics’ is ‘the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China’ (ibid.:17).
All of this puts China at odds with the United States, which for decades was 
prepared to facilitate China’s economic rise in return for investment and 
trade benefits accruing to US corporations and consumers, accompanied 
by the tacit assumption that with prosperity China would democratise and 
become more ‘like us’. Few hold this illusion now. Not only does China’s 
rate of economic growth continue to outstrip the US, but structural changes 
in the domestic economy, away from labour-intensive manufacturing to 
new industries based on China-controlled technology, explicitly backed 
by the (now seldom mentioned) Made in China 2025 policy, pose 
a  direct challenge to the economic and military power underpinning 
US global dominance since World War II. Furthermore, an accelerated 
military build-up under President Xi, provocative actions in the South 
China Sea, a more aggressive attitude to Taiwan’s reincorporation with 
‘the motherland’ as well as China’s recent efforts to expand its influence 
overseas represent a variety of challenges to the established global order 
and the central role of the United States. 
The Pacific Islands region is not on the geographic, strategic or economic 
frontlines of this new Cold War (see Wesley-Smith, Chapter 2, this 
volume). As argued by Zhou Fangyin in Chapter 7, there is little evidence 
that Beijing has attached high priority to strategic, political or economic 
interests in Oceania, nor has it singled out the region for special attention. 
This is not the case elsewhere, particularly in Asia where President Xi 
has explicitly challenged US leadership aspirations and where the rival 
powers compete fiercely over jurisdictional issues in the South China Sea 
and the East China Sea, the militarisation of China’s ‘near seas’ periphery 
and the future status of Taiwan. Nevertheless, Western powers have 
exercised considerable influence in the Pacific Islands since the colonial 
era and in many ways this is an important characteristic—while nations in 
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sub-Saharan Africa can be considered genuinely postcolonial, most Pacific 
Island nations are still strongly influenced by former (and, in some cases, 
current) colonial powers France, Australia, New Zealand or the US. 
Each of these four metropolitan powers have announced new foreign 
policy initiatives explicitly or implicitly designed to counter China’s 
growing sway in the region. These initiatives are analysed in depth in 
this book (see Varrall, Chapter 3; Iati, Chapter 4; Finin, Chapter 5; and 
Maclellan, Chapter 6). Here it will suffice to note the major characteristics 
of Australia’s ‘Step-Up’ policy, New Zealand’s ‘Pacific Reset’ plan, France’s 
‘great power’ ambitions and the renewed focus on Oceania in Washington 
DC, dubbed the ‘Pacific Pledge’ in late 2019.
The shared characteristic of these initiatives is that they reflect anxieties 
about regional security. Security has been a preeminent concern of the 
Western powers since an expansionist Japan used the Pacific Islands 
as stepping stones to threaten their interests in the Pacific War, and it was 
the central consideration during the Cold War when policy initiatives 
were designed to completely exclude the Soviet Union from the region. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, Western regional 
security policy was recalibrated to reflect concerns about international 
criminal activity and, after the 9/11 attacks of 2001, the possibility that 
terrorist groups would become established in politically unstable or 
‘failing’ Pacific Island states (May 2003). The concern today is not only 
that China has gained economic and diplomatic traction in a region long 
considered a Western strategic domain, but that Beijing might use its 
growing influence to establish a military presence. This possibility goes to 
the heart of long-established defence planning in the US, Australia and 
New Zealand, which seeks to deny adversaries the ability to project power 
by sea or air over the ocean spaces surrounding them.
The first public indications of renewed strategic unease came in early 2018 
when Australian officials questioned the value of Chinese infrastructure 
projects in the region and suggested that the loans facilitating these 
activities had implications for the sovereignty of Pacific Island states. 
The essential elements of this narrative—that Beijing’s lending practices 
reflected nefarious motives—received a boost in April 2018 when the 
defence correspondent for The Sydney Morning Herald claimed Beijing 
had approached officials in Vanuatu about establishing a permanent 
military presence (Wroe 2018). The story focused on upgrades to the 
Luganville wharf on the island of Espiritu Santo conducted by the state-
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owned Shanghai Construction Group, suggesting that the new facility 
could accommodate Chinese naval vessels. Officials in Vanuatu and 
China denied these claims and it was later revealed that the contract 
with the Chinese company did not contain a debt-for-equity clause as 
earlier claimed. Nevertheless, the idea that China has military aspirations 
in the region and that Chinese loans could be used to leverage that 
access, resonates with a wider narrative about China’s activities in 
Djibouti, Sri  Lanka, Cambodia and elsewhere, and now appears to be 
widely accepted by Western security analysts (see, for example, Fox and 
Dornan 2018).
Whatever its veracity, major elements of Australia’s Step-Up policy towards 
the Pacific Islands region are consistent with Western suspicions of China’s 
motives overseas. From mid-2018 Canberra moved quickly to counter 
an offer by the Chinese communications technology giant Huawei to 
construct a fibre optic cable for Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, 
extended a similar offer to Vanuatu and announced the establishment of 
an AU$2 billion fund to compete with China’s infrastructure development 
efforts. Programs designed to counter Chinese aid and construction 
initiatives are supported by increased diplomatic activity on the part of 
Australia, New Zealand, the US and the United Kingdom. Other aspects 
of Step-Up that make its security policy foundations clear include the 
establishment of the Australia Pacific Security College (DFAT 2018), 
a Pacific Fusion Centre to share information about unlicensed fishing, 
drug trafficking and other illegal activity, and a bilateral initiative with 
Fiji to develop the Black Rock Camp into a regional hub for police 
and peacekeeping training and preparedness. In addition, in late 2018 
Australia signed an agreement with Papua New Guinea to develop the 
Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island with support from the US. This 
is significant not only because it includes the planned deployment of 
Australian naval personnel there, but also because in his speech to APEC 
in November 2018 Vice President Pence explicitly linked the base to 
Chinese aggression in the South China Sea (Pence 2018). The Lombrum 
initiative is emblematic of the increased militarisation of the Pacific 
Islands region at a time when military aspirations attributed to Beijing 
are loudly condemned in Canberra. It is also worth noting that a goal of 
Australia’s policy towards the region is further integration of Pacific Island 
countries ‘into Australian and New Zealand economies and our security 
institutions’ (Australian Government 2017; Dobell 2019).
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If New Zealand’s new policy approach to the Pacific Islands relies heavily 
on increased aid, diplomatic activity and people-to-people exchanges, the 
recent ratcheting up of interest in the region in Washington is spearheaded 
by the Pentagon and fuelled by strategic concerns. As Gerard Finin argues 
in Chapter 5, US policy in the Pacific Islands region has always been 
driven by strategic interests. The US maintains a large military presence in 
Guam, conducts training exercises in the neighbouring Commonwealth 
of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) and tests missile systems 
at its Kwajalein base in the Marshall Islands. Central to the US’s free 
association relationships with the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau 
and the Federated States of Micronesia is Washington’s exclusive control 
of the defence of these islands and the ability to deny foreign military 
access to almost 6 million square kilometres of land, ocean and airspace. 
Finin details the increased attention in Washington to the  upcoming 
renegotiation of the compacts of free association that tie the US to 
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau, and notes 
that in May 2019 the leaders of these entities met with President Trump, 
the first ever such meeting with a US president. He also highlights new 
outreach efforts to non-US affiliated parts of the region, including visits 
by senior White House officials to Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, and 
proposed collaborative initiatives between the Pentagon and military 
forces in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga.
The reemergence of the security imperative in Western foreign policy 
towards the region is important because such policies tend to be pursued 
more aggressively than would otherwise be the case. The new approach 
has an absolutist quality reminiscent of the ‘strategic denial’ policies of 
the Cold War, where any interaction with the Soviet Union was deemed 
unacceptable. Obviously, exclusion is not possible in the case of China, 
but Western officials have made it quite clear that any agreement between 
Beijing and a Pacific Island country to establish a military facility would 
cross a red line. They have also raised the spectre of debt-leverage to 
suggest that Pacific Island governments should avoid further infrastructure 
borrowing from China.
These priorities are at odds with the policy preferences of the leaders of 
many Pacific Islands states, who in recent years have worked to define 
a regional security approach that emphasises threats to Island societies 
like natural disasters and other environmental concerns. This emphasis on 
human security is apparent in the Boe Declaration that emerged from the 
2018 Nauru meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), which identifies 
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climate change as the primary threat to regional security and makes no 
mention of foreign powers or military bases, while noting that the region 
is ‘increasingly crowded and complex’ (PIF Secretariat 2018; see also Fry 
2019:264–73).
Caught in between
Before considering the implications of the reemergence of great power 
competition for Pacific Island nations, it is important to bear in mind that 
Australia and New Zealand, two of the most significant external actors 
in the region, are also caught in the middle of the escalating competition 
between the US and China. Indeed, their own attempts to manoeuvre 
between the conflicting demands of Washington and Beijing are already 
reflected in their changing policies towards the region. In other words, 
the ongoing efforts of policymakers in Canberra and Wellington to 
resolve these dilemmas will reverberate in the Pacific Islands. They suggest 
pressures that Pacific Island leaders also face as they walk a diplomatic 
tightrope between competing great powers.
Since World War II, defence policy in Australia and New Zealand has 
been built around the assumption of a preeminent US military presence 
in the Asia-Pacific region as well as an enduring alliance with Washington 
that would ensure US support should the need arise. Thus, Australia’s 
2016 Defence White Paper identifies the US as Canberra’s ‘most important 
strategic partner’ and places ‘a strong and deep alliance’ with Washington 
‘at the core of Australia’s security and defence planning’ (Australian 
Government 2016). Although New Zealand’s relationship with 
Washington has never fully recovered from a rift over nuclear policies in 
the 1980s, defence statements still emphasise a commitment to the ‘rules-
based international order’ led by the US, very close military cooperation 
with Australia and participation in the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing 
consortium that includes Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom and 
the US (New Zealand Government 2018).
If security policy continues to be firmly based on defence relations with the 
US, in recent years the economies of both countries have become heavily 
dependent upon China. China is now Australia’s largest trading partner by 
far, representing 34 per cent of its exports and 24 per cent of its imports in 
2018. More than 1.43 million Chinese tourists visit annually (year ending 
August 2018) and Australia is second only to the US as a destination for 
THE CHINA ALTERNATIVE
8
Chinese students, making education Australia’s fourth-largest export after 
iron ore, coal and natural gas (DFAT 2019). Unlike the US, Australia’s 
terms of trade with China are favourable and have led to the country’s first 
current account surplus in 44 years (Cranston 2019). China is also New 
Zealand’s largest trading partner, providing a market for 30 per cent of its 
dairy products and 24 per cent of its forestry products, as well as being a 
significant source of investment capital, almost half a million tourists 
a year and over 30,000 foreign students (MFAT 2017). Both countries 
are in an unequal relationship with the US and China. Australia and New 
Zealand need the US as a military partner more than Washington needs 
them, and any breakdown of economic relations would hurt Australia and 
New Zealand more than it would hurt China.
At the heart of the debate around whether Australia needs to choose 
between the US and China is international relations scholar and former 
deputy secretary for defence Hugh White. He contends that Australia 
was for many years able to maintain the illusion that ‘we can keep relying 
on China to make us rich while America keeps us safe’ because neither 
China nor the US exerted strong pressure to choose sides (White 2017b). 
He argues that changed when President Obama announced his pivot to 
Asia in an address to the Australian Parliament in late 2011. Since the 
pivot was clearly aimed at containing China, and Australia had agreed 
to support the effort by hosting US marines in Darwin, it was no longer 
possible to argue convincingly in Beijing that Canberra was not taking 
sides in the emerging competition between the US and China. Since 
then, according to White, Australian officials have had to decide ‘how 
far we can please China without risking a rebuke from Washington. Our 
government weighs every decision concerning each country in the light 
of what it will mean for our relations with the other’ (White 2017a:47). 
Similar calculations preoccupy decision-makers in New Zealand. 
At times it has been difficult to maintain the correct balance. For example, 
Australia has been quick to volunteer troops to support US-led conflicts 
in the Middle East, but was reluctant to send ships to join Washington’s 
‘freedom of navigation’ voyages designed to challenge China’s maritime 
claims in the South China Sea. This may have helped reassure Beijing, 
although not enough to prevent China from sending warships to shadow 
Australian naval ships traversing the area on other business (Tarabay 2019). 
It certainly does not please the US, which, according to US Ambassador 
to Australia Arthur Culvahouse, ‘wants Australia to embrace a power role 
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in the Pacific’ to combat China’s ‘payday loan diplomacy’ in the region 
(Dayant 2019; Reuters 2019). For its part, New Zealand has struggled 
to reassure Beijing of its commitment to their multifaceted bilateral 
relationship in the face of mounting concern by its Five Eyes partners 
about alleged Chinese infiltration in business and domestic politics.
The cost of getting the balancing act wrong was apparent in early 2019 
when Australian coal exports were held up at Chinese ports, allegedly 
in retaliation for, among other things, Canberra’s abrupt decision to 
block Huawei from participating in the construction of Australia’s 5G 
telecommunications network. Parallels have been drawn between the 
detention of Canadian citizens Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and 
Australian writer Yang Hengjun being held in China and charged with 
espionage, a crime that carries the death penalty. A senior Australian 
security analyst described it as ‘hostage diplomacy’ (Medcalf 2019). 
New Zealand also felt the heat from Beijing in late 2018 when the 
Government Communications Security Bureau denied a request by 
Spark, one of the country’s largest telecommunications companies, to 
use Huawei technology in 5G infrastructure. China deferred the launch 
event for a major tourist promotion, turned back an Air Zealand flight to 
Shanghai—supposedly because of deficient paperwork—and postponed 
for several months a planned state visit to China by New Zealand Prime 
Minister Jacinda Ardern (Agence France-Presse 2018; Albert 2019; 
Tobin 2019a).
The increased emphasis on security in the Pacific Islands region, especially 
in Australia, the return of the Cold War idea of strategic denial, the 
explicit critique of China’s regional activities by officials in Canberra and 
Wellington, and Australia’s base initiative in Papua New Guinea suggest 
that, at least for the moment, these governments have decided to tilt towards 
Washington and attempt to manage the resulting fallout in relations with 
Beijing. However, this could change as US–China competition escalates. 
Domestic politics are a factor here. During the Australian federal election 
in May 2019, it was apparent that bipartisanship over China had broken 
down, with the ruling Coalition attempting to capitalise on remarks 
by former Labor prime minister Paul Keating that the government had 
been too hawkish on China, that ‘when the security agencies are running 
foreign policy, the nutters are in charge’, crediting this shift to former 
Fairfax China correspondent John Garnaut’s classified report on Chinese 
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influence in Australia. ‘They’ve all gone berko1 ever since then. [When] 
you have the ASIO chief knocking on MPs’ doors, you know something’s 
wrong’ (Keating quoted in Greene and Sweeney 2019). In New Zealand, 
there are differences within the governing coalition, with former deputy 
prime minister and foreign minister Winston Peters articulating views on 
China that were more hawkish than those of others in cabinet, including 
Prime Minister Ardern (Burton-Bradley 2019).
For the Pacific and Australia, the central questions are how is US–China 
competition likely to evolve, what policies should be adopted and 
how will the strategic calculus change as events unfold. Hugh White is 
convinced that although war is not the inevitable outcome of the US–
China struggle for leadership in East Asia, it is a likely result. He suggests 
that sooner or later the US will back away from an armed conflict with 
China that could involve nuclear weapons, largely because Washington 
will realise that US interests in this part of the world are not worth the 
human and material costs of such a conflagration (White 2019a:234–38). 
Critiques of White’s work have run along two lines: security analysts, 
while agreeing with his calls to increase defence spending, maintain that 
he underestimates US resolve and ability to retain its influence in Asia 
and the Western Pacific as well as the value of alliances with other states 
such as India, Indonesia and Japan, while overestimating the inevitability 
of China’s rise and its capacity to achieve its ends through military means 
(Goldrick and Graham 2019; Jennings 2019); and that he glosses over 
the nature of the CCP under Xi Jinping, misunderstands the nature of 
the Chinese army as an army of the party, rather than the nation, and 
the non-military means by which Beijing expands its influence (Garnaut 
2018). White’s work is remarkably silent on China, dedicating just a few 
pages to its motivations and including some wishful thinking: ‘We might 
expect, and certainly hope, that China’s leaders, who are keen students of 
history, recognise that they would be better off exercising primacy with 
a light touch’ (White 2019a:41). All sides are remarkably silent on the 
Pacific itself, despite it being the focus of their threat analyses. 
For analysts like White, then, Australia’s immediate interests lie in reducing 
its strategic dependence on the US, formulating a more independent 
foreign policy and learning to live with China’s growing power and 
influence in the region. Others urge Australia and New Zealand to do 
1  Australian colloquial term meaning ‘beserk’ (Macquarie Dictionary, 7th edition).
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whatever it takes to strengthen their relations with the US-led Western 
alliance and confront the CCP’s attempts to infiltrate domestic politics 
and influence policy from within. All of this suggests that the foreign 
policy approaches of Australia and New Zealand towards Pacific Island 
countries could shift dramatically in the future depending on which 
school of thought gains most influence in policy circles. 
Leveraging the competition?
No matter how strongly promoted, Western policies towards the Pacific 
Islands have always had to contend with attempts by Island leaders to 
exercise agency and manage outcomes. Indeed, over the years Pacific 
Island states have registered remarkable successes in dealing with powerful 
external actors, despite the apparent disadvantages of small size, lack of 
resources and aid dependency. Early examples include preventing Japan 
from dumping nuclear waste in the deep ocean; banning driftnet fishing by 
distant-water fishing nations; and negotiating a tuna treaty that required 
the US to change its stated position on the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), counter domestic legislation and take on a powerful 
domestic fishing industry lobby (Tarai 2015). Recent achievements 
are equally striking as Island countries have worked together in global 
multilateral settings, often in opposition to the policy preferences of their 
larger regional partners, to put French Polynesia back on the UN list of 
territories to be decolonised; include ocean management and climate 
change as UN Sustainable Development Goals; and make significant 
contributions to the final text of the 2015 Paris Accord on climate change 
mitigation and adaptation (Fry and Tarte 2015). As Tarcisius Kabutaulaka 
points out in Chapter 1, the narrative of ‘our Blue Pacific’ increasingly 
invoked by Pacific Island leaders provides a framework for this recent 
history of assertive diplomacy and ‘is premised on the idea of responsibility 
and stewardship to the region, especially the Pacific Ocean, and through 
that, to the rest of the world’.
Pacific Island leaders have also managed to resist security policies they did 
not regard as appropriate, even when those policies have been afforded 
high priority in Washington, Canberra and Wellington. A key example 
here is the ultimate failure of the strategic denial imperative, the central 
tenet of Western policy towards the region during the Cold War, when 
Kiribati and Vanuatu signed fisheries access treaties with the Soviet Union 
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despite considerable pressure not to do so (Tarai 2015). It is also worth 
noting that in late 2018, at the same time that Australia was promoting 
a new regional security agenda aimed at containing China, Pacific Island 
leaders agreed to the 2018 Boe Declaration, which contained a very 
different understanding of security and pushed back against the idea that 
they should curtail their dealings with Beijing to enhance the security 
environment.
Pacific Island states have generally welcomed China’s increased regional 
presence and benefited materially from it. According to the Lowy Institute, 
in the decade after 2006 China committed a total of US$1.78 billion in 
aid to the eight Pacific Islands countries that recognised Beijing during this 
period, as well as providing financial support for regional organisations 
and funding scholarships for some 1,400 Pacific Island students to study 
in China (Lowy Institute 2019; Zhang and Marinaccio 2019). Chinese 
companies and individuals are significant investors in resource extraction 
and retail across the Pacific. Pacific economies have benefited from trade 
with China, now the second largest trading partner for the region as 
a whole. Island economies also stand to benefit from the recent increase 
in resources committed to the region by Australia, New Zealand and the 
US, even if the primary purpose of these initiatives is to counter China’s 
influence. Papua New Guinea, for example, is to receive massive funding 
for rural electrification while, among other things, Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu will gain improved fibre optic communications. These resources 
would probably not have been forthcoming without the emerging great 
power competition. 
Some Island leaders have used China to leverage concessions from other 
powers. Fiji, for example, turned to China for support as part of its ‘Look 
North’ policy in the aftermath of the 2006 coup and its subsequent 
ostracism by members of the Commonwealth and the PIF. Sandra Tarte 
outlines how the relationship between Fiji and China has strengthened 
significantly in recent years. She argues that Fiji rather than China was 
instrumental in fashioning the relationship: ‘Contrary to concerns 
about China’s increasing influence in Fiji, the analysis suggests that 
Fiji proactively exploited opportunities within this partnership, while 
maintaining and exercising its autonomy and agency’ (Tarte, Chapter 12). 
Fiji’s engagement with China provided an incentive for traditional partners 
to return after national elections were held in 2014 and some semblance 
of democracy was restored. As a result, Fiji now has significantly increased 
foreign policy and defence options. In June 2019 Australian Minister 
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for Foreign Affairs Marise Payne travelled to Fiji to visit the Black Rock 
facilities that Australia has agreed to develop; welcome Fiji into the Pacific 
Labour Scheme; announce an initiative to allow select Fiji athletes to 
train in Australia; provide a progress report on a joint study on enhanced 
business opportunities; and report that some Fiji infrastructure projects 
were under ‘active consideration’ for Australian funding (Payne 2019).
The China–Taiwan struggle for diplomatic recognition is one arena where 
the ability of island leaders to exercise autonomy and agency will continue 
to be tested. Before 2008, when a ‘diplomatic truce’ effectively suspended 
the competition, Pacific Island states were able to leverage significant 
concessions by playing Beijing and Taipei off against each other. Several 
Island countries, including Nauru and Vanuatu, switched recognition 
from one to the other in return for lucrative assistance packages. In one 
high-stakes case, in 2003 a new government in Kiribati successfully 
terminated its relationship with Beijing and recognised Taiwan despite 
the presence of a Chinese satellite-tracking facility on Tarawa (see Zhang, 
Chapter 8). At the time the so-called cheque-book diplomacy was put 
on hold, six Pacific Island countries recognised Taiwan. In December 
2016, Beijing abandoned the diplomatic truce when China reestablished 
relations with the African country of Sao Tome and Principe. Since then 
six other countries, including two in the Pacific, have followed suit, leaving 
a total of only 15 countries worldwide that recognise Taiwan.
After 2016, Taipei’s Pacific Island allies (Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Marshall 
Islands, Palau and Solomon Islands) found themselves subject to intense 
scrutiny. It is important to review some new factors that have come into 
play since the earlier round of competition. In a speech on 2 January 
2019, President Xi Jinping gave the ‘peaceful reunification’ of Taiwan 
higher priority:
We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the 
option of taking all necessary means [to reclaim the island] … 
‘Taiwan independence’ goes against the trend of history and will 
lead to a dead end (Xinhua 2019). 
The strong tenor of the speech was in part a response to Taiwanese 




I am calling on China that it must face the reality of the existence of 
the Republic of China (Taiwan); it must respect the commitment 
of the 23 million people of Taiwan to freedom and democracy; 
it must handle cross-strait differences peacefully, on a basis of 
equality; and it must be governments or government-authorized 
agencies that engage in negotiations (Focus Taiwan 2019).
In recent years the power differential between China and Taiwan has 
increased dramatically in favour of Beijing. Although there is debate 
about China’s ability to use military means to force a resolution, Beijing 
is in a position to trump Taipei in a bidding war for recognition using aid 
packages and other incentives. The other new variable for Pacific Island 
nations emerged during the Trump administration. The US has long 
supported Taiwan through arms sales, but recently it has adopted a hard 
line towards countries that switch to China. Washington was quick to 
voice its displeasure and even threaten sanctions when Panama and later 
El Salvador, both countries with long histories of relations with the US, 
announced they were cutting ties to Taipei and recognising Beijing. In May 
2019, the US Acting Assistant Secretary for Southeast Asia, W. Patrick 
Murphy, urged Pacific Island countries to maintain their relations with 
Taiwan. He stated that the US was eager to help countries ‘protect their 
sovereignty and their independence, to have viable alternatives … to meet 
their development needs, their infrastructure needs, and their nation 
building needs’ (Pandey  and Packham 2019). The question of Taiwan 
recognition has become a component of wider US–China competition. 
Taiwan’s allies in the Pacific are pressed by China to switch, while Taiwan, 
the US and its Western allies urge them to maintain the status quo.
One front for China’s campaign to bring Taiwan’s Pacific allies into the 
fold operates at the regional level, with Beijing bringing intense pressure 
on the PIF to recognise the One China policy. Although the forum is 
unlikely to bend to this pressure, the initiative puts Beijing’s Pacific allies 
in a difficult position while sending a warning to countries that recognise 
Taiwan (Dziedzic 2019). Perhaps in an attempt to reduce the tension, 
PIF Secretary General Dame Meg Taylor suggests establishing a forum–
China dialogue ‘in a similar manner to the PALM [Pacific Islands Leaders 
Meeting] with Japan or the Africa–China Dialogue’ that would involve all 




The other, more important, dimension of China’s efforts to erode Taiwan’s 
diplomatic space in the Pacific is bilateral, with Beijing deploying a mixture 
of carrots and sticks to influence Pacific Island choices. Sticks were preferred 
in the case of Palau, where restrictions imposed by Beijing on tourists 
heading to this destination resulted in a 45 per cent drop in arrivals from 
China between 2015 and 2018, and a 31 per cent overall drop in tourist 
numbers during the same period (Government of Palau 2019). Yet Palau 
has chosen not to switch, at least for now, perhaps conscious of its many 
entanglements with the US and confident in the eventual renegotiation of 
the compact of free association with Washington on favourable terms. Like 
Palau, and despite a long history of protest regarding the nuclear testing 
legacy there, Marshall Islands relies heavily on the US for support through 
the compact of free association and many Marshallese take advantage of 
free access to the US for education, health care and work. Although there 
is some support for more Chinese investment in the country, particularly 
to create a special economic zone on Rongelap Atoll, it is not clear if that 
might translate into a serious move to recognise Beijing (Tobin 2019b). 
Such a proposal would be strongly opposed by the US, which regards the 
relationship as important, not least because of its missile-testing facility 
on Kwajalein Atoll.
Great power politics were on full display when, in April 2019, a new 
government was formed in Solomon Islands and announced it was 
considering switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China 
(see Aqorau, Chapter 10). Solomon Islands has strong economic ties with 
China, which is its main export destination (nearly all of it raw logs), and 
the incentive to switch was an infrastructure-heavy aid package, estimated 
to be worth US$500 million, pitched directly to the prime minister and 
his close advisers by China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation 
(CCECC), a Chinese state-owned enterprise.2 This was countered by 
the promise of enhanced development assistance from Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan and the US, which Taiwan’s representative in the Solomon 
Islands referred to as the ‘democratic bloc’.3 In a break with protocol, 
US White House officials travelled to Honiara to lobby Prime Minister 
Sogavare to remain with the Republic of China, with Vice President Mike 
Pence adding the weight of his position by correspondence and telephone 
2  Interviews with politicians and officials in Honiara July 2019, with second author. See also 
Everington (2019).




(see Kabutaulaka, Chapter 1). Despite pressure from the US and its 
Western allies, in September 2019 Sogavare announced that Solomon 
Islands would recognise Beijing, citing the findings of the Bipartisan Task 
Force and a report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External 
Trade (Sogavare 2019).
The decision to switch was made despite the reservations of some analysts 
concerned about Honiara’s capacity to manage a relationship with Beijing. 
In Chapter 10, Transform Aqorau concludes that:
China’s funding support may come at the cost of further opening 
up natural resources to Chinese companies. Given the poor quality 
of government … and the poor track record of natural resource 
management, it is argued that a switch will only exacerbate the 
already weak governance setting in the Solomon Islands (see also 
Kabutaulaka 2019).
Similar concerns were expressed by some opposition leaders in Kiribati 
when the government there unexpectedly decided to recognise China less 
than a week after Solomon Islands did so (RNZ 2019). According to 
officials in Taiwan, the switch occurred after Beijing offered to provide 
support for transport systems, including aircraft and ferries (Lee 2019).
There are no indications that Kiribati’s example will be followed in 
neighbouring Tuvalu, which has close ties to Taiwan in part because of 
a long history of illegal Taiwanese fishing in its waters (Marinaccio 2019). 
However, Australia has decided to open a high commission there—to join 
the Embassy of the Republic of China (Taiwan), the only other resident 
diplomatic mission in Funafuti (Pearlman 2018). It is also interesting to 
note that CCECC, the same Chinese company active in promoting the 
switch in Solomon Islands, recently set up shop in Tuvalu to undertake 
a refurbishment of the port. Nor is Nauru likely to contemplate recognising 
Beijing. Its ties to Australia run deep, not least because Canberra’s offshore 
detention centre is located there, and its leaders expressed hostility to 
Beijing after heated interactions with Chinese officials when Nauru 
hosted the 2018 meeting of the PIF.
In his study of Pacific Islands regionalism, Greg Fry uses the idea of 
‘contingent power’ to explain why ‘Pacific island states have sometimes 
prevailed in shaping Pacific regionalism and at other times managed to 
mediate global discourses through regional action’ (Fry 2019:230–322). 
Contingent power refers to:
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Circumstances that, in certain combinations, can influence 
outcomes, and I am thus avoiding the conceptual trap of seeing 
power as a fixed capacity based on material factors and size 
(ibid.:320).
This concept can be applied to the issues discussed above. It might 
explain, for example, how Fiji was able to leverage the China factor 
and exercise autonomy when powerful actors were aligned against it 
and why some Pacific Island states are better positioned than others to 
resist attempts to influence their diplomatic choices. It also suggests that 
contingencies can place limits on a Pacific Island state’s ability to leverage 
any particular situation to its advantage. Those Pacific Islands heavily 
dependent on a Western power—for example, through free association 
relationships—are less able to leverage competition between rival powers 
than those free of such entanglements. Small size or limited capacity can 
also be important contingent factors. For example, in retrospect, it is clear 
that two Chinese loans to Tonga—one to rebuild parts of Nuku‘alofa 
destroyed by riots in 2006, and a second for road redevelopment outside 
the capital city—would prove problematic when it came time to repay the 
money. According to Rohan Fox and Matthew Dornan (2018), this debt 
distress and possible vulnerability to external influence was not a result of 
Beijing setting some kind of trap. Rather, it was a result of ill-informed 
or misinformed decisions by local decision-makers, egged on by Chinese 
companies that stood to gain from the resulting government contracts.
Peace and cooperation?
Great power competition is already impacting developments in the Pacific 
Islands region and the ability of Island states to manage or mediate those 
new forces for their own ends. But US–China competition is dynamic 
and how it develops in the future could alter the nature of power relations 
in the Pacific Islands region in profound ways. We would suggest that, in 
general, the more intense the US–China competition becomes the less 
likely that Island leaders will be able to exercise agency, preserve their 
independence and avoid committing to one side or the other. Here it is 
worth briefly exploring three areas of tension, each of which could escalate 
into armed conflict under certain circumstances, as well as the consequent 
implications for the Pacific Islands region. 
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The US–China stand-off in the South China Sea is likely to escalate 
in the short term and could even precipitate war. In large part this is 
because China regards its claims there to be core to its national defence 
and non-negotiable—and has constructed military facilities on reclaimed 
islands in the area to emphasise its resolve. Although it does not have 
any jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea, Washington sees 
these assertions as a direct challenge to the US-led rules-based order, 
to freedom of navigation principles and a significant impediment to its 
ability to project power in East Asia. The situation is further complicated 
by competing territorial or maritime claims to various parts of the area 
by Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. 
Despite its provocative freedom of navigation naval campaign, it is unclear 
whether the US would intervene in the event that one of the periodic 
altercations between Asian claimants and China turned violent. However, 
in March 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo invoked the mutual 
defence treaty to reassure Philippines leaders that the US would come to 
their aid if Philippine vessels or aircraft were attacked in the South China 
Sea (Fonbuena and Kuo 2019).
The situation regarding Taiwan is equally intractable. China has made it 
abundantly clear that the reintegration of what it regards as a renegade 
province is inevitable and President Xi has upped the ante with his 
nationalist China Dream rhetoric, backed by military instruments 
developed for this purpose. His speech on 2 January 2019 was remarkable 
not just for flagging a possible invasion, with the strange caveat that 
‘Chinese don’t fight Chinese’, but for what it did not say. Rather than 
accommodating Taiwanese aspirations for autonomy, the version of the 
‘one country, two systems’ outlined in Xi’s speech dropped any mention 
of preserving Taiwan’s armed forces or political institutions (Bush 2019). 
Despite ongoing influence attempts (Huang 2019) and a buy-out of 
Taiwan’s traditional media outlets by PRC-friendly businesses (Aspinwall 
2019), anti-China sentiment has increased in Taiwan in recent years, 
influenced in part by ongoing protests in Hong Kong over alleged 
violations of the terms of its ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement with 
China. Any attempts to force the issue by military means, even using 
options that stop short of invasion, such as a blockade, are likely to meet 
with fierce resistance from the Taiwanese public as well as a well-trained 
and equipped military force. Most analysts agree that an all-out invasion 
would be logistically difficult and costly in human and material terms, 
even if the US were not involved (see, for example, Roy 2018). A key 
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question is how the US would respond in the face of Chinese military 
aggression directed across the Taiwan Strait. Support for Taiwan has 
increased significantly since the Trump administration assumed power, 
as well as in the US Congress where, according to Denny Roy, members 
‘realise America’s leadership position in the region would be severely if 
not fatally compromised’ if the US declined to intervene. Yet there are 
few indications that the American public would support such a move. 
Furthermore, unlike some members of his administration, President 
Trump has focused almost entirely on his trade war with China, and at 
times seemed ambivalent about the value of US alliances in Asia (ibid.:6).
A third scenario concerns the possibility that China successfully 
concludes an agreement with a Pacific Island government to establish 
some sort of naval facility in the region. Although statements from 
Western allies, particularly Australia, suggest that such a development 
would be completely unacceptable, and the Step-Up initiative is designed 
to prevent it from happening, it is not clear what these powers would 
be prepared to do if it actually occurred. Perhaps it would depend, at 
least to some extent, on the nature and apparent purpose of the facility. 
Hugh White (2019b) argues that while establishing a Pacific base would 
be ‘a low-cost, low-risk way for China to show off its growing military and 
diplomatic reach and clout’, for Australia the costs of preventing it ‘might 
simply prove impossible to bear’. He goes on to suggest that it might be 
more feasible to focus on building military capabilities ‘that in war could 
neutralise Chinese bases in the South Pacific’. While White’s logic for why 
China might build a Pacific base (because it can) is sound, others point 
out his response assumes China would only use a fraction of its military 
force and opt not to use ballistic missiles against Australia, a nation where 
more than half of its citizenry live in three cities (Shoebridge 2019).
Conflict or the likelihood of conflict over issues relating to the South 
China Sea or Taiwan would impact the Pacific Islands region in significant 
ways. Those Island entities with defence relationships with the US would 
be directly implicated, particularly those with significant military facilities, 
like Guam, Marshall Islands and, to a lesser extent, CNMI and Palau. 
Under the terms of its compact agreement with the US, the Federated 
States of Micronesia might get drawn in too, should Washington decide 
this was necessary. At least in these cases, choice is not an option since 
Island leaders are already committed to the US side of any possible conflict. 
As noted before, Australia has declined to participate in US freedom of 
navigation exercises in the South China Sea. But there would be pressure 
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for Canberra to contribute if US–China competition escalated into armed 
conflict. If that were to happen, and if the redeveloped Manus Naval Base 
was operational, then Papua New Guinea could also be drawn in.
Escalation of US–China tensions, especially if conflict erupts, is likely 
to involve Pacific Island states even if they are not bound by defence 
agreements  with a Western power. At the very least, Australia, New 
Zealand and the US would probably redouble their current efforts to 
persuade Pacific Island countries to support Western security imperatives, 
which, in their current form, means offering economic incentives to 
reduce dependency on Chinese loans and rebuff any attempts by Beijing 
to  establish or expand military ties. It is not clear if the Western allies 
would adopt more drastic methods if current policies prove ineffective. 
After all, during the Cold War the US used some dubious tactics in 
the dispute with Palau over the nuclear-free clause in its constitution, 
delaying the passage of the compact of free association for decades until 
that provision was removed (see, for example, Parmentier 1991; Roff 
1991). And Canberra’s 2003 decision to lead the Regional Assistance 
Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), a massive interventionist 
effort, was made in the context of concerns about the regional security 
implications of the breakdown of law and order in that country, as 
well as in response to humanitarian considerations (see, for example, 
Kabutaulaka 2005). The  establishment of  a Chinese naval base in the 
Pacific would not necessarily lead to Australia and New Zealand reducing 
their involvement in the region. Instead, their outreach efforts might take 
radically different forms. 
Despite China’s impressive trade, aid and investment profile in the region, 
it is not clear how much influence Beijing actually has on decision-making 
in Pacific Island capitals. It is difficult to identify examples where China 
caused Island leaders to take actions they otherwise would not have taken 
or that were contrary to their expressed interests. Perhaps one example 
is Fiji’s decision to close down Taiwan’s trade office in Suva as a result 
of pressure from China (Tarte, Chapter 12). Another would be China’s 
seizure of Chinese nationals from Fiji and Vanuatu, allegedly for internet 
crimes, but with apparent disregard for local legal norms and procedures. 
It is interesting to note that diplomatic efforts to have Pacific Island 
leaders speak out in favour of China’s claims in the South China Sea in 
the aftermath of a negative decision in 2016 at the UNCLOS Permanent 
Court of Arbitration were largely unsuccessful. Only Vanuatu obliged and 
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officials there suggest that it did so in the context of its own disputes with 
neighbouring New Caledonia over rival claims to two uninhabited islands. 
There is little evidence to suggest that regional leaders seek to emulate a 
‘China model’ of political or economic development, supporting the claim 
that China’s soft power influence in the region is limited (Herr  2019; 
Smith 2016). Indeed, some studies suggest that Pacific Island societies 
are more immediately impacted by the actions and interests of Chinese 
corporations than those of China’s government officials (Brant 2013; 
Dornan and Brant 2014; Smith 2013). Nevertheless, there have been 
situations in Australia and New Zealand, as well as in Palau, where Beijing 
has employed economic tools to exert influence. Such efforts could well 
increase as the US–China conflict intensifies and the support of other 
countries becomes more important to both sides. In the event of armed 
conflict, more direct action cannot be ruled out if Beijing regards key 
strategic interests to be at stake. After all, China has pursued key interests 
in the South China Sea with little regard for competing claims and almost 
universal condemnation from the international community.
Organisation of the book
The idea for this book emerged in early 2018 in conversations between 
the editors about the rapidly changing nature of China’s relationship with 
Pacific Island countries. A number of developments in the region suggested 
the beginning of a new, more intense, phase in the relationship and that 
there were numerous indications of growing unease in official circles in 
metropolitan countries, particularly Australia, about the political and 
strategic implications of China’s regional activities. Despite (or perhaps 
because of ) unprecedented media attention to China’s involvement in 
regional affairs, we felt there was a pressing need for a rigorous reevaluation 
of prevailing academic and media narratives as well as policy assumptions.
We invited leading scholars to analyse key dimensions of the changing 
relationship between China and the Pacific Islands region and to explore 
the strategic, political, economic and diplomatic implications for 
regional actors. Draft chapters were submitted in December 2018 and 
authors assembled in Port Vila, Vanuatu, in February 2019 to critique 
each other’s work in a two-day workshop and hear feedback on project 
themes at a one-day public symposium held at the Emalus campus of the 
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University of the South Pacific (USP).4 The China Alternative: Changing 
Regional Order in the Pacific Islands consists of 16 chapters written by 
academics based in Solomon Islands, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Australia, 
New Zealand, the United States and China, as well as an introduction 
by the editors. All contributions have been extensively revised in light 
of reviewers’ comments.
The chapters in this book are framed by two keynote speeches delivered at 
the public symposium in Port Vila on 8 February 2019, one by Vanuatu 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ralph Regenvanu, the other by Secretary 
General of the Pacific Islands Forum Dame Meg Taylor. These speeches 
serve as reminders that our focus should always be on the sovereign 
interests of those most directly impacted by geostrategic competition in 
the region. In the introduction, we attempt to place the interests and 
options of Pacific Island countries within a wider context of the emerging 
rivalry between large powers, paying particular attention to how many 
of the impacts of China’s rise are mediated by the determination of the 
United States to contain that rise, as well as the policy dilemmas of 
Australia and New Zealand caught in between these giant rivals.
In the opening two chapters, Tarcisius Kabutaulaka discusses how 
Pacific  leaders have developed the notion of ‘the Blue Pacific’ or 
‘the Blue Pacific Continent’ as a conceptual vehicle to assert their agency 
in the face of competing narratives, and Terence Wesley-Smith explores 
the proposition that escalating US–China competition represents a new 
Cold War with direct and indirect implications for Pacific Island interests. 
The following four chapters by Merriden Varrall, Iati Iati, Gerard Finin 
and Nic Maclellan examine how Australia, New Zealand, the US and 
France, respectively, have reshaped their policies in response to China’s 
increased profile in the Pacific Islands region. Zhou Fangyin examines 
4  The China Alternative project was co-sponsored by the Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA), 
The Australian National University, and the Center for Pacific Islands Studies (CPIS), University of 
Hawai‘i, at Manoa. We are grateful for support received from our respective institutions, as well as 
additional funding from CPIS National Resource Center (NRC) grant; an ANU College of Asia and 
the Pacific Strategic Partnership Development Grant; and an ANU Asia Pacific Innovation Program 
grant. The public symposium in Port Vila was generously hosted on the USP campus by Dr Joseph 
Foukona, who worked with Dr Tarcisius Kabutaulaka (CPIS) to plan the event. Lea Giacomelli (DPA) 
and James Viernes (CPIS) worked tirelessly to ensure that we all got to Vanuatu in February 2019 and 
that the workshop and symposium went smoothly. Special thanks to all the insightful contributors 
to the volume, to Sarah Jost and Cathy Johnstone who worked long and hard on copyediting all the 
chapters, and to Emily Tinker for shepherding the manuscript through the publication process at 
ANU Press under difficult circumstances. 
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China’s regional engagement and argues against the proposition that 
Beijing has singled out the Pacific Islands for special attention. Denghua 
Zhang looks at some of China’s recent bureaucratic reforms and how these 
might impact the delivery of aid to the region. Henryk Szadziewski rounds 
out this cluster of China-centred chapters by examining the implications 
of the inclusion of Oceania in Beijing’s massive Belt and Road Initiative 
with its emphasis on infrastructure development along the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road.
The next two chapters examine aspects of a key challenge associated with 
China’s regional rise and the increased pressure on Taiwan’s allies in the 
region to switch their recognition to Beijing in the face of countervailing 
pressure from Western countries as well as Taipei. Transform Aqorau 
looks at how these factors played out in Solomon Islands, the largest of 
Taipei’s allies, resulting in a decision to switch recognition to Beijing, and 
suggests that the country’s governance institutions are not yet ready to 
effectively manage relations with the Asian giant, especially since its natural 
resources are already at risk through overexploitation. Jessica Marinaccio, 
on the other hand, examines how Taipei has emphasised an Austronesian 
identity to support its diplomatic relations with Pacific Island countries, 
with particular attention to how well this approach has worked in Tuvalu, 
the smallest of Taiwan’s Pacific partners.
In the two country-level case studies that follow, Sandra Tarte analyses 
the evolving relationship between China and a key regional actor, Fiji, 
while Sarah O’Dowd looks at the pros and cons for Papua New Guinea 
of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The next three chapters focus on the 
Chinese communities that have sprung up in Pacific places in recent years, 
as well as their occasionally uneasy relationships with local populations. 
Fei  Sheng and Graeme Smith report on their research with Chinese 
nationals in Vanuatu, while Patrick Matbob surveys a long history of 
distrust between Chinese traders and local communities in Papua New 
Guinea. In the final chapter, Laurentina Barreto Soares discusses how 
overseas Chinese have engaged with local communities in Timor Leste and 
how this relates to China’s soft power diplomacy there. Although Timor 
Leste is not a member of the PIF, the fact that its leaders increasingly 
identify with the Pacific Islands region, and that its experience with China 
has many parallels in Oceania, justify the inclusion of Barreto Soares’s case 




This is a pivotal moment in global politics as states around the world 
try to understand the nature of the escalating rivalry between the US, 
the dominant global power since World War II, and China, by far its 
most formidable competitor, and identify key implications for their own 
national interests. The small states of the Pacific Islands region are no 
exception, especially given their deep entanglements with Western powers 
since the dawn of the colonial era. Although the region is unlikely to 
become a major focal point of this great power struggle any time soon, 
Island states are already experiencing its by-products as China’s regional 
profile increases and traditional partners manoeuvre to maintain their 
influence. Furthermore, changing Western foreign policies towards the 
Pacific Islands reflect not just developments in the region itself, but 
what is happening on the front lines of the conflict, particularly in the 
South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, where the US and China vie for 
leadership in East Asia. In a type of policy displacement or transference, 
Pacific Island states feel the effects of mounting anxieties in Australia and 
New Zealand about balancing their own relationships with the US, their 
main security partner, and China upon which their economies depend.
Greg Fry suggests that ‘when the West sees a threat to its interests in the 
Pacific at a time of global rivalry, the Pacific Island states have greater 
bargaining power’ (Fry 2019:323). As we can see from recent developments, 
there is much evidence to support this assertion. China’s rise has given 
Island states more options and opportunities for trade, aid and investment, 
and Western powers are adding further resources in an attempt to retain 
their influence. Some Pacific Island states, like Fiji, have leveraged China’s 
presence to further their own agendas, while others are enjoying material 
benefits they might not otherwise have received. Still others, like the freely 
associated states in the north Pacific, can look forward to greater leverage 
as negotiations with the US for compact renewal get under way. Yet the 
successful application of this bargaining power is contingent on a complex 
array of factors. Because of their strategic locations, as well as military and 
other connections to the US, Guam, CNMI, Palau, the Marshall Islands 
and Federated States of Micronesia have less room to manoeuvre when 
it comes to negotiating relations with China than Pacific Island entities 
without such entanglements. Furthermore, some Island governments may 
have greater capacity than others to manage relations with large external 
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powers. This seems to have been the case when Tonga negotiated large 
loans from China and is certainly Transform Aqorau’s major concern 
about Solomon Islands’ switch from Taiwan to China.
A major factor in all of this, however, is the priority that larger powers give 
to their policies in the Pacific Islands region and it is fair to assume that 
strategic and defence concerns receive the most attention. For example, 
Australia was prepared to devote massive resources to its RAMSI initiative 
largely because regional security considerations were involved, and the 
US was determined that Palau’s constitutional provisions were not going 
to be allowed to interfere with its ability to operate nuclear-powered or 
armed vessels in this strategically important part of the ocean. The current 
heightened engagement of the Western powers is driven by concerns 
about regional security and the possible establishment of a Chinese base. 
At the moment, the tools of persuasion are diplomatic and economic in 
nature and it is too early to tell how effective they will be as great power 
competition intensifies.
As presently constituted, Australia’s Step-Up policy faces challenges given 
significant differences with Pacific Island leaders on regional security 
priorities, and divergence on climate change mitigation (Hayward-Jones 
2019). How far would Western powers be prepared to go if current 
policies prove inadequate? What we have seen so far are mainly positive 
inducements to influence decisions in Island countries, but could these be 
turned into threats to withdraw support or even impose sanctions?
The same question might be asked about China’s involvement in the 
region. How far would Beijing be prepared to go if strategic planners 
decided to make acquiring a naval base in the Pacific Islands a priority? 
Or to defend such a facility once it was established? Despite a recent 
history of effective and assertive diplomacy and the powerful symbolism 
of the Blue Pacific narrative, it seems unlikely that Island governments 
could easily resist, manage or leverage competing pressures of that nature. 
In other words, Fry may be correct that the bargaining power of Pacific 
Island states increases when larger powers compete, but there are limits to 




In December 2019, a new coronavirus was detected in the city of Wuhan 
in central China that spread rapidly throughout the world. By early June 
2020, more than 6 million cases of COVID-19 had been reported to the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and 370,000 deaths attributed to 
the virus, with the number of casualties continuing to rise. Government 
containment measures are likely to reduce the global gross domestic 
product (GDP) by a rate ‘approaching the level of economic contraction 
not experienced since the Great Depression of the 1930s’ (CRS 2020:4). 
The pandemic has also altered the dynamics of US–China relations and 
escalated strategic competition to a new and dangerous level. This has 
further implications for Pacific Island countries already dealing with the 
health and economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis. The pandemic 
adds additional layers of uncertainty for the region as external competition 
takes new forms, the possibility of spillover from conflict zones in the 
broader Asia-Pacific region increases and Pacific Island countries seek to 
leverage additional economic support.
The pandemic has significantly impacted the economies of both 
the US and China and amplified the economic dimensions of their 
competition. The  International Monetary Fund projects that the US 
economy will contract by 5.9 per cent in 2020, about twice the rate of 
decline experienced after the financial crisis in 2009, with double-digit 
unemployment projected to persist into 2021 (CRS 2020:6). China’s 
economy shrank by an estimated 6.8 per cent in the first quarter of 2020, 
the first retrenchment since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, 
with a real unemployment rate as high as 20 per cent (SCMP Reporters 
2020a; Huifeng 2020). In his report to the annual Two Sessions high-
level meetings in May 2020, Premier Li Keqiang declined to set a target 
for GDP growth in the coming year (SCMP Reporters 2020b). However, 
the ultimate result may be to further tilt the economic balance in China’s 
favour. With the twin advantages of reopening sooner than other countries 
and centralised control of resources, China may be able to recover 
relatively quickly, though lags in overseas demand will require greater 
emphasis on domestic consumption. Massive government interventions 
5  The manuscript for this collection was awaiting publication at ANU Press when the global 
significance of the coronavirus pandemic became apparent. This short addition to the volume’s 
introduction was written in early June 2020 in order to identify some implications of COVID-19 for 
key themes dealt with in the book. 
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to limit the immediate damage to the US economy have ballooned the 
federal debt and deficit, which may hinder economic growth for years 
to come (Tellis 2020:2–3). If economic capacity is the essence of great-
power rivalry, the real test will be China’s ability to make further gains in 
the race for control of high technology, as Western countries accelerate 
efforts to decouple their economies and exclude key components, such as 
semiconductors, from Chinese supply chains.
COVID-19 challenged the domestic political positions of both President 
Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump and gave them an excuse 
to target each other. Xi was notably absent when the epidemic first 
emerged in Wuhan, only taking charge after public distress and anger 
had escalated significantly. Probably more important for Xi’s hold on 
power were the economic shocks associated with the virus and their 
implications for the standard of living of Chinese citizens. As Minxin 
Pei notes, China’s economy was already slowing down and ‘the CCP has 
relied heavily on economic overperformance to sustain its legitimacy’ 
(Pei 2020:3). Meanwhile, Trump was roundly criticised for his handling 
of the pandemic, which the medical journal The Lancet described as 
‘inconsistent and incoherent’ (The Lancet 2020:1521). By early June, 
the US had recorded 1.9 million cases and 109,000 deaths, making it the 
epicentre of the global pandemic, and Trump’s approval was dropping in 
the polls. Trump’s efforts to hasten the reopening of the economy before 
the virus was contained amounted to a desperate attempt to revive his 
chances in the November 2020 presidential election. Both leaders tried to 
deflect blame, with Xi putting the focus on local party officials and Trump 
attempting to make state governors responsible for managing the crisis. 
They both also ramped up already heated nationalistic rhetoric to redirect 
public anger overseas.
As pro-nationalist forces gain ground within the CCP, China’s military 
has become increasingly active in disputed parts of the South China Sea, 
and the US has responded with more frequent ‘freedom of navigation’ 
sorties through China’s marine periphery (Starr and Browne 2020; 
Wu 2020). Tensions over the future of Taiwan increased in May 2020 as 
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo publicly congratulated Tsai Ing-Wen 
on her landslide reelection as Taiwan’s president, and there were reports of 
increased pressure on President Xi to commence military action against 
Taiwan, assuming that a weakened US would be unwilling to intervene 
(Chan 2020; Chung and Zheng 2020). Though the chances of direct 
US–China military conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Straits 
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remain remote, opportunities for costly miscalculations have increased 
and the long-term impact of the economic downturn on the military 
budgets of both countries is unclear (Tellis 2020:3). Meanwhile, the 
Trump administration has weaponised the pandemic, accusing Beijing 
of failing to contain the Wuhan outbreak and concealing its severity. 
In an extraordinary move, in May 2020 Trump announced that the US 
would withdraw from the WHO, which he claimed had been hijacked by 
Beijing, further reducing the opportunity for a coordinated international 
response to the ongoing global health crisis. Additionally aggravating the 
conflict were US threats to withdraw recognition of Hong Kong’s special 
status as Beijing ‘beat the drums of Chinese nationalism’ in a series of 
moves designed to increase its direct control of the territory in the face 
of the ongoing prodemocracy movement there (Fong 2020).
Rising US–China military tensions have obvious implications for those 
Island places essential to US strategic networks, especially Guam. They 
also provide further impetus for US efforts to renegotiate compacts of 
free association in the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, 
and Palau, and for Australia to hasten the implementation of the 
strategic components of its Pacific Step-Up initiative. In the context of 
COVID-19, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
announced it had ‘paused work on a new development policy’ and was 
placing ‘a clear priority on our near neighbours, particularly the Pacific, 
Timor-Leste and Indonesia’ (DFAT 2020). Those Island countries that 
continue to recognise Taipei remain firmly in the spotlight, as the struggle 
over Taiwan’s political status and access to international organisations, 
such as the WHO, takes centre stage in US–China strategic competition. 
Medical assistance provides a new arena for great power competition. 
President Trump has made no attempt to organise an international response 
to the pandemic, while Beijing has sought to improve its damaged global 
reputation through medical outreach to countries struggling to deal with 
the virus. Since mid-March 2020, China has deployed health workers, 
equipment and medical advice along a ‘Health Silk Road’, so-named to 
enhance President Xi’s assertion of global leadership through his signature 
Belt and Road Initiative (Lancaster et al. 2020). It is unlikely that this 
form of diplomacy will have a lasting impact on China’s image overseas, 
especially in the context of the more aggressive approach recently adopted 
by Chinese diplomats. There is no indication that the leaders accepting 
medical assistance will be any more attracted to a China governance model 
already marred by reports of human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet, 
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as well as the abrupt imposition of a national security law in Hong Kong. 
It is also clear that the reputation of the US has nosedived as a result of 
its incompetent handling of the pandemic. That there are no apparent 
ideological winners in this phase of the new cold war is perhaps not 
surprising, since both leaders are primarily focused on domestic audiences: 
Xi on the CCP elites and Trump on his loyal base in the Republican Party 
(Gill 2020).
Meanwhile, health diplomacy has been on full display in the Pacific 
Islands region. When the virus threat emerged, Pacific Island countries 
moved quickly to close their international borders, and by early June 2020 
only Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Papua New Guinea had 
reported cases of COVID-19 (Buhre 2020; McGarry and Newton Cain 
2020). However, the economic damage to the region is severe, especially 
among states heavily reliant on tourism or remittances. In a somewhat 
belated attempt to respond collectively to the pandemic, Pacific Island 
leaders invoked the Biketawa Declaration on regional security and in 
April 2020 established the Pacific Humanitarian Pathway. The pathway’s 
goal of ‘enabling the provision of medical and humanitarian assistance … 
in a timely, safe, effective and equitable manner’ has faced some challenges 
as development partners, including China, Taiwan, Australia, New 
Zealand and the US, tend to favour bilateral over multilateral approaches 
to compete for influence (Blanchard 2020; Maclellan 2020; PIF 2020).
China was quick to see the opportunity for COVID-19 diplomacy in the 
region, convening a videoconference in early March with leaders from 
the 10 Island countries that recognise Beijing in order to share medical 
advice and offer support. Chinese companies, philanthropic organisations 
and local Chinese communities have complemented government efforts 
with their own donations and shipments of medical supplies (Pryke and 
McGregor 2020; Zhang 2020). These initiatives brought a strange echo 
of the Luganville wharf controversy in Vanuatu, with defence sources 
claiming that a plane chartered by CCECC to deliver aid prevented an 
Australian air force plane from delivering humanitarian relief (Galloway 
2020). Despite these aid efforts, travel restrictions may hurt some of 
China’s leading contractors in the region, particularly those that have failed 
to localise their workforces. Many workers travelled home for Chinese 
New Year and have been unable to return to their project sites, putting 
numerous construction projects in jeopardy. The China Council for the 
THE CHINA ALTERNATIVE
30
Promotion of International Trade has issued force majeure certificates to 
affected Chinese enterprises to assist them in avoiding liability for stalled 
projects, but it is doubtful these will hold up in local courts (Erie 2020).
Australia remains eager to be seen as the ‘partner of choice’ in the region, 
especially after US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Australian Prime 
Minister Scott Morrison agreed that Australia would focus its COVID-19 
relief efforts on the South Pacific while the US would direct most of its aid 
to the American-affiliated islands in the northern Pacific (Maclellan 2020; 
US Department of State 2020). Australia has leaned further towards US 
policy positions during the pandemic, speaking out about the need for 
an independent inquiry into the Chinese origins of the virus and even 
sending a frigate to participate in a joint exercise in the South China 
Sea (Power 2020; Wong 2020). This has not prevented Australia from 
becoming collateral damage in the US–China trade war, however. In the 
same week Beijing announced it would be importing more beef and 
barley from the US under the Phase 1 trade deal, it slapped restrictions on 
Australia’s beef and barley exports that will cost farmers over AU$2 billion. 
Canberra’s outspokenness provided cover for these actions, helped by 
most Australian media outlets accepting Beijing’s narrative that Australia 
was being punished for its temerity.
COVID-19 has demonstrated the susceptibility of Pacific Islands to 
global health crises and their relatively vulnerable positions in the global 
economy. As Island leaders contemplate the post-pandemic future, they 
will be looking for financial assistance to hasten the economic recovery of 
their countries. Their ability to win concessions by leveraging increased 
competition between external powers remains to be seen. Western 
countries are still eager to head off China’s attempts to increase its regional 
influence, but will have to balance enhancements of their Pacific aid 
budgets against pressures to attend to urgent domestic needs. China faces 
similar tensions, and it is unclear whether it will be able to pursue its Belt 
and Road Initiative with the same vigor as before. Indeed, some Pacific 
Island countries that have borrowed heavily from China, including Tonga 
and Vanuatu, will probably join other countries in the Global South in 
requesting that existing loans be forgiven or renegotiated (Abi-Habib and 
Bradsher 2020). If military tensions in the South China Sea or Taiwan 
Strait cause protagonists to harden their positions in Pacific locations 
where key interests are judged to be at stake, then the strings attached to 
offers of support may become more explicit. 
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INTRODuCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has heightened existing tensions between the 
US and China, and, as Ashley Tellis (2020) put it, ‘COVID-19 knocks 
on American hegemony’ in the international system. While the ultimate 
outcome of this grand geopolitical rivalry remains unclear, states around 
the world, including those in the Pacific, are obliged to deal with new 
levels of strategic uncertainty and economic insecurity, and navigate 
between fiercely competing external powers as best they can. In early 
2019, Dame Meg Taylor (in this volume) outlined the challenge for the 
region in explicit terms: ‘Our political conversations and settlements 
must be driven by the wellbeing of our Blue Pacific continent and its 
people, not by the goals and ambitions of others’. COVID-19 has made 
that challenge more pertinent, as well as more difficult to achieve.
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In the midst of increasing geopolitical competition in Oceania, Pacific 
Island countries are pushing back on the dominant narratives and 
cartographies that powerful countries use to frame how the region fits into 
their global agendas. Central to this resistance is the Blue Pacific narrative, 
which the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) endorsed in 2017. It provides 
a counternarrative for Pacific regionalism and a strategy to counter the 
dominance of global powers. This is pertinent in a rapidly changing 
regional order where powerful countries compete to map Oceania into 
their boundaries of influence.
This chapter uses mapping as a framework to examine how the Blue 
Pacific narrative pushes back on the dominant cartographies by 
Washington DC, Beijing, Canberra, Wellington, Paris and other hubs 
of global power. Central to these dominant cartographies is the US-led 
Indo-Pacific strategy and China’s Maritime Silk Road, an extension of its 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). I argue that the Blue Pacific empowers 
Pacific Island countries by giving them agency to frame and tell their 
1  I am thankful to Greg Fry and Stewart Firth who read and provided valuable comments on an 




own narratives and map their own spaces and places—their region—in 
the face of overwhelming global interest by powers who want to draw 
Oceania into their maps and agendas. Here, I contend that since its 
endorsement, the Blue Pacific narrative has been successful in asserting 
the sovereignty of Pacific Island countries, highlighting issues that are 
important to them and making metropolitan powers conscious of their 
interests and priorities. It gives Pacific Islanders the conceptual tools to 
assert themselves in regional and global discussions. The Blue Pacific is 
therefore both a narrative and a strategy for assertive diplomacy. 
Two questions underlie this chapter’s discussions and are fundamental to 
understanding the role of the Blue Pacific in the region’s contemporary 
geopolitics: (i) What are the tension points between the Blue Pacific as 
a countermap and counternarrative and the Indo-Pacific and Maritime 
Silk Road as the new geopolitical maps drawn by the US and China? 
(ii) Can the Blue Pacific, as a framework for assertive Pacific diplomacy, 
successfully counter the new dominant narratives and cartographies? 
Geopolitical mapping in Oceania
Cartographers have long used maps to identify and claim control over 
geographical, economic, political and social spaces. Consequently, maps 
are effective tools for projecting power.
They have been deployed to claim territories for colonial control, exert 
geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic interests, and create and 
maintain global order and worldviews. In mapping, the power is in the 
hands of the cartographers—they ‘draw’ the boundaries and exercise 
power over what is bounded, underlining the fact that maps are powerful 
political tools (Harley 2009; Klinghoffer 2006).
Modern states, corporations and other institutions of power deploy maps 
to make spaces ‘legible’ (Scott 1998), so that they can be appropriated 
and controlled. This is done through the mapping of entire regions 
for geopolitical control as well as locally, such as with the registration 
of land. But maps do not just create legibility. They also make spaces 
become invisible by omitting or marginalising them. As Harley points 
out, ‘maps … exert social influence through their omissions as much as 
much as the features they depict and emphasise’ (1992:290). For example, 
geoeconomic maps may emphasise resources and their economic values 
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and omit villages, people and the cultural values of these resources (Peluso 
1995). Geopolitical maps typically highlight the interests of powerful 
countries and marginalise or omit the interests and priorities of less 
powerful ones.
Oceania is not new to cartographies. Long before European contact, 
Pacific Islanders mapped and remapped their landscapes, seascapes and 
socialscapes. But since the arrival of Europeans, the region’s landscapes 
and seascapes have been mapped and claimed by one colonial power or 
another. By the end of the 19th century, most of the region had been 
colonised as powerful countries competed for control of the Islands 
(Campbell 1989; Douglas 2011; Howe et al. 1994; Matsuda 2012). The 
colonial boundaries created in the 1800s were later adopted by present-day 
Pacific Island nation-states when they gained independence. The Islands 
were also mapped into the subregions of Polynesia, Micronesia and 
Melanesia, which were envisioned not only as geographical spaces, but 
also racialised ones (Douglas 2011; Kabutaulaka 2015a). 
In the post–World War II period, geopolitical competition in the region 
was defined largely by the Cold War, especially the strategic denial policy 
adopted by the US and its allies. This policy denied communist countries, 
particularly the former Soviet Union, access to the region, which became an 
Anglo-Francophone lake (Herr 1986). Consequently, Western countries 
mapped the region into their sphere of influence and gave themselves the 
‘right’ to use the region for their strategic purposes. Great Britain, France 
and the US used the region for nuclear testing, including Kirimati Island 
in Kiribati (1957–58), Moruroa and Fangataufa in French Polynesia 
(1966–96) and Bikini and Enewetak in the Marshall Islands (1946–62) 
(Firth 1986; Macllelan 2005, 2017). Furthermore, the US and France 
built and maintained military bases in Guåhan/Guam, Kwajalein in the 
Marshall Islands, French Polynesia and New Caledonia. At the end of 
the Cold War, Western countries, including Australia and New Zealand, 
continued to have a dominant influence in the region.
In the 1990s, another cartographical layer was drawn onto the region: the 
Asia-Pacific, which mapped the Pacific Islands as part of a broader region 
and with a focus on economic cooperation. Consequently, the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) was established in 1989. However, it 
favoured the Pacific Rim countries with larger economies. Apart from 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), no other Pacific Island country is a member 
of APEC. In this Asia-Pacific map, Oceania was often treated as  an 
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empty space, or, as Hau‘ofa stated, a ‘hole in the Asia-Pacific doughnut’ 
(2008:397). In the mapping of the Asia-Pacific, Oceania was drawn 
into this broad cartography, but at the same time was made invisible or 
omitted, implying that the region and its people were insignificant and 
had no agency, and that their places and resources were subject to the 
control of powerful Pacific Rim countries.
In the late 1990s, another map was drawn, especially for the western 
Pacific. Australian policymakers and their allies in academia described 
the region as part of the ‘arc of instability’ that stretched from Indonesia 
to Fiji following the conflicts in Bougainville, Timor-Leste and Solomon 
Islands and the coups in Fiji (Ayson 2007; Dobell 2007). This was not 
a neutral description of places but a subjective mapping that reflected 
Australia’s geostrategic thinking, which in turn influenced the nature 
of its relationships with its neighbours—places that Canberra considers 
Australia’s backyard, or its patch. Australia had mapped itself as being 
surrounded by troubled places that it had a responsibility for because they 
were within its sphere of influence. In essence, Australia had mapped itself 
as a centre of stability and power surrounded by an arc of instability. 
The aforementioned illustrates how, over the past two centuries, Pacific 
Islands and Islanders have been drawn into numerous maps. They were 
never consulted or included as cartographers in these mapping exercises. 
These maps were not innocuous instruments. Rather, they defined global 
powers’ geopolitical control, divided Pacific Islands and Islanders and 
severed preexisting relationships. The use of cartographies for geopolitical 
purposes continues through the present. 
But Pacific Islanders have also been engaged in counter-mapping; they 
use the processes, instruments and power of maps to draw alternative 
boundaries and give visibility to their priorities. These countermaps 
include not only physical geographical spaces but also conceptual 
boundaries or ideas about relationships to spaces, places and each other. 
Peluso discusses counter-mapping in the forest territories of Kalimantan 
in Indonesia, where local communities ‘appropriate the state’s techniques 
and manner of representation to bolster the legitimacy of “custom” claims 
to resources’ (1995:384). In the following, I discuss how Pacific Island 
countries utilise countermapping as a response to the geopolitical maps 
that have been drawn by globally powerful countries.
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The Indo-Pacific and the Maritime 
Silk Road
In the past decade, we have seen contending cartographies used to frame 
geopolitical competition between global powers, especially the US and 
its allies on one hand and China on the other. At the centre of this are 
the Indo-Pacific and the Maritime Silk Road. These new terms are not 
innocent changes in semantics, or an objective exercise in nomenclature. 
Rather, they are part of a process that invokes a particular way of imagining 
and relating to the world, in this case to the Indian and Pacific Oceans 
and the countries in and around them. For powerful countries, these new 
and contending cartographies embody their global strategies and serve to 
exert their geopolitical control. They include the Pacific Islands without 
consulting them or acknowledging their sovereignty and agency.
The push by the US and its allies to replace the term Asia-Pacific with 
Indo-Pacific attempts to map a large part of the world that includes two 
major oceans and stretches from the west coast of the US to the east 
coast of Africa. This Indo-Pacific strategy is part of an attempt by the US 
and its allies to counter China’s increasing and assertive influence in the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans. It is a geopolitical and geostrategic mapping 
that evokes interests in and control over a large part of the world. 
China’s increasing influence led Washington DC to ‘rebalance’ its foreign 
policy focus from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. 
This was reflected in the Obama administration’s ‘Asia-Pacific pivot’ 
policy. On 17 November 2011, while addressing the Australian federal 
parliament, then president Barack Obama said:
The United States is turning our attention to the vast potential 
of the Asia Pacific region … our new focus on this reflects 
a  fundamental truth—the United States has been, and always 
will be, as Pacific nation. 
Similar sentiments were expressed by then secretary of state Hillary 
Clinton in an 11 October 2011 article titled ‘America’s Pacific Century’. 
In it, Clinton states that ‘we are also expanding our alliance with 
Australia from a Pacific partnership to an Indo-Pacific one, and indeed 
a global partnership’ (2011:4). The term Indo-Pacific is not new. Japan 
had used it for at least a decade prior to 2010 to frame its diplomatic 
and development assistance to the Asia-Pacific region as the Free and 
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Open Indo-Pacific  (FOIP). Brewster (2018) discusses how the concept 
of a FOIP existed alongside Japan’s other programs, such as the Bay of 
Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BBIGB) and the Asia–Africa Growth 
Corridor (AAGC). These were avenues through which Tokyo invested in 
new economic and transportation corridors from the Pacific across the 
Indian Ocean to Africa. 
By the end of the Obama administration, the geopolitical thinking and 
language in Washington DC had shifted from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-
Pacific—a redrawing of the US’s geopolitical map and which countries it 
had decided to draw in or out. By the time President Donald Trump took 
office, the idea of the Indo-Pacific as a loosely defined and panoramic 
perspective of the world covering the Pacific and Indian Oceans had 
been established. The Trump administration fleshed out the details of the 
Indo-Pacific. In his speech to the APEC CEO Summit in Vietnam in 
November 2017, President Trump outlined a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ 
strategy and a ‘rules-based order’ (Brewster 2018)—the rules being those 
established by the cartographers. The US has since rallied support from 
its allies, especially its quadrilateral partners: Australia, Japan and India 
(the quad). Washington DC subsequently forged a trilateral alliance with 
Australia and Japan that focuses on increasing influence in the Pacific 
Islands. Consequently, through the invocation of the term Indo-Pacific, 
a huge part of world was mapped and claimed as a sphere of influence. 
In June 2019, the acting US secretary of defence Patrick Shanahan 
described the Indo-Pacific as the Department of Defense’s ‘priority 
theatre’ (Department of Defense 2019). But others have argued that the 
Indo-Pacific is more than simply a counter to China’s influence, that it is 
not new, nor is it the exclusive preserve of the US foreign policy circle. 
They point to the support from other countries—not only the quad, but 
also Southeast Asia countries such as Indonesia and Singapore (Medcalf 
2014). Pacific Island countries have been more cautious about joining the 
Indo-Pacific. 
In the past two decades, China has established itself as a global power—
at least a global economic power—that challenges the US’s preeminence. 
This is discussed in detail elsewhere (Woodward 2017). China’s increasing 
global influence is partly because of Beijing’s own global mapping 
exercises. Central to this is the BRI—also referred to as the One Belt, 
One Road—that President Xi Jinping launched in 2013. The BRI maps 
China’s grand strategy for geoeconomic and geopolitical expansions and 
influence that serve its domestic priorities. This is in line with the 2006 
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Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party’s announcement 
that its foreign policy ‘must maintain economic construction as its 
centrepiece, be closely integrated into domestic work, and be advanced 
by coordinating domestic and international situations’ (quoted in Wang 
2011:74). The BRI integrates China’s domestic priorities and international 
engagements (Wang 2011).
In the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the BRI is represented by the Maritime 
Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), which resembles the ancient Maritime Silk 
Road that connected China from Fuzhou in Fujian to different parts of 
the world, but with an emphasis on connections to Europe. Blanchard 
and Flint (2017) discuss the origins of the recent reiteration of the MSRI. 
It focuses on connectivity, including the construction of hard infrastructure 
projects such as ports, roads and airports. These projects involve different 
Chinese actors, including the state, state-owned enterprises and private 
companies. The MSRI underlies Beijing’s establishment of itself as 
a  territorial and economic power (ibid.). Examples of such projects in 
the Pacific Islands include the Santo port facility in Vanuatu, the airport 
terminal, sports stadium and other infrastructure projects in Samoa, 
and road projects in Fiji and PNG. There have also been investments in 
natural resource extractions, such as the Ramu Nickel mine in PNG and 
the bauxite mine in Bua, Vanua Levu, Fiji. The BRI and MSRI paved the 
way for the cooperation between China and the Pacific Island countries 
(Xinhua 2018). Henryk Szadziewski’s chapter in this collection examines 
the BRI in the Pacific Islands. Elsewhere, he has discussed the BRI and 
anticipations for economic development in Fiji (Szadziewski 2020).
Oceania has been drawn into the contending cartographies of the US and its 
allies and China. While Asian influences in the Pacific Islands are not new 
and have increased over time (Crocombe 2007), in recent years Beijing’s 
influence has become more prominent. This was particularly evident 
following the first China–Pacific Islands Development Cooperation 
Forum in 2006, at which then Chinese premier Wen Jiabao announced 
Beijing would give US$492 million (RMB3 billion) in concessional loans 
to the region’s eight Pacific Island countries it has diplomatic relations 
with. Beijing has backed its assertive diplomacy with financial muscle; its 
aid to Pacific Island countries has increased in the past decade, making 
it the second largest donor in the region behind Australia (Brant 2015; 




China’s increasing influence has generated discussions about its challenge 
to the dominance of the ‘traditional powers’—the US, Australia, France, 
New Zealand, Great Britain—in the region (see Hanson and Fifita 2011; 
Henderson and Reilly 2003; Windybank 2005; Yang 2011). But others 
have also pointed to the complexity of these relationships, Pacific Island 
countries’ agency and how ‘new powers’ like China provide alternative 
opportunities for Pacific Island countries (see Porter and Wesley-Smith 
2010; Wesley-Smith 2010, 2013). Samoa’s Prime Minister Tuilaepa, in 
commenting on concerns about debts associated with Pacific Islands’ 
relationships with China, said:
Our partners have fallen short of acknowledging the integrity of 
Pacific leadership and the responsibility they carry for every decision 
made in order to garner support for sustainable development in 
their nations … Some might say there is a patronising nuance 
in believing Pacific nations did not know what they were doing 
(Reuters 2018).
Australia and New Zealand have also mapped their interests in the region 
through ‘Pacific Step-Up’ and ‘Pacific Reset’, respectively (Australian 
Government 2017; New Zealand Government 2018; Wallis and Powles 
2018). These initiatives are supported by financial commitments, such 
as the AU$2 billion Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the 
Pacific (AIFFP), which aims to boost infrastructure development in the 
Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste. The AIFFP is administered 
by the new Office of the Pacific in the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (Rajah 2018). Furthermore, Australia offered to pay much 
of the installation cost for the Coral Sea Cable System, a high-speed 
communications cable connecting Australia, PNG and Solomon Islands, 
for the specific purpose of ensuring that the Chinese company Huawei did 
not get the contract (Remeikis 2018). In the lead-up to the August 2019 
PIF meeting in Tuvalu, the Australian Government announced it would 
commit AU$500 million to finance climate change adaptation efforts in 
the Pacific Islands (Lyons 2019a). At the same time, Australia is deepening 
its strategic cooperation with France in the Pacific, and increasingly views 
France as a counterweight to China.
Other US allies have also enhanced their presence in the region. Great 
Britain’s ‘Pacific Uplift’ will see it gain a stronger presence in the Pacific 
by reopening its high commissions in Vanuatu and Tonga, and opening 
a  new one in Samoa. These will add to the current offices in PNG, 
Solomon Islands and Fiji. The British High Commissioner in Canberra, 
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Vicki Treadell, stated, ‘We’re doubling our footprint in the South Pacific 
… Britain wants to be full-square alongside Australia and other partners to 
play our part’ (Crowe 2019). Indonesia, an important US ally in Southeast 
Asia, launched its ‘Pacific Elevation’ in Auckland, New Zealand, in July 
2019 (Radio New Zealand 2019c). In October 2019, Jakarta announced 
it will start a foreign aid program by 2021 with Pacific Island countries 
as potential beneficiaries (Radio New Zealand 2019d). Also in October 
2019, the US announced its ‘Pacific Pledge’, which includes promises of 
millions of dollars in assistance to Pacific Island countries (Ewart 2019).
As has been the case in the past, Pacific Island countries were not 
included in the mapping of the Indo-Pacific and the Maritime Silk Road, 
or Australia’s Pacific Step-Up, New Zealand’s Pacific Reset, the Great 
Britain’s Pacific Uplift, Indonesia’s Pacific Elevation and the US’s Pacific 
Pledge. But Pacific Island countries are uneasy with these geopolitical, 
geostrategic and geoeconomic maps. Consequently, they have drawn their 
own cartography—a countermap called the Blue Pacific.
The Blue Pacific
PIF leaders endorsed the Blue Pacific at their 48th meeting in Apia in 
September 2017. In addressing the meeting, Samoan Prime Minister and 
then chair of the forum Tuilaepa Lupesoliai Sailele Malielegaoi urged 
leaders to ‘capture the essence of our Blue Pacific’. He said:
The Blue Pacific will strengthen the existing policy frameworks 
that harness the ocean as a driver of transformative socio-cultural, 
political and economic development of the Pacific … it gives 
renewed impetus to deepening Pacific regionalism (2017:2). 
The Blue Pacific was endorsed ‘as the core driver of collective action 
for advancing the Leaders vision under the Framework for Pacific 
Regionalism’, which was adopted in 2014 (PIF Secretariat 2017:3). 
PIF leaders also ‘recognised the Blue Pacific as a new narrative that calls for 
inspired leadership and a long-term Forum foreign policy commitment to 
act as one “Blue Continent”’ (ibid.). The communiqué commented on 
regionalism, identity, the centrality of the ocean and the responsibilities 




I propose here that the Blue Pacific has two aspects: a narrative and 
a strategy. Below, I examine these features, drawing from contemporary 
and past conversations. I also note that while the term Blue Pacific is 
relatively new, the ideas underlying it have a longer genealogy. 
The Blue Pacific as a narrative
As a narrative, the Blue Pacific offers alternative perspectives about 
Oceania that are empowering and strengthen regionalism. It also places 
the Pacific Ocean as central to the region’s shared geographies, identities, 
interconnections and responsibilities. It pushes back on the negative and 
disempowering narratives that have dominated others’ representations of 
Oceania (Hau‘ofa 2008).
First, the Blue Pacific frames the narrative for deeper Pacific regionalism, 
which was outlined in the Framework for Pacific Regionalism and 
reiterated in the Blue Pacific. These two documents provide the platform 
for a renewed commitment to Pacific regionalism and are the core drivers 
of collective actions (PIF Secretariat 2017:2–3). At the centre of this 
narrative is the Pacific Ocean, which connects the Pacific Islands and 
peoples, and is therefore the foundation for collective regional identity 
and cooperation. Samoa Prime Minister Tuilaepa captured the significance 
of the ocean:
For the Pacific region and its island countries, the ocean is crucial. 
Exercising a sense of common identity and purpose linked to 
the ocean has been critical for protecting and promoting the 
potential of our shared Pacific Ocean. It is this commonality of 
the fundamental essence of the region which has the potential to 
empower the region through collective and combined agendas 
and actions. The Blue Pacific will strengthen the existing policy 
frameworks that harness the ocean as a driver of a transformative 
sociocultural, political and economic development of the Pacific. 
Furthermore, it gives renewed impetus to deepening Pacific 
regionalism (2017:2). 
The importance of the ocean in defining Pacific identities and framing 
regionalism is not new. It was fundamental in the early days of establishing 
regional organisations such as the PIF (formerly the South Pacific Forum) 
and determining membership (Bryant-Tokalau and Frazer 2006; Fry 
1979, 1997). More recently, Pacific Islander scholars have also pointed to 
the ocean as a source of inspiration, knowledge and identity. For example, 
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Teresia Teaiwa writes that ‘we sweat and cry salt water, so we know that 
the ocean is really in our blood’ (quoted in Hau‘ofa 2008). Epeli Hau‘ofa’s 
seminal paper ‘Our Sea of Islands’ (2008) centres the Pacific Ocean as 
a source of identity and a pathway that connects the Islands and cultures. 
Second, the Blue Pacific narrative presents Oceania as interconnected and 
vast. It pushes back on stories often peddled by metropolitan countries 
and their proxies that describe Pacific Island countries in largely negative 
ways: small, disconnected, isolated, poor and vulnerable. The alternative 
narrative of the Blue Pacific describes the Pacific Islands as large ocean 
states or a Blue Continent, rather than small island states. It highlights 
the fact that Oceania is large, resource rich and interconnected. This is 
not a mere rhetorical statement. The Pacific Ocean covers one-third of 
the earth’s surface area and hosts rich fisheries resources, land and seabed 
minerals, forestry and other natural resources. Furthermore, Pacific 
Islanders have interacted with each other for thousands of years through 
trades, wars, intermarriages, etc.
Others have previously expressed these ideas about the region’s vastness 
and interconnections. Writing in 1949, for example, Albert Norman 
(1949) asserted that the view that the Pacific Islands were separated and 
isolated from each other because of the vastness of the ocean was an 
illusion, created partly because the colonial powers claimed ownership 
of what he referred to as the ‘visible peaks of the land’ (the islands). He 
suggested that the ‘first step in “reclamation” has been to free the land 
of these bonds, to restore the essential regional viewpoint and unity, to 
overlook the dividing waters, to see the land and its people as united’ 
(Norman 1949:1). Hau‘ofa (2008) also argued that the ocean connects, 
rather than disconnects, island countries, and that instead of thinking 
about the Pacific Islands as small and isolated, there is a need to think 
of the region as vast because it includes the entire ocean. Hau‘ofa’s paper 
has had a fundamental impact on academic discussions and has filtered 
into regional policy discussions as well, as exemplified by the theme of the 
2017 PIF leaders meeting: The Blue Pacific—Our Sea of Islands. 
Third, the Blue Pacific outlines an expanded concept of security that 
is inclusive of human security, humanitarian assistance, environmental 
security and regional cooperation in building resilience to disasters and 
climate change. This concept encompasses aspects of security such as 
geopolitics, geostrategy, geoeconomy/spatial and resources. It does not 
focus exclusively on strategic security. 
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This concept of expanded security was elaborated in the Boe Declaration, 
which the PIF adopted in 2018. It commits the PIF countries:
to strengthening the existing regional security architecture inclusive 
of regional law enforcement secretariats and regional organisations 
to: account for the expanded concept of security; identify 
and address emerging security challenges; improve coordination 
among existing security mechanism; facilitate open dialogue and 
strengthened information sharing; further develop early warning 
mechanisms; support implementation; promote regional security 
analysis, assessment and advice; and, engage and cooperate, where 
appropriate, with international organisations, partners and other 
relevant stakeholders (PIF Secretariat 2018:11). 
Within the framework of an expanded security, climate change is an 
issue that Pacific Island countries see as their most important existential 
threat. The Boe Declaration states that ‘climate change remains the single 
greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of 
the Pacific and our commitment to progress the implementation of the 
Paris Agreement’ (PIF Secretariat 2018). 
This is in contrast to Australia, the largest member of the PIF, but a major 
coal exporter that focuses primarily on strategic security, as discussed 
previously. Examples of this focus include the agreements between 
Washington DC and Canberra to a joint program to upgrade the Lombrum 
naval base on Manus in PNG, where it is likely Australian Navy vessels 
will be permanently based (BBC News 2018; Murphy 2018). In Fiji, 
where China had been seeking to redevelop the Republic of Fiji Military 
Force Black Rock facility in Nadi for police and peacekeeping training, 
Australia intervened with a better offer, which was accepted (Radio New 
Zealand 2019a; Riordan 2018). Both China and Australia presented Fiji 
with naval vessels in 2018. The Australians supplied the Republic of Fiji 
Navy Ship (RFNS) Kikau after an extensive refit (Singh 2018), while the 
Chinese gave a new monitoring vessel, RFNS Kacau (Talebua 2018). 
Furthermore, Australia demonstrated its Pacific Step-Up with its 
commitment to pay for much of the installation cost of a high-speed fibre 
optic communications cable connecting Australia, PNG and Solomon 
Islands for the specific purpose of ensuring that the Chinese company 
Huawei did not get the contract (Remeikis 2018). The 4,700-kilometre 
Coral Sea Cable System was completed in September 2019. In a further 
sign of the Australian Government’s new focus on infrastructure, 
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it  established the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the 
Pacific, administered by the Office of the Pacific in the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Rajah 2018). 
Fourth, the Blue Pacific narrative highlights the responsibilities and 
custodianship of PIF members, especially to the health of the ocean. The 
Framework for Pacific Regionalism states that ‘Pacific peoples are the 
custodians of the world’s largest, most peaceful and abundant ocean, its 
many islands and its rich diversity of cultures’ (PIF Secretariat 2014). This 
is reinforced in the Blue Pacific, which seeks to strengthen states with 
‘our shared stewardship of the Pacific Ocean and reaffirm the connections 
of Pacific peoples with their natural resources, environment, culture and 
livelihoods’ (PIF Secretariat 2017:3). Embodied in this is a recognition of 
a shared ‘ocean identity’, ‘ocean geography’ and ‘ocean resources’ (Taylor 
2017). The Boe Declaration also states that PIF countries ‘affirm our 
stewardship of the Blue Pacific and aspire to strengthen and enhance our 
capacity to pursue our collective security interests given our responsibility 
to sustain our Pacific peoples and our resource’ (PIF Secretariat 2018:10).
Central to Pacific Islanders’ responsibility and stewardship is the issue of 
climate change. Pacific Island countries have taken leadership on this issue 
because they are at the forefront of climate change impacts, and because 
many global powers have not prioritised climate change. On this issue, 
Australia emerges as, at best, hypocritical. As a member state of the PIF, 
Australia signed the Boe Declaration, then soon afterwards approved the 
development of giant new coalfields in the Galilee Basin of Queensland, 
and continues as the world’s largest coal exporter. Furthermore, the 
US withdrew from the Paris Agreement, China is the world’s largest 
investor in coal production, Japan promotes coal-fired power and India 
is a  significant emitter of greenhouse gas. Consequently, PIF members 
have a responsibility on this issue. In May 2019, during a meeting with 
PIF leaders in Fiji, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António 
Guterres highlighted the ‘unique moral authority that Pacific Island 
countries have to speak out on climate change issues’ (Guterres 2019). He 
said that ‘the continued leadership of the Pacific region will be critical’. 
The Pacific Island countries and metropolitan powers differ in what 
each regards as its central security issue. For metropolitan countries, 
it is geostrategic concerns, particularly China’s growing influence. 
Pacific  Island countries, on the other hand, emphasise climate change 
as the most important security issue. These differences came to the fore 
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during the PIF leaders meeting in Tuvalu in August 2019. Australia was 
widely criticised for watering down the language in the communiqué, 
with Pacific Islands leaders calling for urgent action on climate change 
(Lyons 2019b).
The Blue Pacific as a strategy
As a strategy, the Blue Pacific does two things. First, it draws an alternative 
cartography by pushing back on the Indo-Pacific and the Maritime Silk 
Road, the dominant geopolitical maps drawn by global powers. It gives 
legibility and prominence to the Pacific Ocean and the Pacific Islands. 
The  primary cartographers are the Pacific Island countries, though 
Australia and New Zealand are included because of their membership in 
the PIF. This is not just a geographical map. As discussed previously, it is 
also a mapping of narratives and issues. 
Second, it facilitates an assertive Pacific diplomacy and empowers 
Pacific Island countries to be more emphatic in pushing for issues that 
are important to them. This is vital given the increased intensity of 
geopolitical competition in the region (Morgan 2018). As Prime Minister 
Tuilaepa states:
The sheer fact of our geography … places the Pacific at the centre 
of contemporary global geopolitics … The Blue Pacific provides 
a new narrative for Pacific regionalism and how the Forum engages 
with the world (2017:4). 
In such an environment, global powers often assume that their values, 
histories, economic and political systems, interests and security agendas 
are paramount and worthy of global application.
For most of the post–World War II period, Western countries dominated 
the region and sought to dictate Island countries’ economic, political and 
strategic agendas. As Taylor states:
We seem to have found ourselves in a position where some of 
the decisions about our region are overtly influenced by others. 
Overdependence on the goodwill of others has left us in 
a  vulnerable state, particularly in relation to the climatic events 
(Taylor 2019).
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Pacific Islanders’ assertion of their collective sovereignty is not new. 
In  1971, the then independent Pacific Island countries established the 
South Pacific Forum (now known as the PIF) because of their desire to 
map themselves into regional and international politics and highlight 
issues they saw as pertinent to the region. This followed Pacific Islanders’ 
dissatisfactions with the colonial powers’ dominance of the South Pacific 
Commission (now the Pacific Community) (Fry 1979, 1993, 2019).
In the subsequent years, the Pacific Island countries have rallied around 
issues such as decolonisation, anti-nuclear weapons testing (Firth 1986; 
Maclellan 2017; Regnault 2005; Walker and Sutherland 1988) and 
resource management, especially tuna fisheries (Hanich et al. 2014). 
This has led to the numerous regional treaties and declarations that form 
the foundation of the region’s security architecture: the South Pacific 
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (also known as the Rarotonga Treaty) (1985); 
the Honiara Declaration (1991); the Waigani Convention (1995); the 
Aitutaki Declaration (1997); the Biketawa Declaration (2000); and the 
Nasonini Declaration (2002). Others such as the Niue Treaty (1992) 
and its Subsidiary Agreement (2012) and the Vavau Declaration (2007) 
focused on tuna management, a shared resource that is economically 
important to Pacific Island states. This illustrates how Pacific Island 
countries have been mapping their concerns and interests onto regional 
and international forums, and on issues that have national, regional and 
global intersections. 
The Pacific Island countries have been relatively successful in their 
collective efforts: most have gained constitutional independence and two 
colonial territories—New Caledonia and French Polynesia—are on the 
UN’s Decolonization Committee list; nuclear powers such as the US, 
France and Great Britain stopped their nuclear weapons testing in the 
region (Maclellan 2005; Regnault 2005); and there are new initiatives in 
tuna fisheries management, such as the Vessel Day Scheme introduced by 
the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (Aqorau 2007). 
Despite this, Western powers and their allies continue to dominate the 
region. Their influence has largely been taken for granted during the 
post–Cold War period. It was assumed that, with the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union and no one to challenge the power of Western 
countries, the Pacific Ocean would become an Anglo-Francophone lake 
shared with Japan. Pacific Island countries were largely marginalised 
in the geopolitical discussions (Fry 1993, 2019). US influence is 
THE CHINA ALTERNATIVE
56
predominantly in the northern Pacific with the former Trust Territories—
Palau, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Marshall Islands—Guåhan/
Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas (CNMI). 
This includes military bases in Guåhan/Guam, CNMI and Kwajalein in 
the Marshall Islands (Scott 2012). In the South Pacific, it is American 
Samoa, an unincorporated territory of the US. The French have influence 
in New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna. Australia and 
New Zealand are members of the PIF and have immense influence in the 
South Pacific, though they have some differences in the ways in which 
they relate to the region in terms of policies and approaches (Wallis and 
Powles 2018). Japan’s influence has largely been through its development 
assistance programs (Tarte 1998). Tokyo also hosts the annual Pacific 
Islands leaders meeting, which gives Japan access to Pacific Island leaders. 
In the past decade, Indonesia has asserted itself as an emerging geopolitical 
and economic power in the region, especially in Melanesia, though this 
has often been met with resistance, primarily due to some Pacific Islands 
countries’ concerns about the Indonesian Government’s violent reprisals 
against pro-independence supporters in West Papua since the 1960s 
(Kabutaulaka 2015b; Lawson 2016). As stated previously, Indonesia has 
followed Australia and New Zealand by announcing its Pacific Elevation 
policy (Radio New Zealand 2019b, 2019c), with a plan to become an aid 
donor by 2021 (Radio New Zealand 2019d).
China’s increasing influence has caused a renewed interest in the region. 
This has given Pacific Island countries the opportunity to forge and 
strengthen alternative relationships, including with China. In choosing 
to do so, Pacific Island states have asserted their sovereignty. For example, 
in September 2019, Solomon Islands and Kiribati severed diplomatic ties 
with Taiwan and established relations with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). This was despite the US and Australia cautioning them not to make 
the switch. This caution was particularly evident in the case of Solomon 
Islands. On 9 September 2019, a joint mission from the US, Australia, 
New Zealand and Japan, headed by US ambassador Catherine Ebert-
Gray, met with officials from the Solomon Islands prime minister’s office. 
Records of the meeting indicate that then US Vice President Mike Pence 
had previously communicated with the Solomon Islands Prime Minister 
Manasseh Sogavare and that there was a mutual agreement that Solomon 
Islands’ decision on whether or not to switch diplomatic relations to the 
PRC would be held off until the two leaders had met at the margins of the 
UN General Assembly meeting later that month. Furthermore, the US:
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signaled their interest in Bina Harbour with the view to broaden 
the concept to a commercial and economic Centre for Malaita 
that goes beyond the current concept of the international wharf 
and fish facility to include establishment of a Centre for maritime 
surveillance and training for maritime security, upgrades of road 
links with Auki and southern part of Malaita, new access road to 
Aluta basing and extending the submarine cable link from Auki 
to Bina via terrestrial cable connection. This would be a mega 
investment and it would be grant funded (Office of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 2019). 
Despite this, in an assertive demonstration of its sovereignty, Solomon 
Islands established diplomatic relations with the PRC on 21 September 
2019 (Al Jazeera 2019). 
Such assertive diplomacy is also being demonstrated at the regional 
level in what Fry and Tarte (2015) have referred to as the ‘new Pacific 
diplomacy’ and what the former Kiribati president Anote Tong calls 
a  ‘paradigm shift’ (2015). It is characterised by ‘a fundamental shift in 
the way that Pacific Island states engage with regional and world politics’ 
(Fry and Tarte 2015:3). This assertive Pacific diplomacy has seen Island 
governments resisting the dominance of Western countries and the 
establishment of new regional organisations such as the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum (PIDF) in 2013. The PIDF excludes Australia and 
New Zealand, promotes inclusiveness of state and non-state entities in 
regional discussions and has taken leadership on issues such as climate 
change that are seen as central to Pacific Islanders’ concerns (Tarte 2015).
As the PIF Secretariat (2018) stated, the Blue Pacific was part of ‘responses 
to specific shifts in the regional or global security landscape’, but also 
an attempt to reiterate Pacific Islands’ agency and the importance of 
the region’s own security architectures in this changing regional order. 
Further, ‘our region has and continues to experience shifts in the security 
environment since the early 2000’s but our regional security architecture 
has remained largely static’ (PIF Secretariat 2018). In its 2017 
communiqué, the PIF stated that the Blue Pacific ‘provides a political 
platform that enables Forum Leaders to assert their collective sovereignty 
over the Pacific Vision into the future’ (PIF Secretariat 2017). 
Central to Pacific Island countries’ diplomatic assertiveness is the issue of 
climate change, on which they have mapped a path that is fundamentally 
different from that of Australia, the US and other metropolitan powers. 
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Pacific Island leadership on climate change is evident not only at the 
regional level, but also at the international level. For example, in 2017, Fiji 
took on the presidency of the UN COP 23—the annual Conference of 
the Parties to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Pacific Island leaders have also been critical of the policies and actions of 
the ‘traditional powers’ in the region. In December 2018, for example, 
Tuvalu Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga called on Australia to include 
climate change action as part of its Pacific Step-Up. He warned that 
Canberra’s inaction could undermine its Pacific pivot, saying:
We cannot be regional partners under this Step-Up initiative—
genuine and durable partners—unless the government of Australia 
takes a more progressive response to climate change … They know 
very well that we will not be happy as a partner, to move forward, 
unless they are serious (Dziedzic 2018). 
Similarly, when Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison visited Fiji 
on 17 January 2019, Fiji Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama told him, 
‘Here in Fiji, climate change is no laughing matter’. This was in reference 
to an incident in 2015 when then Australian immigration minister Peter 
Dutton joked about the fate of Pacific Islanders in the face of climate 
change, prompting laughter from then prime minister Tony Abbott 
(Dziedzic and Handley 2019). Bainimarama (2019) went on to highlight 
the seriousness of the impacts of climate change and was also critical of 
Canberra putting the interests of the coal industry ahead of the welfare 
of Pacific Islanders: 
From where we are sitting, we cannot imagine how the interest of 
any particular industry can be placed above the welfare of Pacific 
peoples—vulnerable people in the world over (Dziedzic and 
Handley 2019).
In the past decade, climate change has become the rallying issue for Pacific 
Island states and non-state entities, triggering the region to be more vocal 
and assertive. It has also influenced the manner in which Pacific Island 
countries organise themselves and participate in regional and international 
forums (Carter 2015; Goulding 2015). Climate change has influenced the 
nature and dynamics of Pacific diplomacy, similar to how, in the 1980s 
and 1990s, tuna fisheries influenced diplomacy between Pacific Island 
countries and distant-water fishing nations (Aqorau 2015). For  both 
climate change and tuna fisheries, much of the diplomacy is about defining 
59
1 . MAPPING THE BLuE PACIFIC IN A CHANGING REGIONAL ORDER
and asserting the interests of the Pacific Island countries and pushing back 
on global powers. This is similar to the assertive diplomacy seen during 
the height of the anti-nuclear testing era (Firth 1986).
Climate change has also influenced institutional changes within Pacific 
regional governance (Tarte 2014). The Pacific Small Islands Developing 
States Group (PSIDS) are more assertive on issues such as climate change. 
Fry and Tarte (2015:7) point out:
PSIDS has taken on a dramatically new diplomatic role for the 
Pacific Island states since 2009, to the point where it has all but 
replaced the PIF as the primary organising forum for Pacific 
representations at the global level.
Manoa (2015) examines and discusses in detail the roles and assertiveness 
of PSIDS at UN forums, especially around climate change issues.
On the issue of China’s increasing influence, some Pacific Island leaders 
view Beijing as another development partner, rather than a threat. 
For example, Vanuatu’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ralph 
Regenvanu welcomed Chinese aid and investments in his country while 
admitting the ‘extra diplomatic pressure’, saying:
It has been good for us. The blow-up has made Australia much 
more interested. They have committed to build the police college 
for us. They have committed to picking up the national security 
standard. They have talked about being much more interested 
in improving work strategies. They have been talking about 
improving infrastructure. So, great (Duffield 2018). 
He went on to describe China as:
a great partner, I think far more respectful of us as government-to-
government diplomatic representatives than Australia. They don’t 
presume like Australia. They can be just as forceful, but Australia 
has got the gold medal for that one (ibid.).
Similarly, in response to criticism by Australia’s then international 
development minister Concetta Fierravanti-Wells that Beijing was 
building ‘roads to nowhere’ and ‘useless buildings’, Samoan Prime Minister 
Tuilaepa called the criticism insulting to Pacific Islands leaders, saying, 
‘The comments seem to question the integrity, wisdom and intelligence 
of the leaders of the Pacific Islands’ (Hill 2018).
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The aforementioned demonstrates how the Blue Pacific has mobilised the 
Pacific Island countries and asserts their views and interests in the face of a 
changing regional order. As Wesley Morgan pointed out, ‘if  traditional 
powers want Pacific Islands to endorse their vision for a free and 
open Indo-Pacific they will need to take the concerns of island states 
seriously’ (2018:4).
The power of the Blue Pacific
This chapter illustrates the power of the Blue Pacific as a framework for 
regionalism and assertive diplomacy in a changing regional order where 
global powers are attempting to map their geopolitical interests onto the 
region. The most dominant maps are the Indo-Pacific and the Maritime 
Silk Road. Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Indonesia and the US 
have also mapped their interests through initiatives such as the Pacific 
Step-Up, Pacific Reset, Pacific Uplift, Pacific Elevation and Pacific Pledge, 
respectively. Pacific Island countries have responded by establishing the 
Blue Pacific narrative, which frames regional cooperation, pushes back 
on the geopolitical maps imposed by the global powers and asserts the 
interests, concerns and priorities of the Pacific Island countries.
The Blue Pacific is both a narrative and a strategy. As a narrative, it 
frames Pacific regionalism by placing the Pacific Ocean at the centre of 
Pacific Island countries’ identities and interconnections. It tells a story 
of empowerment, which describes Pacific Island countries as ‘large 
ocean states’ and a Blue Continent, rather than small island countries. 
It also outlines Pacific Island countries’ responsibilities and stewardship, 
especially to the ocean and taking a leadership role in addressing issues 
such as climate change. This narrative pushes back on global powers’ 
focus on strategic security, which has triggered geopolitical competitions, 
especially between the US and its allies on one hand and China on the 
other. Instead, it highlights climate change as the central security issue, 
not only for Pacific Island countries, but globally. This is articulated in 
the Boe Declaration, which provides for a broad and inclusive definition 
of security.
 As a strategy, the Blue Pacific facilitates Pacific Island countries’ assertion 
of their views at regional and global discussions. It is what I refer to here 
as ‘assertive Pacific diplomacy’—Pacific Island countries’ proactive and 
emphatic assertion of their agendas and priorities. This empowers them 
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to organise as a region and push back on the dominance of metropolitan 
powers. Consequently, Pacific Island countries are working to strengthen 
existing regional organisations and establish new ones, like the PIDF.
In the midst of intense geopolitical competition and the changing regional 
order, Pacific Island countries have asserted their sovereignty by choosing 
and strengthening diplomatic relations with whomever they want. They 
have maintained their rapport with traditional development partners, but 
have also forged and strengthened relationships with new powers in the 
region, including China. Ten Pacific Island countries now have diplomatic 
relationships with China, while four have relationships with Taiwan. 
Beijing’s increasing influence has raised concern amongst the Indo-
Pacific alliance. For Pacific Island countries, the choice to have diplomatic 
relations with anyone is a right, an affirmation of their sovereignty and 
the fact that they are global players in their own rights. The Blue Pacific 
narrative gives Pacific Island countries the confidence and the framework 
to assert that sovereign right.
The Blue Pacific is an example of countermapping by Pacific Island 
countries, drawing their own map in the face of increased geopolitical 
interest. This is difficult in a region where, despite constitutional 
independence, Pacific Island countries are economically dependent on 
metropolitan countries that often use that dependence as leverage to exert 
political influence. It is a situation where former colonial powers still have 
significant influence. In some of these Island places, the colonial powers 
never left. These include the French territories (New Caledonia, Wallis 
and Futuna and French Polynesia), the US’s unincorporated territories 
and commonwealth (Guåhan/Guam, American Samoa and CNMI) and 
Chile in Rapanui/Easter Island. For Palau, the FSM and the Marshall 
Islands, the US still has a lot of influence through the Compact of Free 
Association agreements. The Cook Islands and Niue are self-governing, 
but intricately tied to New Zealand. In this situation, where Pacific 
Island countries’ affairs are deeply intertwined with those of metropolitan 
countries, the entrance of a new power like China could potentially 
destabilise the dominant regional order, therefore giving Pacific Island 
countries the opportunity to draw their own maps. In this case, they have 
drawn the Blue Pacific and used it as a narrative and a strategy to chart 
alternative futures in a changing regional order.
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The power of the Blue Pacific lies in its ability to mobilise Pacific Island 
countries, strengthen regional solidarity and assert their sovereignty in 
the international arena. So far, Pacific Island countries have been able 
to make global powers pay attention to issues that are important to 
them. Consequently, these countries are mapping the Blue Pacific as an 
alternative geopolitical map that defines the new regional order.
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In 2012 former president of Kiribati Anote Tong welcomed increased 
interest in the Pacific Islands by external powers, commenting that it 
is ‘nice to be relevant’ (Tong 2015). He also noted significant changes 
in the way that leaders were dealing with outside forces impacting the 
region, a shift that Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte argued represented a ‘new 
Pacific diplomacy’. Characterised by an emphasis on self-determination 
exercised through new institutions and focused on addressing relevant 
global issues, particularly climate change, Fry and Tarte identified ‘a time 
of transformation of the regional diplomatic culture equivalent to the 
move from the colonial to the postcolonial era, a time that represents a 
transformation of regional order’ (Fry and Tarte 2015:4). Yet just a few 
years later, the region appears to be entering another transition occasioned 
by the very geopolitical changes welcomed by President Tong and 
associated with the expanding influence of China.
Until recently, commentators have been sanguine about the impact of China’s 
growing presence in the region, noting advantages such as new diplomatic, 
trade and investment opportunities for Pacific Island states (see, for example, 
1  Many thanks to Greg Fry and Graeme Smith for their very useful comments and suggestions on 
an earlier version of this chapter.
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D’Arcy 2016; Wesley-Smith 2013, 2016). These sentiments were not 
necessarily shared by representatives of more established external actors 
in the region, particularly Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 
worried about erosion of their longstanding influence in regional affairs. 
Nevertheless, officials adopted a generally pragmatic attitude, perhaps 
swayed by China’s preference for working within established economic and 
political systems rather than attempting to replace them. In 2012, then US 
secretary of state Hillary Clinton told a news conference in Cook Islands 
that the Pacific ‘is big enough for all of us’ and went on to say, ‘We think it 
is important for the Pacific Island nations to have good relationships with 
as many partners as possible, and that includes China as well as the United 
States’ (Dziedzic 2012).
Two main factors have conspired to upset Clinton’s attitude to regional 
developments. First, China has embarked on a more assertive and 
ambitious phase in its rise to global power. In 2017, five years into his 
tenure as Communist Party General Secretary, President Xi Jinping 
announced that China had ‘crossed the threshold into a new era’ 
(McCahill 2017:2). Buoyed by constitutional changes consolidating 
his hold on domestic power, Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’ imagines 
a proud China restored to its former status as a global actor, pursuing its 
interests through expanded networks of trade and diplomacy backed by 
a rapidly modernising military. Xi’s signature diplomatic and economic 
program, now known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is massive 
in scale and aspiration. His attitude to the eventual reintegration of 
Taiwan has hardened considerably and his actions in the South China 
Sea, including building militarised artificial islands, leave no doubt about 
China’s determination to establish ‘a maritime sphere of influence with 
exclusive rights to resources’ in what China terms its ‘near seas’ periphery 
(Roy 2014). There are clear signs in all of these developments that Beijing 
is now prepared to challenge a global order long dominated by the United 
States, at least when it considers it necessary to do so.
Second, and of more immediate importance, existing power holders have 
responded more forcefully to the challenges of China’s rise. US President 
Obama’s administration recognised the significance of developments 
in China for American power and attempted to counter them through 
a strategic ‘pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific region, as well as efforts to consolidate 
US relations with regional countries, particularly through the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership trade agreement. But the Trump administration abandoned 
any pretence at soft balancing and labelled China a strategic rival and 
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evil actor. A report to the US Congress in November 2018 declared that 
‘many aspects of China’s attempts to seize leadership have undoubtedly 
put at risk the national security and economic interests of the United 
States, its allies, and its partners’ (USCC 2018:vii). In  a  speech to the 
Hudson Institute the previous month, Vice President Mike Pence roundly 
condemned Beijing’s authoritarian domestic activities and expansionist 
aspirations and promised ‘strong and swift action’ in response to any 
violations of international norms (Pence 2018). As Zachary Karabell 
points out, Pence’s remarks were reminiscent of Churchill’s 1946 Iron 
Curtain speech signalling the start of the Cold War with the Soviet 
Union (2018:1). Indeed, it has become commonplace for US officials 
and commentators to talk of the escalating US–China contest as ‘nothing 
less than a new cold war’, even if their understanding of what that means 
differ (Kaplan 2019:2; see also Tarabay 2018; White 2019). Whatever 
its characteristics, as Stephen Walt argues, this ‘will be the single most 
important feature of world politics for at least the next decade and 
probably well beyond that’ (2018:3).
This chapter explores some implications of these geopolitical 
developments for the Pacific Islands, and particularly for president Tong’s 
vision of a region striving to ‘chart its own course’ (Tong 2015:24). It is 
worth noting that the impacts on the region of the Cold War with the 
Soviet Union were profound, shaping the process of decolonisation in 
significant ways, and establishing patterns of ‘development assistance’ 
(and aid dependency) that persist to this day. Although Fry argues 
that US, British and French nuclear testing programs in the region 
would have proceeded regardless, Cold War dynamics enhanced their 
importance, with catastrophic consequences for some island populations 
(Fry 1993:227–29). The underlying rationale for Western foreign policy 
initiatives towards the region for most of this period was strategic in 
nature, designed to keep newly independent island states ‘on side’ and 
completely exclude the Soviet Union from regional affairs.2
The impact of US–China rivalry on the Pacific Islands will be different 
because its inherent characteristics are different, because China is already 
deeply involved in the region and because the region is unlikely to be 
a primary site of geopolitical confrontation. Nevertheless, the spillover 
2  Even at the height of the Cold War, Pacific Islander agency helped determine regional outcomes: 
for example, when the Western allies were forced to modify their ideas about strategic denial after 




effects from major zones of friction, such as the jurisdictional disputes in 
the South China Sea, or the struggle for control of Taiwan, are already 
apparent. Meanwhile, the most immediate impacts are economic and 
diplomatic, as the US and allies such as Australia, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, France, the EU and Japan ratchet up their own regional 
activities. Western interest increased dramatically in 2018 when analysts 
worried that China would use debt-derived leverage to establish a military 
presence in the region. The main impetus for Australia’s ‘Step-Up’, New 
Zealand’s ‘Pacific Reset’ and the US’s ‘Pacific Pledge’ initiatives is again 
strategic. These priorities for the Western allies sets them at odds with 
those of their island partners who have determined that climate change, 
not a rising China, is the major threat to regional security. While these 
new levels of interest and sources of economic support are welcomed by 
Island leaders, the challenge will be to use them to achieve the sustainable 
forms of development they have espoused in recent years. Even if these 
domestic efforts are successful, the serious threats posed by climate change 
are likely to intensify, propelled in part by the race for economic growth at 
the heart of the US–China confrontation. If this is a new Cold War, it is 
taking place in and contributing to a warming world.
A new Cold War?
The US-dominated international order faces challenges on two main 
fronts: from Russia and its surrogates in Europe and the Middle East, 
and  from Beijing along China’s maritime peripheries, with China 
regarded as the more formidable opponent by far. As Hugh White notes, 
China ‘is the strongest adversary America has ever faced, and getting 
steadily stronger’ (2019:5). Furthermore, according to Robert Sutter, the 
‘partnership between China and Russia has matured and broadened … 
with serious consequences for US interests’ (2018:3). 
There are significant differences between the emerging US–China stand-
off and the Cold War. Perhaps most notable is the role of ideology, a central 
feature of conflict with the Soviet Union. Clearly there are ideological 
differences between the two sides, with the US espousing liberal democratic 
principles and China remaining committed to Communist Party rule and 
a managed economy.3 The US is the main proselytiser, constantly seeking 
3  It is interesting to note that a group of Trump allies and leaders in conservative thought have 
recently revived the Cold War–era Committee on the Present Danger to counter China’s ‘existential 
and ideological threat to the United States and to the idea of freedom’ (Spinelli 2019).
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to promote its political values overseas aided by a dominant discourse 
that frames liberal ideas, such as the so-called Washington consensus for 
development initiatives, as self-evident. Indeed, one factor fuelling the 
new hostility towards China is that Beijing has not implemented the liberal 
reforms that Western commentators argue should accompany economic 
growth. Instead, the Communist Party ‘has used economic growth … to 
strengthen its own grasp on authority … [and] advance its state-capitalist 
model’ (USCC 2018:vii). Even if some Chinese leaders now refer to ‘the 
China model’ and President Xi routinely cites a ‘community of common 
destiny’ when discussing BRI, to date Beijing has not systematically tried 
to persuade its diplomatic and trade partners to adopt China’s approach 
to governance or economic development (Callahan 2016). China has 
consistently refrained from commenting on the internal affairs of countries 
in the Global South, even if that leaves Beijing open to accusations of 
encouraging authoritarian or rogue regimes overseas.
Also in contradistinction to the Soviet example, China has risen to power 
precisely by working within the US-dominated economic and political 
order. Rather than two largely autonomous systems separated by an 
‘iron curtain’, the economies of the US and China are deeply entangled, 
with extensive corporate and people-to-people exchanges between the 
countries. As Peter Frankopan notes:
Asia and the Silk Roads are rising—and they are rising fast. 
They are not doing so in isolation from the West, nor even in 
competition with it. In fact, quite the opposite: Asia’s rise is closely 
linked with the developed economies of the United States, Europe 
and beyond (2019:24).
Many countries now have significant trade, aid or investment ties to 
China, even those with strained political relationships to Beijing, like 
Japan, Vietnam or Taiwan, or firm strategic allies of the United States 
anxious about China’s increased global influence, such as Australia and 
New Zealand.
Another significant difference between the emerging situation and the 
Cold War lies in its military dimensions. The Cold War involved an 
escalating arms race precipitating the 1962 Cuban missile crisis that 
brought the world to the brink of nuclear war, as well as bloody proxy wars 
in Korea, Indochina and Afghanistan (Lind 2018:2). Although China 
possesses nuclear weapons too, which would hopefully prevent cold war 
conflict becoming hot, the current situation is quite different (but see 
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Talmadge 2018). Beijing has devoted considerable resources to expanding 
and modernising its military apparatus and particularly the blue-water 
capacity of its navy, but it is building from a low base. The  Liaoning, 
its first aircraft carrier, launched in 2012, is an older refurbished vessel 
of Soviet design; a second, domestically produced vessel, the Shandong, 
was commissioned in December 2019. Perhaps China’s most notable 
achievements in military technology are the development of stealth aircraft 
that can reportedly match US models in performance and an increasing 
capacity for cyber warfare. However, it is worth remembering that in 
2018 Washington devoted approximately 2.5 times more in absolute 
terms in support of the military than Beijing (SIPRI 2019). Western 
analysts acknowledge that it will be many years before China can match 
American military might and global reach, although they express concern 
about Beijing’s growing digital and artificial intelligence capabilities 
and asymmetric ability to disrupt US military operations. In any case, 
given the enormous demand for resources at home, Beijing may have no 
immediate ambitions to mount such a global challenge. As Georgetown 
University’s Oriana Mastro argues, ‘China has no interest in establishing 
a web of global alliances, sustaining a far-flung global military presence, 
sending troops thousands of miles from its borders’ (2019:2).
Unlike much of the Cold War struggle, the military dimensions of the 
emerging US–China rivalry are asymmetric and concentrated in key 
geographic areas, most notably the near seas periphery, control of which 
China regards as essential to its national security. Western officials are 
conscious of the fact that China already has the wherewithal to disrupt 
US naval activities and challenge the ‘rules-based order’ in the western 
Pacific; hence a new emphasis on the so-called Indo-Pacific strategy to 
shore up US relations with allied countries in East, Southeast, and South 
Asia, and the revival in 2017 of the informal Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue (‘the Quad’) between the US, Japan, Australia and India, with 
a  shared commitment to ‘defend their vision of regional order against 
what they perceived as accelerating Chinese aggression’ (Tarapore 2018:2; 
US Government 2019). As it attempts to protect itself against what 
Beijing perceives as US attempts to encircle and contain its rise, China 
seeks to displace the US as the dominant power in Asia. As Mastro puts it, 
‘Although China does not want to usurp the United States’ position as the 
leader of a global order … it wants to force the US out [of Asia]’ (2019:2). 
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In essence, then, for the moment at least, ‘this is a contest … between the 
world’s two most powerful states over the leadership of the world’s most 
prosperous and dynamic region’ (White 2019:4).
The fundamental concern among Western analysts is that China’s growing 
economy not only enables its military expansion but also threatens US 
economic superiority and ability to influence global events through 
non-military means. As Jude Woodward argued, ‘The relative decline of 
the US economy meant that it has less capacity to use economic leverage 
alone to bind countries across the developing world to its strategic 
priorities’ (2017:5). These concerns are exacerbated by fears that US 
technological superiority is being eroded. The focus of the Trump regime 
was apparently on curbing aberrant Chinese trade practices through hefty 
sanctions. But the underlying worry was Beijing’s rapid transition from 
an economy built around labour-intensive industries to one driven by 
China-controlled advanced technology, ‘the real existential threat to US 
technological leadership’ (Laskai 2018:2). These trends and perceptions 
increase the likelihood of armed conflict. As Woodward argued, ‘The US’s 
declining economic leverage means it is forced to rely more openly on 
military means to achieve many of its objectives’ (2017:11).
In Beijing, much of this is seen as US attempts to prevent China achieving 
its destiny as a great power. Beijing’s military build-up is understood as 
defensive, largely consisting of targeted efforts to establish control of vital 
trade routes that represent China’s lifelines for continued economic growth, 
thereby reducing dependency on the exceptional global reach of the US 
navy. This need to establish control explains the establishment of Beijing’s 
first overseas military base in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa where busy 
sea lanes converge, as well as the focus on China’s maritime periphery—its 
near seas—where a large proportion of its global trade is concentrated. 
The renewed focus on Taiwan as a renegade province and its eventual 
reintegration into China is emblematic of the heightened nationalism 
encouraged by President Xi, but it also reflects a pragmatic recognition 
of the island’s strategic location just a few miles off China’s coast. Beijing 
regards its diplomatic and economic initiatives in neighbouring Asian 
countries as legitimate attempts to counter threats from an encircling 
network of US military bases in Japan, South Korea, Guam, Singapore 
and Australia, from staging areas in other countries such as the Philippines 
and a US-supported arms build-up in Taiwan.
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None of this is to diminish the importance of the growing rivalry between 
these great powers, or potential spillover effects in the Pacific Islands, 
but rather to note that some of its manifestations are different from the 
conflict with the Soviet Union. In particular, this is not so much a zero-
sum battle for ideological control of the global order as a rivalry where 
Beijing’s challenges to the status quo are selective and where complex 
economic and political dimensions overlap. At least for the moment, 
other countries, including the Pacific Islands, find themselves dealing 
with both parties and attempting as best they can to balance strategic, 
political or commercial imperatives, although choosing one side or the 
other may well become necessary as the conflict intensifies (White 2017; 
see also Wesley-Smith and Smith, Introduction to this volume). The 
initial focus of the competition is on Asia, although other fronts may 
open up in time.4 For most parts of the world, particularly the developing 
countries of the Global South, this will be a struggle for influence fought 
largely with trade deals, defence agreements, infrastructure projects and 
financial incentives. 
As with the Cold War, economic growth is at the centre of US–China 
competition, representing the very essence of China’s rise as well as the 
key to US attempts to retain its global power. In another similarity with 
the Cold War, the main instrument deployed in the competition for 
influence in the developing world, including the Pacific Islands, is the 
promise of economic development. But unlike the earlier period, all of 
this is playing out in the face of a mounting climate change crisis and 
a growing realisation that, despite the breakthrough 2015 Paris Agreement, 
the global community is incapable or unwilling to do enough to curb 
emissions (see, for example, Harvey 2019). George Monbiot argues that 
economic growth is the fundamental and often-ignored factor in the fight 
against climate change: ‘Beyond a certain point, economic growth—the 
force that lifted people out of poverty, and cured deprivation, squalor 
and disease—tips us back into those conditions’ (2018). After reviewing 
the results of recent studies about the growth–emissions relationship, 
economist Peter Christensen concludes that the implication is that:
4  In December 2018, then national security advisor John Bolton announced a new US–Africa 
strategy designed to counter what he described as China’s corrupt and predatory practices on that 
continent (Bolton 2018).
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If we are producing more and consuming more, we must assume 
that emission rates will grow significantly faster than we thought. 
Our current estimates of future damages are highly sensitive 
to growth rates and the primary reason is that is what’s driving 
emissions. In the absence of meaningful climate policy, higher 
baseline growth scenarios likely imply higher emissions growth 
around the world (quoted in Yale News 2018).
As will be discussed further below, in this context the emergence of US–
China competition must be regarded as a particularly ominous turn 
of events. 
Pacific spillover
In May 2014 President Xi Jinping sent a veiled warning to Washington 
when he told a regional security forum in Shanghai that Asia’s security 
problems should be solved by Asians themselves (China Daily 2014). 
The  focus here is on the Asia part of the Asia-Pacific region and, even 
if Beijing regards the Pacific Islands as part of China’s ‘great periphery’ 
or extended neighbourhood, and has included it in the BRI, there is no 
strong evidence that it has been singled out for special attention even in 
President Xi’s ‘new era’ (Zhang 2018:7). China’s trade, aid, investment 
and diplomatic activities in the Pacific Islands region have increased 
significantly in recent years, but no more so than elsewhere in the world. 
Nevertheless, several overlapping sites of escalating US–China tensions in 
Asia have connections with, or implications for, Pacific Island countries. 
These tensions include the increased militarisation of the wider region, 
the disputes in the South China Sea and the struggle over Taiwan’s 
political status.
The military dimensions of the US pivot to Asia include increased air 
and naval capacity in the region, regular naval forays into disputed 
areas along China’s coastline, advanced missile systems in South 
Korea, US troops stationed in Darwin, Australia, and enhanced access 
arrangements in Southeast Asian countries, particularly the Philippines. 
China’s activities,  in turn, represent what US analysts call ‘Area Access/
Area Denial’ (A2/AD), involving ‘shore-based ground-to-air, anti-ship 
and air defense missiles, improved fighter aircraft, radar and tracking’ 




The most immediate impact of these developments in the Pacific 
Islands region is in Guam, a US territory and home to major military 
installations.5 In recent years the militarisation of Guam has intensified 
significantly, with the planned relocation of large number of US 
military personnel from bases in Okinawa, the construction of facilities 
for these additional troops, a new deep-draft wharf to accommodate 
aircraft carriers and a  training facility to improve Guam’s capacity to 
intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (Aguon 2010:65–66). Not 
only does all of this make Guam more vulnerable to missile attack in 
the event of conflict, but also it serves to deepen the social and political 
marginalisation of the island’s indigenous people. Even before the current 
build-up, Chamorro represented less than 40 per cent of the resident 
population, a  demographic disadvantage that will be exacerbated even 
if only a portion of the projected influx eventuates. Guam is one of the 
17 remaining entities on the United Nations’ (UN) list of Non-Self-
Governing Territories and, despite a recent UN resolution condemning 
the use of such territories for military purposes, Guam’s central role in the 
pivot must be seen as a further setback for the longstanding movement for 
self-determination there (Aguon 2010).
The military spillover may also have a potential impact on three US-
affiliated entities, parts of which make up what strategists call the ‘second 
island chain’: the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the Federated 
States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of Palau (ROP). These 
strategically significant islands were taken over by the US after the defeat 
of Japan in World War II and gained qualified forms of independence in 
1986 (RMI and FSM) and 1994 (ROP). Their ongoing relationships with 
the US are defined by compacts of free association (COFA) that allow for 
financial support and access to the US for COFA citizens in return for 
complete strategic control of these entities by Washington. As a US State 
Department official noted in 2003, ‘The most significant US interest at 
the time the Compact was negotiated was the value placed on the right 
to exercise strategic denial over half a million square miles of the Pacific 
between Hawaii and Guam’ (in Underwood 2017:4). Although the 
compacts and subsidiary agreements also allow for military installations, 
if Washington deems them necessary, to date the only permanent military 
facility is the Kwajalein missile-testing facility in the Marshall Islands. 
5  The neighbouring Northern Mariana Islands, a commonwealth in political union with the US, 
is also impacted but to a lesser extent.
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The importance of the test site has increased with the growing emphasis on 
missile defence systems and two new radar systems capable of monitoring 
Chinese air and naval activities (as well as North Korean missiles) are being 
installed in Palau. Former president of Palau Johnson Toribiong recently 
observed that the US presence ‘is more recognizable in Palau now’ and 
describes this trend, as well as the eventual authorisation of long-delayed 
compact funding in the US Congress, as ‘in part a reaction to the presence 
of China in the South China Sea’ (Kerrigan 2018:2).
For RMI and FSM, the first periodic renegotiations occurred in 2003 
and the new agreements, known as Compact II, entered into force in 
2004. These reviews occurred in the period after the end of the Cold War 
and before the China threat had emerged as a major preoccupation in 
Washington, which may account for the relatively harsh terms insisted 
on by US negotiators. At the time, the Government Accounting Office 
concluded that the value of strategic denial was overrated in the post–
Cold War world; Robert Underwood commented that a heavy emphasis 
on US financial oversight made Compact II ‘more compact and less 
free’ (2017:9). The funding for Palau’s latest compact was agreed upon 
in September 2010 but not released by Congress until March 2018, 
also indicating lack of interest in Washington. However, in June 2018, 
the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission reported 
increased ‘concern that the US Compact countries could decide to end 
their agreements with the United States, in part due to China’s increased 
influence’ and indeed such a move has already been proposed in the 
FSM legislature (Meick et al. 2018:19). This suggests that the compact 
states will go into the next set of negotiations, which have to occur before 
2023 (2024 for Palau), with more leverage than before. A notable part of 
Washington’s recent Pacific Pledge initiative is increased interest in the 
freely associated states. In May 2019, President Trump met the leaders of 
these states in the White House and, in another first, Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo followed up with a further high-level meeting in Pohnpei 
in FSM in August.
Although Underwood is confident that the compacts will be renegotiated, 
the China factor has rendered this outcome less certain that it would have 
seemed just a few years ago (Grossman et al. 2019; Underwood 2017:10). 
It will be interesting to see whether exclusion of foreign military from the 
compact states continues to be the operating principle for US planners, or 
if further militarisation of these islands begins to replace strategic denial 
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as US–China competition intensifies. Perhaps as a sign of things to come, 
in April 2019 US soldiers took part in training exercises in Palau, the first 
such deployment in more than 30 years (Olson 2019).
Military dimensions of the emerging conflict are also manifest elsewhere 
in the region. France has used the rise of China to justify maintaining 
a modest military presence in New Caledonia although, as Nic Maclellan 
argues, its possible role in the event of conflict in the distant South China 
Sea remains unclear (see Maclellan, Chapter 6). More significant are 
Australia’s recent actions, triggered by concerns that China is seeking to 
establish a naval presence in the region. Although such speculation is not 
new, the narrative catapulted to prominence with a story in The Sydney 
Morning Herald in April 2018 claiming that a project to upgrade the 
Luganville wharf on the island of Espiritu Santo in Vanuatu, funded 
by Chinese loans, could accommodate Chinese naval vessels. The story 
quoted ‘senior security officials’ to suggest that this initiative might 
‘culminate in a full military base’ (Wroe 2018). Despite emphatic denials 
from officials in Vanuatu and China, and the fact that the story’s claims 
were never publicly substantiated, then prime minister Malcolm Turnbull 
warned that Canberra would view ‘with great concern’ the establishment 
of any military bases in the region (ABC News 2018).
Much of Canberra’s Step-Up effort is economic, ostensibly designed to 
help Pacific Island countries avoid the ‘debt trap diplomacy’ associated 
with Chinese-funded infrastructure projects, but several initiatives are 
strategic in nature. Canberra has substantially increased its funding for the 
Australian Defence Cooperation Program in Papua New Guinea (PNG), 
launched a AU$2 billion Pacific Maritime Security Program, agreed to 
redevelop Fiji’s Black Rock Camp as a regional hub for police training 
and proposed new security cooperation agreements with Vanuatu and 
Solomon Islands (Morgan 2018). Perhaps most significantly, in November 
2018, Australia reached agreement with PNG to build a joint naval base 
on Manus Island, rehabilitating a facility used by the US in World War II. 
This followed reports that Chinese companies had expressed interest in 
helping develop the port 6 and speculation that, like the Luganville wharf, 
it could be used as ‘an ideal logistics node for China’s People’s Liberation 
Army-Navy … as it seeks to sustain more frequent operations in the 
Western Pacific’ (Panda 2018).
6  There was speculation that China Harbour Engineering, which was already developing Manus’s 
Momote Airport, was interested in port construction on Manus (Jaipragas 2018).
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The Lombrum Naval Base initiative, also supported by the US, 
is  significant not only because it provides PNG with an upgraded 
facility for its coastal patrol boats, but also because Australian ships and 
personnel will be stationed there. While the details remain unclear, some 
observers have questioned the value of this investment, noting that even 
with upgrades the port will not be able to accommodate larger vessels 
(Boyd 2018). At the very least, as Mike Scrafton argued, ‘the opportunity 
costs of building a major facility suited to military operations in a conflict 
in the Asia-Pacific seem largely unexamined’ (2018). Apart from 
showing support for US hardline policies, the real objective may be to 
send a muscle-flexing message to Beijing. This move further militarises 
the conflict and complicates PNG’s attempts to balance its relationship 
with its close neighbour and former colonial power against its significant 
economic relationship with China.
The Manus base agreement was concluded in the context of escalating 
tensions in the South China Sea as China makes increasingly clear its 
intentions to assert control of the area and the US responds equally 
forcefully (Burgers and Romaniuk 2017). There were diplomatic attempts 
to draw Pacific Island countries into the dispute in the aftermath of 
a  lawsuit brought by the Philippines against China at the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in The Hague. In July 2016 the court found that 
China’s historic claims to sovereignty over most of the South China Sea 
had no basis in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, a judgment 
that Beijing has adamantly refused to accept (Perlez 2016). China 
reportedly attempted to ‘whip up support’ for its legal claims from its 
Pacific Island allies, although there is no evidence to suggest that anything 
more than diplomatic encouragement was involved and, in the end, only 
one country, Vanuatu, publicly indicated support for China’s position 
(Flitton 2016).7
7  If conditionality were to be involved in future interactions, however, that would signal 
a significant change in the political dimensions of China’s win–win, no-strings-attached approach to 
bilateral relations. Especially given their own vested interest in Law of the Sea questions, escalating 





A major concern with implications for the Pacific Islands region is that the 
complex triangular relationship between China, Taiwan and the US will 
deteriorate further and even lead to overt conflict. The four Pacific Island 
countries that still recognise Taiwan (Palau, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and 
Nauru) are already caught up in this dispute and the pressure to switch 
allegiance to Beijing is mounting. Indeed, two of Taiwan’s former Pacific 
allies, Solomon Islands and Kiribati, decided to switch recognition to 
Beijing in September 2019.
Relations between Taipei and Beijing worsened after President Tsai Ing-
wen and the Democratic Progressive Party came to power in Taiwan in 
January 2016. Although Tsai repeatedly promised not to seek formal 
independence, Beijing insisted that she explicitly endorse the ‘1992 
consensus’, a loose understanding anticipating eventual reunification 
with China, and exerted considerable economic, diplomatic and political 
pressure to that end. In a major speech in January 2019, President Xi 
Jinping claimed that reunification is inevitable, ‘the great trend of history’, 
and in the face of any independence attempts China made ‘no promise 
to abandon the use of force, and retain the option of taking all necessary 
measures’ (Buckley and Horton 2019). US President Donald Trump did 
not help matters when, after his inauguration in early 2017, he accepted 
a congratulatory phone call from President Tsai and indicated that he 
might reconsider the US’s longstanding acceptance of the One China 
policy. In March 2018 he signed legislation that encouraged official 
exchanges with Taiwan and in June opened a new (unofficial) embassy in 
Taipei. US warships periodically sail through the Taiwan Strait, further 
demonstrating US support for Taipei (ibid.). Potentially significant for 
Pacific Island countries is the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, signed into 
law in December 2018, which includes a commitment ‘to counter efforts 
to change the status quo’ regarding Taiwan.
Pacific Island countries are directly involved in the battle for diplomatic 
recognition as Beijing moves aggressively to reduce Taipei’s international 
space by cutting off third-party support. Tsai’s election in 2016 spelled the 
end of the eight-year ‘diplomatic truce’, an informal agreement between 
Beijing and Taipei to suspend competition for recognition. Since then, 
seven countries, including two in the Pacific (Burkina Faso, Dominican 
Republic, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe, El Salvador, Solomon Islands 
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and Kiribati) have switched their recognition from Taiwan to China, 
leaving a total of only 15 countries supporting Taipei. As the balance of 
power between China and Taiwan shifted decisively in favour of Beijing 
in recent years, the struggle for recognition is arguably now more about 
symbolism than substance. Yet it continues to have real consequences, not 
least because of US interest in the matter. El Salvador’s switch in August 
2018 elicited a sharp response from the White House, which issued 
a  statement accusing Beijing of ‘apparent interference in the domestic 
politics of a Western Hemisphere country’ and warned that it would have 
to re-evaluate the US relationship with El Salvador (Sands 2018).
Great power politics were very much in evidence in 2019, after it became 
apparent that leaders in Solomon Islands were considering abandoning their 
longstanding relationship with Taiwan in favour of recognising Beijing. 
In June 2018, a group of leaders, including two cabinet ministers, visited 
Beijing. Although the trip was described as private, officials in Taiwan 
interpreted it as ‘a negative signal’ for Taipei (Strong 2018). In April 2019, 
newly elected Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare confirmed that a switch 
to Beijing was under discussion with his coalition partners (Packham 
2019). The domestic debate about a possible switch revolved around the 
fact that China is the major market for Solomon Islands timber exports 
and that the economic benefits from developing the relationship further 
would likely far exceed those provided by Taiwan. Indeed, Prime Minister 
Sogavare was informed that Beijing would offer a starter aid package worth 
an estimated US$500 million in return for diplomatic recognition. This 
was soon countered by the promise of significantly increased assistance, 
much of it aimed at infrastructure development, from a consortium 
of Western countries including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the 
US, with White House officials travelling to Honiara to lobby Sogavare 
directly. US Vice President Mike Pence was also involved in the negotiation 
(see Kabutaulaka, Chapter 1). Despite this political pressure, however, in 
September 2019 Sogavare announced that Solomon Islands would recognise 
Beijing, citing the findings of the Bipartisan Task Force and a report from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade (Sogavare 2019). When 
Solomon Islands announced in September 2019 that it would recognise 
Beijing, officials in Washington DC, including Pence, were quick to register 
displeasure (Rampton 2019). Western interests received a further setback 
less than a week later when Kiribati unexpectedly decided to recognise 
China, apparently after receiving an offer from Beijing to help upgrade sea 
and air transport systems (Lee 2019). 
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All of this puts an intense spotlight on the Pacific Island countries that 
continue to recognise Taiwan and now represent more than a quarter of all 
Taipei’s remaining diplomatic allies. The situation is further complicated 
by the fact that two of those countries, Palau and Marshall Islands, are 
bound to the US through compacts of free association, suggesting that any 
attempts to switch allegiance to Beijing could provoke a sharp response 
from Washington. The first country to feel significant pressure from China 
has been Palau, which has had a close relationship with Taiwan since Palau 
achieved independence in 1994. Concerned about its ability to cater for 
growing numbers of tourists, Palau’s government began in 2015 to restrict 
the number of flights from China, which by then carried more than 
50 per cent of all visitors. Beijing responded by instructing travel agents 
not to book tours to this destination. By 2018, the number of visitors 
from China had dropped by 45 per cent, with significant consequences 
for Palau’s economy. In August 2017 Palau President Tommy Remengesau 
Jr said that ‘it was not a secret that China would like us … to switch to 
them’ and other officials speculated that Beijing is trying to shore up its 
influence ahead of the expiry of compact funding. Some business interests 
in Palau see the economic advantages of switching recognition to Beijing, 
but US counter moves seem likely given Palau’s strategic location in the 
‘second island chain’ (Lyons 2018; Master 2018).
Similar resistance in Washington might be anticipated if the Marshall 
Islands decides to recognise China, especially given the location of the 
Kwajalein missile facility there. It is interesting to note that the FSM is 
the only one of the compact states to recognise Beijing and has long been 
considered the least strategically significant of the three. Nevertheless, 
in light of the fact that the western extremities of the FSM constitute 
part of  the second island chain and Chinese companies have proposed 
large-scale development projects in Yap, the US will probably expand 
its efforts to offset increasing Chinese economic influence in FSM when 
compact renegotiations get under way. There are few current indications 
that Tuvalu is inclined to move away from its recognition of Taiwan 
and  leaders in Nauru are adamantly opposed to breaking relations 
with Taipei. 
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Economic influence and infrastructure
Existing concerns that China’s growing economic ties to Pacific Island 
countries threaten Western influence in the region have been exacerbated 
by the southern expansion of the BRI. China is now the second largest 
trade partner in the region as a whole and the largest for some Island 
countries. According to the Lowy Institute’s aid mapping project, 
China’s committed aid to the region in 2016 amounted to AU$277.44 
million, making it the second largest regional donor behind Australia 
(AU$1.02 billion) (Lowy Institute 2019). China is now Fiji’s largest aid 
partner and the second largest for PNG, Tonga, Samoa, Cook Islands and 
Vanuatu. Perhaps most impressive (and visible) are Chinese commercial 
ventures in the region, led by Metallurgical Corporation of China’s 
US$1.6 billion Ramu nickel-mining venture in PNG as well as a rapidly 
expanding number of construction contracts held by Chinese companies. 
Many of these contracts, estimated to be worth in excess of US$5 billion, 
are backed by concessional or commercial loans from China’s financial 
institutions, including the China Export-Import Bank and the China 
Development Bank.
The massive economic and diplomatic BRI—first announced in 2013 and 
now involving some 120 countries in Asia, the Middle East and Europe—
is building what Beijing calls a ‘community of common destiny’ based 
on trade and commerce. All the Pacific Island countries that recognise 
Beijing have signed MOUs for BRI cooperation, including Cook Islands 
and Niue, both in free association arrangements with New Zealand 
(Devonshire-Ellis 2019). Although many infrastructure projects in the 
region predate the launch of the Pacific leg of the BRI’s 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road, the significance of the initiative is clear. BRI increases 
incentives for Chinese companies to seek out commercial opportunities 
in Pacific Island countries as well as opening up new sources of funding 
for such projects.
Ambivalence towards the BRI in US official circles has turned to hostility 
in recent years. Critics express concern about development standards 
and practices and contribute to a narrative that highlights examples of 
maladministered infrastructure schemes or projects that could enable 
China’s military expansion (Pantucci 2018). Informing many of these 
concerns, however, are underlying anxieties about the implications of all 
of this for US economic, political and military influence. Viewed through 
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a geopolitical lens, the assumed future success of BRI is seen as a growing 
challenge to the current order. While officials in the Trump administration 
generally advocate opposition to BRI as part of the wider confrontation with 
China, some commentators argue that opposition is counterproductive to 
Western interests since many participating countries welcome this type of 
investment. Instead, they advocate ‘alternative solutions’. Raffaello Pantucci, 
for example, celebrates Washington’s decision to ‘super-charge’ the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation, making more US funds available for 
infrastructure projects overseas (2018:4).
Western countries active in the Pacific, particularly Australia, have 
tended to mimic US attitudes to China’s infrastructure initiatives by 
loudly condemning the construction of what Australia’s then minister 
of international development, Concetta Fierravanti-Wells, called ‘useless 
buildings’ and ‘roads to nowhere’ and raising the possibility that some of 
this activity is a cover for military expansion (Wyeth 2018:1). Narratives 
about China’s ‘debt diplomacy’ or ‘debt-for-equity’ leverage originating 
elsewhere, particularly in debates about the implications of a Chinese 
company’s takeover of port facilities in Sri Lanka, have also found their way 
into regional discourse (Abi-Habib 2018). Such assertions persist despite 
a recent analysis of Chinese-funded projects by the Rhodium Group that 
found that ‘actual asset seizures’ as a result of defaults on Chinese debt ‘are 
a very rare occurrence’ (Kratz et al. 2019:5). Indeed, Barry Sautman and 
Yan Hairong argue that in the Sri Lankan case:
The Hambantota port lease was not a result of any inability to 
service the loans, nor was it a debt-for-equity swap—the Sri 
Lankan government still owns the port. And funds received for 
the lease were not used to repay port-related debt, but to pay off 
more expensive loans, generally to Western entities (2019:4).
Whatever the merits of the Sri Lankan case, arbitrarily projecting 
generalisations about Chinese lending practices onto situations in the 
Pacific Islands is problematic. While China, like Western countries, 
undoubtedly hopes to use economic tools to exert influence, the proposition 
that Beijing is encouraging Pacific countries to take on unsustainable 
levels of debt in order to extract concessions remains unsubstantiated. 
Indeed, such an approach might well be counterproductive in Pacific 
Island countries where Chinese investment is generally welcomed and 
where assets sufficiently important to Beijing, including strategic ones, 
are difficult to identify. As Michael O’Keefe points out, if China really 
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wanted to use economic means to undermine Western influence in the 
region, it has ample instruments at its disposal to do so without resorting 
to a roundabout scheme of debt leverage (2018:3).
Australia has also followed the US lead by attempting to provide 
alternatives to Chinese economic initiatives. As then foreign minister Julie 
Bishop put it, her government would ‘compete with China’s infrastructure 
development spree in Australia’s neighborhood’ ostensibly to help counter 
threats to their sovereignty (Wroe 2018). Among other initiatives, 
Australia has announced plans to establish a AU$2 billion infrastructure 
bank, increase incentives for Australian companies to bid for contracts in 
the region, build undersea fibre optic cables for Solomon Islands, Papua 
New Guinea and Vanuatu, and funding (with New Zealand, Japan and 
the US) a multibillion-dollar rural electrification project in Papua New 
Guinea (Packham 2018).
Implications for Pacific Islands’ aspirations
China’s heightened profile in the Pacific Islands has been accompanied 
by a significant expansion in the volume of trade with the region, as well 
as increased flows of aid and investment to Pacific Island countries that 
recognise Beijing. Heightened tensions between more established actors 
in the region and China promise to further accelerate the inward flow of 
resources. According to a statement by President Xi Jinping before his 
state visit to Papua New Guinea in November 2018, China’s support to 
the region is intended to help Island countries ‘in pursuing development 
paths suited to their national circumstances’ as well as ‘contributing to 
economic growth and people’s welfare in this part of the world’ (Xi 2018). 
Prime Minister Scott Morrison described the Step-Up in Australia’s 
relations with the Pacific as ‘a new chapter in relations with our Pacific 
family … for its own sake, because it’s right. Because it’s who we are’. 
The overall goal of Australia’s policy towards the Pacific, according to 
Morrison, is a region that is ‘secure strategically, stable economically and 
sovereign politically’ (Morrison 2018). Both these statements are laden 
with unexamined assumptions about, for example, Xi’s link between 
economic growth and human welfare or Morrison’s supposition that open 
market economies promote stability—or indeed his claim that Australia 
is an integral part of the Pacific family.
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However, it is more important here to explore what all of this new energy 
might mean for the aspirations expressed by Pacific Islanders themselves. 
Although there is no Pacific-wide development plan, it is possible to 
identify some broad principles and priorities informing recent development 
discourse in the region. These priorities are captured in the Draft Strategic 
Plan 2017–2020, produced by the Pacific Islands Development Forum 
(PIDF), a regional organisation established in 2013 ‘out of a desire to bring 
transformative changes in member countries by focusing on the sustainable 
and inclusive development in the region’ (PIDF 2017:4). Although a full 
analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting that PIDF 
was formed explicitly in opposition to existing regional institutions, 
especially the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and, according to its architects, 
to provide a vision for the region more suited to current circumstances. 
Even if regional support for PIDF has waned recently, the ideas formulated 
there have informed changes in the priorities and practices in other regional 
organisations including the PIF (Fry and Tarte 2015).
Since PIDF was formed largely in opposition to the perceived dominance 
by Australia and New Zealand of PIF and other regional organisations, 
it is hardly surprising that a key principle animating the work of PIDF is 
self-determination. According to the PIDF charter, ‘The Pacific should be 
governed by and for Pacific Islanders’ and external powers can participate 
in PIDF deliberations as observers (PIDF 2015:10, 11). There is also 
a new emphasis on South–South partnerships in international policy 
initiatives. A second key value is ‘a shared and enduring commitment 
to Green-Blue Pacific economies, sustainable development and especially 
poverty eradication’ (PIDF 2017:8). Matthew Dornan and his colleagues 
note that terms like ‘blue-green growth’, the ‘green economy’ and the 
‘blue-green economy’ are not used consistently in the region (Dornan 
et al. 2018). For PIDF, these terms do not suggest a rejection of economic 
growth per se, although there is explicit recognition of ‘the valuation of 
critical ecological, social, spiritual/cultural assets that are not recognised 
by the “brown economy”’ (PIDF 2017:10). Instead, the emphasis is on 
sustainable forms of growth and development informed by ‘green’ and 
‘blue’ principles, including ‘decarbonised’ forms of energy and transport. 
Finally, the major concern that has animated PIDF from the beginning 
is climate change and its regional impacts. The strategic plan lists its first 
objective as ‘advocating the very real and pressing significance of climate 
change for the lives and livelihoods of Pacific Islands and Pacific Islanders’ 
(ibid.:8). This priority was echoed at the PIF meeting in Nauru in 
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September 2018, where the leaders adopted the Boe Declaration, which 
in its opening paragraph reaffirms ‘that climate change remains the single 
greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples 
of the Pacific’ (Doherty 2018).
Escalating competition for influence in the region has mixed implications 
for the self-determination aspirations of Pacific Island leaders. The arrival 
of more development partners has certainly provided leaders with more 
aid, trade and investment options, and transactions with China are not 
subject to liberal reform conditions typical of agreements with Western 
powers. Australia’s newly discovered emphasis on infrastructure funding 
will also be welcomed in the region. On the other hand, and despite 
Morrison’s appeal to Pacific Island family values, the fear is that increased 
Australian resources will be accompanied by an expectation of increased 
influence over how those resources are used. Paradoxically, if projects 
are funded by loans then this can only add to the debt burden routinely 
decried when the funds come from China. Furthermore, framing the 
Step-Up initiative in terms of regional security is unlikely to be seen as 
‘of and for’ Pacific Islanders, who generally do not see the rise of China 
as a threat to their security even though the militarisation associated with 
the competition for influence may well constitute such a threat (O’Keefe 
2019). As discussed above, Western strategic imperatives have already had 
an impact on the self-determination aspirations of colonised Chamorro 
communities in Guam and, under certain circumstances, could further 
restrict sovereign options for citizens of the compact states in Micronesia.
Whether or not the expanding flow of resources into the region associated 
with increasing competition for influence will help or hinder sustainable 
development goals prominent on the regional agenda depends to a large 
extent on how such development is defined and pursued. Much foreign 
investment flows into natural resource exploitation and large-scale 
mining, forestry or fishing industries are hardly known for their ‘green’ 
or ‘blue’ characteristics, although they might be managed to limit the 
resulting environmental damage. The imminent onset of seabed mining 
in the region raises a whole new set of environmental (and other) issues 
(Hunter et al. 2018).8
8  Access to some likely sites for Pacific seabed mining that lie outside the marine jurisdiction of 
Pacific Island states is controlled by the International Seabed Authority (ISA). As John Copley (2014) 
pointed out, the ISA was created ‘to administer seafloor mining in international waters, not to ask the 
question “Is it a good idea?”’.
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Sustainability in other Pacific sectors is often associated with the 
employment of ‘green’ technologies such as solar or wind energy. Given 
the heavy reliance on imported oil for energy generation in many 
Pacific Island places, as well as the large number of rural communities 
without access to electricity, this is clearly a desirable trend. However, 
it does raise questions about increased dependence on the countries 
where most of these technologies originate, as well as the environmental 
costs associated with the manufacture, transport and disposal of such 
equipment (UCS  2013). In a few parts of the region, like Vanuatu, 
there is a genuine emphasis in development planning on protecting or 
strengthening the long-established, sustainable and carbon-free kastom 
(traditional) economy. But  even there the demands for cash incomes 
sometimes override concerns about resource depletion or ecological 
change (Dornan et al. 2018).
Implications for climate change concerns
Pacific Islands’ concerns about climate change are fully justified given 
their relatively fragile ecosystems, as well as their vulnerability to extreme 
weather events and rising sea levels. Especially in the low-lying atoll 
states of Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, salt water intrusion 
already endangers fresh water supplies and staple food crops, while ocean 
acidification damages coral reefs and degrades the marine ecosystems upon 
which local populations depend. Escalating great power competition is 
likely to increase the threat.
Pacific Island governments are actively implementing measures to adapt 
to the new circumstances. They have also made it a priority to lobby 
aggressively at the United Nations for action to mitigate the drivers of 
climate change, especially greenhouse gas emissions. Pacific leaders played 
a key role in crafting the 2015 Paris Agreement on action to counter 
climate change, most notably in working to add to the agreement a limit 
of 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial global temperatures, even if 
this was only included as an aspirational target (Carter 2018). Their 
insistence on this inclusion has proved percipient as an October 2018 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report demonstrates 
that limiting warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius instead of the 2.0 degrees 
actually targeted in the Paris Agreement makes a huge difference to the 
global damage caused by rising sea levels, droughts, floods, extreme 
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weather events, reduction in biodiversity, ocean acidification and loss 
of coral reefs (IPCC 2018). The report also notes that a massive global 
effort is needed to reduce emissions enough to keep below the 1.5 degrees 
Celsius threshold, as well as indicating the limited time left (12 years) to 
do so. As a member of the IPCC working group put it, ‘We have pointed 
out the enormous benefits of keeping to 1.5 degrees Celsius, and also 
the unprecedented shift in energy systems and transport that would be 
needed to achieve that’ (Watts 2018).
The increased attention to the Pacific Islands region associated with the 
rise of China and efforts by other countries to contain that rise has led 
to more resources to support adaptation efforts by Island governments. 
China has supplied solar energy equipment to some Pacific Island 
countries and appears willing to do more, while the new Pacific policy 
positions announced by Australia and New Zealand in 2018 include 
measures to develop resilience in the face of environmental challenges. 
The situation regarding climate change mitigation is much less promising. 
The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and 
its commitment to relaxing environmental regulations are unfortunate 
setbacks for global efforts to limit warming, while Australia’s determination 
to keep exporting coal represents a major political impediment to 
Canberra’s efforts to step up its engagement with the Pacific Islands 
region. And despite its leading role in the development of alternative 
energy technologies, and some impressive decarbonising efforts at 
home, China’s  emissions are not expected to peak until 2030. In the 
meantime, China remains the number one producer of greenhouse gases 
(Geall 2017).9 As long as other priorities continue to supersede efforts to 
deal with the causes of climate change, these ‘development partners’ can 
only offer to help alleviate some of the symptoms of this existential threat 
to Pacific lives and livelihoods. In a report released on the eve of its annual 
Davos conference, the World Economic Forum (WEF) identified climate 
change and other environmental concerns as the top global risk for 2020 
and noted that intensifying geopolitical rivalry was a major impediment 
to urgent multilateral mitigation efforts (WEF 2020).
9  For example, Sam Geall argues that ‘China’s shift away from coal-fired energy has proceeded at 
a rate that was once unimaginable’, but notes that whether Beijing will replicate this success in BRI 
projects overseas remains unclear (2017:3). 
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The global competition discussed in this chapter may well aggravate the 
situation. China’s rise is heavily dependent on capitalist-style growth, 
albeit with ‘Chinese characters’, while the US attempts to stimulate its 
own economic expansion in order to maintain a dominant role in the 
world. Meanwhile both countries seek to enhance their global influence 
by advocating growth-oriented development to those people on the planet 
not yet fully integrated into the global economy, including in Pacific 
Island countries. Studies show that carbon emissions are closely linked 
to consumption and economic growth, what Monbiot (2016:9) calls the 
twin ‘motors of environmental destruction’ (Granados et al. 2012; Rainey 
2019).10 Short of some radical rethinking of development priorities on 
the part of powerful global actors, this appears to be a formula destined 
to frustrate the chances of achieving the enormous roll back of emissions 
called for in the 2018 IPCC report. Veteran commentator Cary Huang 
notes Chinese Premier Li Kegiang’s pessimistic assessment of China’s 
recent economic performance and argues that a renewed focus on 
economic stability will likely overshadow efforts to combat financial risk, 
poverty and pollution: ‘Chasing faster economic growth will inevitably 
come at the expense’ of the three ‘critical battles’ identified by the leaders 
in 2017 (2019:6).
Although contributing relatively little to global emissions, Pacific 
Island countries are not entirely disconnected from the emerging crisis. 
The region’s largest country, Papua New Guinea, is an active participant 
in the global carbon economy, exporting crude oil since the early 1990s 
and large quantities of liquefied natural gas since 2014. Together these 
industries represent some 60 per cent of the value of PNG’s exports and 
contribute significant government revenue. It is also worth noting that 
the IPCC identifies reforestation as an essential component of all of its 
four identified pathways to lower emissions, but ongoing deforestation is 
a feature of many island countries, especially in Melanesia (IPCC 2018). 
In PNG an estimated 4 per cent of the total area of rainforest existing in 
2002 had been cleared (some for oil palm plantations) or logged by 2014, 
with much higher rates in the logged areas (Bryan and Shearman 2015). 
Solomon Islands relies heavily on the export of unprocessed round logs, 
10 The growth–emissions link was demonstrated in 2018 when emissions rose sharply as the 
US economy expanded in response to the Trump administration’s stimulus measures and despite 
increased use of non-carbon alternatives in the energy and transportation sectors (Rhodium Group 
2019). It is also worth noting that increased military spending was a significant factor in the Trump 
stimulus package and that the US military is the single largest institutional user of oil as well as the 
single largest institutional emitter in the world.
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most going to China, and trees are being harvested at rates estimated to 
be as much as 20 times sustainable levels. Indeed, some commentators 
suggest that if such rates continue, rainforests in Solomon Islands will be 
all but gone by 2036 (Global Witness 2018).
Several years after the Paris Agreement was signed, it is hard to be optimistic 
about the chances of its success. The agreement clearly underestimated the 
speed and severity of the impacts of climate change. The 2018 IPCC report 
estimates that carbon pollution would have to be reduced by 45 per cent 
by 2030 in order to keep warming under the 1.5 degree Celsius red line, 
compared to a reduction of 20 per cent to achieve the 2.0 degree standard 
written into the agreement (IPCC 2018). And yet most signatory countries 
are not on track to meet even the more modest goals agreed to in 2015. 
The dominant discourse about the global environmental crisis assumes 
that current patterns of growth and consumption can not only continue 
but expand, as long as they are accompanied by the deployment of low-
carbon energy alternatives, more efficient use of limited resources and/or 
the development of large-scale carbon capture technologies. However, the 
adequacy of any of these proposed solutions has yet to be demonstrated. 
For example, the authors of a recent analysis of possible climate change 
pathways argue that reliance on unproven technologies for large-scale 
carbon removal ‘may well represent an irresponsible and inappropriate 
gamble’ (Lamontagne et al. 2019).
That leaves the main focus on other carbon capture and sequestration 
initiatives and a radical reduction of global emissions. Some analysts 
suggest that a ‘World War II–scale effort’ would be required to implement 
the necessary economic, social and political changes before it is too late 
(Rockoff 2016). The chances of this eventuating seem remote, especially 
as policymakers in Washington and Beijing contemplate the emerging 
imperatives of a different type of war. At the core of the new Cold 
War, it seems, is a carbon emissions race with potentially catastrophic 
global consequences.
Conclusions
Pacific Island countries are facing some direct consequences of the 
escalating competition between a rising China and the US with its 
Western allies. Although most of the sites of intense military competition, 
such as the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, lie outside the region, 
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some US-affiliated Pacific islands such as Guam, Commonwealth of the 
Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, FSM and Palau are directly implicated, 
while others, most notably PNG, are drawn in because of their defence 
links to other Western powers. Meanwhile, those Pacific Island states 
that still recognise Taipei are under political and economic pressure from 
China to recognise Beijing, and from the United States and its allies not 
to contemplate such a shift.
However, the most significant impacts of escalating big-power competition 
for Pacific Island countries are neither military nor political but economic, 
demonstrated through increased flows of trade, aid and investment. These 
new resource flows increase the potential for Island leaders to exercise 
choice and agency, for the region to ‘chart its own course’, not least by 
breaking the monopoly of influence exercised for many years by a small 
number of Western powers. Yet the dominant development discourse in 
the region continues to emphasise economic growth, albeit using ‘green’ 
and ‘blue’ tools to achieve it. Whatever the perceived short-term benefits of 
further integration into the global economy, there are also costs associated 
with this type of development, including the erosion of cultural and social 
institutions and values, often revolving around land ownership, that have 
served these societies well for centuries.
A major cost of the accelerating US–China competition are additional 
pressures to expand a global economy, whose destructive environmental 
characteristics are readily apparent, and a growing political impulse to 
prioritise geopolitical competition over climate change mitigation efforts. 
In other words, the new Cold War has direct implications for what Pacific 
leaders have identified as the ‘single greatest threat to the livelihoods, 
security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific’ (Doherty 2018).
References
ABC News 2018. Chinese Military Base in Pacific Would Be of ‘Great Concern’, 
Turnbull Tells Vanuatu. Pacific Beat program, 10 April. www.abc.net.au/
news/2018-04-10/china-military-base-in-vanuatu-report-of-concern-turnbull-
says/ 9635742
Abi-Habib, M. 2018. How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port. The New 
York Times, 25 June.
97
2 . A NEW COLD WAR?
Aguon, J. 2010. On Loving the Maps Our Hands Cannot Hold: Self-Determination 
of Colonized and Indigenous Peoples in International Law. 16 Asian Pacific 
American Law Journal 47. 
Bolton, J.R. 2018. Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. 
Bolton on The Trump Administration’s New Africa Strategy. Remarks to 
the Heritage Foundation. Washington DC, 13 December. td.usembassy.
gov/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-on-the-
trump-administrations-new-africa-strategy/
Boyd, A. 2018. As Oz Gears Up in Manus, China Says ‘Discard Cold War Thinking’. 
Asia Times, 10 November. asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2018/11/as-oz-
gears-up-in-manUS–China-says-discard-cold-war-thinking.html
Bryan J.E. and P.L. Sherman (eds) 2015. The State of the Forests of Papua New 
Guinea 2014: Measuring Change Over Period 2002–2014. Port Moresby: 
University of Papua New Guinea. png-data.sprep.org/system/files/The%20
State%20of%20Forest%20in%20PNG%202014.pdf
Buckley, C. and C. Horton 2019. Xi Jinping Warns Taiwan That Unification Is the 
Goal and Force Is an Option. The New York Times, 1 January. www.nytimes.
com/2019/01/01/world/asia/xi-jinping-taiwan-china.html
Burgers, T. and S. Romaniuk 2017. Will Hybrid Warfare Protect America’s Interests 
in the South China Sea? The Diplomat, 30 March. thediplomat.com/2017/03/
will-hybrid-warfare-protect-americas-interests-in-the-south-china-sea/
Callahan, W. 2016. China’s ‘Asia Dream’: The Belt and Road Initiative and 
The New Regional Order. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1(3):1–18. 
doi.org/10.1177/2057891116647806
Carter, G. 2018. Multilateral Consensus Decision Making: How Pacific Island 
States Build and Reach Consensus in Climate Change Negotiations. PhD 
thesis, ANU. doi.org/10.25911/5c7f93e2c3c08
China Daily 2014. China’s Xi Proposes Security Concept for Asia. 21 May. 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/21/content_17531900.htm
Copley, J. 2014. Shedding Some Light on the International Seabed Authority. 
University of Southampton blog: Exploring our Oceans, 9 March. moocs.
sout hampton. ac.uk/ oceans/2014/03/09/shedding-some-light-on-the-
international-seabed-authority/
D’Arcy, P. 2016. The Chinese Pacific: An Historical Overview. In M. Powles 




Devonshire-Ellis, C. 2019. China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Pacific Islands. 
Silk Road Briefing. Dezan Shira & Associates, 23 May. www.silkroad briefing.
com/news/2019/05/23/chinas-belt-road-initiative-pacific-islands/
Doherty, B. 2018. Australia Signs Declaration Saying Climate Change ‘Single 
Greatest Threat’ to Pacific. The Guardian, 6 September. www.theguardian.com/ 
environment/2018/sep/06/australia-signs-declaration-climate-change-greatest-
threat-pacific-islands
Dornan, M., W. Morgan, T.N. Cain and S. Tarte 2018. What’s in a Term? ‘Green 
Growth’ and the ‘Blue-Green Economy’ in the Pacific Islands. Asia and the 
Pacific Policy Studies. Special Issue: The Pacific Islands in the 21st Century 
5(3):408–25. doi.org/10.1002/app5.258
Dziedzic, S. 2012. US Pledges More Aid for Strategic South Pacific. ABC News, 
1 September. www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-01/an-us-pledges-aid-to-south-
pacific-copy/4237938
Flitton, D. 2016. South China Sea Dispute: China Is Trading Aid for Support for 
Claims. The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 June. www.smh.com.au/world/south-
china-sea-dispute-china-is-trading-aid-for-support-for-claims-20160606-
gpc7qf.html
Frankopan, P. 2019. The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Fry, G. 1993. At the Margin: The South Pacific and Changing World Order. 
In R. Leaver (ed.), Charting the Post-Cold War Order. Colorado: Westview Press, 
224–42.
Fry, G. and S. Tarte. 2015. The ‘New Pacific Diplomacy’: An Introduction. 
In G. Fry and S. Tarte (eds), The New Pacific Diplomacy. Canberra: ANU Press, 
3–19. doi.org/10.22459/npd.12.2015.01
Geall, S. 2017. Clear Waters and Green Mountains: Will Xi Jinping Take the 
Lead on Climate Change? Analyses, 16 November. Lowy Institute. www.lowy 
institute.org/publications/clear-waters-and-green-mountains-will-xi-jinping-
take-lead-climate-change
Global Witness 2018. Paradise Lost: How China Can Help Solomon Islands Protect 
its Forests. Report, 18 October. www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/forests/
paradise-lost/
Granados, J.A.T., E. L. Ionides and Ó. Carpintero 2012. Climate Change and the 
World Economy: Short-run Determinants of Atmospheric CO2. Environmental 
Science & Policy 21:50–62. doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2012.03.008
99
2 . A NEW COLD WAR?
Grossman, D., M. Chase, G. Finin, W. Gregson, J.W. Hornung, L. Ma, J.R. Reimer 
and A. Shih 2019. America’s Pacific Island Allies: The Freely Associated States and 
Chinese Influence. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. doi.org/10.7249/rr2973
Harvey, F. 2019. Richer Nations Accused of Stalling Progress on Climate Crisis. 
The Guardian, 14 December. www.theguardian.com/science/2019/dec/13/
richer-nations-accused-of-stalling-progress-on-climate-crisis
Huang, C. 2019. As China Chases Economic Growth, Pollution and Poverty Will 
Take a Back Seat. South China Morning Post, 17 March. www.scmp.com/week-
asia/opinion/article/3001867/china-chases-economic-growth-pollution-and-
poverty-will-take-back
Hunter, J., P. Singh, and J. Aguon. 2018. Broadening Common Heritage: Addressing 
Gaps in the Deep Sea Mining Regulatory Regime. Harvard Environmental Law 
Review, 16 April. harvardelr.com/2018/04/16/broadening-common-heritage/
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 2018. Global Warming 
of 1.5°C. Special Report of the IPCC. New York: United Nations. www.ipcc.
ch/sr15/
Jaipragas, B. 2018. The Tiny Island with a Big Role to Play in US Plans for the 
South China Sea. South China Morning Post, 3 December.
Kaplan, R. 2019. A New Cold War Has Begun. Foreign Policy, 7 January. 
foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/a-new-cold-war-has-begun/
Karabell, Z. 2018. A Cold War is Coming, and it Isn’t China’s Fault. Foreign Policy, 
31 October. foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/31/a-cold-war-is-coming-and-it-isnt-
chinas-fault/
Kerrigan, K. 2018. Former Palau President: Compact ‘The Best Deal’. The Guam 
Daily Post, 16 November. www.postguam.com/news/local/former-palau-
president-compact-the-best-deal/article_60c04990-e891-11e8-a897-b3c22 
f850 bc5.html
Kratz, A., A. Feng, and L.Wright 2019. New Data on the ‘Debt Trap’ Question. 
Rhodium Group Note, 29 April. rhg.com/research/new-data-on-the-debt-
trap-question/
Lamontagne, J., P. Reed, G. Marangoni, K. Keller and G. Garner. 2019. Robust 
Abatement Pathways to Tolerable Climate Futures Require Immediate Global 




Laskai, L. 2018. Why Does Everyone Hate Made in China 2025? Council on 
Foreign Relations, Net Politics blog, 28 March. www.cfr.org/blog/why-does-
everyone-hate-made-china-2025
Lee, Y. 2019. Taiwan Says China Lures Kiribati with Airplanes after Losing Another 
Ally. Reuters, 19 September. www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-diplomacy-
kiribati/taiwan-says-china-lures-kiribati-with-airplanes-after-losing-another-
ally-idUSKBN1W50DI
Lind, M. 2018. Cold War II. National Review, 10 May. www.nationalreview.com/ 
magazine/2018/05/28/us-china-relations-cold-war-ii/
Lowy Institute 2019. Pacific Aid Map. pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/
Lyons, K. 2018. ‘Palau against China!’: The Tiny Island Standing Up to a Giant. 
The Guardian, 8 September. 
Master, F. 2018. Empty Hotels, Idle Boats: What Happens When a Pacific Island 
Upsets China. Reuters, 18 August. www.reuters.com/article/us-pacific-china-
palau-insight/empty-hotels-idle-boats-what-happens-when-a-pacific-island-
upsets-china-iduskbn1l4036
Mastro, O.S. 2019. The Stealth Superpower: How China Hid Its Global Ambitions. 
Foreign Affairs, January/February. www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ china/ china-
plan-rule-asia
McCahill, W.C. 2017. China’s ‘New Era’ and ‘Xi Jinping Thought’. The National 
Bureau of Asian Research, 24 October. www.nbr.org/publication/ chinas-new-
era-and-xi-jinping-thought/
Meick, E., M. Ker and H.M. Chan 2018. China’s Engagement in the Pacific 
Islands: Implications for the United States. Staff Research Report, 14 June. 
Washington DC: US–China Economic and Security Review Commission. 
www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China-Pacific%20Islands%20Staff 
%20Report.pdf
Monbiot, G. 2016. The Zombie Doctrine. The Guardian, 16 April. www.mon 
biot. com/2016/04/15/the-zombie-doctrine/
Monbiot, G. 2018. While Economic Growth Continues We’ll Never Kick Our 
Fossil Fuels Habit. The Guardian, 26 September. www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2018/sep/26/economic-growth-fossil-fuels-habit-oil-industry
Morgan, W. 2018. The Indo-Pacific and the Blue Pacific. Devpolicy Blog, 22 August. 
www.devpolicy.org/the-indo-pacific-and-the-blue-pacific- 20180822/
101
2 . A NEW COLD WAR?
Morrison, S. 2018. Australia and the Pacific: A New Chapter. Speech at Lavarack 
Barracks. Townsville, Queensland, 8 November. www.pm.gov.au/media/
address-australia-and-pacific-new-chapter
O’Keefe, M. 2018. Why China’s ‘Debt-Book Diplomacy’ in the Pacific Shouldn’t 
Ring Alarm Bells Just Yet. The Conversation, 17 May. theconversation.com/
why-chinas-debt-book-diplomacy-in-the-pacific-shouldnt-ring-alarm-bells-
just-yet-96709
O’Keefe, M. 2019. Morrison’s Vanuatu Trip Shows the Government’s Continued 
Focus on Militarising the Pacific. The Conversation, 17 January. theconversation.
com/morrisons-vanuatu-trip-shows-the-governments-continued-focus-on-
militarising-the-pacific-109883
Olson, W. 2019. US Soldiers Return to Palau after 37 Year Hiatus. Stars and Stripes. 
Military.com, 8 April. www.military.com/daily-news/2019/04/08/us-soldiers-
return-palau-exercise-after-37-year-hiatus.html
Packham, B. 2018. Canberra to Fund PNG Internet and Electricity Boost. 
The  Australian, 14 November. www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/
foreign-affairs/canberra-to-fund-png-internet-and-electricity-boost/news-sto
ry/652c21a086fc76a21f0c2d73b6edc8dc
Packham, B. 2019. China Eyes Pacific Alliance with the Solomon Islands. 
The Australian, 1 May. www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/china-eyes-
pacific-alliance-with-the-solomon-islands/news-story/7b9f0830b8d 083054 
bb998 ae 22a221ff
Panda, A. 2018. Are Fears of a Chinese Port Facility on Manus Island Justified? 
The Diplomat, 29 August. thediplomat.com/2018/08/are-fears-of-a-chinese-
port-facility-on-manus-island-justified/
Pantucci, R. 2018. China’s Belt and Road Hits Problems but Is Still Popular. 
Financial Times, Beyond BRICS blog, 15 November. Available at raffaello 
pantucci.com/2018/11/28/chinas-belt-and-road-hits-problems-but-is-still-
popular/
Pence, M. 2018. Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s 
Policy Toward China. Washington DC: The Hudson Institute, 4 October. 
china.usembassy-china.org.cn/remarks-by-vice-president-pence-on-the-
administrations-policy-toward-china/
Perlez, J. 2016. Tribunal Rejects Beijing’s Claims in South China Sea. The New 




PIDF (Pacific Islands Development Forum) 2015. Charter of the Pacific Islands 
Development Forum. Suva: PIDF. www.pidf.int/wp-content/uploads/ 2017/ 
07/PIDF-Charter.pdf
PIDF (Pacific Islands Development Forum) 2017. Draft Strategic Plan, 2017–
2020. Suva: PIDF. www.pidf.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/PIDF-Strategic-
Plan.pdf
Rainey, J. 2019. Economic Expansion Boosts Carbon Emissions, Despite Green-
Tech Gains. NBC News, 9 January. www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
economic-boom-spikes-carbon-emissions-despite-green-tech-gains-n956336
Rampton, R. 2019. Pence Rebuffs Solomon Islands PM after Nation Cuts 
Ties with Taiwan. Reuters, 17 September. www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-
diplomacy-pence-exclusive-idUSKBN1W22WK
Rhodium Group 2019. Preliminary US Emissions Estimates for 2018. Rhodium 
Group Note, 8 January. rhg.com/research/preliminary-us-emissions-estimates-
for-2018/
Rockoff, H. 2016. The US Economy in WWII as a Model for Coping with Climate 
Change. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 22590. 
www.nber.org/papers/w22590
Roy, D. 2014. US–China Relations and the Western Pacific. The Diplomat, 
16  January. thediplomat.com/2014/01/US–China-relations-and-the-western-
pacific/
Sands, G. 2018. Even with US Help, Taiwan Is Fighting a Losing Battle 
Against China to Keep its Friends and Influence. South China Morning Post, 
13  September. www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/
article/ 2164009/ even-us-help-taiwan-fighting-losing-battle
Sautman, B. and Y. Hairong 2019. The Truth About Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port, 
Chinese ‘Debt Traps’ and ‘Asset Seizures’. South China Morning Post, 6 May. 
www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/3008799/truth-about-sri-
lankas-hambantota-port-chinese-debt-traps
Scrafton, M. 2018. What War Will We Need Manus For? The Strategist, 
4 December. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. www.aspistrategist.org.au/
what-war-will-we-need-manus-for/
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 2019. World Military 




2 . A NEW COLD WAR?
Sogavare, M. 2019. Statement by the Prime Minister Hon. Manasseh Sogavare 
on Switch to China. Solomon Times, 20 September. www.solomontimes.com/
news/statement-by-the-prime-minister-hon-manasseh-sogavare-on-switch-
to-china/9362
Spinelli, D. 2019. These Trump Allies Are Preparing for a New Cold War with 
China. Mother Jones, 22 April. www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/04/these-
trump-allies-steve-bannon-frank-gaffney-new-china-cold-war/
Strong, M. 2018. Officials from Taiwan Ally Solomon Islands Visit China. 
Taiwan News, 16 June. 
Sutter, R. 2018. China–Russia Relations: Strategic Implications and U.S. Policy 
Options. NBR Special Report no. 73. The National Bureau of Asian Research. 
www.nbr.org/publication/china-russia-relations-strategic-implications-and-
u-s-policy-options/
Talmadge, C. 2018. Beijing’s Nuclear Option; Why a U.S.–Chinese War Could 
Spiral Out of Control. Foreign Affairs, November/December: 44–50.
Tarabay, J. 2018. CIA Official: China Wants to Replace US as World Superpower. 
CNN, 21 July. www.cnn.com/2018/07/20/politics/china-cold-war-us-super 
power-influence/index.html
Tarapore, A. 2018. The Geopolitics of the Quad. The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 16 November. www.nbr.org/publication/the-geopolitics-of-the-
quad/
Tong, A. 2015. ‘Charting its Own Course’: A Paradigm Shift in Pacific Diplomacy. 
In G. Fry and S. Tarte (eds), The New Pacific Diplomacy. Canberra, ANU Press, 
3–19. doi.org/10.22459/npd.12.2015.02
UCS (Union of Concerned Scientists) 2013. Environmental Impacts of Renewable 
Energy Technologies. UCS blog, 5 March. www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/ 
renewable-energy/environmental-impacts
Underwood, R.A. 2017. The Changing American Lake in the Middle of the Pacific. 
Address at Georgetown University, 16 November. www.uog.edu/_resources/
files/news-and-announcements/2017-2018/robert-underwood-the_changing_
american_lake-111617.pdf
USCC (US–China Economic and Security Review Commission) 2018. 2018 
Report to Congress. Washington, DC: US–China Economic and Security 




US Government (Department of Defense) 2019. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: 
Preparedness, Partnership, and Promoting a Networked Region. Washington DC: 
Department of Defense, 1 June. media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-
1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-
REPORT-2019.PDF
Walt, S. 2018. What Sort of World Are We Headed For? Foreign Policy, 2 October. 
foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/02/what-sort-of-world-are-we-headed-for/
Watts, J. 2018. We Have 12 Years to Limit Climate Change Catastrophe, Warns 
UN. The Guardian, 8 October. www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/
oct/08/ global-warming-must-not-exceed-15c-warns-landmark-un-report
WEF (World Economic Forum) 2020. The Global Risks Report 2020. 15th edition. 
Geneva: WEF. www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2020
Wesley-Smith, T. 2013. China’s Rise in Oceania: Issues and Perspectives. 
Pacific Affairs 82(2):351–72. doi.org/10.5509/2013862351
Wesley-Smith, T. 2016. Geopolitics, Self-Determination, and China’s Rise in 
Oceania. In M. Ishihara (ed.), Self-Determinable Development of Small Islands. 
Singapore: Springer, 85–99. doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-0132-1_5
White, H. 2017. Without America: Australia in the New Asia. Quarterly Essay 
68:1–81. www.quarterlyessay.com.au/essay/2017/11/without-america
White, H. 2019. Can the US Win the New Cold War with China? Not without 
Risking a Nuclear War. South China Morning Post, 6 March. www.scmp.com/
comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2188648/can-us-win-new-
cold-war-china-not-without
Woodward, J. 2017. The US vs China: Asia’s New Cold War? Manchester: 
Manchester University Press.
Wroe, D. 2018. Australia Will Compete with China to Save Pacific Sovereignty, 
Says Bishop. The Sydney Morning Herald, 18 June. www.smh.com.au/politics/
federal/australia-will-compete-with-china-to-save-pacific-sovereignty-says-
bishop-20180617-p4zm1h.html
Wyeth, G. 2018. Is China Building Roads to Nowhere in the Pacific? The Diplomat, 
17 January. thediplomat.com/2018/01/is-china-building-roads-to-nowhere-
in-the-pacific
Xi, J. 2018. Jointly Charting a Course Towards a Brighter Future. Speech at APEC 
CEO Summit, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. Xinhua, 17 November. 
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/17/c_137613904.htm
105
2 . A NEW COLD WAR?
Yale News 2018. We May Be Underestimating Future Economic Growth, and its 
Potential Climate Effects. 14 May. news.yale.edu/2018/05/14/we-may-be-
underestimating-effects-economic-growth-climate-change
Zhang, D. 2018. China, India and Japan in the Pacific: Latest Developments, 











Australia has moved from a position of alert to one of alarm regarding 
China’s growing presence in the Pacific. As one security analyst explains, 
‘Canberra is increasingly concerned about Beijing’s intensified interest in 
the Pacific islands, including efforts to sway political elites and targeted 
pursuit of transportation infrastructure projects in locations across 
Melanesia’ (Graham 2018a). This viewpoint is based on the combination 
of two main factors: Australia’s concerns about China and Australia’s 
understandings of the vulnerabilities of the Pacific. Australia increasingly 
sees China as a strategic threat at global, regional and national levels, 
while at the same time it is closely tied to the Chinese economy. 
Concomitantly, Australia functions on a deeply held assumption that 
Pacific Island countries (PICs) are in no position to resist China as its 
presence grows. This chapter will examine the multifaceted aspects of 
Australia’s strong and growing concern about China, including views 
that China is a revisionist country determined to rewrite the rules of 
the global order and apprehension about the impact of a rising China 
on Australia’s national interests. It will also look at Australia’s concerns 
about China’s impact on the Pacific Islands region and how a stronger 
China in the Pacific could negatively affect Australia. The chapter will 
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then look at how Australia understands the Pacific Islands region—its 
needs and interests—and discuss Australian perceptions of how capable, 
or otherwise, the Pacific is to resist China, comparing these with the views 
from PICs. It will examine how the combination of these concerns results 
in a sense of alarm regarding China’s intentions and behaviours in the 
Pacific, as they affect Australia, the region and the international system. 
Australia’s recent Pacific ‘Step-Up’ policy is a major element of an effort to 
counteract these concerns, looking to ensure that Australia is the region’s 
preferred partner. Ultimately, this chapter will ask whether Australia’s 
approach to ameliorating its concerns about China in the Pacific Islands 
is likely to achieve the desired goals.
Australia’s understanding of China’s rise
For at least a decade, Australia has been observing China’s increasing 
presence on the global stage, in the region and, more recently, within 
Australia itself with considerable interest. However, in recent years, there 
has been a distinct shift from observation to anxiety. Australia’s foreign 
policy White Paper of 2003 described China as an economic opportunity, 
with the focus of the bilateral relationship on engagement and building 
a strategic economic partnership (Australian Government 2003:5). Then, 
Australia did not fear the demise of the US’s role in global or regional 
security, confident that no country or group of countries would be able to 
challenge the US’s capacity to shape the global environment. However, by 
2017, the central security concern in the new foreign policy white paper was 
the challenge posed to Australia by China’s expanding role in international 
affairs, occurring at the same time as the US’s apparent withdrawal. The 
2017 White Paper focused on the changing power balance in the Indo-
Pacific, noting that ‘the United States has been the dominant power in our 
region throughout Australia’s post–World War  II history. Today, China 
is challenging America’s position’ (Australian Government 2017:1). The 
white paper advocates that the US should maintain its commitment and 
encourages China to operate according to the existing rules. 
Likewise, the Australian Government’s Strong and Secure: A Strategy 
for Australia’s National Security (Australian Government 2013b), the 
country’s first, refers to the risk of another state seeking to influence 
Australia or its regional and global partners by economic, political or 
military pressure. It stops short of naming China, but the implication 
is clear (Hayward-Jones 2013:5). Recent defence white papers also note 
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Australian concerns about China. The 2009 Defence White Paper made 
clear that Australia viewed China as a security challenge for the regional 
order. While somewhat more moderate in tone, the 2013 Defence White 
Paper warned of the danger of a  ‘major power with hostile intentions’ 
establishing bases ‘in our immediate neighbourhood from which it could 
project force against us’ (Australian Government 2013a:25). In its 2016 
Defence White Paper, the Australian Government criticised China directly 
in some places, as well as referring obliquely to ‘newly powerful countries’ 
that ‘want greater influence and to challenge some of the rules in the global 
architecture established some 70 years ago … leading to uncertainty and 
tensions’(Australian Government 2016:45).
In recent years, many prominent Australian politicians and commentators 
have taken the stance that China is a revisionist power that seeks to 
undermine or reinvent the existing structures of the international order. 
This narrative is widespread across media as well as policy and political 
circles. For example, then minister for foreign affairs Julie Bishop and 
prime minister Malcolm Turnbull made a number of high-profile public 
remarks regarding their concern about China’s role in the international 
system, which were reported across the Australian media. In 2017, 
Turnbull gave a keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore 
that warned of the dangers of Chinese aggression and the importance 
of maintaining the ‘rules-based order’, highlighting unilateral actions 
to militarise or create territory. He advised China to respect others’ 
sovereignty (see, for example, Harvey 2017; Smethurst 2017; Farrow 
2017; SBS News 2017). Bishop backed Turnbull’s strong line, saying that 
China had acted in ’direct disregard’ of the international order (see, for 
example, Riordan 2017). Nick Warner, the Director General of newly 
formed intelligence agency the Office for National Intelligence (ONI), 
argued that the rules-based order is under threat by countries who prefer 
to use strength rather than abide by existing rules and norms, alluding—
if not referring directly—to China (ABC Radio National 2019). Many 
public intellectuals and think tank analysts have made similar comments 
(see, for example, Bisley and Schreer 2018; Chellaney 2018; Graham 
2018a; Medcalf 2015).
Impact on Australia’s national interests
There are several aspects to how this broader concern about China’s rise 
is seen to be impacting Australia’s national interests. One element is the 
growing anxiety about China’s influence on Australian politics, public 
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debate and freedom of speech (see, for example, Chen 2017; Grattan 
2017; Smith 2017). Intellectual-about-town Clive Hamilton also weighed 
in on the debate with his high-profile book Silent Invasion: China’s 
Influence in Australia in which he paints China very clearly as ‘Australia’s 
enemy’, determined not only to control Chinese at home but to dominate 
the world, including Australia, by whatever means (Hamilton 2018; for 
a review of the book, see Podger 2018).
The question of Chinese influence in Australia became a heated public 
debate after the ABC’s Four Corners program and Fairfax Media released 
a joint investigation into China’s power and influence in Australia in June 
2017, dramatically labelling it a ‘tale of secrets, power and intimidation’ 
(ABC News and Fairfax 2017). In the program, journalists ‘uncover[ed] 
how China’s Communist Party (CCP) is secretly infiltrating Australia’ in 
order to undermine Australian interests and promote the CCP’s agenda 
(ibid.). The concern around Chinese influence centres on the growing 
role and power of China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD) and 
its agenda to strengthen the authority and legitimacy of the CCP both in 
China and abroad (see Groot 2015). The UFWD works to convince those 
who are not the CCP’s natural allies that China and the CCP do not pose 
any kind of threat. It is not easy to be clear about who may be working 
for the UFWD and, as a result, many Chinese individuals have come to 
be suspected of promoting the UFWD agenda in Australia. For example, 
over the past several years, papers and articles have proliferated around 
the potential role of Chinese students in influencing debates and views in 
Australia (see, for example, among many others: Garnaut 2017; Gill and 
Jakobson 2017; Joske 2017; Laurenceson 2017; Seo 2018; Varrall 2017). 
Chinese media in Australia has also been viewed as a source of concern (see 
Birtles 2017; Lim and Bergin 2018). Some Chinese businesspeople came 
under suspicion of disloyalty to Australia because of connections with 
the United Front or CCP. Connections between Australian politicians 
and Chinese businesspeople with CCP or UFWD links were closely 
scrutinised and, in some cases, this scrutiny led to political resignations 
such as that of former Australian Labor Party (ALP) senator Sam Dastyari 
(see, for example, Brophy 2019). In response, new national security and 
foreign interference laws were introduced in 2018, generally accepted as 
being long overdue (Douek 2018).
Australia is also worried about China choking off economic ties 
should it decide to do so. Australia is acutely sensitive to the risk that 
it may experience  ‘sanctions with Chinese characteristics’, as Gavekal 
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Dragonomics described it in an internal note to clients (Xie and 
Cui 2017). The Australian economy is closely linked to China—China 
is Australia’s largest trading partner  and has been for some years. The 
economic relationship is broadening and  deepening across many 
areas, particularly in services such as tourism and education. For many 
educational institutions, international students, of which Chinese 
students make up a  large proportion, are an important source of fee 
revenue (RBA 2018; see also Smith and Lim 2018). There is considerable 
concern around what a government-encouraged downturn of Chinese 
students could mean to the viability of Australian universities, given that 
they represent around 30 per cent of the international student population 
and a considerable proportion of funding in some universities (see, for 
example, White 2018). Linda Jakobson from China Matters notes that 
a warning issued by the Chinese embassy in December 2017 could be read 
as ‘the very first small step in the use of economic coercion’ (Smith and 
Lim 2018). Around the same time, an op-ed article in Chinese newspaper 
The Global Times, titled ‘Australia must do more for Chinese  students’, 
argued that Australia was not an ideal destination for Chinese students 
(Wang 2017). Interestingly, this article appeared in the English-language 
version of the paper, suggesting it was a message intended for Western 
rather than Chinese readers. There are indications that these signals are 
having some impact. For example, Australian Department of Education 
and Training data suggests that while the number of Chinese students 
to Australia continued to increase in 2018, the rate of growth has 
dropped by 7 per cent (Australian Government 2018). Coinciding with 
the most heated discussions about Chinese influence, Australia found 
its beef exports stranded in Chinese ports and there was also a similarly 
unexplained slowdown in clearance times for Australian wine and cheese.1 
In early 2019, Australian coal exports were blocked or slowed in ports 
in northeast China (Walker 2019). Despite Beijing denying any official 
ban, it was speculated that this slowdown could be retaliation against 
Australia’s ban on Chinese telecommunications company Huawei from 
bidding on Australia’s 5G network (Bloomberg News 2019). At the 
time of going to press, the China’s embassy in Australia had taken the 
unusual step of releasing a list of 14 grievances, including the Huawei 
and ZTE ban, and ‘incessant wanton interference in China’s Xinjiang, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan affairs’, but also concerns that went well beyond 
1  Australian business representatives, December 2018. Conversations with author.
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China’s core interests, including funding of an ‘anti-China’ think tank 
and ‘spreading disinformation imported from the US’ about COVID-19 
(Kearsley et al. 2020).
China has in the past responded to South Korea’s announcement that it 
would host a US missile-defence system in 2017 by cancelling group tours 
and closing some local operations of Korean businesses, hurting the South 
Korean economy for several months. In November 2016, China imposed 
fees on Mongolian imports after Mongolia hosted a visit from the Dalai 
Lama. In May of that year, group tours and agricultural imports to Taiwan 
were cut after President Tsai Ing-wen omitted the One China principle in 
a speech. In 2012, the Philippines attempted to arrest Chinese fishermen 
in disputed waters; China suspended imports of Philippine bananas and 
issued a travel alert. In 2010, China cut imports of Norwegian salmon 
after Chinese political activist Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize. Also in 2010, after Japan arrested a Chinese fisherman in disputed 
waters, China blocked exports of rare earths to Japan (Xie and Cui 2017).
In addition to these concerns about Chinese political influence and 
potential economic leverage in Australia, Australia is also highly alert to 
the challenge of China as a strategic military threat. This is particularly 
true of China’s increasing role in the Pacific Islands region, as will be 
explored in more detail in the following section. 
China’s impacts on and influence in the 
Pacific Islands region
With these broader concerns about China’s increasing global role in mind, 
Australia has for many years been observing China’s activities in the Pacific 
Islands region with some unease. Over the past 15 years, a number of 
scholarly and policy-focused papers have drawn policymakers’ attention 
to the topic. For example, in 2003, an article titled ‘Dragon in Paradise: 
China’s Rising Star in Oceania’ appeared in The National Interest, in which 
authors John Henderson, Benjamin Reilly and Nathaniel Peffer warned 
of the ‘important long-term consequences’ of China’s growing role in 
Oceania (2003:1). In 2006 the Australian Parliament’s Senate Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade released a report on 
Australia’s relationship with China, Chapter 10 of which was dedicated 
to understanding China’s relationship with countries in the Southwest 
Pacific and the implications for Australia (Parliament of Australia 2006). 
In 2007, Terence Wesley-Smith published a paper on China as a new 
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force in Pacific politics (Wesley-Smith 2007). In the past several years 
this interest has noticeably increased and expanded—from discussions in 
academic and policy circles to numerous articles on the topic of Chinese 
influence in the Pacific Islands region in Australian think tanks and media. 
Articles decrying China’s ‘mighty orbit’ in the Pacific (Saunokonoko 
2018), its foreign influence as ‘offensive’ and a danger to Australia, appear 
regularly (see Brady 2017; Brook 2018; Dobell 2018 and others).
There are a number of recurring themes in the Australian literature about 
China in the Pacific Islands. In particular, many commentators raise 
concerns about Chinese aid, including its developmental effectiveness, 
its labour and environmental standards, links to local corruption, its 
potential military presence and its potential for creating debt burdens that 
could be utilised for political purposes. Here I examine those that are of 
the most concern to Australia.
Developmental effectiveness
Australian government aid officials have long been concerned that 
Chinese development interventions in the region not only had few 
sustainable development impacts, but also actually undermined the 
efforts of traditional donors like Australia.2 Chinese aid to the Pacific was 
in Australian headlines again in 2018 when former Australian minister 
for international development and the Pacific Concetta Fierravanti-Wells 
described it as ‘useless’, with few economic or health benefits (Graue and 
Dziedzic 2018). These concerns reflect a long tradition of criticism of 
Chinese aid globally, including an influential piece by Moses Naim in 
2009 that described China as a ‘rogue donor’ providing ‘very, very toxic’ 
loans to developing countries. Including China with Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and Venezuela, Naim argued that ‘their goal is not to help other countries 
develop ... Rogue aid providers couldn’t care less about the long-term 
well-being of the population of the countries they “aid”’ (Naim 2009). 
However, more recent analyses suggest that while the developmental 
effectiveness of Chinese aid in the Pacific is mixed, results are ‘dependent 
in large part on the actions of Pacific Island governments’ (Dornan and 
Brant 2014; see also Smith 2018). 
2  AusAID (Australia’s former Australian international aid agency) and Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) officials in Beijing 2011–14. Conversations with author. AusAID was 




Putative connections between an increased Chinese presence and 
corruption have been a source of concern around the world. Research 
undertaken in Africa suggests that there is an increase in local corruption 
around active Chinese project sites, which lingers after the project 
implementation period has ended. In Africa at least, this effect does not 
seem to be because of the increase in economic activity per se, but rather 
because the Chinese presence has an impact on local norms. These impacts 
do not occur with other bilateral donors or multilateral donors like the 
World Bank (Isaksson and Kotsadam 2016). The broader picture around 
the relationship between aid and corruption is inconclusive, so it would 
be premature to conclude that there is a simple causal connection (ibid.).
However, Chinese investment and the potential it holds for fuelling 
corruption in the Pacific Islands region is certainly a source of concern in 
Australia and has been for some years. At the top end of the scale are incidents 
such as the use of Chinese aid money to make an AU$1 million bribe to 
the former Papua New Guinea (PNG) prime minister, Sir Michael Somare, 
as ‘part of Beijing’s push to exert greater influence in the Pacific’ (Grigg and 
McKenzie 2018). At the more day-to-day level, as Dornan and Brant (2014) 
note, lack of transparency and an insufficient involvement of the civil service 
in project selection processes means political leaders can negotiate directly 
with Chinese contractors. Practices where Chinese construction companies 
provide benefits such as meals and travel to ministers when lobbying for 
projects, are described by civil servants as ‘corruption’, although some argue 
this is more ‘political clientelism’ or ‘leadership by “big men”’, in which 
gains are received but not necessarily for personal benefit (Dornan and 
Brant 2014). Dobell noted in 2007 that the competition between Taiwan 
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for diplomatic recognition was 
‘destabilising island states … making Pacific politics more corrupt and more 
violent’ (2007:17). 
The issue of Chinese presence and corruption has also been observed 
by some Pacific Island leaders. For example, Vanuatu Foreign Minister 
Ralph Regenvanu has argued that policing of local laws and issues around 
corruption are the biggest problems in dealing with China (Smith and Lim 
2019). However, Terence Wesley-Smith (2007) argued that in fact there is 
little evidence to suggest that China’s activities have encouraged corruption 
and instability in Oceania. The degree and extent of corruption caused by 
China’s increased presence in the Pacific is not clear; however, it continues to 
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be a source of considerable concern for Australia. For Australia, the concern 
about corruption is not only that it undermines good governance and the 
effectiveness of aid, but that it is also a particular risk in countries that, in 
Australian narratives, are often understood as dangerously close to becoming 
‘failed states’. In 2005, then prime minister John Howard noted that for 
many ‘fragile tiny states’ in the Pacific Islands region, ‘poor governance, 
crime and corruption pose a real threat to both economic development and 
to regional security’ (Howard 2005).
Debt
Much of the literature around Chinese interest in PICs discusses the issue 
of debt burden. Debt is considered to be a burden when a country has 
trouble paying back the loans it has received, creating pressure on the 
economy. How much debt a country can manage is usually measured 
by looking at the ratio of debt to how much the economy is growing 
(GDP). Chinese bilateral development assistance does not adhere to the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) guidelines and 
loans can be provided at whatever concessional interest rate is negotiated 
between the two parties (for more detailed information on Chinese aid, 
see Lancaster 2007; Brautigam 2009, particularly Chapters 4, 5 and 6; 
Dornan and Brant 2014; Varrall 2018; Johnston and Rudyak 2017; 
Zhang 2017, 2018). Several countries in the Pacific Islands region have 
high debt-to-GDP ratios and are considered to be in ‘debt distress’. 
The countries in the high-risk category are Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu (Fox and Dornan 2018). Tonga 
provides an illustration of where Chinese aid practices can result in debt 
distress with questionable developmental outcomes: 14.5 million Tongan 
pa‘anga (around AU$9  million) in aid money for expanding the royal 
palace (Dreher et al. 2017, who note that it is unclear whether the funding 
was a loan or via export credits). However, it is incorrect to assume that 
all PICs that have high debt are in debt to China or that all countries 
that have received Chinese loans are in difficult fiscal circumstances. For 
example, Cook Islands Finance Minister Mark Beer notes that the country 
is managing its debts well, referring to an Asian Development Bank report 
that shows the country has a debt-to-GDP ratio of around 25 per cent, 
well below ‘danger’ levels (Hill 2018). Importantly, as Fox and Dornan 
(2018) point out, around half of the countries in the high-risk category 
do not recognise the PRC, but rather have a diplomatic relationship with 
Taiwan, so do not have access to Chinese concessional finance. In total, 
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China holds around 12 per cent of the debt owed by Pacific Island nations 
and it is only Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu where Chinese lending makes 
up more than one-third of total debt. In Samoa, debts to multilateral 
development banks is higher than debt to China. Vanuatu is not at high 
risk of debt distress and government statements suggest the country will 
be working towards lowering levels of debt (Fox and Dornan 2018).
Most recently, Lowy Institute research published in 2019, drawing 
on data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Lowy 
Institute’s own Pacific Aid Map, argued that while debt burden is rising in 
the Pacific, this reflects a confluence of factors and is more closely linked 
to the region’s risk of disaster than excessive Chinese lending (Rajah et al. 
2019). The research also records that China is not the dominant financier 
in the region and, except for Tonga where China holds more than half of 
public debt, traditional creditors like Japan, the Asia Development Bank 
and the World Bank play a more significant role. In the case of Tonga, 
China has twice agreed to defer debt repayments with little apparently in 
return (ibid.). Additionally, the analysis shows that, in 90 per cent of cases, 
Chinese loans were made in situations where at the time there appeared 
to be scope to sustainably absorb the debt, not dissimilar to other official 
lenders in the region (ibid.).
Strategic military threat
Concerns about China as a strategic military threat are particularly 
resonant in relation to the Pacific Islands region, based on a long-held 
view that it is via this route that adversaries could project military power 
into Australia. Since the 1970s, defence white papers have made clear 
that the regions near Australia need to be kept secure, stable and able to 
intercept any adversaries before they reach Australia (Hegarty 2015:8). 
As Graeme Dobell argues, ‘Australia’s strategic denial instinct in the South 
Pacific is a constant, with a 140-year history (it helped drive federation in 
1901)’ (2017). Similarly, Greg Sheridan and Cameron Stewart (2018)
argued in The Australian that:
Australia’s intelligence and analysis agencies believe that the South 
Pacific now presents the greatest strategic threat to Australia, as 
a result of what they believe is Beijing’s intention to establish a 
military base in the region. This marks the first time since World 
War II that the South Pacific has been of such intense strategic 
concern to Canberra.
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While this anxiety around the Pacific as an access point for adversaries 
has been recorded in defence white papers for decades, the current 
degree of concern has not been seen since World War II and perhaps 
the Cold War to a lesser extent. Australia’s ‘vulnerability to threats from 
hostile powers coming from or through the region’ was demonstrated 
with Japan’s advance into Australia during World War II. At that time, 
as Shadow Defence Minister Richard Marles said in a speech at the Lowy 
Institute in November 2017, PICs like Kiribati, Solomon Islands and 
PNG were the scenes of horrific and intense fighting in which thousands 
were killed. The Bomana War Cemetery in PNG is the largest Australian 
war cemetery in the world, with around 4,000 Australian defence force 
personnel buried there (Marles 2017). Concerns were reignited during 
the Cold War when Libya and the USSR ‘made overtures’ to countries in 
the Pacific (Wallis 2017:7). 
Now, many in the Australian policy community are convinced that it 
is China’s ambition in the Pacific Islands region to set up one or more 
military bases as part of a global strategy of force projection. As one 
security academic explains, it is now becoming a ‘settled view’ within the 
Australian Government that ‘Beijing has strategic designs on the so-called 
“second island chain”, including ambitions to establish some form of 
military base, potentially upsetting the Western powers’ “traditional” pre-
dominance that has existed without serious challenge since 1945’ (Graham 
2018b). The government’s fear is that China is seeking to find a ‘malleable 
country’ from which it can begin its ‘salami-slicing tactics’ in the Pacific 
Islands region.3 They foresee that China would pursue a strategy of first 
setting up something apparently innocuous like a monitoring outpost to 
police Chinese fishing vessels, followed by the appointment of a defence 
attaché and then, within 10 years, would install full military facilities.
Reflecting these concerns, reports that China was in discussions with 
Vanuatu to establish a military base there caused consternation in 
Australia. Dr Malcolm Davis of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
(ASPI, a think tank funded by the Australian Department of Defence) 
has noted that Chinese spending in Vanuatu is not just about promoting 
tourism, arguing that ‘they’re thinking commercial influence, political 
influence and ultimately a military presence’ (Bilton 2018). China is 
funding a major new wharf on the island of Espiritu Santo in Vanuatu, 
3  Australian analyst on the Pacific Islands region, December 2018. Interview with author.
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which raised eyebrows in defence, intelligence and diplomatic circles 
‘because while its stated purpose is to host cruise ships, its size means 
it also has the potential to service naval vessels’ (Jonathan Pryke from 
the Lowy Institute, as quoted in Wroe 2018). The notion was compared 
with China’s development of a military base in Djibouti and reports that 
it is considering building military facilities in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, 
in which China’s economic influence appears to be being utilised for 
strategic purposes. Military experts such as Charles Edel from the United 
States Studies Centre argue that if a Chinese military base were to be 
established in Vanuatu, or anywhere in the Pacific, other bases would soon 
follow, allowing the Chinese military to challenge US and allied access 
to the region, fundamentally undermining Australia’s security (as quoted 
in Wroe 2018). A proposed Chinese port on Manus Island as well as the 
possible development of harbours in PNG has also worried Australia, as 
it could provide ‘Beijing with a prime strategic location for projecting 
military power north towards US forces in Guam, or south towards 
Australia’ (Davis 2018).
Others, however, have argued that despite reports, China has in fact ‘not 
attempted to establish port facilities or military bases anywhere in the 
vast reaches of Oceania’ (Wesley-Smith, 2007:2; see also Hayward-Jones 
2013:7). From over a decade ago, researchers of the Pacific Islands region, 
such as Terence Wesley-Smith and Jenny Hayward-Jones, have observed 
that analysts who make claims about Chinese military intentions ‘offered 
no proof that China is actually engaged in any military-related activities 
in Oceania, or has any plans to do so’ (Wesley-Smith 2007:15; see also 
Hayward-Jones 2013:7). Now, despite ongoing concerns, just as argued 
in this research, China has not established any actual military presence in 
the Pacific. One possible exception is the Chinese satellite-tracking facility 
established in Kiribati in 1997. Some suspect this facility was used to 
monitor US missile-testing activities in the neighbouring Marshall Islands. 
However, when Kiribati changed its diplomatic recognition to Taiwan in 
November 2003, China dismantled the tracking station, which does not 
suggest that it was of critical strategic importance to China (Wesley-Smith 
2007:16). Another is the reported approach to the Government of Timor-
Leste by Chinese defence firms to establish a radar to monitor shipping 
and illegal fishing in the Wetar Strait with the condition that the facilities 
be staffed by Chinese technicians. Then vice prime minister José Guterres 
contacted the US embassy with concerns that the facilities could be used 
for other purposes and the project did not proceed (WikiLeaks 2008).
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Influence
Australia is particularly concerned about rising Chinese influence in the 
Pacific Islands region and the implications this may have in the region, 
globally and directly on Australia’s interests. Critics argue that China’s 
propensity to give loans regardless of a country’s existing debt burden 
and repayment capacity is creating a situation in which loan-recipient 
countries will be so crippled by their debt to China as to be vulnerable to 
Chinese political influence. That is, they will be economically beholden 
to  China and be in no position to resist China’s requests for certain 
behaviours and positions—for example, regarding China’s claims in the 
South China Sea or the development of military facilities. Commentators 
point to Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka as an example of the possible result 
of a debt burden to China. In that case, Sri Lanka was unable to service the 
loan for the port’s construction and the two countries negotiated a debt-
for-equity swap accompanied by a 99-year lease for China to manage the 
port. As one commentator put it, ‘China wants to conquer the world, 
and its sneaky strategy to get there already has several countries in a sticky 
situation’ (Fernando 2018).
The shorthand for this phenomenon is ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ and it 
generates great concern in Australia as it suggests China could increase its 
influence over Pacific Island nations to the detriment of Australia’s own 
influence and interests. In one example, Cameron Hawker, an analyst 
with the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) and a former adviser 
to the ruling Coalition government, is quoted in a newspaper article as 
saying, ‘I think we all know now is that [Australia’s] role in the Pacific 
is being challenged by [the fact that] China’s frankly cashed up and it’s 
spending its money pretty freely across the South Pacific’ (McCarthy 
2016). An article in the Australian Financial Review (AFR) argued that 
while Pacific Island countries in general, and PNG in particular, have 
‘historically been in Australia’s orbit’, PNG has been ‘rapidly taking 
on Chinese loans it can’t afford to pay and offers a strategic location in 
addition to significant LNG and resource deposits’ for China (Kehoe 
2018; for similar perspectives on debt distress caused by China, see also 
Fernando 2018; Garrick 2018; Pryke 2019). A report written by Harvard 
scholars for the US State Department— classified but a version of it was 
leaked to the AFR—argued that countries like PNG, Vanuatu and Tonga 
were at risk of undue Chinese influence because of the unsustainable loans 
they had received (Parker and Chefitz 2018; discussed by O’Keefe 2018).
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The debate around debt and influence has not been clearly resolved. 
According to Fox and Dornan, Tonga is the only country where the 
debt-trap diplomacy narrative may have some basis—and even then 
understanding of how these loans came about makes this unlikely. Based on 
their analysis, they conclude that while debt is a problem in the region, the 
Chinese ‘“debt-trap diplomacy” argument is without foundation’ (for an 
analysis of Pacific Islands region debt, see Fox and Dornan 2018). Rajah, 
Pryke and Dayant (2019) argue in their research that the most recent 
evidence suggests that accusations of China using debt-trap diplomacy 
for leverage are inaccurate, although they emphasise that this could 
change if current practices continue without substantial restructuring 
along the lines of formal lending rules similar to those of the multilateral 
development banks. Smith, however, notes that there are already signs 
in the Pacific Islands region that the PRC is willing to leverage aid for 
political advantage, citing examples such as Fiji’s closure of its trade and 
tourism office in Taiwan immediately after Prime Minister Bainimarama 
attended the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017 (Smith 2018).
Australia’s understanding of the 
Pacific Islands region
Australia has long considered the Pacific Islands region to be ‘its backyard’, 
with associated feelings of obligation and managerial responsibility. 
The perceptions and understandings that underpin the relationship tend 
to be taken for granted in Australian political, policy and public circles and 
are rarely interrogated. However, these understandings are not neutral, 
but constructed and maintained according to particular philosophical and 
ideological visions of what is and should be happening in the region and 
have consequences for the policy options Australia considers appropriate 
or necessary.
Australian commentary on the Pacific Islands region has for some time 
been founded on the concepts of vulnerability, weakness and the danger 
of the collapse of the state. These weaknesses are usually ascribed to PICs’ 
small size, low economic growth and general economic strength, and 
governance challenges. For example, Graeme Dobell (2019) from ASPI 
argued that ‘the familiar list’ of challenges facing the Pacific
121
3 . AuSTRALIA’S RESPONSE TO CHINA IN THE PACIFIC
is as cruel as ever—small economies with big challenges, rapid 
population growth and stretched governments. Plenty of modern 
ills are arriving, along with climate change to rev recurring 
natural disasters. 
This kind of framing is not new. As Greg Fry observed over two decades 
ago, prominent Australian images of the South Pacific and Pacific 
Islanders depicted a ‘doomsday’ or ‘nightmare’ scenario (Fry 1997:313). 
Wesley-Smith argued that the literature around governance in the Pacific 
Islands region gives the impression that ‘all island leaders are corrupt, 
malleable, self-serving and impulsive’ (2007:18). Overall, the picture 
painted in the great majority of the Australian literature about the Pacific 
is one of a region and individual countries in multifaceted crisis— 
economic, governance, health, democratically and security. 
Problems and solutions: What does a ‘region in 
crisis’ need?
This framing is important because how a ‘problem’ is constructed and 
understood serves to allow and disallow certain solutions as seemingly 
acceptable and appropriate. As Fry argued in 1997, these conceptions 
‘significantly affect the parameters within which future possibilities are 
worked out’ (1997:313). Over time, and continuing today, the framing 
of the Pacific Islands as a region in the grip of one or another of multiple 
forms of crisis allows Australia to conclude that even if certain parties, 
including the Pacific Islanders themselves, do not like the policy solutions 
Australia proffers, they are necessary and inevitable. For example, 
commenting on the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper’s policy shift based 
on Pacific integration with Australia, Dobell (2017) contended that 
critics will argue that ‘integration is colonialism redux, a polite term for 
dominance’. But, he argued, this does not mean it is a poor policy, rather, 
the criticisms need to be countered. He stated:
The rebuttal will require slow persuasion and consistent delivery. 
The promise of integration with Australia and New Zealand is the 
offer of a stronger, richer region—because poor and weak states 
can’t be truly independent.
The ‘doomsday’ Australian discourse continues to result in a perception 
that Pacific Islanders needed to reinvent themselves—and be reinvented—






The ‘naturally reached’ conclusion in Australia has tended to be that 
the Australian Government must take proactive measures to manage, 
mitigate, control or prevent weakness becoming a broader problem 
both for PICs themselves and for Australia’s own interests. The Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is a good example. First 
articulated in 2002, the idea of Solomon Islands as a potential failed 
state was quickly taken up by Australian analysts and commentators 
(Kabutaulaka 2005:295). In a report with the unequivocal title 
Our Failing Neighbour—Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands, ASPI 
argued that the imminent risk of Solomon Islands becoming a failed 
state meant that Australia was obliged to take decisive action in order to 
prevent ‘Solomon Islands becoming a vector in the region for the kind of 
transnational problems that are so common elsewhere in the world’, which 
would ‘make Australia significantly more vulnerable to transnational 
criminal operations’ as well  as flowing over to other countries in the 
region (Wainwright 2003:13–14). The ASPI report’s construction of the 
situation was influential. Then prime minister John Howard used almost 
exactly the same language in an interview with ABC Radio that same year, 
and in 2004, RAMSI Special Coordinator Nick Warner used the same 
reasons to explain the importance of the intervention force in a speech to 
a national security conference (Warner 2004).
A region in crisis cannot manage external threats 
without support from Australia
This framing of the Pacific Islands as a region in crisis also underpins 
how Australia is responding to China’s increased presence in the region. 
The understanding that Pacific Island nations are weak, and governments 
are overstretched or corrupt, results in the conclusion that they are 
either incapable of resisting Chinese overtures and influence efforts, or 
willing to sell themselves cheaply. For example, the aforementioned 2006 
Senate Standing Committee’s report noted that ‘the weakness of Pacific 
islands make them attractive strategic resources for China’, drawing on 
Henderson, Reilly and Peffer’s argument that ‘their financial and other 
problems make the support of Pacific states cheap for Beijing to buy’ 
(Parliament of Australia 2006, citing Henderson et al. 2003:98). 
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In this research cited by the Senate, the authors argue that the Pacific 
Islands’
utility as … possible sites for port facilities or even military bases, 
means that relatively small investments in these countries can have 
major longer-term payoffs for countries like China.
Likewise, Susan Windybank from the influential Australian think tank 
Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) argued in 2005 that Pacific Island 
countries were vulnerable to what she termed ‘The China Syndrome’, 
in which China works to cultivate new friends and allies while others 
such as the United States are distracted elsewhere (Windybank 2005:28). 
She raised concerns that the Pacific could ‘become a testing ground for 
China’s growing power’ (ibid.:29; see also Wallis 2017).
A region in crisis—what did Australia do wrong 
before and what should Australia do about it now?
With these fundamental assumptions about the Pacific settled into 
concrete fact, the issue for Australian analysts and policymakers is then 
framed as a simple technocratic question of ‘what did Australia do wrong 
before and what should Australia do about it now?’ (For example, see 
Dobell 2019; Firth 2018; Hegarty 2015;Wallis 2018).
The question of ‘what Australia should do about the Pacific’ has been 
fraught for decades. Australian engagement with, and approaches to, the 
Pacific Islands region have fluctuated greatly over time, often reflecting 
events in the region, the advocacy of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and the 
personal interest of the Australian foreign minister of the time. Jonathan 
Schultz noted in his research that Australia’s approach to the Pacific Islands 
region can be characterised into key periods. He describes 1988–93 as 
‘constructive commitment’; 1993–96 as focused on economic reform 
and resource management; 1996–2000 as a period of ‘confidence and 
neglect’; a ‘brief and glorious period’ from 2000–03; and ‘intervention 
and confrontation’ from 2003–07 (Schultz 2012, 2014). 
Again, events in Solomon Islands in 2003 provide a good example of 
the mercurial nature of Australia’s approach to the region. In that year, 
the government switched from adamant rejection of intervention in the 
Solomon Islands crisis, to full support. In January, then foreign minister 
Alexander Downer (2003) argued that:
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Sending in Australia troops to occupy the Solomon Islands would 
be folly in the extreme. It would be difficult to justify to Australian 
taxpayers. And for how many years would such an occupation have 
to continue? And what would be the exit strategy? And the real 
show-stopper, however, is that it would not work … Foreigners 
do not have the answers for the deep-seated problems affecting the 
Solomon Islands. 
However, within six months, the Australian Government had made a 
full about-face. An anonymous letter to the editor of the Solomon Star 
and Island Sun newspapers (2016) noted that this shift in approach was 
‘greeted with some surprise’ in the Pacific.
The ups and downs in Australia’s attentiveness to the Pacific continued 
through the Howard, Rudd, Gillard and Abbott governments. Former 
Liberal prime minister John Howard’s policy in the Pacific Islands region 
was frequently criticised. Pacific Island leaders, such as former PNG 
prime minister Michael Somare, described his government’s approach 
as ‘arrogant and insulting’ (SBS News 2013). Kevin Rudd’s government 
(2007–10), from the Labor side of politics, made some positive progress in 
bilateral relations with PNG and Solomon Islands. Rudd made PNG his 
first overseas visit as prime minister. Subsequently, however, Liberal prime 
minister Tony Abbott’s attitude was uninterested at best, as illustrated by 
his decision not to attend the 2014 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders 
meeting (Maclellan 2014). In 2009, around 12 per cent of Australia’s 
diplomatic posts were in the Pacific, fewer than the number in Europe 
(Broadbent et al. 2009). Australian broadcasting services to the Pacific 
Islands region, through the Australia Network and Radio Australia, were 
closed, and Australia’s voice in the region ‘has become little more than 
a croak into the ether’ (Dover and Macintosh 2018; see also Maclellan 
2014). Since 2014, Australia has been dramatically cutting its aid budget, 
including to the Pacific (see, for example, Georgeou and Hawksley 2016; 
Maclellan 2014; Pryke 2019; Wood 2014).
A region in crisis—Australia steps up
Most recently, late 2018 saw another turnaround when the Australian 
Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) formally 
announced the Step-Up initiative in the Pacific, stating that the ‘Pacific 
is one of the highest priorities of the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper’ 
(DFAT 2018). The Minister for Foreign Affairs Marise Payne (2018) said 
‘stepping up in the Pacific is not an option, it is an imperative’. The stated 
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goal of the Step-Up is simply to ‘support a more resilient region’. The means 
to achieve this goal is through ‘strengthening Australia’s engagement with 
the region’ with enhanced partnerships and relationships across economic 
growth, security and people-to-people ties. The political language around 
this policy shift strongly emphasises the moral obligation aspect of 
Australia’s engagement with the region, setting it in terms of a ‘response 
to the significant long-term challenges faced by our partners in the Pacific’ 
and a ‘new chapter in relations with our Pacific family’ (DFAT 2018).
The new Step-Up initiatives fall into three categories. 
The first, stronger partnerships for economic growth, includes proposals 
to support infrastructure development in the region. Two major projects 
were announced on 8 November 2018: AU$2 billion for a new Australian 
Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFPP) and a proposal 
for the Australian Parliament to approve additional resources and powers 
for Australia’s Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC). 
A week later, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit 
in PNG, leaders from Australia, Japan and the United States announced 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on a trilateral partnership for 
infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific region. Also at APEC, the 
Australian Prime Minister jointly announced the Papua New Guinea 
Electrification Partnership. With Japan, New Zealand, the US and 
PNG, the partnership aims to provide 70 per cent of PNG with access to 
electricity by 2030.
The economic growth proposals also include expanding the Pacific Labour 
Scheme to all PICs, uncapping the numbers of workers and promoting 
the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus as a 
means of better integrating Pacific Island economies, expected to enter 
into force in mid-2020 when ratified by eight of the signatory countries. 
The second category, stronger partnerships for security, intends to reflect 
concerns raised in the Boe Declaration on Regional Security, signed 
on 5 September 2018 in Nauru by PIF leaders. The Boe Declaration 
recognises an expanded concept of security that includes human, cyber 
and environmental security. The establishment of an Australia Pacific 
Security College and Pacific Fusion Centre are designed to support the 
implementation of the Boe Declaration. The purpose of these institutions 
is to provide training and professional development opportunities for 
officials across countries and agencies, and aggregate and share security 
information as a means to support well-informed responses to security 
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challenges across the region. Other projects were also announced in 
November 2018: a dedicated vessel for support, humanitarian and disaster 
relief and response; an annual Joint Heads of Pacific Security Forces event; 
an Australian Defence Force Pacific Mobile Training Team; and a Pacific 
Faculty of Policing at the Australian Institute of Police Management. 
In addition, the Australian Government announced AU$9 million over 
four years for expanding Australia’s Cyber Cooperation Partnership with 
the Pacific. These announcements build on earlier initiatives and programs, 
such as the bilateral security partnership MOUs with Tuvalu and Nauru; 
a bilateral security treaty with Solomon Islands; and a commitment of 
AU$2 billion to the Pacific Maritime Security Program over the next 
30 years, among others. 
The third category, ‘stronger relationships between our people’, includes 
education initiatives such as scholarships for Pacific students to study in 
Australian secondary schools; an increase to the number of scholarships 
under the Australia Pacific Training Coalition; and an expansion of the 
Australia–Pacific BRIDGE School Partnerships for teacher training. 
This category also encompasses a new Church Partnerships Program 
announced by the Australian Prime Minister in November 2018 and a new 
Australia–Pacific sports linkages program. A new Pacific–Australia Card 
(PAC) will offer eligible applicants priority visa application processing 
and recognition at Australian airports. These initiatives are in addition 
to a number of existing programs such as the Pacific Connect Program 
announced in September 2017 and the three-year AU$10  million 
Australian Aid: Friendship Grants program.
Structural changes within DFAT were another important element of 
the Pacific Step-Up policy. As the DFAT website sets out, an Office 
of the Pacific was established to coordinate ‘deepening engagement with 
the Pacific’ through whole-of-government coordination and support for 
Australia’s efforts to develop even closer ties with the Pacific (DFAT 2018). 
As at the end of 2018, DFAT had established a new Indo-Pacific group, 
under which falls the Office of the Pacific. It consists of two divisions: the 
Pacific Strategy Division and the Pacific Bilateral Division. Within these 
divisions are seven branches dedicated to Pacific Island countries and 
themes. Themes include Pacific Labour Mobility and Economic Growth; 
Pacific Regional Engagement and Outreach; Pacific Infrastructure; and 
Pacific Security—Maritime and Climate Change. Some insiders note 
that that this kind of ‘re-tooling’ has not been seen for decades, and 
certainly not for the Pacific. However, this new Office of the Pacific at 
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DFAT was seen by some Pacific analysts as representing very little in 
terms of a real shift in conceptualisation of, or approach towards, the 
Pacific Islands region, given that indications suggested it may largely be 
staffed by secondees from the Australian Federal Police and departments 
of Defence, Home Affairs and the Attorney-General, with no mention 
of, for example, education, health or climate change expertise—all key 
priority areas for the Pacific.4 
The view from the Pacific—‘anything 
but tiny’
In general, views from the Pacific Islands region differ markedly from the 
Australian perspective. As Wesley Morgan argues, ‘it is far from certain 
that Pacific island countries share the same geostrategic anxieties, and 
diplomatic agendas, of traditional powers on the Pacific-rim’ (2018). 
In a beautiful article written in 1993, Epeli Hau‘ofa offers a ‘view of 
Oceania that is new and optimistic’, in which the Pacific Islands region 
is not understood as ‘pitiful microstates condemned forever to depend 
on migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy, and not on any real 
economic productivity’ and in which Pacific peoples are not belittled, 
even unintentionally, by often well-meaning external commentators 
(Hau‘ofa  1993:150). Hau‘ofa argues that ‘the world of Oceania is not 
small; it is huge, and growing bigger every day’ (ibid.:151). He says:
But if we look at the myths, legends, and oral traditions, and 
the cosmologies of the peoples of Oceania, it becomes evident 
that they did not conceive of their world in such microscopic 
proportions. Their universe comprised not only land surfaces, but 
the surrounding ocean as far as they could traverse and exploit 
it, the underworld with its fire-controlling and earth-shaking 
denizens, and the heavens above with their hierarchies of powerful 
gods and named stars and constellations that people could count 
on to guide their ways across the seas. Their world was anything 
but tiny (1993:152).
He posited that the perspective of Pacific weakness is simply a reflection of 
neo-colonialist perspectives, convincing people that they ‘have no choice 
but to depend’ (ibid.:151). Hau‘ofa then argued that:
4  Nic Maclellan, February 2019. Conversation with author.
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If this very narrow, deterministic perspective is not questioned 
or checked, it could contribute importantly to an eventual 
consignment of groups of human beings to a perpetual state 
of wardship wherein they and their surrounding lands and seas 
would be at the mercy of the manipulators of the global economy 
and ‘world orders’ of one kind or another (ibid.:151–52).
The strategic priorities of the ‘Blue Pacific’
Building on these ideas, in 2017, the notion of the ‘Blue Pacific’ was 
articulated by Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielagaoi at the 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders meeting, emphasising Pacific Island 
states’ autonomy, independence and ability to determine and pursue 
their own strategic interests. The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, 
released at the leaders meeting in Nauru in 2018, further reiterated this 
determination. Of particular interest is the expanded definition of what 
constitutes security and threats to security. Whereas Australia’s support for 
the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ emphasises ameliorating military security 
concerns, the Boe Declaration explains that for the Pacific, security 
includes human security, humanitarian assistance and environmental 
security. However, it also clearly states that the primary security concern is 
climate change, which ‘remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, 
security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific’ (PIF Secretariat 2018).
Climate change was again emphasised as the primary concern for the Pacific 
at the 2019 PIF in Tuvalu. Host Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga’s goal 
was for leaders to agree to the Tuvalu Declaration, which acknowledged a 
climate crisis, encouraged countries to revise emissions reductions targets 
and called for a rapid phase-out of coal use. Despite the then Tuvaluan 
prime minister’s efforts, the declaration was not unanimously endorsed. 
New Zealand had reservations about financing for the UN’s Green 
Climate Fund, as did Australia, and Australia also expressed concerns 
about the sections on emissions reductions and coal use. Several Pacific 
Island leaders expressed strong disappointment about these qualifications, 
including the Prime Ministers of Fiji and Tonga. Mr Sopoaga said that 
while Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison was ‘concerned about 
saving your economy in Australia’, he was ‘concerned about saving my 
people in Tuvalu’ (Clarke 2019).
129
3 . AuSTRALIA’S RESPONSE TO CHINA IN THE PACIFIC
Collective identity, collective diplomacy
The Blue Pacific, the Boe Declaration and the Tuvalu Declaration all build 
on a broader movement of Pacific Islands diplomacy based on a common 
sense of identity and purpose in overcoming common constraints 
(PIF Secretariat 2014:1) as a means to reassert Pacific Islands’ agency and 
interests. Collective diplomacy itself is not a new idea in the region. During 
the 20th century, the ‘Pacific Way’ of undertaking diplomacy emphasised 
consensus among Island states (Aqorau 2015; see also Tarte 2014). This 
approach had a number of successes both regionally and globally, including 
the Rarotonga Treaty of 1985, which designated the South Pacific as a 
nuclear-free zone (Naupa 2017:903). The more recent narrative position 
of PICs is that they are one ‘Blue Continent’, critical to the effective and 
sustainable management of a vast swathe of  the world’s ocean, and the 
marine resources associated with it, notably the world’s largest tuna fishery 
and seabed minerals and energy supplies (Morgan 2018). 
More recently, the region has deliberately begun to reconfigure its 
identity as a neighbourhood with shared interests rather than a collection 
of individual states pursuing their own interests (Naupa 2017:904). 
As Fry and Tarte argue, Pacific Island states have experienced what 
former president of Kiribati Anote Tong described as a ‘paradigm shift’, 
fundamentally changing their approach to engaging with regional and 
world politics (Fry and Tarte 2015:3). Networked, rather than traditional 
state-centric ‘club’ diplomacy, is being adopted as a means to gain access to 
inner circles of policy negotiation (Naupa 2017:904). Pacific diplomacy 
aims to interrupt the prevalent international relations discourses that see 
global affairs through the prism of strategies and interests of powerful 
Pacific Rim countries and in which Pacific Islands’ affairs are viewed as 
means to broader and greater ends. 
Regarding China, Pacific Island leaders, such as PIF Secretary General 
Dame Meg Taylor and Vanuatu Minister of Foreign Affairs Ralph 
Regenvanu, argue that the Blue Pacific is aware of and capable of 
negotiating the challenges arising from China’s increased presence in the 
region (see interview with Smith and Lim 2019; also O’Keefe 2018). 
Taylor and Regenvanu emphasise that Pacific Island states are not naïve 
regarding China’s interests and approaches. However, both emphasise 
that the immediate security priority for the Pacific is climate change, 




If you look at the Pacific Rim countries, you’ve got to ask yourself, 
who is really committed to the one issue, the most important issue 
that faces this region: climate change? (Smith and Lim 2019)
And in relation to the priorities of large powers with interests in the 
region, Taylor said, ‘they’re not prepared to really look at the needs of 
the  region and our young people, then I’d be questioning, “Well, why 
come back?”’ (ibid.).
Conclusion
Australia has long been aware of and uncomfortable about China’s presence 
in the Pacific Islands region. Australia has made it very clear that it wants 
to be the region’s preferred partner, not China. As Graeme Dobell (2019) 
noted, China’s growing presence in the Pacific has prompted a renewed 
surge of interest in maintaining Australia’s preeminent position as the 
preferred partner of PICs. In recent years, Australia’s response to China 
in the region has shifted from alert to alarm. While carefully avoiding 
direct references to China, its latest Pacific Islands policy, as laid out in 
the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and in the 2018 launch of the Step-
Up initiative, is—at its heart—concerned with managing and containing 
China’s influence in the region (see, for example, Murray 2018; Whiting 
and Dziedzic 2019 among many other media stories. See also Dobell 
2018 and O’Keefe 2018). Australia’s Step-Up initiative reflects this 
recent dramatic increase in concern about China in the Pacific, although 
a renewed interest (again) in the Pacific Islands region had been under 
discussion for several years both in political and bureaucratic circles.5 It is 
clear that Australia continues to be extremely anxious that Pacific Island 
nations cannot, or perhaps will not (or perhaps both), push back against 
China in the way that most aligns with Australian strategic interests 
and priorities.
While many consider that it is Australia’s neglect of the region that has 
caused Pacific Island states to ‘fall into the arms of China’, another way 
to look at the situation is that it is because of how Australia constructs the 
Pacific Islands region, with corresponding actions, that PICs are open to 
engaging with other partners, depending on whether what is on offer aligns 
with their own articulated interests. The 2019 PIF in Tuvalu provides an 
5  Former senior DFAT official, February 2019. Conversation with author.
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illustrative example—much of the English-language analysis of Australia’s 
engagement at the 2019 forum suggests that it has had a  detrimental 
effect on Australia’s reputation in the region, damaged its Step-Up goal of 
being the Pacific’s preferred partner and affected the region’s relationship 
with China in ways that do not align with Australia’s interests (Clarke 
2019). Certainly, the Chinese Foreign Ministry lost no time in arguing 
that Australia would do well to reflect on its ‘condescending and insulting’ 
approach to the Pacific Islands region, contrasting it directly with China, 
which ‘doesn’t insult island countries and go down and tell the world 
that we’ve given this much money to the Pacific islands’ and describing 
Australia as a ‘condescending master’ (Geng 2019).
Australia’s approach to the Pacific for the past several decades has been 
inconsistent, oscillating between neglect and intervention. Despite 
this, certain fundamental assumptions about the region have remained 
constant over time, particularly around the weakness and incapacity of 
Pacific Island countries. Over the past several years, the Australian policy 
and political community has combined this long-held understanding 
with growing concerns about China’s influence in the region, resulting 
in increased anxiety, if not alarm, about risks to security and a renewed 
determination to ‘step up’ and counterbalance. However, the distinctly 
differing conceptions between Australia and Pacific Island countries about 
what the ultimate threat to security is means that Australia’s approach 
threatens to undermine the very goals it is aiming to achieve. 
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This chapter examines New Zealand’s ‘Pacific Reset’ (Reset) policy to 
determine whether it is a response to anxieties about China’s growing 
presence in the Pacific Islands region. In March 2018, New Zealand’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Winston Peters announced the 
Reset and its significant policy shift, both financially and diplomatically. 
The  Reset includes a NZ$714.2 million allocation to New Zealand’s 
Official Development Assistance fund, with the Pacific as the major 
recipient, and 14 new diplomatic posts. On its face, this is a significant 
change in New Zealand’s foreign policy in the Pacific. Intriguingly, Peters’ 
announcement was made the day after former United States secretary of 
state Hillary Clinton, in a visit to New Zealand, warned of China’s soft 
power push into the Pacific. It also came amidst concerns expressed by New 
Zealand and Australian officials about China’s chequebook diplomacy in 
the region. Despite this seemingly obvious reason for the Reset, the New 




This chapter argues that the Reset is intended to address concerns about 
China’s increasing presence in the Pacific and is a result of the perspective 
New Zealand has adopted about China’s place in the region. This 
perspective has largely been influenced by years of neglect of the region 
by Western powers, a point that has often been stressed in New Zealand 
foreign policy circles, but usually by those not directly involved in the 
decision-making processes. These years of neglect were accompanied 
by the use of aid as a political tool, often as leverage over Pacific Island 
countries, a point not lost on foreign policy observers, particularly those 
in the region. New Zealand’s perspective has also been influenced by the 
rise in the number of external actors in the region, giving the impression 
of a more contested Pacific geopolitics. While these external actors pose 
no real rivalry to the incumbents, they raise interesting possibilities, 
which are influencing how New Zealand views the region. For a country 
that has since World War II taken strong measures to provide a security 
architecture in the region, both for itself and its allies, these possibilities 
can appear threatening.
Whether New Zealand’s perspective about China is accurate is another 
matter. Though New Zealand has always welcomed Chinese money, it has 
been more ambivalent about its political presence in the Pacific. On this 
front, New Zealand has clearly taken the position that China’s activities, as 
it perceives them in the context of regional geopolitics, are troubling and 
warrant a response of the magnitude of the Reset. This chapter examines 
various statements and arguments contained in speeches about the Reset, 
the policy context in which the Reset was formulated and the most recent 
document produced by the New Zealand Ministry of Defence, which 
complements the Reset. These strongly suggest China is the focus of 
the Reset. 
What is behind the Pacific Reset?
The Reset was announced in March 2018 by New Zealand’s Deputy 
Prime Minister, the Honourable Winston Peters, at a speech delivered at 
the Lowy Institute (Peters 2018a). According to Peters, there were several 
reasons for the Reset. First, the Reset is part of a ‘dramatic’ change in both 
the domestic and foreign policies of the coalition government, which 
came into power in late 2017. The coalition is made up of three political 
parties: the Labour Party (one of the two major parties), New Zealand 
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First and the Greens. Notably, both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade and the Minister of Defence are from New Zealand First, a party 
that sits on the centre-right of New Zealand politics. Second, the Pacific 
is facing ‘social and environmental problems’, which are ‘attracting an 
increasing number of external actors and interests’. According to Peters, 
these problems are prompting changes that, at times, are not ideal for the 
Pacific Island countries, because the ‘need and temptation often leads to 
greater risk than prudence would suggest’. In response, New Zealand wants 
to be a good neighbour and assist Pacific Island countries in addressing 
these challenges in a way that preserves their autonomy. Third, the Pacific 
is becoming more important to international relations. Fourth, stability 
in the Pacific is critical to New Zealand’s national security. Peters noted 
that these reasons needed to be understood, in particular the following 
geographical, historical and social facts about New Zealand: it is a Pacific 
country, historically, culturally, politically and demographically, and ‘the 
Pacific is where New Zealand matters more, wields more influence and 
can have a more positive impact’. In other words, New Zealand is a small 
player in international relations, but in the Pacific region, constituted 
primarily by microstates, it has and wields considerable influence. While 
it is not a ‘big power’, it can act like one.
Is the Reset aimed at countering the influence of China in the Pacific? 
The New Zealand Government has not directly said that this is the Reset’s 
purpose; in fact, Peters has stringently denied that the Reset is ‘specifically 
to counter China’ and instead explained in a 2018 Radio New Zealand 
interview that it is designed:
to ensure that the shape and character of our neighbourhood 
maintains the level of influence of countries who believe in 
democracy … who believe in sovereignty and countries who have 
got the best interest of the neighbourhood in mind, not some 
wider and larger purpose (Radio New Zealand 2018f ). 
Although a number of commentators have inferred a link between the 
Reset and increasing Chinese influence (Novak 2018; Reuters 2018; 
Walters 2018b), they provide no direct evidence.
However, there is considerable circumstantial evidence that the purpose 
of the Reset is to counter China. A report by Stanford University’s 
Hoover Institution, Chinese Influence and American Interests: Promoting 
Constructive Vigilance, argues that New Zealand is ‘vulnerable to Chinese 
influence’ and that ‘China appears ready to exploit’ New Zealand’s 
THE CHINA ALTERNATIVE
146
pursuance of closer ties with it ‘to subvert New Zealand’s continued 
ability to independently shape its policy priorities’ (Diamond and Schell 
2018:169). In the aforementioned radio interview (Radio New Zealand 
2018f ), Peters was asked to respond to the following comment:
It [the report] goes on to say that New Zealand has long pursued 
ties with China but what is changing is the willfulness with which 
China appears to exploit the dynamic with New Zealand and to 
subvert New Zealand’s continued ability to independently shape 
its policy priorities. What are you doing as foreign minister to 
counter that?
Peters replied:
You know what I’m doing to counter that. The first thing we did 
when we became a government and I became foreign minister was 
set out to evaluate what had gone on and that’s why we’ve got the 
Pacific Reset, which is a huge turnaround in our approach to our 
neighbourhood and our engagement with it, and our engagement 
in it, and our engagement with each … every government in the 
Pacific and also those other players such as Japan, Australia, the 
European Union, the UK, France (ibid.).
At the very least, Peters’ conflicting statements suggest that China is a factor 
in the Reset. 
A critical analysis of Peters’ Lowy Institute speech and subsequent rhetoric 
and actions sheds further light on this issue. Specifically, Peters stated that 
the Pacific:
has also become an increasingly contested strategic space, no 
longer neglected by great power ambition, and so Pacific Island 
leaders have more options. This is creating a degree of strategic 
anxiety (Peters 2018a).
Arguably, China is the great power New Zealand is strategically anxious 
about. China, the US and perhaps France are the only great powers active 
in the region, and, of these, China is the relative newcomer. France and 
the US have long histories as colonisers in the Pacific and continue to 
control their dependencies and, in the case of the US, Compact of Free 
Association states. As such, it is nonsensical to believe that France and the 
US are the ones Peters referred to as having ‘great power ambition’ in the 
Pacific, even taking into consideration the recent inclusion of the French 
dependencies in the Pacific Island Forum (PIF). Further, it would be 
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surprising if New Zealand was becoming strategically anxious about the 
actions of the US in the region after both countries signed the Wellington 
and Washington declarations in 2010 and 2012, respectively. Both 
declarations, but especially the first, commit each country to enhancing 
their partnership in the Pacific, particularly in addressing security issues. 
Of the great powers in the Pacific (the UK effectively departed after the 
Cold War and is only now reestablishing ties), China is the only one 
whose ambitions would cause New Zealand strategic anxiety.
However, anxieties about the increasing presence of China in the Pacific 
must be understood in context. If New Zealand had retained its traditional 
influence in the Pacific, a response to China’s increasing influence in the 
magnitude of the Reset might not have been required. Instead, it is the 
relative demise of New Zealand’s, and its allies’, influence that is causing 
consternation in Wellington and gave rise to the Reset. One area where this 
is particularly noticeable is in Pacific regionalism, or regional cooperation 
between Pacific countries, including former colonial powers. New Zealand’s 
and Australia’s domination of Pacific regionalism is no secret. Initially, 
regionalism served the interests of the metropolitan powers, and it was not 
until the 1960s that ‘Island leaders began to challenge this biased regional 
framework’ (Tarte 1989:183). Even then, because these powers provided 
the bulk of the funding to the main regional organisations—the Pacific 
Community and the PIF (New Zealand and Australia for the PIF)—they 
were best positioned to control the regional agenda in pursuit of their 
interests (Bryant-Tokalau and Frazer 2006:2). Nevertheless, the Western 
powers’, particularly Australia’s and New Zealand’s, domination of Pacific 
regionalism is waning. Led primarily by Fiji, Pacific Island countries are 
gaining greater control over the regional agenda, not only with the formation 
of new organisations such as the Pacific Islands Development Forum, but 
also in determining the agenda of the premier regional organisation, the PIF 
(Fry and Tarte 2015).
Does the Reset entail a new direction 
in New Zealand foreign policy?
The policies that constitute the Reset lift New Zealand–Pacific relations 
to a different level, and appear to push them in a different direction. 
According to Peters, the Reset has two distinct strands: ‘back-to-basics’ 
diplomacy and an increase in assistance. The first involves engaging Pacific 
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countries with New Zealand’s views of the ‘strategic environment facing 
the Pacific, including the proliferation of external actors’ (Peters 2018a). 
This follows five principles approved by the New Zealand cabinet: 
1. Demonstrate understanding of the Pacific shaped by government and 
non-government actors.
2. Exhibit friendship through more interaction, in particular frank 
conversations at the political level, which also entails a greater focus on 
the Pacific than previously. 
3. Strive for solutions of mutual benefit.
4. Achieve a collective ambition, whereby New Zealand and its allies 
would work together with Pacific countries and other external actors 
to achieve common aims.
5. Seek sustainability.
The second involves a budgetary increase, which had not been done 
since 2008, and a rise in New Zealand diplomatic expertise, particularly 
in the Pacific. According to Peters, this will demonstrate New Zealand’s 
commitment to the region, allowing New Zealand to do more in 
relation to issues such as climate change, good governance, human 
rights and women’s political development, as well as give more funding 
to multilateral institutions. Overall, New Zealand seeks ‘leadership 
diplomacy’, in conjunction with Australia, that goes beyond the ‘donor/
recipient interaction and into genuine, mature political partnerships’ 
that involve ‘understanding, friendship, mutual benefit, and collective 
ambition, to achieve sustainable results’ (ibid.).
The two most important changes in the Reset are the level of investment 
in the diplomatic core that engages on Pacific issues and the change 
from a donor–recipient model to one of partnership. As noted, one of 
the glaring deficiencies or issues with New Zealand’s previous Pacific 
engagement was its relative lack of attention to diplomatic integrity; 
while professionals designated to regions such as Asia and Europe were 
equipped with relevant language and cultural training, the same was not 
expected of those sent to the Pacific. This is not to say that those deployed 
to the Pacific were not well versed in Pacific languages or cultures, or 
were not genuinely focused on the region. However, according to Powles 
and Powles (2017), New Zealand diplomats to other regions are expected 
to have greater expertise than those sent to the Pacific. In most other 
regions, it is usual practice to appoint ‘senior New Zealand diplomats 
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with training and professional experience in the field of diplomacy’ 
(Powles and Powles 2017:20). In many cases, these diplomats will have 
been trained in local languages by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade. By comparison, New Zealand has a much lower proportion of 
professional diplomats heading its Pacific posts (ibid.). Peters implicitly 
hints at this phenomenon, stating that the Reset is a ‘strategy based on 
mutual respect’ (Peters 2018a). If the Reset entails a radical change, was 
there a lack of mutual respect previously? 
New Zealand’s Pacific identity came to the fore of its foreign policy in the 
early 1970s, particularly with the Kirk Government. However, whether 
New Zealand was seeking a partnership with the region, or regarded their 
relationship as something less, is questionable. Gerald Hensley, a New 
Zealand diplomat and head of the prime minister’s department under two 
administrations, notes that during the early years of the Pacific-focused 
foreign policy approach, New Zealand demonstrated a lack of genuine 
and meaningful engagement: 
The new emphasis on the South Pacific, however, was no more 
than a polite fiction … Revealingly, politicians and diplomats 
who carried the message of NZ’s Pacific identity to foreign 
governments rarely confirmed their words by wanting a posting 
there (Hensley 2013:307–8). 
The Pacific was a convenient (or inconvenient) means to an end: ‘The stress 
on the South Pacific was a fig leaf to cover a more fundamental withdrawal 
from the world’ (ibid.).
Rightly or wrongly, New Zealand has also used its aid to the Pacific as 
a  tool to control, or at least influence, the region to advance its own 
interests. For the past several decades, New Zealand has dedicated the 
majority, approximately 60 per cent, of its overseas development assistance 
to the Pacific, but not for altruistic reasons. John Henderson, who served 
as the head of the prime minister’s office under David Lange, noted:
A 1989 audit report of MERT [Ministry of External Relations 
and Trade] identified foreign aid as a ‘principal tool in our foreign 
policy’ in the South Pacific. It noted the importance of aid for 
providing access to key decision makers at both the political and 
official levels. While the report also emphasised the role of aid in 
developing island state economies, it linked this to reducing the 
scope for outside ‘undesirable influences’ to meddle in the region. 
… Political outcomes were more important than the economic 
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and humanitarian reasons for providing the aid. Aid was an 
important instrument of foreign policy. As the 1990 policy 
review put it: ‘Our mana as a people of the Pacific is maintained 
through our ODA because it gives substance to our relationships’ 
(1999:287–88).
Pacific leaders and other commentators on Pacific geopolitics have long 
known the inequity of this relationship, as well as New Zealand’s, and its 
closest ally Australia’s, condescending and overbearing approach. The PIF 
(formerly the South Pacific Forum) was specifically formed to give Pacific 
countries more autonomy from the regional influence of metropolitan 
powers, including New Zealand. New Zealand, along with Australia, was 
associated with the colonial approach to regionalism and, understandably, 
was not initially included as a full member of the PIF; they were observers 
(Tarte 1989:184). Regional leaders such as Fiji’s first prime minister Ratu 
Sir Kamisese Mara expressed concerns about New Zealand’s and Australia’s 
dominance of the regional agenda (Bryant-Tokalau and Frazer 2006:3). 
These concerns were later echoed by other leaders and commentators. 
Bryant-Tokalau and Frazer noted:
For inter-governmental organisations in particular, the funding and 
involvement of Australia and New Zealand has meant a striking 
asymmetry of power in the running of those organisations and in 
the settling of regional policy (ibid.). 
They conclude that while it would be going too far to say that Pacific 
countries ‘have completely lost control of the regional agenda … it is 
not very clear just how much control they have left’ (Bryant-Tokalau and 
Frazer 2006:20). Winston Peters’ rhetoric suggests that New Zealand 
is finally acknowledging the asymmetrical power relationship between 
it  and Australia on the one hand, and the Pacific Islands on the other, 
and is prepared to treat the Pacific Island countries as equals and partners.
New Zealand’s back-to-basics diplomacy, which kicked off with a tour of 
the region in 2018 and a plan to ‘spend considerable time’ there (Peters 
2018a), suggests a new-found emphasis on relationship building. The five 
principles of the Reset indicate not only the policy areas of future focus, 
but also past neglect. Notably, there is an emphasis on engaging the Pacific 
as equals, something that was obviously lacking previously. Peters’ rhetoric 
is telling. He noted that exhibiting friendship includes ‘honesty, empathy, 
trust and respect’, which ‘means staying in frequent touch at a political 
level’ (ibid.). He also noted, in reference to Australia, that ‘I suspect our 
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two countries … have been preoccupied with other parts of the world 
when building on our own borders are matters of concern’ (ibid.). His last 
statement speaks to Hensley’s point. 
New Zealand has neglected the Pacific, but Peters underestimates the 
extent to which and ways this has been done. He is correct that New 
Zealand has not devoted as much financial resources to its relationship 
with the region as other Pacific partners, such as Australia and China, 
and that, diplomatically, New Zealand has not paid enough attention 
to Pacific Island countries’ perspectives. New Zealand has treated the 
region as a  recipient, a tool in its broader foreign policy objectives. 
However, Peters fails to appreciate, or at least express, that New Zealand’s 
and Australia’s overbearing and neo-colonial approaches have resulted 
in a failure to recognise that these countries are not just sovereign, but 
autonomous. Not only do many have legal standing in the international 
community as sovereign nation-states, they also have been striving, as 
independent countries, to control their affairs without undue influence 
from abroad, particularly from their previous colonisers, of which China 
is not a part. Peters’ Lowy Institute speech betrays a foreign policy attitude 
not dissimilar  from the past. On the one hand, he stated that ‘Pacific 
countries want to stand on their own two feet as equals, make their own 
choices and have their distinctive voices heard on the global stage’, and 
the Reset ‘will be a  strategy based on mutual respect’ (Peters 2018a). 
On the other, he stated:
New Zealand’s view is that we must be respectful of Pacific Island 
countries’ clear wish to manage their own international relations 
while at the same time retaining New Zealand’s traditional 
emphasis on human rights, the rule of law, transparency, good 
governance and the promotion of democracy (ibid.).
And then, ‘But make no mistake. Isolation and a lack of size is no excuse 
for failing to strive for the best of standards’ (ibid.). This is somewhat 
reminiscent of the hermeneutic rule: forget the nonsense before the 
‘but’. Aid conditionality based on what New Zealand considers ‘good 
governance’ appears to be as firm a part of New Zealand’s foreign policy 





More external actors are seeking diplomatic relations with Pacific Island 
countries. Aside from the usual suspects, such as the US, China, Taiwan 
and Japan, a number of other external governments are entering or 
reentering the Pacific geopolitical scene. Britain, whose presence in the 
region waned in the 1990s, is officially back. In early 2018, it announced 
a major reengagement with the Pacific, involving, among other things, 
the reopening of embassies in Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu. This could be 
an inconsequential development. According to Fraenkel, ‘I don’t really see 
the connections with the Island states figuring in a major way in British 
foreign policy in the future. It’s too far away and its interests aren’t there’ 
(Radio New Zealand 2018a). However, the fact that Britain reopened 
only nine diplomatic posts around the world, and three are in the Pacific, 
suggests something more significant. 
Among the new or newer actors are Indonesia, India, Russia and, most 
recently, Israel. Although their contributions and influence in the region 
pale in comparison with established Pacific hegemons, their presence 
makes the geopolitical scene interesting, if for no other reason than that 
they are giving Pacific Island countries more options for assistance, however 
little it might be relative to that provided by the traditional benefactors. 
Nevertheless, there may be other reasons to take these actors seriously. 
Russia, though far from being a player in the Pacific, is appearing on 
the region’s geopolitical radar. Russia has been actively seeking to build 
ties with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including Fiji (Muraviev 
2018). In 2012, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov 
became the first senior Russian government official to visit Fiji. This was 
reciprocated a year later when Fijian Prime Minister Voreqe Bainimarama 
made an official state visit to Russia. In January 2016, Russia donated 
approximately 20 containers carrying weapons and military hardware to 
Fiji. Russian military personnel were then sent to train the Fijian military 
on their use. Fijian government officials said the weapons were to be 
used to rearm Fijian peacekeepers serving in United Nations missions 
(Doherty 2016). In 2017, Russia based 100 personnel in West Papua 
and flew two nuclear-capable Tu-95 bombers over the South Pacific in 
late 2017, taking off from airfields in Indonesia (Knaus 2017). In May 
2018, a Russian training warship arrived in Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
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and was welcomed by PNG officials. Interestingly, the visit was termed by 
PNG’s minister for foreign affairs and trade Rimbink Pato as a ‘pre-APEC 
gesture of friendship’ (Riordan 2018), even though APEC was scheduled 
for November. Peters’ concerns about the Pacific being a contested 
geopolitical space are well-founded. 
Is China’s presence posing a threat to 
New Zealand?
Since China entered the Pacific in 1975, signing diplomatic agreements 
with Fiji and Samoa, its presence and influence have risen dramatically, 
particularly in the post–Cold War era when powers like the US and Britain 
visibly withdrew. By the 2000s, it was not uncommon for Pacific Island 
countries to espouse ‘Look North’ policies (Crocombe 2007; Henderson 
and Reilly 2003). Though China’s purpose was initially to counter Taiwan’s 
efforts to gain diplomatic recognition as the official government of China, 
this has morphed into something larger, especially in past two decades. 
China’s increasing presence threatens the influence that the Western 
allies, particularly the US, have enjoyed in the Pacific for much of the 
20th century. Whether China is seeking to become the regional hegemon, 
and in particular challenge and perhaps supersede the US, is not known. 
On the one hand, it could be argued that China uses the Pacific to test 
its power against the US and its allies as part of its global aspirations for 
hegemony (Henderson and Reilly 2003). On the other hand, China’s rise 
in the region could be seen as typical for a rising global power, and it 
possibly has no specific intention to challenge the US or any of its allies 
(Crocombe 2007). Regardless of the viewpoint taken, there is no doubt 
that New Zealand and its allies view China as a threat to their interests, 
especially if its growing influence is not made to conform to the rules-
based international order they largely created. 
China’s initial move into the Pacific was welcomed by New Zealand’s 
allies, in particular the US, as a way to counterbalance Russia. New 
Zealand also welcomed China’s engagement in the region, but probably 
more for the possible increased economic and trade opportunities. 
As a small and isolated country, New Zealand places a high value on trade. 
Since the 1970s, when Britain, then its largest export market, joined the 
EEC (European Economic Community, now the European Union), 
New Zealand has had to seek trade opportunities elsewhere, particularly 
Asia. As such, China has been a focal point for trade relations. This was 
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exemplified when New Zealand became the first OECD (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development) country to sign a free 
trade agreement (FTA) with China. The FTA was enacted despite New 
Zealand having a reputation for being a moral foreign policy actor, and 
despite China’s human rights record. For these reasons, New Zealand 
remains supportive of China’s presence in the Pacific. 
However, New Zealand is more ambivalent about China when it comes 
to security and strategic issues. In April 2018, media reports suggested 
that China had military ambitions in the Pacific. One report claimed 
that China had approached Vanuatu about a military buildup, though 
no formal proposals were made (Wroe 2018). Australia’s 9News network 
‘confirmed’ that the Australian Defence Force was aware that China 
had ‘sounded out Vanuatu about increasing its military engagement’ 
(Uhlmann 2018). In response, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinta 
Ardern noted that she could not comment on the validity of the report, 
but that New Zealand is ‘opposed to the militarisation of the Pacific’ 
(Walters 2018a). Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister 
Winston Peters stated the militarisation of the Pacific is ‘something New 
Zealand had been “seriously concerned about” for a while now’ (ibid.). 
Though he did not specifically mention China, Peters did note:
There were a number of players doing certain things in the Pacific 
that are not good for the peace and security, long-term, of the 
Pacific, or for the growth of democracy itself. 
Apart from New Zealand’s allies, China is the only other big player that 
can affect regional peace and security. Importantly, Peters’ statements came 
one month after his announcement of the Reset, where he predicated the 
change on ‘strategic anxiety’ about the Pacific becoming ‘an increasingly 
contested strategic space, no longer neglected by great power ambition’ 
(Peters 2018a). Unless New Zealand was strategically anxious about the 
actions of the US, Australia or Japan, China is the only other option. 
New  Zealand wants Chinese money, but fears Chinese political and 
military influence. 
Since the Reset was announced, New Zealand has ramped up its Pacific 
engagement. It announced 14 new diplomatic posts as part of the Reset, 
10 in the Pacific, including Hawai‘i, and four Tokyo, Beijing, Brussels 
and New York, ‘to co-ordinate development policy and partnerships 
for the Pacific region’ (Radio New Zealand 2018g). Notably, the New 
Zealand Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 
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(New Zealand Government 2018), released shortly afterwards, indicated 
a closer intertwinement of foreign affairs and defence priorities. A 2019 
New Zealand Ministry of Defence publication, Advancing Pacific 
Partnerships, has a section entitled ‘Defence’s Pacific Reset’, which makes 
it clear that Defence’s strategic policy settings are aligned with the Reset 
(New Zealand Government 2019). 
The Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018 (Statement) sets out the 
principles that guide New Zealand’s defence policies. China is, again, 
treated with ambivalence. On the one hand, New Zealand recognises 
China’s importance to the region and world affairs, particularly in relation 
to what it perceives as the international rules-based order (IRBO). On the 
other, it explicitly and implicitly expresses concern about China’s pursuit 
of its interests internationally, including in the Pacific. It notes that 
Washington and Beijing are in competition with each other, and that this 
has consequences for other countries. Importantly, it notes that China 
does not promote, or adopt, similar values to the order’s ‘traditional 
leaders’, including around governance, human rights, development and 
economic liberalism. Further, it argues that, in some instances, particularly 
in military affairs, China is challenging the IRBO. It is within this context 
that China’s increasing presence is discussed. Although the Statement does 
not specifically mention the Pacific, it states that the challenges posed 
to the rules and norms by countries that are in pursuit of ‘spheres of 
influence’, ‘is a risk for open societies, including New Zealand’. China 
is one of the countries (Russia is the other) that is specifically identified 
as pursuing ‘spheres of influence’ (New Zealand Government 2018:17). 
China’s influence internationally and in the Pacific is prompting new 
narratives about New Zealand defence. 
Notably, the Statement also expresses concern about Russia. It notes that, 
in integrating into the IRBO, Russia, like China, has not always done so 
in accordance with the values and principles of the traditional leaders. 
Indeed, Russia has gone further. It ‘has attempted to discredit Western 
democracy by challenging its “internal coherence”, leveraging information 
operations, and exploiting existing fissures with Western societies’ (ibid.). 
Though Russia is not mentioned in relation to the Pacific, two factors 
connect it to the region. First, Russia is viewed as an ally of China. 
Second, Russia is making its presence felt in the Pacific. While China and 
Russia are not acting in concert in the region, at least not explicitly, the 
possibility that they may in the future cannot be ruled out.
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China’s rising presence in the Pacific can easily be construed as a threat to 
New Zealand’s interests in the region. First, it gives Pacific countries an 
alternative source of financial assistance, giving them more leverage when 
engaging with traditional benefactors, and arguably more autonomy. 
Whereas New Zealand’s attaches conditions to its aid, China does not, 
although recipient countries are expected to adhere to its One China 
policy. Often, recipient countries have more discretion in how Chinese 
grants and soft loans are used as opposed to aid from New Zealand. 
In fact, China provides financial assistance for specific projects requested 
by Pacific Island countries, such as funding for new infrastructure, 
swimming pools, parliament buildings, wharfs and the like. The China 
alternative reduces New Zealand’s ability to use aid as a political tool in 
the Pacific.
China’s policies, and the way it engages Pacific Island countries, often do 
not support New Zealand policies, not that they should. For example, 
China does not promote good governance or human rights. New Zealand 
has and continues to promote these and similar norms; according to 
Peters, these are non-negotiable parts of the Reset (Peters 2018a). From 
a New Zealand perspective, China also follows an alternative model 
of development, which the Statement conceptualises as ‘a liberalising 
economy absent liberal democracy’ (New Zealand Government 2018:17). 
These threats to New Zealand’s interests are not new, and analysts such as 
Henderson and Reilly (2003) have examined them. However, they appear 
relevant to the current government’s view of China. 
Newer concerns involving security matters are also emerging. The first is 
the possibility of a Chinese military presence in the Pacific Islands region. 
Aside from rumours, this concern also springs from a belief that Chinese 
economic policies are intertwined with their military ambitions. China’s 
economic growth has been accompanied by an increase in its military 
power (Robertson and Sin 2017:91) and there is speculation from the 
US, at least, that the two go hand in hand. With reference to both Asia 
and the Pacific, former deputy assistant secretary of defence for South and 
Southeast Asia Joseph Felter claimed that China was aiming to establish 
‘dual-use’ facilities, such as commercial ports, that could be converted to 
military bases (Radio New Zealand 2018c). This should not be a surprise; 
as China’s economic power increases it will expect a role in the Asia-Pacific 
commensurate with its rise (Mapp 2014:2).
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The intertwinement of Chinese economic and military goals has been 
associated with the debt-trap narrative. China’s economic plans, known 
popularly as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) include ‘Pacific pathways’ 
(Garrick 2018), and seven Pacific countries have signed up for it: PNG, 
Samoa, Fiji, Niue, Cook Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu (Radio New Zealand 
2018e). According to Garrick (2018), the fear is that China will use the 
loans associated with its BRI as leverage to expand its military footprint.
The debt-trap narrative was most prominently deployed at the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting held in PNG in 2018 by US Vice 
President Mike Pence, who accused China of luring developing countries 
into debt traps through infrastructure loans. China, in return, rejected 
the accusation, highlighting the fact that no country in the world had 
fallen into a ‘so-called debt trap because of its cooperation with China’ 
(The Economic Times 2018). However, China’s promised US$4 billion of 
finance to build PNG’s first national road network (Global Construction 
Review 2017) does prompt questions about PNG’s debt situation and the 
implications of China’s financing. 
Pence was not the first to use the debt-trap narrative. In early 2018, 
US Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Scott Swift warned that China 
would increase debt in a given country and then ask for something in 
return that was not part of the original deal (Parker and Chefitz 2018). 
Parker and Chefitz argued that Pacific countries should be included in 
those that could be affected by China’s debtbook diplomacy, particularly 
Tonga, Vanuatu and PNG. They noted that China is ‘positioning itself 
to capitalise on the impending fiscal distress of Pacific Island countries’ 
(Parker and Chefitz 2018:41). Since that 2018 report, the narrative has 
gained traction. Former Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop noted, 
‘We want to ensure that they [Pacific Island countries] retain their 
sovereignty, that they have sustainable economies and that they are not 
trapped into unsustainable debt outcomes’, and that ‘the trap can then be 
a debt-for-equity swap and they have lost their sovereignty’ (Power 2018). 
Seidel (2018) argued, ‘Debt-trap diplomacy is behind a new land grab’. 
Rightly or wrongly, New Zealand has been implicated as one country that 
is countering the possibility of debt traps through an extensive campaign 
of aid, trade and diplomacy (Lintner 2018; Kehoe 2018; Wu 2018). 
Not all are convinced of the debt-trap argument. According to Fox and 
Dornan (2018), this argument is predicated on ‘anecdotal evidence’ 
rather than ‘hard data’. Using international debt data, Fox and Dornan 
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argued that, although debt is a problem in the Pacific Islands region, the 
‘debt distress’ is not a result of lending by China. They note that ‘Chinese 
lending comprises less than half of lending in any single country’ and 
makes up around 12 per cent of the total debt owed by Pacific nations, 
even though China is the largest bilateral lender. Notably, 88 per cent 
of the total owed by Pacific nations is comprised of debts by PNG and 
Fiji. However, in both countries, ‘domestic debt dominates government 
borrowing’. Further, ‘it is only in Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu that Chinese 
lending comprises over one-third of total debt’, and the debt-trap only has 
basis in relation to Tonga, where there is a ‘high level of debt distress, 
and Chinese lending dominates’. Fox and Dornan concluded that the 
debt-trap argument ‘is without foundation’.
The potential problem of Pacific Island countries falling into significant 
debt is a concern to New Zealand. Deputy Prime Minister Peters cautioned 
Pacific governments about walking into debt traps (Walsh 2018), and 
Japan has expressed interest in cooperating with New Zealand to resolve 
the Pacific Island debt problem (Radio New Zealand 2018d). New 
Zealand has good reason to be concerned about the possibility of debt 
traps. The problem with Fox and Dornan’s argument, and conclusion, 
is that it is predicated on the debt level of the region as a whole. Clearly, 
China does not need to have the entire region in a high-debt ratio to itself 
in order for the debt-trap narrative to have basis. The region does not act as 
a single entity, but as independent, sovereign countries. China only needs 
at least one country in the region to be in a debt-trap scenario in order for 
the narrative to make sense. It is akin to arguing that there was no debt-
trap problem in Asia before Sri Lanka gave up its port to Chinese control. 
Even if only Tonga and/or PNG and Fiji gives up control of its ports, 
or some other strategically important asset, the debt-trap narrative could 
make sense. Further, the level of debt does not have to be the key issue in 
this narrative. Instead, it is the extent to which debt would allow China 
to have undue influence on the recipient countries in question (O’Keefe 
2018). China does not need to be the biggest creditor to these countries 
in order to achieve this. Nevertheless, it is one of the biggest creditors 
in some cases, like Vanuatu, where about half of the country’s foreign 
debt is owed to China, and Tonga, where 60 per cent of the country’s 
foreign debt is owed to China (Klan 2018). China does not need control 
of strategically important assets in every Pacific Island country.
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If debt issues can pave the way for increased Chinese military presence 
in the region, as aforementioned, this would be problematic for New 
Zealand’s interests in the Pacific and threaten what has long been the 
Western allies’ security control over the region. Before New Zealand took 
over some of the German colonies in the region on behalf of Britain at the 
beginning of World War I, it had long held aspirations to project military 
might in the Pacific. The opportunity to do so arose post–World War II. 
As the victorious great powers (US, Great Britain and China) planned the 
division of Japan’s Pacific territories, New Zealand and Australia made 
their own play for strategic control of the region through the Canberra 
Pact (or the ANZAC Pact) (McIntyre 1995:227). The pact continues to 
inform New Zealand defence and security policy through the present (New 
Zealand Government 2018). It provides for a ‘permanent machinery for 
collaboration and cooperation’ between the two countries in all defence 
matters of mutual interest, to the extent that they are acquainted with each 
other’s mindset, so that there will be ‘the maximum degree of unity’ in the 
presentation of their views ‘elsewhere’ (Vandenbosch and Vandenbosch 
1967:21). The pact is important to the principle of New Zealand and 
Australia being a ‘single strategic entity’ (McKinnon 1998). The US, for 
its part, has had control over the Micronesian region’s security issues, 
particularly through its compacts of free association with Palau, Marshall 
Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, for the better part of the 
20th century to the present. 
The Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS 
Treaty) has played an important role in the collective security policies 
of those countries in the Pacific. Though the 1984 Lange Government’s 
nuclear-free policies caused the cessation of the ANZUS Treaty 
commitments between New Zealand and the US, relations have largely 
been restored by the Wellington and Washington declarations. Notably, 
the Wellington Declaration commits the two countries to a strategic 
partnership in the Pacific. Further, these declarations were signed around 
the same time the US made a visible return to the region. In 2009, in 
response to the Australian 2009 Defence White Paper, then US secretary of 
state Hillary Clinton stated, ‘We want Australia, as well as other nations, 
to know that the United States is not ceding the Pacific to anyone’ 
(Davies 2009). She was referring to the broader Asia-Pacific region, but 
the Pacific was a key consideration. In 2011, the US built one of its largest 
embassies in Australasia in Suva. In 2012, it sent Clinton, still secretary 
of state, to the PIF, a first in the history of the organisation. Arguably, 
these actions were done in response to China’s increasing presence in the 
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Pacific. The rising power of China in the region was clearly the context 
for Clinton’s 2009 comments and subsequent rhetoric associated with 
president Obama’s Asia-Pacific pivot (Clinton 2011; Eckert 2011).
China could pose a strategic challenge and security risk to New Zealand’s 
and its allies’ domination of the Pacific. Despite President Trump undoing 
many of Obama’s international commitments, including the Pacific pivot, 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the Paris Agreement on 
climate change, not much appears to have changed in the US’s view of the 
Pacific. Vice President Pence’s pre-APEC comments warning China about 
seeking undue influence, clearly referencing the Pacific, shows that the US 
continues to take the region seriously. In 2019, when Solomon Islands 
renounced its diplomatic recognition of Taipei in favour of Beijing, Pence 
cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Sogavare, which was 
to have taken place on the sidelines of a United Nations General Assembly 
meeting in New York. According to Rampton (2019), a senior US official 
claimed the cancellation was due to the switch. If true, it is quite ironic; 
the US recognises Beijing, not Taipei.
Nevertheless, it shows the US’s concern with China’s increasing influence 
in the region. 
However, perhaps more important are the broader implications of 
China’s rising influence in the region. The Ministry of Defence’s Strategic 
Defence Policy Statement 2018 identifies three key threats to the 
IRBO: spheres of influence, challenges to open societies and complex 
disruptors. China is important in relation to the first. Although New 
Zealand recognises that ‘China is deeply integrated into the rules-based 
order’, it believes China has ‘not consistently adopted the governance 
and rules championed by the order’s traditional leaders’ (New Zealand 
Government 2018). In particular, China’s positions on human rights and 
freedom of information are different from New Zealand’s. Further, China 
does not follow the same ‘model of development’ as the West, preferring 
‘a  liberalising economy absent liberal democracy’ (ibid.). In  terms 
of military power, New Zealand is concerned with the expansion  of 
China’s military presence in the Asian region, at times in contravention 
of conventional practices regarding sovereignty. While none of these 
issues are prominent in the Pacific, there is the odd sign that something 
of a similar nature might emerge.
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From a New Zealand perspective, Western allies need to retain control 
of security issues in the Pacific, and a Chinese military presence, should 
it eventuate, would threaten that control. This priority is somewhat 
evident in the Reset and related policies. In his Lowy Institute speech, 
Peters stated that national security was one of three reasons the Pacific was 
important for New Zealand. Though he did not mention China’s rising 
influence, he did warn of great power ambitions in the region. In noting 
that the US was ‘grappling’ with the same realities as New Zealand, it is 
obvious he was not referring to the US itself. That leaves China. Notably, 
Peters urged Australia, the European Union and the US ‘to better pool 
our energies and resources to maintain our relative influence’ in the 
Pacific (Peters 2018a). Before attending a regional forum that included 
a meeting with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Peters spoke of the 
need for those in the Western camp to address ‘the new ball game’ in the 
Pacific (Radio New Zealand 2018b). He did not clarify what the new ball 
game was. However, given his statements at the Lowy Institute and the 
‘spheres of influence’ discussion in the Defence Statement, it is arguable 
that China is the focus. In November 2018, Peters announced the 
Pacific Enabling Fund as part of the Reset and stated that ‘the coalition 
government is committed to rebuilding New Zealand’s standing in the 
Pacific’ and that the fund would allow engagement with Pacific partners 
on a range of activities that sit outside New Zealand’s formal aid funding 
arrangements, including military cooperation activities (Peters 2018b). 
Steff (2018) notes:
Ultimately, balancing China in the South Pacific will require 
greater coordination with Australia—still the Pacific’s largest 
donor—and reading out to other states. Japan, South Korea and 
the United States share concerns about China chipping away at 
their relative influence. 
After decades of relative neglect, New Zealand recognises the need to reset 
its policies and reassert it and its allies influence in the region, with a focus 
on defence and security issues. 
Conclusion
Whatever China’s activities in the Pacific, whether building dual-purpose 
infrastructure or enticing countries into debt traps, it is clear that New 
Zealand has adopted the view that they warrant a considerable shift in its 
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foreign policy approach, and this is manifest in the Reset. To be sure, this 
view is not explicit in New Zealand’s statements concerning the Reset, 
and the New Zealand Government fervently denies that it is intended 
to counter China. Nevertheless, an analysis of related rhetoric and policy 
documents by the New Zealand Government indicate that the anxieties 
behind the Reset could not have been caused by any other actor in the 
region except China.
This view or representation of China must be understood in context. 
It  comes after decades of neglect and a neo-colonial approach to the 
region, the result of a miscalculation on the part of New Zealand and its 
allies; they assumed the Pacific was under their control. Pacific loyalty was 
probably taken for granted. After decades of using aid as a political tool 
to leverage New Zealand’s interests vis-à-vis those of the Pacific Island 
countries, the latter discovered a new source of power. With the rise in 
the number of external actors in the Pacific, particularly China, New 
Zealand’s pride of place in the region, which it had developed through 
various security arrangements, is vulnerable. Regional geopolitics is 
changing, and China’s growing presence is the key contributing factor. 
Compounding New Zealand’s anxieties is the apparent vulnerability 
of Pacific Island countries to Chinese aid, giving rise to the debt-trap 
narrative. In the context of New Zealand’s, and its allies’, history in the 
region, China’s presence has caused consternation to the extent that 
a policy like the Reset is warranted.
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Gerard A . Finin
A new era
For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, America’s global 
leadership is being directly challenged. In Asia, blunt trade policies 
imposed upon China by the Trump administration had raised the spectre 
of a trade war. United States’ withdrawal from the critically important 
Paris Climate Agreement during the Trump years prompted widespread 
condemnation by the global community, particularly from Pacific Island 
nations. President Trump’s advocacy of unabashed US unilateralism also 
generated tensions with European allies, including close partners that for 
generations cooperated with the US in maintaining stability.
In contrast, the 2020 election of President Joseph Biden is all but 
certain to usher in a return to the Obama administration’s emphasis on 
multilateralism to advance peace and stability, consciously avoiding the 
hairpin policy turns, contradictions and befuddlement evident over 
the  last four years. One of the Obama administration’s flagship foreign 
policy initiatives was its ‘rebalance’ or ‘pivot’ towards the Asia-Pacific, 
a  decision that reflected long-term economic and demographic trends. 
The historically robust US military presence across the Asia-Pacific region 
was balanced by multinational military exercises, the proposed Trans-Pacific 
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Partnership trade agreement and enhanced public diplomacy. Although 
the rebalance was clearly articulated during the Obama administration’s 
first term by secretary of state Hillary Clinton, there were in retrospect 
insufficient concrete actions to impart real credibility. At  best, the 
pivot remained largely aspirational, and never gained traction as a true 
transformation in US foreign policy. With many of the same individuals 
who initially conceived the ‘rebalance’ now back in government, analysts 
are asking whether the ‘rebalance’ will in some form be resurrected?
Despite stark differences in approach and style compared to his 
predecessors,  the Trump administration continued to pursue US power 
projection across this vast area—a pillar  in America’s westward strategy 
with roots dating back to the late 19th century (Anderson 2015). What 
distinguished the Trump administration was its sharp focus on potential 
threats from China as it attempted to amplify the US’s profile and presence 
across the renamed Indo-Pacific region. However deep the contemporary 
political divisions with the US may be, there is broad agreement that 
China cannot be left unchallenged. China’s increasingly authoritarian 
state is viewed as an aggressive threat to the regional order that must 
be confronted. The Biden administration’s change in tone and policy 
branding will do little to alter the Trump administration’s deployment 
of the full array of US government departments and agencies operating 
under the loosely constructed, and at times contradictory, Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific Strategy (Roy 2019).
Consistent with this new thinking about China’s motivations in Oceania 
are New Zealand’s Pacific Reset and Australia’s Pacific Step-Up initiatives, 
both designed to counter the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) desire to 
play a larger role in the Pacific Islands region. And even if the US has yet 
to clearly define what it is now calling the ‘Pacific Pledge’, there can be 
little doubt that this is a transformational moment in the Pacific region, 
with Australia, New Zealand and the US anticipating a much more highly 
competitive era. While slow in gaining full momentum, the new ‘whole of 
government’ responses to China’s rise by Western powers are increasingly 
evident in Oceania as well as across the Indo-Pacific more broadly. 
The Biden administration’s National Security Council point person for 
Indo-Pacific strategy advocates ‘the need for a balance of power; the need 
for an order that the region’s states recognize as legitimate; and  the 
need for an allied and partner coalition to address China’s challenges to 
both’ (Campbell and Doshi 2021:1).
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Evidence of this change has been apparent in Washington well before 
the 2020 presidential election. For instance, in March 2019 senior White 
House staff, including the senior director for Asian affairs and the director 
for Oceania and Indo-Pacific Security on the National Security Council 
visited Vanuatu and Solomon Islands for meetings with top officials. 
Other indications of intensifying US focus in the region in 2019 include 
a sharp uptick in funding for public diplomacy programs, new military 
to military initiatives between the Pentagon and Fiji’s armed forces and 
visits to the region by US congressional delegations. New Pacific Island 
activities among Washington-based research and educational institutions 
such as the Hudson Institute and Georgetown University’s Center for 
Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies suggest interest is by no 
means limited to government.1
High-level North Pacific engagement
The effort to stem Chinese influence in the North Pacific was evident 
in a February 2019 statement by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo 
addressing the foreign policies of two North Pacific nations that have 
a special ‘free association’ agreement with the US. Both the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Republic of Palau (Palau) were 
commended for positions clearly at variance with US policy regarding 
official recognition of Taiwan. Quoting the US vice president, Secretary 
Pompeo said: 
America will always believe Taiwan’s embrace of democracy is an 
example to be internationally supported. We respect and support 
the decision those of you have made to continue to support Taiwan.
Left completely out of the statement was any mention of the Federated 
States of Micronesia (FSM), the largest nation in Free Association with 
the US, and the only North Pacific Island nation that, like Washington, 
recognises the PRC. Shortly thereafter, however, a senior delegation of US 
1  These activities include seminars and roundtable dialogues focusing on Oceania’s evolving 
strategic position. Similarly, the DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies recently 
convened a Strengthening the US–Pacific Islands Partnership workshop in Fiji that brought together 
a who’s who of Oceania’s regional organisations. An example of the increase in Pacific-focused 
publications is a recent Hudson Institute paper on the use of foreign aid to counter China’s Djibouti 
Strategy (Lee 2019). Additional evidence of US military activity is the deployment of some 200 US 
troops to Palau for an exercise known as Pacific Pathways. 
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military, coast guard and Department of the Interior officials travelled to 
meet with leaders of the FSM (as well as FSM’s Chuuk State Government) 
before also visiting Palau and the RMI (Radio New Zealand 2019). 
President Donald Trump subsequently convened an unprecedented 
working-level meeting at the White House on 21 May 2019 with 
Presidents Hilda Heine of the RMI, David Panuelo of the FSM and 
Tommy Remengesau of Palau. The brief Oval Office discussion and 
photo opportunity was intended to advance Compact of Free Association 
economic support renewal negotiations before the 2023–24 deadlines. 
Just a few days prior to the White House event, President Remengesau, in 
an op-ed article published by The Hill (2019), noted how China ‘has risen 
as a serious challenge to US dominance of the Pacific Ocean today’. While 
in Washington, President Heine similarly focused her remarks on Chinese 
pressure, including incursions within the RMI’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
related to the illegal entry of fishing vessels.
Since re-establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979, 
Washington has kept Taiwan at arm’s length politically, as it saw far 
greater prospects for advancing US interests through relations with the 
PRC. However, China’s rapid rise as a global power intent on charting 
its own course has in more recent years created a range of diplomatic and 
economic frictions. This includes its renewed emphasis on reincorporating 
Taiwan into its body politic as part of the One China principle. Under 
President Xi Jinping, it is clear that of the thousands of islands across the 
Indo-Pacific, the Austronesian island state that matters most to Beijing is 
Taiwan. Few scholars dispute that the PRC is resolute in its determination 
to bring Taiwan within Beijing’s direct control. Standing in opposition to 
Beijing’s plans are four sovereign Pacific Island nations, including the RMI 
and Palau, that at least for now appear unwavering in their recognition of 
Taiwan.2 This support for Taiwan, coupled with plans announced by the 
US in 2004 to greatly reduce economic support to the FSM and the RMI, 
has encouraged Beijing to increase diplomatic and economic activities in 
the North Pacific. 
2  Early in 2019, President Xi made this clear to officials and military leaders seated in the Great 
Hall of the People when he stated, ‘The country is growing strong, the nation is rejuvenating and 
unification between the two sides of the strait is the great trend of history’. Later in the address 
he asserted, ‘We make no promise to abandon the use of force and retain the option of taking all 
necessary measures’ (Buckley and Horton 2019).
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While some analysts may see US–PRC competition in the Pacific Islands 
region as a mere replay of the Cold War, when Soviet diplomatic and 
naval activities prompted a sharp US reaction, the dynamics of the US–
China relationship are far more complex. To better understand the larger 
geopolitical developments across Oceania, this chapter explores how US–
China relations are evolving in the three Freely Associated States (FAS) of 
the North Pacific and suggests how and why US policy in the FAS reflects 
larger trends in US–China relations.
Background
America has not been overtly challenged militarily in the Pacific Islands 
region since the US concluded World War II. US activities in the North 
Pacific were especially free of geostrategic constraints because of large US 
military installations in Hawai‘i, Guam and the Philippines. Under United 
Nations (UN) auspices, in 1947 the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
(TTPI) was created where Japan had once ruled (Hezel 2003). The UN 
gave exclusive authority for governing the TTPI to the US. In time, nearly 
all of this island constellation would become the three FAS, each having 
a treaty-like agreement or ‘compact’ with the US guaranteeing unilateral 
and unfettered US military access. During the post-war decades, the RMI 
was the site for 67 nuclear tests, while the Northern Marianas reportedly 
served as a counter-insurgency training location for missions in Southeast 
Asia and for support of the Chinese Nationalist Party based in Taiwan. 
With the US represented in the South Pacific by American Samoa, as well 
as close bilateral ties with Australia, Britain, France and New Zealand, the 
entire Pacific Islands region during the post-war decades came to be seen 
by many US policymakers as an ‘American lake’ (Underwood 2017).3  
The slow pace of TTPI economic development and Cold War pressures 
during the 1960s and 1970s brought about a dramatic per capita increase 
in US funding for the TTPI. Historian David Hanlon assessed the failures 
of these financial infusions when he observed:
3  In the words of former US congressman Robert Underwood (2017), ‘The absolute arrogance 
of these activities was given various justifications at the time. It was classic imperialist exploitation 
papered over with the flimsiest of authority. As we look at those days, the old saying in the Trust 
Territory comes to mind. The islanders had the trust and the Americans had the territory’.
THE CHINA ALTERNATIVE
172
The messy entanglements that marked efforts at economic 
development by the mid-1970s resulted in part from Trust 
Territory government offices, federal bureaucracies and 
international aid agencies working at cross-purposes or against 
one another in institutionally prescribed ways in the development 
game (1998:237). 
If the initiatives to stimulate economic development fell short of stated 
goals, the US-led efforts to establish vibrant democratic institutions 
with elected representative bodies met far greater success. Similarly, the 
establishment of public educational institutions (from primary through 
community colleges) and cultural exchanges (e.g. the Peace Corps) saw 
significant gains (Stayman 2009).
A UN-monitored vote in the late 1970s subsequently offered TTPI 
residents the opportunity to formally become an unincorporated part of 
the US. This was rejected by most of the TTPI districts (Levy 2008). 
Therefore, during the mid-1980s and through the early 1990s, the TTPI 
structure transitioned to a new arrangement wherein three new nation 
states and one commonwealth were created. The Northern Mariana 
Islands chose to become a commonwealth of the US, with a legal status 
similar to that of Puerto Rico. The RMI and Palau, each embracing 
considerable cultural homogeneity, voted to become sovereign unitary 
republics. The more culturally diverse FSM was created by establishing 
four state governments within one country: Chuuk, Kosrae, Pohnpei 
and Yap.
What is distinctive about the US’s relationships with these three countries 
is the special bilateral agreements that were created to maintain close and 
mutually beneficial ties. The idea of free association was first established 
between New Zealand and two neighbouring South Pacific nations, Cook 
Islands (1965) and Niue (1974). Self-government in free association 
provided greater sovereignty and independence for the smaller developing 
nations without hindering visa-free movement to the larger nation 
for residency, employment or education.4 With some modifications, 
this served as the model for the three newly established nations in the 
North Pacific.
4  While Cook Islanders and Niueans elect their own parliaments and national leaders, they travel 
internationally with New Zealand passports. This has complicated their desire to have UN representation.
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Following independence, the FSM, the RMI and Palau, despite initial 
US reluctance, joined the UN and other international institutions 
with full membership rights and responsibilities. At the same time, the 
compacts of free association in the North Pacific provided for continued 
US economic assistance and exclusive US military access. Importantly, 
in keeping with the principles of sovereignty and self-government, each 
party retains the right to unilaterally withdraw from the free association 
agreement (Stayman 2009:9). Despite the obvious asymmetries between 
the interactions of a continental power and smaller states, the basic US 
relationship with the three FAS advances the national interests of each 
of the parties to the compacts. Over some three decades, none of the 
signatory nations have ever taken steps indicating they wish to abrogate 
their respective free association agreement. 
Early years of nationhood
The first compacts of free association were signed by the US with the 
FSM and the RMI in 1986. An impasse over proposals to make Palau 
nuclear free delayed its independence until 1994. US budgetary and 
program support to the FSM and the RMI from 1987 through 2003 is 
estimated to have totalled US$2.1 billion. For a total population of less 
than 160,000, this represented approximately US$900 per capita basis on 
an annual (Finin 2013:24).
The success of the FAS in developing vibrant democratic political 
institutions contrasts with the ongoing challenges of creating more 
self-reliant economies, particularly in the FSM and the RMI. A number 
of post-independence initiatives to stimulate these economies, such as 
the establishment of domestic fishing fleets, fared poorly (Hezel 2006). 
An  in-depth assessment of the economic support provisions of the 
FSM and the RMI compacts by the US General Accountability Office 
(US GAO) in 2003 found that:
many Compact-funded projects in the FSM and RMI experienced 
problems because of poor planning and management, inadequate 
construction and maintenance, or misuse of funds. Further, the 
US, FSM, and RMI provided little accountability over Compact 




The initial 15 years of the FSM’s and the RMI’s independence (often 
termed Compact I) demonstrated the complexities of island development 
in an environment with limited capacities and young institutions. At the 
same time, it underscored the need make development investments more 
effective. Following prolonged negotiations focusing on mechanisms to 
ensure greater accountability of US funds, Compact II (2004–23) created 
a new structure for US economic support with an emphasis on the health 
and education sectors. 
Under the new Compact II arrangement, five-person economic 
management committees were established for each country. Membership 
in the FSM’s Joint Economic Management Committee (JEMCO) and 
the RMI’s Joint Economic Management and Financial Accountability 
Committee (JEMFAC) was composed of three US members and two from 
each of the respective countries. This imbalance in JEMCO and JEMFAC 
representation, seen by many as a neocolonial imposition, was described 
by former US congressman Robert Underwood of Guam as ‘less free and 
more compact’ (2003). From the perspective of the FSM and the RMI, 
there were perhaps fewer anxieties about the stricter process of review 
and approval for the expenditure of compact funds (US$3.6 billion in 
economic assistance 2004–23) than were concerns regarding deep 
infringements of national sovereignty. To many observers, the JEMCO 
and JEMFAC structures suggested less collegiality and amity in working 
toward common development goals, reintroducing a process more akin to 
pre-independence TTPI-style budgetary rule.
Furthermore, Compact II required the establishment of trust funds for 
each nation. The trust funds were strongly suggestive of US thinking 
about its future relationships with the FSM and RMI. Widely interpreted 
as an economic exit strategy for the US, Compact II specified a schedule 
of reduced annual US treasury flows (called decrements) for recurrent 
government expenditures (e.g. public worker salaries, government 
program budgets) and an increase in funds deposited annually into 
the trust funds’ accounts. These accounts were intended to create an 
investment pool sufficient to generate the income needed to sustain the 
FSM’s and the RMI’s fiscal requirements after the economic support 
provisions of the compacts expire. The yearly decrements in US funding 
for recurrent expenditures soon forced the FSM and the RMI to attempt 
budget cuts while simultaneously seeking alternative sources of revenue 
and economic support.
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An analysis of the trust funds by the US GAO published before the 
2008 global economic crisis foresaw management challenges and market 
volatility that would call into question projected revenue streams (US GAO 
2007). A subsequent 2018 US GAO analysis of actions needed to prepare 
for the post-2023 transition to trust fund income concluded that ‘the trust 
funds are increasingly likely to provide no annual disbursements in some 
years and to not sustain their value’ (2018:1). 
Even before this most recent report, however, both the FSM and the RMI 
sought assistance from other countries. For instance, in 2008 and 2010 
FSM reportedly deposited US$1 million from Chinese grants in the FSM 
Trust Fund. The RMI established its own trust fund under an agreement 
with Taiwan wherein US$10 million was contributed as an initial 
corpus. By 2017, this fund had grown to US$15.1 million (US GAO 
2018:79–80).  
In light of the looming scheduled deadline for major US economic support 
to end, the FSM and the RMI have explored new economic development 
opportunities. For example, in 2018 the RMI took preliminary steps 
to embrace digital currency as a way to attract more economic activity, 
pulling back only when International Monetary Fund officials warned 
of significant dangers (Baraniuk 2018). Although it is highly likely that 
agreement with the US will be reached, both countries have carefully 
assessed what the potential vacuum in economic support could mean for 
their future bilateral relationships with the US and other nations. 
In contrast to its neighbours, the Republic of Palau has a record of strong 
economic growth and fiscal performance that places it as one of the Pacific 
Islands’ only upper middle–income countries. Its per capita gross national 
income of US$13,950 (2017) is more than three times that of FSM’s and 
more than twice that of the RMI’s.5 Its trust fund, established at the time 
of independence in 1994, was valued at an estimated US$184 million in 
2015. The extended eight-year delay in the passage of US congressional 
legislation providing economic support, initially promised in 2010, has 
been resolved. This has once again set the relationship between the two 
countries on solid footing for renewal prior to the 2024 deadline.
5  See pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org.
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Viewed as a whole, the bilateral ties between the US and the three 
countries with free association relationships are generally positive, with 
US embassies in each of the capitals facilitating regular communication 
and monitoring the work of numerous US federal agencies. Still, there can 
be little doubt that the eventual withdrawal of major US funding to the 
FSM and the RMI creates uncertainty about the future and encourages 
both nations to explore new forms of engagement with existing allies 
or potential new partners.
Current US security interests
For well over seven decades, the Pacific has been seen as critical to US 
national security and other core US interests in the region. The compacts 
of free association in the northwest Pacific provide for exclusive US access 
to the waters, land and airspace over an area of more than 5,590,460 square 
kilometres, an expanse nearly as large as the continental US.6 Catalysed 
by China’s ambitions, as well as the changing geostrategic environment 
across the Pacific generally, the US is currently reassessing its relations 
with the FAS. To a greater extent than ever before, these three sovereign 
island nations are gaining both voices and negotiating leverage with some 
of the world’s most powerful nations (Wesley-Smith and Porter 2010).
The US views the FAS as peaceful, stable democracies that regularly hold 
free and fair elections and maintain commendable human rights records. 
There has never been civil unrest or disruptions of the constitutional 
processes comparable with those of some neighbouring allies such as the 
Philippines. Within the UN, the voting records of the FSM, the RMI and 
Palau are ranked as being among the most consistent with positions taken 
by the US. Citizens of the FAS value their visa-free access to the US for 
purposes of study, work or residency without time limitations. In light of 
the US taking responsibility for their national defence, the FAS are able to 
focus on domestic issues such as health and education. Qualified citizens 
of the FAS are eligible to join the US military, with increasing numbers 
serving in all branches of the armed forces stationed around the globe.7
6  CIA World Factbook. See also, www.seaaroundus.org.
7  See, for example, Nathan Fitch’s 2018 documentary about the FSM’s citizens in the US military, 
Island Soldier. www.islandsoldiermovie.com
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Though all three countries have some similarities, it is important to 
distinguish analytically between the FSM, the RMI and Palau, as the 
strategic importance of each to the US must be seen through a separate 
lense. There is little doubt, for example, that the major billion-dollar 
investments in US military assets in the RMI’s Kwajalein are unrivalled 
in the region. Similarly, the economic trajectories of the three FAS are 
distinctive, with Palau having developed a thriving private sector fuelled 
by its tourism industry. Foreign policies and diplomatic relations also vary. 
As noted previously, only the FSM formally recognises China, while Palau 
and the RMI both have long-standing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. 
However, to a greater degree than ever before, China seeks enhanced 
engagement with the FSM and is simultaneously pushing to advance its 
One China policy in the RMI and Palau.
Critical to understanding the dynamics that underlie contemporary 
developments are two separate but related issues, both concerned with 
US security interests. With the current economic support arrangements 
between the US and the FSM and the RMI set to expire in just three 
years, there are major economic uncertainties. FSM compact sector and 
supplemental education grants ending in 2023 comprise 33 per cent 
of the government’s total expenditures. The RMI compact sector and 
supplemental education grants ending in 2023 constitute 25 per cent 
of the government’s total expenditures (US GAO 2018:20–22). Such 
a  significant reduction in US budgetary support to the FSM and the 
RMI, if matched by a proportionate reduction in government services, 
has the potential to disrupt social and political stability.8 
At the same time, the US is currently seeking to bolster its military 
capabilities in the FAS through new infrastructure and signals installations. 
Such enhancements to the strategic posture of the US, particularly in 
relation to the PRC’s island-building activities in the South China Sea, are of 
increasing priority. Palau’s President Remengesau unequivocally welcomed 
a larger US military presence, stating that all three Freely Associated States 
are ‘natural allies in the Pentagon’s new Indo-Pacific strategy’ (2019).
8  Moreover, both countries may lose population. The visa-free access to the US provided by the 
compacts of free association could, in the face of diminished public services and economic uncertainty, 
lead to increased out-migration, especially among those citizens with marketable skills. Over time, the 
majority of the FSM’s and the RMI’s citizens may choose to reside in the US, conceivably prompting 
the two island governments to adopt policies that encourage more skilled in-migration from other 
Asia-Pacific nations. This is already the case for Cook Islanders and Niueans in the South Pacific, 
where there is a free association structure with New Zealand.
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As the US confronts a fast-changing geopolitical environment across the 
Indo-Pacific, it is clear that 2023–24 represents a significant juncture. 
This date offers policy options for economic decoupling with the FAS or, 
alternatively and more likely, opportunities to bolster bilateral relations 
through new economic support structures. It appears highly probable that 
the once-heralded plans for significant decreases in US economic support 
to the FSM and the RMI will be cast aside in favour of realpolitik. This 
new environment offers the FAS unprecedented opportunities to advance 
their respective national interests.
Overseas development assistance in the 
Freely Associated States
After more than a decade of implicit agreement by China and Taiwan to 
maintain the status quo in terms of diplomatic ties, changes in Taiwan’s 
internal political dynamics, reflected in the 2016 national elections, 
resulted in renewed competition for official recognition. The decisions 
by Kiribati and Solomon Islands in September 2019 to recognise China 
further altered the geostrategic currents. This strategic competition 
for the FAS is evident in aggressive diplomacy as well as expanding 
overseas development assistance (ODA). Concurrently, the increasingly 
competitive dynamic between China and the US has altered how US 
policymakers are thinking about future economic support in the North 
Pacific as well as new opportunities for cooperation with Taiwan.
Competition between Beijing and Taipei for diplomatic recognition has 
brought about intensified outreach efforts, such as aid project ribbon-
cutting visits by Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen to Palau and the RMI. 
This has been accompanied by other relationship-strengthening measures, 
including the signing of a visa-free entry agreement for the RMI’s citizens 
(Radio New Zealand 2018a). Taiwan has also attempted to garner broader 
support within the region by demonstrating greater inclusiveness than 
China in education and training programs that allow individuals from all 
Pacific Island developing states to participate.9 
9  This is seen, for example, in the scholarship program for the University of the South Pacific 
funded through the Pacific Islands Forum.
179
5 . ASSOCIATIONS FREELy CHOSEN
The tension between Taiwan and China was evident in recent years 
during the Pacific Islands Forum meetings hosted by Palau in 2014 and 
the RMI in 2013. From the perspective of the Pacific Island nations, 
however, it is not the diplomatic skirmishes but the annual flows of ODA 
that are of far greater significance.
Neither China nor Taiwan participated in the 2009 Cairns Compact 
on strengthening ODA coordination and transparency in the Pacific. 
Both countries have eschewed collaborating with Western development 
initiatives in favour of charting their own independent courses in the 
Pacific (Finin 2011). Still, there is little doubt among Pacific Island aid 
specialists that Taiwan’s overall aid program pales in comparison to China’s. 
For China, the principles of South–South cooperation— equality, mutual 
benefit, common development and non-conditionality—have long been 
articulated as the basis for their ODA globally, and the Pacific is no 
exception (Kato et al. 2016:144).10
It is estimated by the Lowy Institute that in recent years China has spent 
nearly five times as much as Taiwan in the region. The most comprehensive 
estimates suggest China has expended US$1.26 billion, while Taiwan has 
allocated US$224.03 million. Moreover, China’s projects are reported 
to be some nine times larger on average. Yet, from another perspective, 
Lowy’s analysis found that because the countries that recognise Taiwan 
have much smaller populations, when viewed on a per capita basis, Taipei 
spends US$237 to Beijing’s US$108 (Nguyen and Pryke 2018). Among 
the Pacific countries having smaller populations, such calculations may 
play a role in policymakers’ decisions. 
Participation in China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative has been extended 
to each of the eight Pacific nations that recognise Beijing. However, the 
Beijing-based Taihe Institute recently warned that a number of Pacific 
Island nations would be bad or risky investments for Belt and Road 
projects (China Economic Review 2018). The possible leverage associated 
with such debt, as well as the burdens of debt service payments, has the 
potential to limit Pacific governments’ future expenditures on basic needs. 
In the North Pacific, it appears the FSM has thus far resisted major loans 
from China (Greenfield and Barrett 2018).
10  Concessional and non-concessional financing by China, sometimes in cooperation with state-
owned enterprises providing loans and investments, makes it difficult to distinguish what qualifies as 
ODA (Asplund and Soderberg 2017:108–14). 
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President Xi Jinping’s visit to Port Moresby for APEC’s November 
2018 meeting and his special side gathering with the leaders of Pacific 
Island countries that recognise Beijing allowed China to emphasise how 
potentially transformational Belt and Road Initiative projects could be 
for its diplomatic allies. Meanwhile, at the same APEC gathering, the 
US vice president appeared to depend heavily on Australian goodwill 
to announce ‘joint cooperative’ aid initiatives for the Pacific, suggesting 
USAID was not prepared to offer any major new projects to the region. 
From the perspective of numerous Pacific Island policymakers, Taiwan 
and other metropolitan donors will have to redouble their efforts as 
China becomes an increasingly influential Pacific power, both militarily 
and economically. Based on the recent decisions by Kiribati and Solomon 
Islands to recognise Beijing, it remains an open question whether Taiwan’s 
intensified diplomatic efforts will continue to dissuade its remaining four 
Pacific allies from concluding that the current momentum and tide of 
history favours China.
Despite increasing activity by both China and Taiwan in the North 
Pacific, it is important to underscore that within the FAS, the US and the 
Western multilateral development banks it heavily supports remain by far 
the largest contributors to national development. Multilateral institutions 
appear more eager than ever before to broaden and deepen activities in 
Oceania. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has announced plans 
to set up seven new offices around the region: Cook Islands, the RMI, 
the FSM, Palau, Nauru, Tuvalu and Kiribati will all are slated to have 
an ADB mission by the end of 2022. The ADB’s portfolio of work in 
the region has doubled every five years since 2005. It currently stands at 
$US2.9 billion, with total assistance expected to surpass $US4 billion by 
2020 (Radio New Zealand 2018b).
The World Bank’s offices in Washington DC and Sydney both have 
growing programs with the FAS. A major region-wide research and 
publication effort focusing on ‘Pacific Possible’ includes an optimistic 
vision through 2040 for endeavours such as tourism, fisheries and labour 
mobility (World Bank 2017). Major World Bank investments are being 
made in information and communications technology, specifically the 
installation of fibre optic cables for broadband connectivity. By 2020, for 
instance, a US$63.5 million connectivity project in FSM had connected 
Chuuk and Yap. The second phase of the project includes cables that will 
connect the republics of Nauru and Kiribati, and additional funding from 
the ADB will connect Kosrae (World Bank 2018). Considered as a whole, 
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these recent developments suggest that there is more new development 
partner engagement in the North Pacific than at any time since the 
Cold War.
Still, it is widely acknowledged that the process of getting Western-funded 
projects off the ground in the FAS can at times be delayed by years. In some 
cases the delays are well justified, while in others it appears the approval 
process may be overly bureaucratic. For example, in 2016, US$40 million 
in US compact fund expenditures for the RMI was approved, a reflection 
of the fact that from 2012–15, most compact infrastructure money was 
on hold. It was only with the aid of New Zealand–based engineers that 
dozens of stalled projects were finally launched (The Marshall Islands 
Journal 2017).
In contrast, there is a perception by many Pacific Island policymakers that 
China and Taiwan are both adept at fast-tracking priority projects. In the 
case of large infrastructure endeavours funded by China, this sometimes 
means that all materials and labour are shipped in for a project, allowing 
only minimal local input. But there is little doubt that the project 
will proceed without delay and be completed on schedule. A recent 
comparative study of ODA in Tonga and Vanuatu found that China’s 
diplomats do not obscure the transactional nature of their relationship with 
the Pacific (Cheng and Taylor 2017). Moreover, compared to traditional 
ODA partners, there is ordinarily little conditionality and only minimal 
reporting requirements. Interestingly, it was noted that both China’s 
and Taiwan’s ambassadors appear to have greater discretionary spending 
authority than the ambassadors representing traditional aid donors such 
as the US, Australia, Japan and New Zealand (Funaki 2017). Close 
examination of specific activities within the three FAS helps illuminate 
the dynamics of diplomatic and economic relations on the ground.
Federated States of Micronesia
The FSM (population 103,000) established formal diplomatic ties with 
China in 1989. Since then, the relationship has grown, including the 
2014 creation of the commission on economic trade cooperation. FSM’s 
presidents have all consistently articulated adherence to the One China 
policy. In advancing their strategic goals, it is notable how China and Taiwan 
have gone beyond ODA chequebook diplomacy. Both have worked equally 
hard to cultivate Pacific Island leaders through official state visits featuring 
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ceremonies that bestow status and prestige. The extensive formal protocol 
and high-level access to leaders during official visits by Pacific Island leaders 
to Beijing and Taipei is carefully observed across the region and is consistent 
with the practices often reserved for larger nation states.
Indicative of the level of attention China accords Pacific countries that 
maintain formal diplomatic relations was the March 2017 official state 
visit of FSM’s then president Peter Christian. The well-planned event 
included a welcome ceremony at the Great Hall of the People with a full 
military review. A photograph showing both presidents being warmly 
greeted by flag-waving school children as they walked down a red carpet 
was widely broadcast on social media. President Xi Jinping personally 
invested a significant amount of time in one-on-one discussions related to 
economic development, including the Belt and Road Initiative.11 On the 
subject of tourism, it was noted that China has endorsed the FSM as an 
officially sanctioned tourist destination and announced its support for 
a range of infrastructure projects related to growing the FSM’s fledgling 
tourism industry. The release of small block grants for each of the four 
states, as well as the gifting of a new inter-island aircraft, provided media 
headlines that substantially bolstered China’s standing within  FSM 
(Kaselehlie Press 2017). The December 2019 state visit by current 
FSM President David Panuelo followed a similar formula. 
Neither the modest deliverables nor the public respect conveyed through 
such high-profile visits obscure China’s strategic interests in the region. 
The Pacific’s political leadership has a clear understanding of China’s desire 
for strong bilateral relationships that will increase its influence. At  the 
same time, official state visits like that of FSM’s president provide a basis 
for comparison with Washington’s overall lack of high-level attention to 
the FAS, and the Pacific region more generally. Indeed, while on some 
rare occasions Pacific Island leaders have had working meetings in the 
West Wing, there has never been a formal state visit to the White House 
for a Pacific Island leader or group of leaders. Over the last three decades, 
the US president has engaged with the Pacific Island leaders as a regional 
group on only four occasions, with each of these events taking place in 
Honolulu, Hawai‘i.
11  Another recent example of this personal engagement by China’s leadership is Samoan Prime 
Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi’s participation in the Davos Forum in Northern China. While 
in Beijing, he held talks with President Xi Jinping, who promised to work with Samoa on climate 
change issues and deepen ties between the two countries.
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Since establishing diplomatic ties with the FSM, China has undertaken 
a wide range of ODA projects. Chinese embassy discretionary grants 
frequently provide much-needed equipment. Larger infrastructure projects 
are funded from time to time and may, in some cases, be built by local 
construction companies. These include constructing official residences for 
government officials at the national and state levels, as well as providing 
ships for inter-island transport. Block grants for purposes specified by 
state governments are also a regular element of Chinese involvement. 
Educational institutions have benefited from high-profile projects, such as 
the popular FSM–China Friendship Sports Centre gymnasium built at the 
College of Micronesia in Pohnpei. Initially structured as a US$3.8 million 
interest-free loan, it was subsequently announced as a grant. Other small 
grants and gifts are frequently noted in media accounts, such as solar 
streetlights for state capitals and library book donations covering a wide 
range of subjects on China.
Official contact between China’s diplomats and state government officials 
and direct aid to local governments is valued because it bestows prestige 
on local officials, some of whom in time are elected to national offices. 
In 2016, for instance, the Chinese embassy donated US$277,844 for 
the construction of a new gymnasium complex in Madolenihmw. 
In Pohnpei State alone, China has launched a pilot farm in Pohnlangas, 
constructed a greenhouse, initiated biogas projects as well as a mushroom 
demonstration farm (Peterson 2018).
The most ambitious Chinese investment proposal in FSM to date has 
been the plan to build a 10,000-room holiday resort and casino complex 
in the state of Yap, accompanied by direct airline connections to facilitate 
ease of travel for vacationers.12 Announcement of the endeavour in 2011 
surprised Yap’s citizenry and gave rise to considerable debate regarding the 
wisdom of building such a massive resort in a location with a population 
of some 11,000 on a relatively small island (Anderson 2011; Radio 
Australia 2012). In 2015, Yap’s governor and a 12-member delegation 
made a 10-day trip to China. A reciprocal visit to Yap was made the same 
year by representatives of the Guangdong Friendship Association.
12  University of Guam Professor Donald Rubinstein at a public seminar on 8 May 2014 indicated 
that Chengdu Century City New International Exhibition and Convention Center Company Ltd’s 
(better known as ETG) proposed Paradise concept plan consisted of the construction of an oceanfront 
resort complex including artificial offshore islands and bungalows built over the lagoon, golf courses, 
expanded airport and seaport facilities, ‘an immense water reservoir system’ and native towns where 
displaced Yapese would be relocated (Villegas Zotomayor 2014). 
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With the neighbouring Republic of Palau having attracted nearly 90,000 
Chinese tourists in 2016, Yap’s potential for increased tourism presents an 
attractive business opportunity. However, the image of hordes of tourists 
adversely changing Yap’s highly valued culture and traditions, as well as 
other potential environmental impacts, has resulted in the temporary 
shelving of the project. To the extent that most FSM citizens do not 
distinguish between official Chinese Government assistance and private 
sector initiatives, the controversial proposal seemingly undermined 
diplomatic efforts by China to demonstrate that it is a responsible and 
culturally sensitive Pacific development partner.13 Still, the foregoing 
experiences exemplify China’s interest in expanding its economic footprint 
in the FSM.
China’s desire to foster enhanced engagement with FSM is also reflected 
in a pronounced increase in diplomatic activities. In August 2017, 
for example, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Zheng Zeguang visited 
Pohnpei with a high-level delegation and spoke to the FSM’s political 
leaders. A central topic of the dialogue was the FSM Trust Fund that the 
government of the FSM may rely on, in conjunction with the Compact 
Trust Fund, if US economic assistance is not extended after 2023. It was 
noted that China has already made significant contributions to the 
FSM national trust fund in recent years and might be willing to further 
supplement the fund to help the FSM achieve greater self-reliance. 
The vibrant diplomatic linkages between the FSM and China are likewise 
reflected in numerous ‘people-to-people’ programs. Mechanisms such as 
‘sister city’ agreements are being established to strengthen relationships 
and promote investment. For example, the FSM’s Sokehs Municipal 
Government and Zhongshan City recently signed a document designed 
to foster better relations and understanding between citizens of both 
countries. A similar relationship has been announced with Heilongjiang 
province, facilitated by a large visiting delegation that requested 
a reciprocal visit by the FSM’s officials and entrepreneurs.
China has provided a steady stream of opportunities for young people. 
For  many years, the FSM’s students have availed of scholarship 
opportunities in China. In 2017, for instance, Yap State and Hainan 
13  Another point of friction between Yap and a Chinese firm in 2014 centred on the illegal 
harvesting of sea cucumbers (beche-de-mer). It was also found that the company had failed to renew 
its business licence during the previous year (Yap State Government 2014). 
185
5 . ASSOCIATIONS FREELy CHOSEN
established a new sister province–state relationship, at which time 
Hainan made a commitment to provide 50 academic scholarships within 
the next five years for students from the FSM. In addition, a range of 
invitations were extended for youth exchanges and technical transfer 
exchanges. Small grants have been provided on a regular basis for athletic 
activities, including travel stipends and transit accommodations to fund 
the FSM’s participation in the 2016 Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
An emerging and highly sensitive dimension of the FSM–PRC 
relationship in the post-2023 period focuses on the role China may play 
in discussions regarding Chuuk’s (the FSM’s largest state, population 
48,500) interest in changing its political status to become a sovereign 
nation (Jaynes 2015). Throughout the FSM’s history, there has been 
internal contestation between the four state governments and the national 
government over how  to equitably distribute US Compact of Free 
Association funding. Chuuk government officials periodically intimate 
that if they were an independent nation Chuuk would stand to directly 
receive substantially more overseas development assistance from the US, 
China and other nations. 
The US has consistently maintained that its relationship is with the 
national government in Kolonia and any movement by a state to secede 
would, if the state were no longer part of the federation, presumably mean 
an end to compact-related disbursements. While this understanding 
has implicitly buttressed national unity, the proposed 2023 reduction 
of economic support could weaken national cohesion and encourage 
dialogue with China on this issue. The Chuuk lagoon, one of the Pacific’s 
largest and deepest, is of possible strategic interest to the PRC. It was 
once a critically important location for the Japanese Navy and remains 
a potentially important strategic naval asset.
None of the current activities or projects linking China and the FSM 
are outside the bounds of normal diplomatic and economic engagement. 
In comparative terms, the US and China have a similar range of cultural 
and diplomatic activities with the FSM that are intended to bolster 
bilateral relations. However, any significant diminution of US economic 
support could erode the strong bonds the US presently shares with the 




The strategic value of the RMI (population 53,000) to the US currently 
exceeds that of the FSM and Palau due to the long-term lease and major 
Department of Defense infrastructure investments on Kwajalein. From 
both historical and contemporary perspectives, the relationship between 
the two countries is complex.14 By some estimates, the US provides nearly 
80 per cent of the RMI’s annual budget. Overall economic support 
from Washington to the RMI from 2004 to 2023 is estimated to total 
US$1.5 billion. In addition, the US is committed to paying US$18 million 
per year in rent to the RMI Government through 2066 for exclusive long-
term use of Kwajalein’s Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site.
The Reagan Test Site is but one component of several critical defence-
related activities on Kwajalein (US GAO 2002). Facility investments in 
excess of US$1 billion there over the past decade are indicative of both 
the importance of the base as well as the long-range US plans for its use. 
Current land rental agreements have options for renewal after 2066. There 
is no other similar type of major facility in the FAS, though there are 
currently discussions underway about leasing land in Palau for defence-
related purposes. 
Strong diplomatic ties with the US and Taiwan are central elements of 
the RMI’s foreign policy. In 1991, the RMI initially established relations 
with the PRC. This changed in November 1998 when formal diplomatic 
linkages were forged between the RMI and Taiwan, occurring during 
a period when several other Pacific nations such as the Kingdom of 
Tonga were dropping Taipei in favour of Beijing. Since that time, the 
two countries have promoted exchanges and cooperation in the areas 
of fisheries, agriculture, education, tourism, technology and investment.
Despite the lack of a formal diplomatic presence in Majuro, China has 
nonetheless launched investment initiatives. Most recently indicative of 
China’s economic involvement in the RMI was the Rongelap Atoll Special 
Administrative Region (RASA) proposal. Following RASA’s unveiling by 
14  The US nuclear testing program in the Western Pacific detonated 67 blasts between 1946 and 
1958. In 1987, the US Congress allocated US$150 million to the RMI as compensation for nuclear 
radiation claims. Bikini Atoll residents received US$75 million over 15 years with the remainder 
allocated to trust funds. In 1992, an additional US$90 million was conveyed for the resettlement 
trust fund. Approximately US$600 million has been paid as compensation and remediation for 
nuclear testing that occurred between 1946–58 (US Embassy Marshall Islands 2012). 
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Rongelaps’ mayor at the 2018 Asia World Expo in Hong Kong, news 
reports described the endeavour as a ‘utopia for foreign investors featuring 
relaxed tax and visa requirements’ (Smith 2018a). With a vision of making 
the atolls into a ‘Singapore-like hub’, Chinese websites reportedly noted 
as many as 1,000 houses had already been sold.
In November 2018, there was an unusual motion of no confidence against 
then RMI President Hilda Heine, purportedly based on the government’s 
proposal to introduce a cryptocurrency as legal tender. President Heine 
narrowly prevailed, but indicated that the real issue was Chinese interests:
Really the vote of no confidence is about the so-called Rongelap 
Atoll Special Administrative Region, or RASA scheme, which is an 
effort by certain foreign interests to take control of one of our atolls 
and turn it into a country within our own country (Smith 2018b).15
While the RASA-enabling legislation has yet to be enacted and appears 
to face significant domestic and US opposition, this episode suggests how 
China-financed commercial endeavours may strongly influence domestic 
politics in small island societies.
China’s strategy in the North Pacific has, in recent years, demonstrated 
an increased willingness to exercise its commercial influence in the form 
of punitive commercial actions, such as charging vessels flagged with 
the RMI ship registry higher fees when they enter Chinese ports. The 
RMI’s vibrant ship registry program (second only to Panama) may face 
a significant loss of revenue if China continues this practice.16 As is detailed 
in the following, China has also sought to disrupt Palau’s tourism-based 
economy by restricting its citizens’ travel to Palau for holidays.
Although the US’s ODA to the RMI is by far the largest, Taiwan has been 
effective in using instruments of soft power to advance its relationships 
with both Washington and Majuro. Taiwan’s activities complement US 
activities in a manner that deftly helps to maintain amicable relations on 
all sides. Both grants and soft loans are included in Taiwan’s RMI portfolio. 
For example, in 2016 the International Cooperation and Development 
Fund provided a US$4 million loan for a new Home Energy Efficiency 
and Renewable Energy Project encouraging local residents to embrace 
renewable energy (The Marshall Islands Journal 2016). 
15  See also Lorennij (2018).
16  US Department of State official, 22 April 2019. Interview with author.
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Similarly, Taiwan allocates discretionary funds to support many small but 
highly visible projects, such as the construction of outdoor multipurpose 
courts for sports and the installation of solar streetlights (The Marshall 
Islands Journal 2018). In partnership with the Bank of the Marshall 
Islands, Taiwan underwrites a popular micro-loan program. Since its 
inception in 2006, the program has issued some US$4 million in loans 
to over 1,000 customers (ibid.). The Taiwan-supported Laura Farm is an 
experimental agriculture and aquaculture facility where pilot projects are 
tested for applicability to local atoll conditions.
Taiwan and the RMI have frequently highlighted the cultural ties between 
the two nations in terms of sharing a common Austronesian heritage 
and the socioeconomic benefits associated with the relationship. In 
recent years, Taiwan has also stressed its ability to provide high-quality 
specialised medical care through periodic in-country clinics as well 
as educational programs in Taipei. The I-Shou School of Medicine for 
International Students was established in 2013 as part of Taiwan’s goal 
to increase local medical capacities among its diplomatic allies. There are 
presently 25 Marshall Islands students pursuing degrees in a variety of 
fields at universities in Taiwan.
As is true for citizens of the FSM and Palau, the RMI has benefited from 
visa-free entry to the US. It is thought that approximately 1,000 Marshall 
Islanders emigrate to the US each year, a significant feature of the 
RMI–US bilateral relationship that neither Taiwan nor China can easily 
replicate (Hezel 2013). As an increasing number of Marshall Islanders 
leave for employment in the US, the RMI 2011 Census of Population 
and Housing documents an increase in international migration to the 
RMI (Economic Policy, Planning, and Statistics Office 2012). Between 
2006 and 2011, 1,434 individuals entered as migrants, with 80 per cent 
residing in the capital of Majuro. An estimated 43 per cent were from the 
US, while 9.6 per cent were from the PRC.
In light of the overwhelming long-term US presence in the RMI, it is 
unlikely that China will secure a diplomatic foothold. High economic 
dependency on the US suggests the RMI is unlikely to see a plausible 
alternative to maintaining its current diplomatic relationships. The most 
significant threat facing US military facilities in Kwajalein and the RMI 
as a whole is vulnerability to the effects of climate change.
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Republic of Palau
Palau is distinguished by its upward economic trajectory, having become 
one of the most successful economies in the Pacific. With the smallest 
population of the three FAS (approximately 22,000), Palau’s pristine 
natural environment and favourable geographic location for East Asian 
visitors has been used to good advantage in building a dynamic tourism 
industry. Its success as an international visitor destination has also made 
Palau the most globalised North Pacific nation. By numerous measures it 
is among the most prosperous of the Pacific Island nations, with a gross 
national income per capita of approximately US$13,000. Palau is ranked 
60 out of 186 countries on the 2017 Human Development Index, the 
highest of any developing country in the Pacific. (In contrast, the FSM 
is ranked 131 and the RMI is ranked 106.) At the same time, however, 
Palau’s tourism industry is vulnerable on two fronts: heavy reliance on 
tourists coming from a single country and dependence on foreign labour 
in the private sector.
Like the RMI, Palau since 1999 has maintained diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan. The evolution of Palau’s foreign policy began in the early 1990s. 
Prior to independence, policymakers accepted invitations from China and 
Taiwan for informal talks. Decisions regarding its bilateral relationships 
were well considered and included extensive internal debate.17 Since that 
time, Palau has taken a leading regional role in promoting Pacific Island 
nations’ relations with Taiwan, such as hosting the Taiwan–Pacific Allies 
Summit. During such occasions, Taiwan’s sovereignty has been endorsed 
by the Pacific governments in attendance. The summit declarations 
have regularly underscored Taiwan’s impressive achievements in political 
democratisation and called for Taiwan’s participation in international 
organisations such as the UN and the World Health Organization.
Palau receives substantial ODA, primarily from the US, Japan, Taiwan 
and Australia. For fiscal years 2011–24, direct US funding support will 
total US$229 million, as well as an estimated US$36 million in other US 
federal programs and services. Total US support, including both direct 
economic assistance and projected discretionary program assistance, may 
by 2024 approach a total US$427 million (Lum and Vaughn 2017). 
Estimates suggest Palau receives more than US$10 million annually in 
17  See Mita (2010).
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aid from Taiwan, often indicated by signs announcing infrastructure, 
agricultural or training projects funded by grant money from Taipei 
(Lyons 2018). 
Among Palau’s largest infrastructure projects since independence 
has been  the circumferential road around Babeldaob, at a cost of over 
US$144  million (US GAO 2008). US funding for the project was 
limited to 53  miles, with Taiwan funding completion of the ring. 
The US$25 million Japan–Palau Friendship Bridge completed in 2001 is 
one of Japan’s most visible aid contributions to Palau, connecting Koror 
to Babeldaob. Another major endeavour is the Taiwan-funded agricultural 
technical mission intended to advance Palau’s commercial agricultural 
production and thereby reduce food imports. Israel has assisted Palau in 
a similar manner with projects focusing on fish farming, as well as in the 
field of medicine. 
Yet it is the vibrancy of Palau’s private sector that sets it apart from the 
FSM and the RMI. Drawing on historical linkages and investments from 
Japan, Palau constructed its first luxury resort in 1985. After independence, 
efforts were made to diversify the tourism market to include not only 
Japanese but also Koreans and Taiwanese. Palau’s diplomatic relations 
and geographic proximity to Taiwan steadily increased the visitor flows 
from Taipei, which by 2012 had reached 39,695 annually. However, it 
was not long before Taiwanese travel agencies realised the potential for 
working with travel firms in mainland China to send even larger numbers 
of tourists (Hezel 2017).
Although the Chinese Government never designated Palau as an approved 
destination status (ADS) country, it allowed China-based tour agencies 
to promote group package tours there via commercial and charter flights. 
These tour groups rapidly came to constitute the largest share of Palau’s 
tourism industry. Between 2011 and 2015, the number of Chinese tourists 
surged from 1,699 to 86,850 per year, or more than 50 per cent of annual 
visitor arrivals. Based on 2013 figures, the US$41.4 million collected 
from gross revenue business taxes, personal income taxes, general import 
taxes and airport departure green fees were nearly equal to the total grant 
(US$42 million) money received from the US, Taiwan and multiple other 
sources.18 In November 2017, however, the Chinese Government, without 
advance notice, ordered tour operators to stop selling package tours to Palau. 
Travel agencies in China were warned that sending package tour groups to 
18  See Hezel (2017:39).
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locations without ADS status could lead to substantial fines.19 The sudden 
drop in revenues from Chinese tourists has severely hurt Palau’s public and 
private sectors. Not unexpectedly, restoring outbound plane loads of tourists 
from China hinges on Palau establishing formal relations with Beijing and 
acceding to the One China policy.20 The foregoing suggests that Palau may 
in the future conclude that its relationship with Taiwan is not sustainable. 
With interest being shown by major Chinese investors, Palau could, in the 
absence of significant new US military and ODA investments, begin to 
seriously consider a change in diplomatic recognition.21
Conclusion
Washington appears to be gaining a new appreciation of the FAS’s largely 
successful nation-building efforts, which have produced political and 
social stability. US plans to end major US economic support for basic 
services to the FSM and the RMI in 2023 are increasingly viewed by 
Department of Defense policy analysts as imperilling the returns on this 
long-term strategic investment. In light of the special relationship between 
the US and the FAS, as well as increasingly vigorous efforts by Western 
nations to restrain China globally, it is not surprising to observe the US 
taking measures to curtail China’s drive to establish a more significant 
North Pacific presence.
Concurrently, there is a clear awareness by policymakers in the FSM, 
the RMI and Palau of the need for long-term strategic thinking. Recent 
actions suggest all three nations are open to a significant expansion of 
international engagement to advance their respective national interests. 
While the innovative compact relationships between the FAS and the US 
have clearly established mutually beneficial partnerships, this does not 
preclude forging closer alliances with other countries.
19  This development was reported in Lyons (2018).
20  A second potential area of vulnerability for Palau that may indirectly be subject to China’s 
economic leverage focuses on Filipino ‘guest workers’. Despite a rapidly expanding economy 
over the past two decades, there is an increasing dependence on foreign guest workers in Palau 
(including approximately 4,000 Filipino workers and approximately 1,000 Chinese workers). 
Of the approximately 5,000 non-Palauan workers in Palau, some 75 per cent are from the nearby 
Philippines, suggesting a level of self-imposed dependency on guest workers that is unknown in 
other Pacific Island nations (Alegado and Finin 2000). If China were to convince the Philippine 
government to reduce the number of overseas Filipino workers deployed to Palau, this contraction of 
the labour force could potentially be highly disruptive to Palau’s tourism industry.
21  For a fuller explanation of the secretary of state’s trip to Cook Islands, see Myers (2012).
THE CHINA ALTERNATIVE
192
Despite the 2020 election of President Biden, a return to earlier 
US  policies  that were more accommodating to China’s rise is highly 
unlikely. Similarly, other metropolitan countries in Oceania are also 
recalibrating their policies to more firmly contain Chinese expansionism 
through stronger coalitions and more deliberate shaping of the regional 
order. In particular, Australia and New Zealand’s important economic ties 
with China will require both nations to hedge their Pacific stratagems 
vis-à-vis the PRC. At the same time, the strong Australia and New Zealand 
linkages with the US are all but certain to endure. Emboldened by recent 
developments, the FAS can be counted upon to deepen their engagement 
with the US while adroitly managing their respective relationships with 
Taiwan and China.
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In the 21st century, France remains a colonial power in the Pacific Islands, 
administering three non-self-governing territories—New Caledonia, 
French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna—as well as the uninhabited 
Clipperton Island. At a time when China is expanding its trade, investment 
and political relationships with independent nations like Fiji, Samoa and 
Papua New Guinea, Chinese corporations have had relatively limited 
engagement with the three Francophone territories. However, this is 
steadily changing. Chinese companies have expressed interest in resource 
and aquaculture projects in the French Pacific dependencies. At the same 
time, Pacific Island leaders in Noumea and Papeete are looking to increase 
Chinese tourism and expand trade with China. 
In response, Western allies are reinforcing their security engagement with 
Pacific Island nations in an attempt to blunt growing Chinese influence. 
Alongside Australia’s ‘Step-Up’, New Zealand’s ‘Pacific Reset’ and the 
US’s ‘Pacific Pledge’, the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and US) 
governments are also seeking to mobilise strategic partners like France in 
the Pacific Islands region. Australian politicians, media and think tanks 
have welcomed any signs that allies like France and the United Kingdom 
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will play a greater role in the Pacific Islands, presenting these partners as 
‘stable, democratic and Western’ (Maclellan 2012, 2020). In most cases, 
however, this support comes without analysis of the implications for 
local populations, especially those seeking political independence from 
colonial rule.
This tension between the Western security agenda and the development 
needs of small island developing states is a central contradiction that will 
only be exacerbated in coming years. Australia’s former consul-general to 
New Caledonia Denise Fisher has argued that new geopolitical complexity 
creates significant challenges for the French Government:
France is now one of many more players with interests in the 
South Pacific and must compete with them for the attention of 
the small island countries, and even for the attention of the local 
authorities in France’s own collectivities … The entry of numerous 
new players, particularly China with its strategic and economic 
weight, lends a geo-strategic edge even to aid cooperation. Some 
offer new and different models of economic development, not 
necessarily compatible with that of France’s collectivities in the 
Pacific (Fisher 2015:30).
The French state has its own strategic interests in the region, both military 
and economic, that seek to assert sovereignty over the vast 7 million 
square kilometre exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South Pacific 
(Maclellan 2018d). The governments of New Caledonia, Wallis and 
Futuna and French Polynesia have their own agenda around the oceans, 
climate change and resource management, but lack control over key legal 
and administrative powers because of France’s ongoing colonial authority. 
Even so, governments in Noumea and Papeete are extending their 
engagement with non-traditional partners like China. Speaking at 
a seminar on China’s Maritime Silk Road in November 2019, the President 
of French Polynesia Edouard Fritch saw little difference between investors 
from China and other nations: 
It’s the common interest shown by private investors from China 
and  successive French Polynesian Governments that has led 
to China including French Polynesia in its Silk Road initiative 
… We are open to Chinese private investors, just as we were to 
American, French, European, Samoan or New Zealand investors, in 
key economic sectors that open up our markets, such as tourism or 
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aquaculture. I don’t see a difference between an American investor 
and a Chinese investor. If they are honest, they are all worthy of 
our friendship, whatever their nationality (Fritch 2019:4).1
This chapter begins by discussing French President Emmanuel Macron’s 
promotion of an India–Australia–France axis to contribute to strategic 
containment of China in the Indo-Pacific region. It then presents four 
examples where France’s Pacific dependencies are, in contrast, looking to 
greater engagement with China. Their means for increasing engagement 
include increasing trade with China, attempts to increase Chinese tourism, 
the establishment of a Chinese fishing enterprise on Hao Atoll in French 
Polynesia, and Chinese involvement in New Caledonia’s nickel industry.
Each case study discusses the successes and failures of the engagement 
and tensions between Chinese corporate and Pacific government agendas, 
highlighting the lack of nuance and evidence in much media discussion 
of China in the Pacific.
France and the rise of the Indo-Pacific
France as a Pacific power
Philippe Gomès is president of the anti-independence party Calédonie 
Ensemble and serves as one of New Caledonia’s two representatives in the 
French National Assembly. In an interview, Gomès argued that France’s 
ongoing presence in the South Pacific serves as protection against rising 
Chinese power:
China is an exceptional financial power, which allows them to 
invest widely and heavily, wherever they want and notably in the 
Pacific. With China in the region, we’re like flies; they’ll swat us 
just like that. To leave the French Republic is to leave us at the 
mercy of the Chinese. Frankly, to replace France with the Chinese 
is not on. This would be the exact opposite of independence.2
1  All translations from French by the author.
2  Philippe Gomès, President of Calédonie Ensemble and deputy to the French National Assembly, 
17 October 2018. Noumea. Interview with author.
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At a time of geopolitical tensions between China and the US, regional 
interventions are increasingly framed by the concept of the Indo-Pacific 
rather than Asia-Pacific. In much academic and media debate over France’s 
role, however, Indo-Pacific is conflated with the South Pacific, even 
though the strategic and economic dynamics of India and East Asia are 
fundamentally different from those facing small island developing states. 
As noted by the Prime Minister of Samoa Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi:
The renewed vigour with which a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific 
strategy’ is being advocated and pursued leaves us with much 
uncertainty. For the Pacific, there is a real risk of privileging Indo 
over the Pacific (Malielegaoi 2018:6).
The Indo-Pacific framework was used by French President Emmanuel 
Macron when he visited Australia and New Caledonia in May 2018:
France is a great Indo-Pacific power, and it has great power in 
the Indo-Pacific region through its territories New Caledonia, 
Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia, as well as Mayotte and 
Reunion … [The Indo-Pacific region has] more than 8,000 of our 
military personnel who project our national defence, our interests, 
our strategy; the region has more than three quarters of the vast 
maritime zone—that makes us the second largest maritime power 
in the world (Macron 2018).
In an interview, France’s then ambassador to the South Pacific Christian 
Lechevry argued that ‘the notion of the Indo-Pacific may be new for you 
[Australians], but not for France, given our long-standing presence in 
both the Indian and Pacific Oceans’.3 
A 2018 publication on Indo-Pacific security by the French Defence 
Ministry highlights France’s interests in both the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans based on its colonial possessions, where ‘permanent military 
basing allows France to fulfil the security responsibilities of a resident 
power of the Indo-Pacific’ (Ministry of Defence 2018). During President 
Macron’s visit, officials argued that ongoing French colonial control in 
New Caledonia was crucial to France’s Indo-Pacific strategy. This was 
echoed in media coverage:
3  France’s then ambassador to the South Pacific Christian Lechevry, 5 September 2018. Pacific 
Islands Forum, Nauru. Interview with author.
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In terms of geo-politics, losing control over New Caledonia’s 
foreign affairs and defence would undermine Macron’s strategy, 
of which Australia is a stated ally, to strengthen or protect France’s 
influence in the Indo-Pacific region—presumably as a hedge 
against China (Patrick 2018).
For this reason, France has been extending its diplomacy with Pacific 
regional networks. In 2016, after extensive French lobbying, the 
Pacific  Islands Forum (PIF) leaders meeting in Pohnpei ‘accepted 
French  Polynesia and New Caledonia as full members of the Pacific 
Islands Forum’ (PIF Secretariat 2016:5). 
This decision makes them full participants in the regional body, but has 
raised concern about France’s increased influence over PIF policymaking. 
Former Fiji foreign minister Kaliopate Tavola (2019:26) has noted: 
How can FICs [Forum Island countries], for example, persist at 
the UN [United Nations] to push for decolonisation when the 
prospects of increased French influence as a development partner 
are increasingly being programmed into regional activities?
PIF membership for the two dependencies further integrates France 
into regional security policy, given that Paris retains sovereign control 
over their  defence, military forces, policing and many aspects of 
foreign policy.  It  also amplifies the capacity of the French Republic to 
intervene in regional debates about the Blue Pacific and ocean policy 
(Maclellan 2018d).
France is already a member of the Quadrilateral Defence Coordination 
Group alongside the three ANZUS allies. Under the March 2017 
Statement of Enhanced Strategic Partnership between Australia and 
France, the relationship is increasingly global rather than regional, focused 
on North Korea, the South China Sea and the Middle East. However, as 
then prime minister Malcolm Turnbull welcomed President Macron to 
Australia in May 2018, he made it clear that he sees France as a long-term 
ally in the South Pacific: 
France is a Pacific power. It is a Pacific nation and its significant 
presence in the region can only bring benefits to Australia and to the 
region more broadly. We welcome that and we’ll continue to work 
closely with France in our region (Turnbull and Macron 2018).
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This partnership is dominated by Australia’s purchase of submarine 
technology from France in an AU$80 billion deal with France’s Naval 
Group (Carroll and Ell 2017). After a decade of negotiation, the two 
countries also signed a new Mutual Logistics Support Agreement in 2018 
to allow French and Australian naval and air units to use each other’s 
ports, fuel and logistics in the Pacific (Maclellan 2009).
During their 2018 visit, Macron and Turnbull signed a new Vision 
Statement on the Australia–France Relationship, extending an agreement 
first signed by former prime minister Kevin Rudd of the Australian Labor 
Party (ALP) in 2012. In Australia, support for France’s colonial presence 
in the Pacific region is bipartisan, with leading ALP politician Richard 
Marles stating: 
France is a stable and strong democracy which projects the values 
of democracy within a region where democracy is young and we 
can’t take it for granted … France is a very positive player within 
the Pacific, and we very much welcome France’s ongoing role in 
the Pacific (Maclellan 2012; Marles 2012).
Strengthening the quad against China
During his 2018 visit to Australia, President Macron welcomed China’s 
economic growth and engagement with world markets. However, he 
stressed that the Chinese Government must operate within the trade and 
security framework established by the Western allies:
What’s important is to preserve a rule-based development in the 
region and especially in the Indo-Pacific region. It’s to preserve 
the necessary balances in the region (Turnbull and Macron 2018).
In its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, Australia highlighted this 
‘rules-based order’ as a central pillar of regional policy (DFAT 2017). 
To maintain this order, it promotes ‘the quad’—a structure to increase 
quadrilateral coordination between Australia, the US, Japan and India 
to contain China—even though successive Australian governments have 
denied that containment is the objective of these strategic partnerships. 
The French state is eager to engage with this quad network. During a 2016 
visit to Canberra, then defence minister Jean‐Yves Le Drian promoted an 
Australia–France–India axis as the basis of strategic cooperation in the 
region, saying, ‘We need to think of a three‐way partnership that includes 
India if we want security in the Indo‐Pacific region’ (Nicholson 2016). 
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During his 2018 visit to Australia and New Caledonia, President Macron 
again highlighted France’s connection to both India and Australia, two 
countries where the French Government is actively promoting arms sales:
Our shared priority is to build this strong Indo-Pacific axis to 
guarantee both our economic and security interests. The trilateral 
dialogue between Australia, India and France has the possibility to 
play a central role in this (L’Express 2018).
Some French commentators have suggested that this axis relies on Paris 
maintaining colonial rule in New Caledonia, ‘given the new strategic 
ambition—Noumea is the bridgehead for France in its axis with New 
Delhi and Canberra, through which it hopes to block Chinese expansion 
in the Pacific’ (Hacquemand 2018).
During a March 2018 trip to New Delhi, President Macron signed 
a Joint Strategic Vision of India–France Cooperation in the Indian Ocean 
Region to reinforce France’s strategic partnership with India. France is 
also looking to extend bilateral security agreements with Japan and other 
East Asian and Southeast Asian nations on defence policy (Rigaud 2016). 
French military (in)capacity in the South Pacific
In recent years, successive French defence ministers have announced that 
France would coordinate naval patrols with the United Kingdom in the 
South China Sea in support of freedom of navigation (Panda  2016). 
In  June 2018, Defence Minister Florence Parly noted that British 
withdrawal from the European Union after Brexit would not affect their 
ongoing defence cooperation:
When we meet here in Asia, we may no longer be part of the 
same European club, but we still share something of very deep 
significance: vision, strength, values and a willingness to protect 
them (Brattberg et al. 2018).
This increasing strategic cooperation is targeted at China, but is being used 
to justify French colonialism in the Pacific Islands (Vandendyck 2018). 
During his May 2018 visit to Noumea, President Macron reaffirmed the 
notion of France as a mid-sized global power that would be weakened by 
the loss of its overseas colonies:
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What I would like to say from the bottom of my heart, and in 
my role as President of the Republic, is that France would not 
be the same without New Caledonia … France would be less 
beautiful without New Caledonia, because New Caledonia is part 
of this global France, the France which exists in this region of 
the world, tens of thousands of kilometres from Paris. At heart, 
France’s very purpose is to shine across all continents and all 
oceans (Macron 2018).
Despite this, the conflation of Indo-Pacific security with France’s colonial 
presence in the South Pacific is misleading. The notion that the French 
Pacific collectivities are a bulwark against Chinese expansionism is undercut 
by the reality that France deploys very few military assets in the South 
Pacific. After the 2007–08 global financial crisis, there was a significant 
draw down of French forces based in the region, including a 50 per cent 
reduction in French Polynesia (Maclellan 2009). 
France’s regional naval headquarters, ALPACI, are located in Tahiti, but 
there is a vast distance between there and potential conflict zones in East 
Asia. A quick look at the map shows that Papeete is 11,587 kilometres, 
or 6,256 nautical miles, from Beijing. Even adding new scheduled 
deployments, France’s two frigates, three patrol boats and five surveillance 
aircraft based in Noumea and Papeete have very limited firepower. This 
limited capacity is acknowledged by the French Defence Ministry, which 
notes that these French military assets are focused on humanitarian and 
disaster response (Ministry of Defence 2018:12).
Pacific Island governments are also seeking to broaden the dominant 
narrative of security in the region. Alongside traditional notions of state-
centred security and transnational threats (drug smuggling, illegal fishing, 
organised crime), PIF members increasingly address the issue through the 
prism of human security, encompassing the oceans, climate change and 
the management of maritime resources. The 2018 PIF leaders meeting 
in Nauru issued the Boe Declaration, which reaffirms that ‘climate 
change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and 
wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific and our commitment to progress 
the implementation of the Paris Agreement’ (PIF Secretariat 2018).
However, key development partners do not prioritise funding on climate 
change and security, focusing instead on more traditional threats. This 
tension was highlighted in an interview with French Polynesian President 
Edouard Fritch at the 2018 PIF:
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The discussions we had this morning with our partners showed 
that the Indo-Pacific framework is one that everyone is using, 
guiding their interventions in the Pacific. Within this Indo-Pacific 
framework, there is certainly the problem of global warming, but 
there are other problems that are just as important: the security of 
populations, maritime security, national security for each country 
and also regional security. Today, Pacific countries want more 
security and so are looking to all their partners, whether it’s China 
or the United States.4
This perspective of China as a development partner equivalent to the 
US clashes with the dominant ANZUS narrative of China as a regional 
security threat. Tahitian desires to increase engagement with China are 
in tension with Western policies of strategic denial, as France and its 
Anglophone partners seek to halt supposed Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ 
or the potential deployment of Beijing’s military assets to assist the 




The purported role of France as a bulwark against Chinese influence in 
the Pacific Islands is undercut by the reality that local governments and 
businesses in France’s non-self-governing territories are actively seeking 
more engagement with China. 
Despite this, the extent of Chinese influence in the Francophone Pacific 
should not be exaggerated. It’s growing, but Chinese policy is marked by 
contradictions and setbacks. 
Diplomacy in the Francophone Pacific is complicated by bureaucratic 
structures within China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. China’s relationship 
with France and its overseas dependencies is managed by the Department 
of European Affairs. In contrast, China’s diplomacy with Australia, 
New Zealand, the US and the 10 China-aligned PIF countries comes 
under the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs. Unlike 
4  President of French Polynesia Edouard Fritch, 5 September 2018. Pacific Islands Forum, Yaren, 
Nauru. Interview with author.
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independent PIF countries, the French dependencies are not eligible 
for grants from China or programs under the new China International 
Development Cooperation Agency.
There is evidence of varying capability among Chinese diplomats, who—
often to impress superiors at home—exhibit bullying behaviour that offends 
the dignity of Pacific Island leaders (Maclellan 2018c). The clumsiness of 
Chinese diplomacy in French Polynesia is symbolised by a long-running 
dispute between the Chinese consulate and local landowners in Tahiti over 
the ownership of the consulate building first established in Punaauia in 
September 2007 (Brady 2018; Radio New Zealand 2018).
A significant problem in the Francophone Pacific is China’s ambivalent 
attitude towards decolonisation. In their long struggle for self-
determination and independence, the Kanak people and the Maohi 
people are seeking international support (Maclellan 2015a). The historic 
support shown by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for the struggles 
of oppressed and colonised peoples has largely dissipated. Since the 
capitalist roaders took power in Beijing in the late 1970s, the CCP has 
rejected ‘interference in internal affairs’ that might raise parallels with 
Beijing’s ongoing dilemmas over Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Uighur 
nationalism (Anonymous 2010). The Chinese Government is reluctant to 
criticise French colonialism, valuing France as an ally against the US in 
global trade and climate debates.
The Chinese Government also faces complex interactions between ‘new 
Chinese’ migrants and the long-established Chinese diaspora in the 
Pacific. In this regard, French Polynesia is different to the settler colonial 
state of New Caledonia or the smaller Wallis and Futuna. In  Tahiti, 
Chinese migrants have long intermarried into the local elite and dominate 
Tahiti’s business sector (Burns 2000). In New Caledonia, where a majority 
support ongoing ties to France, Chinese businesses often face hostility 
from the European, Javanese and Vietnamese communities. Chinese 
labourers deployed for mining construction in New Caledonia faced 
hostility from local unions, as they were employed outside local norms of 
industrial relations (Smith 2013).
Finally, analysis of China’s rising influence in the Pacific Islands needs 
to be tempered by an understanding of the interplay between the many 
diverse players in the region (Maclellan 2015b; Zhang 2018a). France and 
the Anglosphere powers are dealing not only with China’s competition 
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with Taiwan, but also with new activity from a number of emerging Asian 
players—India, Korea and Indonesia. Major powers like France, India 
and Japan have their own global relationships (and tensions) with China, 
which complicate their interactions in the Pacific Islands region.
The following section presents four examples of the shifting relationship 
between China and the French Pacific dependencies: increasing 
exports to China from New Caledonia and French Polynesia; attempts 
to increase Chinese tourism by the HNA Group; the establishment 
of  a  Chinese  fishing enterprise on Hao atoll in French Polynesia; and 
Chinese involvement in New Caledonia’s nickel industry.
Trade with China
As the administering power, the French state contributes significant 
funding to its three Pacific dependencies, amounting to nearly €2.5 billion 
per annum. However—as with Australia and the independent island 
states—this financial support has not guaranteed that France remains 
their primary partner for trade.
Analysts Matthew Dornan and Sachini Muller (2018) note that 
Australian–Pacific Island trade is stagnating, at a time when:
trade between China and Pacific Island countries has grown 
rapidly, assisted by China’s growing economic clout … Since 
2000, there has been a twelvefold increase in the value of Chinese 
exports to the region. Over the same period, imports from 
Australia have remained stagnant, with their value in 2017 lower 
than that in 2004.
This pattern can be seen with New Caledonia and French Polynesia. 
In  2018, China was the number one export destination for New 
Caledonia  with 31.7 per cent of trade—due to nickel ore exports—
followed by Korea (15.5 per cent) and Japan (14 per cent). Between 2017 
and 2018, New Caledonia’s trade balance with China doubled due to 
exports of nickel ore and ferronickel metal (ISEE 2019). Close neighbour 
Australia had been a primary export market for ore until the 2016 
closure of the Yabulu nickel smelter in Townsville by rogue politician and 
entrepreneur Clive Palmer (Maclellan 2016). In 2018, Australia ranked 




For imports in 2018, China was the third-ranked source for New 
Caledonia with 9.0 per cent, after France (23.8 per cent) and Singapore 
(14.3 per cent). Once again, neighbouring Australia ranked lower for 
imports at just 7.5 per cent (ISEE 2019).
In October 2012, a Chinese business delegation visited Tahiti led by Li 
Xiaolin, President of the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with 
Foreign Countries (and the daughter of China’s former prime minister 
Li Peng). The delegation looked at opportunities to invest in transport 
and tourism infrastructure as well as agriculture. 
By 2018, Hong Kong and China ranked first in French Polynesia’s 
principal export destinations (with 14.2 per cent of trade), while Australia 
was ranked 15th with just 0.2 per cent (ISPF 2019). In 2018, China 
ranked third (7.9 per cent) in the sources of imports for French Polynesia, 
following France (25.2 per cent) and the US (20.6 per cent). Australia 
again lagged at eighth position with just 2.7 per cent.
French Polynesian entrepreneurs of Chinese heritage are looking to 
China to expand their existing operations. Beyond agricultural products, 
businessman Robert Wan hopes to expand the export of cultured pearls 
to China beyond long-standing sales in Hong Kong. His brother Louis 
Wane is also seeking Chinese investment in his diverse businesses (travel, 
hotels, supermarkets and beverages) that already make up 12 per cent of 
French Polynesia’s GDP (Polynésie la 1ère 2017). As detailed below, Louis 
Wane has already had some success in the tourism sector.
Wooing Chinese tourists to the 
Francophone Pacific
In 2018, Chinese travellers made nearly 150 million trips abroad 
(an increase of 14.7 per cent on 2017) and spent US$115 billion during 
their travels (Xinhua 2019). Pacific Island countries have long worked 
to tap into this tourism market, seeking approved destination status 
from the Chinese Government. In 2004, China joined the South Pacific 
Tourism Organisation as the its first member state from outside the 
region, contributing funding previously provided by Taiwan.
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French Polynesia and New Caledonia are now following the path to 
increased Chinese tourism set by their independent neighbours, but the 
lack of direct flights from Beijing to Tahiti and Noumea has limited access 
to this lucrative market. Local governments are testing the waters but 
face significant constraints because of France’s ongoing control over visas. 
With a policy promoting regional economic integration, the government 
of New Caledonia has been working to boost the number of Asia-Pacific 
tourists, especially from China. William Le Grand, deputy director of 
New Caledonia’s international airline Aircalin, notes: 
China is clearly a very important market with nearly 130 million 
tourists in 2018 around the world. That’s a market to explore and 
we’re working on it with a clear desire to investigate the possibilities 
there (LNC 2018b).
Despite this, the number of Chinese visitors arriving in New Caledonia 
will be relatively small at first. The national airline, together with hotel 
groups and tourist authorities, proposed a goal of just 700 tourists in 
2018, another 1,000 in 2019 and rising to 6,000 by 2025. With the 
establishment of a direct air route to China, tourism authorities eventually 
hope for 20,000 Chinese tourists a year, comprising 15 per cent of the 
local market (at time of writing, however, the COVID-19 (coronavirus) 
epidemic may complicate strategic planning for tourism industries around 
the Pacific).
Aircalin has begun organising charter flights from China to test the 
market. In February 2018, a preliminary charter with 260 Chinese 
tourists travelled from Hangzhou for a week-long visit to New Caledonia. 
In June 2018, New Caledonian authorities signed an agreement with 
Chinese tour operator Caissa International Travel Service, a subsidiary 
of Hainan Airlines (LNC 2018a). The agreement allows for three more 
charter flights to New Caledonia from Tianjin, a city of 15 million people 
located near Beijing. With two of these flights arriving in September 
and October 2018, the Chinese tourists were targeted with ‘upmarket’ 
services, including a visit to the outlying beaches on the Isle of Pines, 
a cultural ‘bush visit’ to the rural town of Bourail and accommodation 
in five-star hotels (LNC 2018d). Another 258 tourists arrived from 
Hangzhou in February 2019, with Aircalin’s William Le Grand noting, 
‘With this full flight, we have the confirmation that our destination is 
attractive to Chinese tourists’ (LNC 2019a).
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Dominique Michaud, the director general of the Marriott hotel chain 
in New Caledonia, noted:
We are just beginning. There is real potential but as long as there are 
not direct connections, the market will be limited. These facilities 
have been partly sorted out, as has the need to accept different 
types of Chinese credit cards. Chinese payments are often virtual. 
They pay more and more with a telephone and China is one of the 
most advanced countries in this manner, unlike us (LNC 2018c).
With the delivery of two new Airbus A330 aircraft during 2019, Aircalin 
director general Didier Tappero announced that the airline was looking 
to cities in China as potential regular routes, saying, ‘China is an option 
being considered very seriously by Aircalin. Destinations like Shanghai 
and Hong Kong are being studied’ (LNC 2019b).
Similar efforts are underway in French Polynesia. Islands like Tahiti 
and Bora Bora have long served as destinations for luxury tourism from 
the US and Europe, but tourism from Australia, New Zealand and 
Japan has fallen  in 2017–19. According to French researcher Sebastien 
Goulard (2017): 
Tourism has been a major economic sector for French Polynesia, 
comprising more than 12 per cent of its GDP. But unlike 
Palau and Fiji, French Polynesia has failed to become a popular 
destination for Chinese travellers. With less than 6,000 visitors in 
2017, Chinese tourists in French Polynesia rank only eighth.
In response, French Polynesia is restructuring its tourist facilities to tap 
the Chinese market. Shen Zhiliang, China’s consul-general in French 
Polynesia, agreed that Tahiti remains a luxury destination for Chinese 
tourists, but argued, ‘You must take account of the cultural differences, 
the eating habits and the high cost of the trip. There is still no direct flight 
between China and French Polynesia’ (TNTV News 2019).
Because of France’s ongoing control of immigration and customs in Tahiti, 
Chinese tourists find it difficult to quickly organise visas for holidays 
there, or arrange a last-minute stopover, even though French Polynesia 
has held Chinese approved destination status since 2008. In an interview, 
French Polynesia’s independence leader Oscar Temaru highlighted this 
ongoing colonial control of immigration as a roadblock to expanded 
tourism from China:
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The real problem for tourism in Tahiti is the visas. There are over 
a hundred countries that have to get a French visa to come and 
visit us, so that doesn’t interest many people. You can go to lie 
on a beach in the sun in Fiji, in Samoa or in Vanuatu without 
a visa. But that’s the way France wants it—they want to control 
everything.5
The French Polynesian Government has sought support from successive 
French governments in Paris for changes to French laws that could 
facilitate travel in larger numbers from China. They want Paris to approve 
short-term transit visas that could be issued to Chinese tourists on arrival 
at Faa’a international airport in Tahiti to increase the chance of a stopover 
en route to South America. The French Polynesian Government has 
also hoped that Paris would authorise longer-stay visas for Chinese 
tourists to make the long trip to Tahiti worthwhile. Currently, visa-free 
entry to French Polynesia for Chinese citizens can only be provided if 
they meet an onerous list of bureaucratic requirements (French High 
Commission 2019).
Gaston Flosse is a leading anti-independence politician in French 
Polynesia. But this long-time loyalist to the French Republic is one of the 
leading boosters for improved relations and economic ties with China. 
As president in 2004, Flosse attempted to set up a French Polynesian office 
in Beijing, but this attempt was overruled by the French Constitutional 
Court. After nine years out of office, Flosse briefly won the presidency 
again in 2013 and actively encouraged Chinese investment in Tahitian 
tourism. 
Flosse led a large delegation to China in December 2013, visiting Beijing, 
Chungking and Haikou (the capital of the southern-most province of 
Hainan). During the trip, he held a series of meetings with Chinese 
officials, including newly elected then vice president Li Yuanchao and 
the chairman of the China Development Bank Hu Huaibang. Flosse 
held talks with Chinese civil aviation authorities and the management 
of  Hainan Airlines to discuss the possibility of increased flights from 
Beijing and Haikou to Tahiti (Maclellan 2014a).




Over two decades, Hainan Airlines has morphed into HNA Group. 
The  company’s fortunes illustrate the challenge of boom-and-bust 
capitalism for Chinese companies. Between 2014 and 2017, the Chinese 
conglomerate took significant stakes in Hilton hotels, Swissport, Ingram 
Micro and Germany’s Deutsche Bank. This multibillion-dollar global 
spending spree even extended to French Polynesia. On 28 August 2014, 
HNA Aviation signed a development cooperation agreement with 
the government of French Polynesia. This opened the way for another 
subsidiary of the Hainan-based corporation, HNA Tourism Company 
Ltd, to buy two companies belonging to prominent French Polynesian 
businessman Louis Wane: the SA Moorea Lagoon Resort, owner of 
the Hilton Moorea Lagoon Resort and Spa in Moorea, and the SARL 
Société Hôtelière Motu Ome’e, owner of the Hotel St Régis in Bora Bora 
(Tahiti Infos 2016b).
From 2017, through their subsidiary Deer Jet, HNA began offering 
a ‘Hong Kong to Tahiti dream journey’ for wealthy Chinese tourists. This 
trip to paradise involved a non-stop flight on a private 787 Dream Jet 
and a week-long stay at the presidential suite of the St Regis Bora Bora 
resort. Then French Polynesian tourism minister Nicole Bouteau, greeting 
the first flight at the airport, said, ‘The Asian market, from China, is 
under development. It’s important for us that a company like Hainan 
is interested in our country’ (Tahiti Infos 2017). 
French Polynesia has long sought Chinese investment in its ailing hotel 
sector, after numerous luxury resorts have closed in recent years due to 
high costs and a lack of Western patrons. Successive administrations have 
sought out Chinese investors to buy into the Mahana Beach tourism 
project, a planned US$2.5 billion luxury beach resort and spa complex 
first proposed by Gaston Flosse. 
Though he was removed from office in 2014 after convictions for 
corruption, Flosse opened the way for a Hong Kong–led consortium to 
bid for a 70-year contract to build and operate the Mahana Beach project. 
The consortium included the real estate firms Recas Global and R&F 
Properties, together with the Chinese state-owned corporation China 
Railway International. In December 2015, the Chinese consortium 
signed a preliminary agreement with the new government of French 
Polynesia led by Edouard Fritch to proceed with the project. Even with 
the government committing to provide 53 hectares of public domain to 
the project, it was clear by the scheduled contract date of 30 June 2016 
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that the Recas Group could not commit the financing to proceed to a full 
70-year contract, and the bid was withdrawn. Then French Polynesian 
tourism minister Jean-Christophe Bouissou noted:
We have avoided running aground on a hidden reef by signing 
a leasing contract with the Recas Group without knowing if 
this consortium had the capacity to develop the project or not 
(Tahiti Infos 2016a).
The integration of Chinese corporations into global systems of production 
and capital accumulation has meant they must ride the boom and bust 
that is a central feature of capitalist markets. The July 2018 death of 
HNA co-chair Wang Jian in France disrupted the company’s share 
price. The debt crisis facing the company since 2018 has limited further 
expansion of global operations, including in French Polynesia. The Bora 
Bora property was advertised for sale in October 2018 as the HNA Group 
sought to sell off some of its global property holdings, reducing its stake 
in Hilton hotels and Deutsche Bank (Zhou 2018). 
Facing collapse, the HNA Group sold nearly US$45 billion worth of 
assets in 2018. However, analysts cited by the US media have raised 
suspicions that the company, with very deep pockets, has state backing 
in China (Barboza 2017; Bloomberg News 2018). In December 2019, 
HNA Group was granted a US$568 million loan by Chinese state-
owned banks to bail out its troubled airline subsidiaries in Hong Kong 
and provincial China. The bailout consortium includes the China 
Development Bank, China Exim Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China, Bank of China  Hong Kong, China Construction Bank and 
Agricultural Bank of China (Richter 2019).
Fisheries on Hao atoll, French Polynesia
Facing a massive trade deficit and high levels of unemployment, French 
Polynesia President Edouard Fritch is eager to promote investment from 
Chinese state-owned and private corporations in agriculture, tourism and 
infrastructure. In an interview, Fritch said: 
China is present to support countries through investment and 
the technical assistance that they bring. Today, French Polynesia 
is certainly a country that is looking for finance and investment 
to support economic development. Around the Pacific, China has 
shown that it is making significant efforts to reduce greenhouse 
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gas emissions at home, but also to provide assistance and funding 
to support the countries of the Pacific zone. I think that we must 
say that today, China is the country that is the most present in 
these smaller island states.6
One major investment proposal is a US$300 million Chinese fisheries 
project on Hao atoll, to be operated by the Chinese corporation Tianrui 
Group Co. Ltd. Despite the commercial nature of the investment, 
Australian media have reported that the Hao project may lead to greater 
Chinese strategic influence. Some even suggest the project opens the way 
for a Chinese military facility in the French Pacific dependency. A May 
2018 article in The Sydney Morning Herald stated:
 The massive fish farm project on Hao atoll has raised eyebrows 
in Canberra because it will sit next to the airport the French 
military previously used to carry out nuclear tests in the Pacific … 
Concerns in Canberra focused on speculation Tianrui could seek 
a lease on their airport, giving Beijing a strategic foothold 11,000 
kilometres into the Pacific Ocean (Wroe 2018d). 
The article, citing US and Australian security analysts, followed similar 
articles by the same journalist the previous month that raised concerns 
about a purported Chinese military base in Vanuatu (Wroe 2018a, 
2018b, 2018c). The claims that China and non-aligned Vanuatu were 
planning a military facility in Luganville were quickly denied by Vanuatu 
Prime Minister Charlot Salwai and Foreign Minister Ralph Regenvanu 
(Maclellan 2018b:18). The French Government too is unlikely to welcome 
a Chinese military base in its Pacific dependency.
It’s ironic that Western security analysts are only now expressing concern 
about the militarisation of Hao atoll. For decades, Hao was used by the 
French military as a forward base for the Centre d’Expérimentation du 
Pacifique (Pacific Testing Centre). Located in the Tuamotu Archipelago, 
Hao’s 3,420-metre military airstrip is one of the longest in the Pacific. 
With a population of around 1,700 people, Hao served as a staging 
post between France, Papeete and the nuclear test sites at Moruroa and 
Fangataufa atolls, where France conducted 193 nuclear tests between 
1966 and 1996.
6  President of French Polynesia Edouard Fritch, 5 September 2018. Pacific Islands Forum, Yaren, 
Nauru. Interview with author.
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Hao lagoon—one of the largest in French Polynesia—was used to 
decontaminate aircraft, ships and personnel exposed to radioactive 
contamination at the CEP. A number of studies have investigated potential 
nuclear contamination on the atoll (Barrillot 1996; CRIIRAD 2006). 
In 2006, the French Delegate for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection 
for Defence Activities revealed that large amounts of radioactive material 
were simply dumped in the ocean after the end of testing in 1996, 
including 2,656 tonnes at two sites off Moruroa atoll and 532 tonnes 
at Hao (DSND 2006:20–22). Worried by evidence of asbestos and 
other toxins on the airbase, local environmental groups have questioned 
whether the atoll is suitable for a fish farming project.
Given this polluted legacy, the government of French Polynesia has been 
trying for decades to lure investors to Hao atoll. In 2000, the Flosse 
Government urged foreign corporations to invest in Hao, ‘a genuine tax 
haven in the heart of the Pacific!’ Advertisements in The Economist (2000) 
magazine stated that Hao atoll offers ‘exemption from corporate taxes, 
exemption from registration and property taxes, exemption from custom 
duties and no personal income tax’. The ad also highlighted the potential 
to repurpose the airstrip and facilities left behind by the French armed 
forces, including: ‘a communication satellite network; international 
airport runway; wharf for deep sea ships; desalination unit; nautical base; 
power plant; hospital’ (ibid.).
With little interest from Western corporations, the search for investors 
extended to China. In December 2016, Tahiti Nui Océan Foods presented 
a proposal for a major fisheries project on Hao. Established in 2014, Tahiti 
Nui Océan Foods is a subsidiary of the Tianrui Group Co. Ltd. Chaired 
by billionaire Li Liufa, the parent company operates from Ruzhou City, 
Henan Province, with investments in cement, foundry, tourism, mining, 
trade and logistics, finance and other industries.
In August 2017, the government of French Polynesia met with Wang 
Cheng, CEO of Tahiti Nui Océan Foods, and the project design was 
finalised on 1 February 2018. Tahiti Nui Océan Foods announced plans to 
build 2,800 cages in Hao’s lagoon to farm fish, prawns and sea cucumbers 
for export. To woo the investors, the Fritch Government passed legislation 
in December 2017 allowing for fiscal incentives that encourage major 
investments in French Polynesia, followed by a decree on 8 March 2018 to 




Early publicity in 2016 stated that up to 10,000 jobs would be created, 
but the scale and cost of the project have been downsized several 
times and the start of construction regularly delayed. Early company 
propaganda suggested would make a US$1.5 billion investment and, 
years later, security analysts and journalists continue to recycle this figure 
without investigation (see, for example, Wroe 2018d). This comes despite 
a publicly available French Polynesian Government decree that shows 
Tahiti Nui Océan Foods will only invest CFP32 billion (French Pacific 
francs), equivalent to US$300 million (Government of French Polynesia 
2018b:6192).
Desperate to generate employment on the atoll, the French Polynesian 
Government has wooed Tahiti Nui Océan Foods CEO Wang Cheng, even 
presenting him with the honorific of Commandeur dans l’ordre de Tahiti 
nui in May 2018. But the delay in construction and the likelihood that 
local jobs will be numbered in the hundreds, not thousands, is causing 
political problems for local boosters of the project. Seeking reelection 
in March 2020, Hao Mayor Théodore Tuahine complained that his 
constituents were originally promised 10,000 jobs. He was also concerned 
that the island cannot train local workers for the project without knowing 
the types of positions that will be available for Polynesians rather than 
Chinese staff: 
There is a lack of detailed information on the project. They talk 
about the need for workers and their preparation, which we’re 
ready to do. But we don’t know what are the technical specialities 
that they want us to prepare! (Tahiti Infos 2019).
The Hao project highlights the reality that initiatives in the Pacific are often 
driven by the commercial interests of private or state-owned corporations, 
rather than overarching government plans. Chinese diplomats are often 
reliant on the Chinese company for information about progress or the 
contents of deals struck with the host government. In an interview in 
early 2019, China’s consul-general in French Polynesia Shen Zhiliang 
reaffirmed his belief that the Hao project will eventually begin: 
In May 2018, there was an inauguration ceremony on Hao and 
in August a delegation from the China Development Bank came 
to inspect the works and for deeper discussions. The two parties 
are both in contact. Polynesian engineers will soon be sent to 
Shanghai [for training]. I think the project is still on track. Neither 
of the two parties has indicated to me an intention to abandon the 
project (TNTV News 2019).
217
6 . STABLE, DEMOCRATIC AND WESTERN
This project is often presented in the Western media as an example of 
Chinese debt-trap diplomacy, but any debt will rest with the Chinese 
corporation. Indeed, the agreement signed by the Fritch Government 
on 29 March 2018 shows that the government has agreed to exempt 
Tahiti Nui Océan Foods from any tax for 30 years on the importation 
of materials and fuel. It has also agreed to several other tax holidays for 
a period of 10 years after construction has been completed (Government 
of French Polynesia 2018b). In mid-2019, the Fritch Government granted 
the Chinese corporation a further year to build a 1.2 million litre fuel tank 
for the project.
On the basis of public documents, neither the Chinese company nor 
the Chinese state retains control over the airstrip on Hao atoll. With the 
French Government in Paris signing off on the project, eager to reduce its 
own state revenues flowing into French Polynesia, there is little evidence 
that the project gives ‘Beijing a strategic foothold 11,000 kilometres into 
the Pacific Ocean’ (Wroe 2018d).
In the future, however, other Chinese corporations may express interest 
in the vast maritime zone around Clipperton and French Polynesia’s 
five archipelagos. In June 2017, under China’s vision of a 21st-century 
Maritime Silk Road, Beijing proposed three ‘blue economic passages’ 
(including a China–Oceania–South Pacific passage) to focus on 
‘sharing blue space and developing the blue economy’ (Xinhua 2017). 
The University of French Polynesia hosted a seminar on the Maritime Silk 
Road in November 2019.
There is also growing interest in deep-sea mining from the China 
Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association 
(Zhang  2018b). The sector, however, is still governed by the French 
State—under French Polynesia’s current autonomy statute, control of 
‘strategic metals’ on the ocean floor rests with Paris rather than Papeete 
(Blue Ocean Law et al. 2019; Maclellan 2018d). France is firmly focused 
on controlling the vast 7,000,000 km² exclusive economic zones (EEZs) 
surrounding its Pacific colonies, as a French Senate report has highlighted:
Thanks to its overseas possessions, France is one of the countries 
affected—indeed the most affected—by this revolution in sharing 
the oceans. Its EEZ is in fact the second largest behind that of the 
United States and beyond this, the most diverse. Present in both 
hemispheres and at all points of the compass, the French EEZ is 
the only one on which the sun never sets (Senate 2014:13).
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Questioned about potential Chinese interest in fisheries during a February 
2016 visit to Tahiti, then French president Francois Hollande stressed the 
importance of ongoing French state sovereignty over French Polynesia’s 
5,000,000 km² EEZ (Hollande 2016). However, France’s sovereignty 
over EEZs pits the French state against the leading independence party 
in French Polynesia, which is actively asserting local rights over marine 
resources under international law. Former senator for French Polynesia 
Richard Ariihau Tuheiava has argued: 
We have continually emphasised the critical nature of the resource 
question as a core issue for our future development. Whether 
or not these resources are considered in Paris to be ‘strategic’ is 
irrelevant to the applicability of international legal decisions 
which place the ownership of natural resources with the people of 
the non‐self‐governing territories (Tuheiava 2017). 
Exporting nickel from New Caledonia
At current estimates, the Melanesian nation of New Caledonia holds more 
than 25 per cent of global nickel reserves. The main island Grande Terre 
is bisected by a massive mountain range filled with vast ore bodies. New 
Caledonia is often called Le Caillou, an ironic reference to the French 
word for pebble. 
Conservative anti-independence politicians have argued that China’s global 
efforts to access natural resources pose a particular challenge for New 
Caledonia due to its strategic mineral reserves. Philippe Gomès, leader of 
Calédonie Ensemble, a major conservative party in New Caledonia and 
a strong opponent of independence, argued that China is more interested in 
New Caledonia than other member countries of the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (though this may come as a surprise to Papua New Guineans and 
Fijians). In an interview, the anti-independence leader said:
On the need for raw materials, who has the greatest demand for 
nickel on a global scale? The Chinese! We have the second largest 
reserves of nickel in the world. If they colonise Solomon Islands, 
Fiji or Papua New Guinea, they’ll get beaches and coconut palms. 
But New Caledonia is le Caillou—the largest rock of nickel in the 
world. So, they’re eyeing us with a hundred, a thousand, times 
more interest that any atoll in the world with their coconut trees.7 
7  Philippe Gomès, President of Calédonie Ensemble and deputy to the French National Assembly, 
17 October 2018. Noumea. Interview with author.
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In contrast, members of the independence movement Front de Libération 
Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) have been eager to break the 
French monopoly over the smelting of nickel in New Caledonia. They 
have looked beyond traditional markets in France, Japan and Australia to 
new partners in China and South Korea to add value to New Caledonia’s 
vast natural resources.
New Caledonia’s Northern Province administration is controlled by 
the FLNKS independence movement under provincial President Paul 
Neaoutyine. Following the armed conflict of the 1980s, the provincial 
administration established a development arm, Société de Financement et 
d’Investissement de la Province Nord (SOFINOR), to expand economic 
opportunities in the rural north, where the population is majority 
indigenous Kanak. In 1990, SOFINOR bought the mining company 
Société Minière du Sud Pacifique (SMSP). 
Following the 1969 Billotte laws, a monopoly over nickel smelting was 
guaranteed to the French-controlled corporation ERAMET and its local 
subsidiary Société le Nickel (SLN), which operates the Doniambo smelter 
in Noumea. The French Government has used its Strategic Investment 
Fund to maintain a 25 per cent holding in ERAMET. French taxpayer 
funds have often been used to bail out SLN as nickel prices fluctuate on 
the international market. 
After New Caledonia’s violent conflict of the 1980s, Kanak independence 
leaders sought to open the nickel sector to foreign competition. The signing 
of the Noumea Accord in May 1998 was only possible because contending 
parties had come to an agreement over the préalable minière (mining 
precondition) posed by the independence movement. The February 1998 
Bercy Accord allowed the transfer of strategic deposits of high-grade nickel 
ore to SMSP and SOFINOR, opening the way for the construction of the 
Koniambo nickel smelter in the north of the country.
In his role as a New Caledonian Deputy in the French National Assembly, 
Philippe Gomès accompanied President Macron to Australia in May 2018. 
During the trip, Gomès said that New Caledonia ‘could fall into Chinese 
hands’ if people voted for independence in the territory’s November 2018 
referendum on self-determination (Higgins 2018). Ironically, at that time 
it was the government of New Caledonia, led by a member of Gomès’ own 
party, that played a crucial role in opening the way for greater Chinese 
involvement in New Caledonia’s nickel industry. 
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Government policy since 2009 has tried to add value to the country’s vast 
nickel reserves by expanding the amount of smelted metal rather than 
exporting raw saprolite or laterite ores. Despite this, ore exports grew by 
24 per cent between 2013 and 2015, with the growth focused on China, 
Japan and Korea. Though New Caledonia has long looked to Japan 
and Australia for exports, for many years it resisted sales of high-grade 
ore directly to China in hopes of protecting metal production in local 
smelting plants. 
In March 2016, Queensland Nickel’s Yabulu smelter, owned by flamboyant 
entrepreneur and novice politician Clive Palmer, went into liquidation, 
even as ships bearing ore were on the water between New Caledonia and 
Australia (Maclellan 2016). Small mining companies, known as petits 
mineurs, lost their export market. Faced with the threat of strikes and 
blockades by subcontractors, the New Caledonian Government buckled. 
In a new plan, then president Philippe Germain announced that his 
government would grant temporary permits for the export of nickel ore 
to China. In an interview, Germain said:
Our mining framework has always prioritised traditional partners 
like Australia and Japan. But if Australia can no longer buy 
the same levels from us, we need an alternative in the current 
circumstances, because we have mines, miners and sub-contractors 
who are dependent on this activity.8
In 2018, New Caledonia exported 6.8 million tonnes of ore, including 
3.3  million tonnes to South Korea, nearly 2 million to Japan and 
1.5  million to China. However, this tonnage to China is only half 
the 3 million tonnes authorised for export each year. A number of mining 
companies are now eager to expand into this market. Thibaut Martelin, 
president of the minerals export council Syndicat des Exportateurs de 
Minerai, has stressed the long-term importance of China over traditional 
export destinations like Japan and Australia:
China effectively serves as a complete substitute for Australia … 
The current Chinese market is a huge advantage in comparison to 
the Australian market because it is open to export from a number 
of smelters and with a greater range of minerals (content of nickel, 
amount of nickel in ferronickel, etc). Today, we face less constraints 
8  Then president of New Caledonia Philippe Germain, 8 March 2016. Noumea. Interview with 
author.
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within the Chinese market. There’s a larger pool of clients who will 
adapt their operations to the ore that’s available, rather than the 
mine having to adapt its operations to the customer (LNC 2019c).
The biggest beneficiary of the opening of export to China has been the 
Northern Province’s SMSP, which has expanded access to the Chinese 
market as part of a broader development strategy.
Over the last three decades, SMSP has grown into a major nickel producer. 
The driving force behind the company is New Caledonian entrepreneur 
Dang Van Nha, known as Andre Dang. His parents arrived in New 
Caledonia from French Indochina in 1935, working as indentured 
labourers in the Koniambo Massif mines owned by SLN. His father died 
in an industrial accident when Dang was just 17 months old, and the 
family moved to Noumea, where Dang became an accountant, manager 
and then leading businessman (Maclellan 2014b).
During New Caledonia’s armed conflict of the 1980s, Dang was driven 
into exile in Australia, with the colonial right perceiving him as too close 
to the FLNKS independence movement. However, he returned to New 
Caledonia in 1990 to assist the Northern Province in managing its mining 
and smelting operations. 
Begun in 1990 as a mining transport company with 120 employees, 
SMSP started exporting nickel ore in 2007. SMSP’s strategy has been to 
retain high-value saprolite ore from the Koniambo Massif for domestic 
use. This ore, with 2.3 per cent nickel content, is being supplied to a new 
smelter established in the Northern Province: the US$5.3 billion plant 
at Vavouto operated by Koniambo Nickel SAS (KNS), a joint venture 
between SMSP and the transnational conglomerate Glencore. In an 
unprecedented arrangement, Dang persuaded the Anglo-Swiss financial 
conglomerate to grant SMSP 51 per cent controlling interest in KNS.
This chapter cannot detail the full range of social, environmental 
and economic impacts of the Koniambo project, but it has been a 
fundamentally transformative project in the Northern Province and 
a crucial pillar of the ‘economic rebalancing’ required under the 1998 
Noumea Accord (Grochain 2013; Sourisseau et al. 2017).
To generate funding for its share of Koniambo finances, SMSP developed 
a strategy to export lower-grade nickel ore to Korea and China, once again 
using joint ventures controlled 51 per cent by SMSP. The company has 
two joint ventures with the Korean corporation Posco: the Nickel Mining 
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Company (NMC) and the nickel processing company Société du Nickel 
de Nouvelle-Calédonie et Corée (SNNC). In 2009, SNNC began smelting 
nickel at the company’s plant at Gwangyang, South Korea, producing 
261,469 tonnes of nickel metal between 2009 and 2017. In  the same 
period, SMSP’s subsidiary NMC exported nearly 20,000,000 tonnes of 
ore to the Gwangyang plant, which uses lower-grade saprolite ore with an 
average of 1.98 per cent nickel content.
The next challenge was to export even lower-grade ore, with an average 
nickel content of 1.65 per cent, to a joint-venture smelter in China. On 
18 October 2017, SMSP signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
with Yangzhou Yichuan Nickel Industry Co. Ltd to develop a joint project 
in China. This MOU was expanded on 22 March 2018 when Andre 
Dang met Yichuan CEO Zhang Jianguo to finalise a memorandum of 
agreement (MOA).
These preliminary agreements were designed to test export systems to 
China before finalisation of a full contract, under which SMSP agrees 
to deliver 600,000 tonnes of nickel ore to Yichuan each year for the next 
25 years, after the Chinese corporation agrees to sell 51 per cent of its 
share capital to SMSP. The full contract was finalised in 2020, though 
exports were slow to expand due to the coronavirus pandemic.
In an interview, SOFINOR’s chief financial officer Karl Therby explained 
that Yichuan’s pyro-metallurgical smelter at Yangzhou began production 
in 2012: 
The Chinese had been purchasing nickel ore from Indonesia, but 
they had a range of concerns about the quality, the humidity of 
the ore and of the reliability of delivery. So SMSP was able to say 
to them that, through our Korean operation, we have shown our 
capacity and reliability to export ore of higher quality than can be 
found in the Indonesian market. So, by signing the contract with 
us, they’ve guaranteed supply—but we retain 51 per cent of the 
operation.9
The decision to operate offshore was driven by domestic politics as well as 
market realities. Conservative anti-independence parties in Noumea are 
fiercely opposed to Chinese investment in New Caledonian enterprises, 
9  Karl Therby, chief financial officer of Société de Financement et d’Investissement de la Province 
Nord (SOFINOR), 7 November 2018. Noumea. Interview with author.
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so SOFINOR and SMSP have developed new ways of working 
without Chinese companies operating in New Caledonia. SOFINOR’s 
Therby explained:
In our political context, with referendums on independence and 
public concern about Chinese influence, we don’t want them to 
operate here. We’ve seen what has happened in Papua New Guinea, 
we’ve seen what has happened in Vanuatu and we want to protect 
the territory from all that. So, they have no actual investment in 
our mines; instead, we just have a contract to supply them.10
In an interview, Andre Dang explained that this strategy is based on an 
unprecedented corporate structure that gives majority control to SMSP 
rather than its Chinese partner:
The corporate structure is a real innovation and it’s the first time in 
the world that it’s been used, above all in China. The structure of 
51 per cent/49 per cent—the Chinese have never before accepted 
this. The Chinese Government was obliged to change a law and 
it took seven years to allow SMSP to start operations there. We’ve 
just taken one small step into the Chinese market. After that we’ll 
see, because the Chinese are very intelligent. We have to be very 
careful, because they can be terrible! The Chinese aren’t here, 
they’ve stayed at home! Instead, we’ve gone over there and have 
taken possession of a small piece of their country, through our 
51 per cent control of the smelter. The cost of operations will be 
paid for by the profits from the smelting.11
In 2018, after striking an agreement with SMSP, Yangzhou Yichuan 
Nickel added a second production line to its Yangzhou smelter, increasing 
potential annual production capacity of ferronickel. The metal is then 
sold to stainless steel producers in China. In July 2018, Northern Province 
President Paul Neaoutyine paid an official visit to China to meet with 
officials from Yangzhou City and major shareholders from Yangzhou 
Yichuan Nickel (SMSP 2018).
The first shipment to China under the MOA, departing Noumea in 
July 2018, revealed some early tensions with the Chinese corporate 
partner. The Yangzhou port, in a shallow river channel, only has capacity 
for vessels weighing 45,000 tonnes, but the first shipment of ore from 
10  Karl Therby, chief financial officer of Société de Financement et d’Investissement de la Province 
Nord (SOFINOR), 7 November 2018. Noumea. Interview with author.
11  Andre Dang Van Nha, 7 November 2018. Noumea. Interview with author.
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New Caledonia amounted to 62,500 tonnes. Without informing SMSP 
or the New Caledonian mining directorate, Yinchuan unloaded 16,006 
tonnes at Lianyungang port rather than deliver the full load to the 
Yangzhou smelter. 
To assert SMSP’s rights as controlling partner, Dang halted further 
shipments until the Chinese company apologised and agreed to bear the 
costs of transhipment to smaller vessels. This ensured all the ore was used 
at the Yangzhou smelter, thereby generating maximum returns to SMSP 
as controlling partner. New shipments recommenced in January 2019, 
with ore loading through the Bay of Téoudié at Kaala-Gomen. By May 
2019, there had been three shipments, with plans to ramp up to a vessel 
every month.
For Dang, this strategy of maintaining majority control over operations 
avoids many of the problems that independent Pacific countries have faced 
with Chinese mining investments. He contrasts the SMSP strategy with 
the US$1.4 billion Ramu Nickel project in Papua New Guinea, which 
has been plagued by the overuse of Chinese labour, poor environmental 
standards and pressure on local politicians (Smith 2013). Now in his 80s, 
Dang will be a hard man to replace as a negotiator of unprecedented deals 
with China. He is, however, grooming successors to implement the vision 
already laid out:
As long as I’m at the company, I will never allow it to sell nickel 
ore directly to China. I only want our resource to be used in New 
Caledonian plants or those that will be owned by New Caledonia 
in the future and that will supply benefits to our country. We’re 
going to shoot ourselves in the foot if we simply provide raw 
minerals to our competitors. That’s been going on for 140 years, 
ever since colonisation. 
We want to ensure the continued existence of our mines, because 
nickel is not a renewable resource. Once you’ve exhausted it, bit 
by bit, that’s the end. We don’t want New Caledonia to end up 
like Nauru. They were a world leader in phosphate mining, but 
they abused it and used it all up. They are a sad country. So, our 
strategy is to add value to the resource which can generate funds 
for use in sectors beyond the nickel industry, which will benefit 
the country and future generations.12
12  Andre Dang Van Nha, 7 November 2018. Noumea. Interview with author.
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Conclusion
As a key member of the European Union (EU), France is well positioned 
for a new post-Brexit relationship with the Pacific Islands. But, at this 
time of geopolitical change, governments in Noumea and Papeete are 
eagerly seeking Chinese grants and investment in tourism, fisheries and 
infrastructure, as well as export markets for New Caledonia’s nickel 
industry and French Polynesian pearls. As yet, there are only a small 
number of direct investments by Chinese corporations, but trade relations 
are shifting rapidly from Europe to Asia, for the French dependencies as 
well as independent PIF countries.
These changes come at a time when PIF member states have begun to 
reposition themselves with other European powers. For many years, France 
and the United Kingdom have contributed significant development 
assistance to the Pacific through the EU’s European Development Fund 
(EDF). However, the future of EDF funding is in flux in the aftermath 
of the June 2016 Brexit referendum, Boris Johnson’s December 2019 
electoral victory and the looming renegotiation of the 2000 Cotonou 
Treaty between the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and 
Pacific nations.
The election of Emmanuel Macron as President in 2017 highlighted the 
crisis facing France’s traditional centre-right and centre-left parties. But 
Macron’s République En Marche movement is facing its own crisis, with 
popular rioting around the country in 2018–19 by the gilets jaunes (yellow 
vests) and massive public service strikes in late 2019. 
France’s strategic role in the Pacific has support within the French 
state, given the costs and benefits of empire are unevenly shared. Most 
metropolitan citizens have limited awareness of the overseas collectivities, 
so institutions that benefit from the maintenance of colonialism play 
a  disproportionate role in policy formulation. Most politicians and 
officials in Paris still believe that the costs of maintaining a colonial empire 
are ones that must be borne, with a report from the French Senate noting: 
The exercise of our sovereignty over these vast stretches and the 
international competition we face are certainly a difficult cost to 
bear in this period of crisis. But this is an investment for the future, 
an historic opportunity for growth and expansion. France, with its 
overseas territories on the front rank, must seize this opportunity 
and bet on the blue economy (Senate 2014:13).
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Will this gamble pay off, or will France be unable to finance its 
multibillion-euro commitment in the South Pacific well into the 
21st  century? And  will China be willing to step up to plug the 
development gap?
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Engagement in the 
Pacific Islands
Zhou Fangyin
In the past few years, the development of relations between China and 
the Pacific Island countries has attracted the attention of some Western 
countries. To avoid taking a superficial view of the relationship between 
China and the Pacific Island countries, this chapter will analyse the 
development of and changes in their relations over the past decade and 
the driving forces behind these changes.  The chapter discusses the 
development direction of China’s policy towards the Pacific Islands in 
the future and how China will seek balance in its relations with the Pacific 
Island countries and Australia and New Zealand.
Have there been significant changes 
in China’s policy towards Pacific Island 
countries in the past several years?
Since 2014, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has visited the Pacific Islands 
region twice and held two collective meetings with the leaders of the 
island countries that have established diplomatic ties with China. This is 
an unusual phenomenon in China’s relations with the Pacific Islands. The 
unprecedented frequency of visits by Chinese leaders to the Pacific 
Islands, as well as China’s rising presence in this region, has led some to 
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believe that China’s interest in the Pacific Island countries has increased 
significantly.  Some Australians and New Zealanders believe that their 
countries’ influence in the Pacific region has been challenged and a prompt 
response is needed (Colton 2018; Dornan 2018; Mitchell 2018).
Have there been significant changes in China’s relationship with the 
Pacific Island countries and, if so, in what ways? In order to reliably assess 
this issue, this chapter will make a judgement based on analyses of high-




Due to the asymmetry in the size and strength of China and the Pacific 
Island countries, this chapter mainly focuses on two aspects of data. 
The first is the number of visits to China by Pacific Island leaders between 
2012–18 (at the level of president, prime minister and governor), as 
well as the number of visits to China by Pacific Island leaders over the 









PNG 3 times in total
1 time for governor: 10/2006
2 times for prime minister: 
04/2009, 09/2010
7 times in total
1 time for governor: 09/2015
6 times for prime minister: 
09/2012, 11/2013, 11/2014, 
07/2016, 12/2017, 06/2018
+4
Fiji 6 times in total
2 times for president: 
09/2010, 08/2011
4 times for prime minister: 
2005, 2008, 2010, 2011
5 times in total
1 time for president: 2014
4 times for prime minister: 
2012, 05/2013, 07/2015, 
05/2017
-1
Vanuatu 6 times in total
3 times for president: 
07/2007, 08/2008, 10/2010
3 times for prime minister: 
02/2005, 08/2008, 04/2010
4 times in total
3 times for prime minister: 







4 times in total
4 times for president: 
04/2006, 12/2007, 08/2008, 
04–05/2010
3 times in total











Tonga 4 times in total
2 times for the king: 
04/2008, 01/2011
2 times for prime minister: 
04/2007/, 08/2008
3 times in total
1 time for the king: 03/2018
2 times for prime minister: 
07/2013, 11/2013
-1
Samoa 5 times in total
1 time for the head of state: 
08/2008
4 times for prime minister: 
2005, 03/2007, 09/2008, 
08/2010
3 times in total
3 times for prime minister: 





3 times in total
3 times for prime minister: 
11/2005, 09/2007, 09/2011
1 time in total
1 time for prime minister: 
11/2013
-2
Niue 3 times in total
3 times for prime minister: 
06/2007, 11/2008, 10/2010
1 time in total
1 time for prime minister: 
11/2013
-2
Source: Collated according to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China.
As can be seen from Table 1, the number of visits to China by Pacific 
Island leaders was 34 during the seven years 2005–11, and 27 during 
the seven years 2012–18, a reduction of 20 per  cent overall. With the 
exception of the number of visits by PNG leaders to China, which rose 
from three to seven, the number of visits to China by leaders of all other 
Pacific Islands decreased.
This study found that Pacific Island leaders make more intensive visits to 
China around major foreign-related events held in China. Such activities 
include the first China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development 
and Cooperation Forum in 2006, the 2008 Olympic Games, the 2010 
World Expo, the second China–Pacific Island Countries  Economic 
Development and Cooperation Forum in 2013, the  APEC annual 
conference in 2014, the ‘9-3’ military parade in 2015, and the Belt and 
Road Forum for International Cooperation summit in 2017. It is worth 
noting that visits to China by Pacific Island leaders have not become more 
frequent since 2013, while China’s home-court diplomacy has become 
more frequent.
The second area of concern is the high-level visits of the Chinese 
Government to the Pacific Island nations. The frequency of visits by 
Chinese officials at the ministerial level and above to the Pacific Islands 
constitutes an effective indictor of the importance China attaches to this 
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region. The scope of statistics analysed were limited to the members of 
the standing committee of the political bureau, the vice-premiers, the 
state councillors (at the rank of vice-premier), the ministers for foreign 
affairs, the head of the International Department of the CPC Central 
Committee, the minister of commerce, minister of defence and chief 














PNG 3 times in total
Wang Jiarui, head of the 
International Department of 
the CPC Central Committee 
(2005); Li Zhaoxing, minister 
for foreign affairs (2006); Chen 
Bingde, member of the central 
military commission and chief of 
the general staff of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army (2009)
2 times in total
President Xi Jinping 
(2018); Wang yi, State 
Councilor and Minister 
for Foreign Affairs (2018)
-1
Fiji 5 times in total
President Xi Jinping (transit in 
2009); Jia Qinglin, member of 
the standing committee of the 
political bureau, chairman of the 
National Committee of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (transit in 2005); 
Zeng Qinghong, member of the 
standing committee of the political 
bureau, vice-president (transit in 
2005); Hui Liangyu, vice premier 
(transit in 2011); Liu yandong, 
state councilor (2010)
3 times in total
Wu Bangguo, member 
of the standing 
committee of the 
political bureau and 
chairman of the 
standing committee of 
the National People’s 
Congress (2012); 
President Xi Jinping 
(2014); Wang yi, State 
Councilor and Minister 
for Foreign Affairs (2018)
-2
Vanuatu 2 times in total
Zeng Peiyan, vice premier of the 
state council (2007); Li Zhaoxing, 






1 time in total
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Number of high-level visits 










Tonga 1 time in total
Li Zhaoxing, minister for foreign 
affairs (2006)
1 time in total
Wang Jiarui, head of the 
International Department 
of the CPC Central 
Committee (2014)
unchanged
Samoa 3 times in total
Li Changchun, member of the 
standing committee of the political 
bureau of the Central Committee 
(2007); Wu Guanzheng, member 
of the standing committee of 
the political bureau of the CPC 
Central Committee (transit in 
2007); Li Zhaoxing, minister for 
foreign affairs (2006)
2 times in total
Jia Qinglin, chairman of 
the national committee 
of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative 
Conference (2011); 





1 time in total
Li Zhaoxing, minister for foreign 
affairs (2006)
-1
Niue 1 time in total
Li Zhaoxing, minister for foreign 
affairs (2005)
-1
Source: Collated according to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China.
As can be seen from Table 2, during the seven years 2005–11, the number 
of visits to the Pacific Island countries by senior Chinese government 
officials within the scope of the statistics was 17, and during the seven 
years 2012–18 the number dropped to eight.  In the earlier period, the 
minister for foreign affairs of China visited seven of the eight Pacific Island 
countries establishing diplomatic relations (with the exception of Fiji). 
In the latter period, the minister for foreign affairs of China visited two 
of the eight island states establishing diplomatic relations: PNG and Fiji. 
While President Xi Jinping’s state visits to Fiji in 2014 and Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) in 2018 represent the highest level of visits by Chinese 
leaders, there has been no significant increase in visits to Pacific Island 




Since the beginning of the 21st century, China’s trade with Pacific Island 
countries has experienced relatively rapid growth. However, this growth 








Samoa Tonga Cook 
Islands
2000 225 .59 15 .43 1 .51 1 .65 2 .04 1 .64 0 .25
2001 141 .51 26 .63 1 .47 1 .87 2 .32 1 .18 0 .38
2002 186 .92 31 .97 1 .67 1 .30 2 .79 4 .84 0 .19
2003 292 .03 31 .32 3 .08 2 .74 3 .19 2 .10 0 .58
2004 296 .37 38 .71 7 .49 7 .45 6 .86 6 .28 0 .91
2005 376 .05 45 .27 8 .27 2 .44 5 .98 2 .94 5 .92
2006 518 .27 69 .23 19 .38 2 .95 12 .96 3 .75 2 .02
2007 680 .98 66 .26 21 .35 9 .49 11 .85 7 .36 2 .98
2008 858 .31 90 .36 34 .67 4 .01 27 .71 7 .29 2 .67
2009 885 .91 97 .13 48 .80 8 .59 44 .87 8 .05 7 .30
2010 1129 .98 128 .58 23 .26 6 .68 70 .07 9 .76 4 .89
2011 1265 .27 172 .42 136 .25 5 .02 37 .85 13 .32 5 .70
2012 1282 .35 236 .18 136 .03 15 .00 71 .77 20 .16 5 .05
2013 1352 .58 303 .88 382 .73 14 .92 54 .48 38 .51 20 .49
2014 2051 .24 340 .19 187 .13 14 .78 56 .06 23 .98 21 .12
2015 2797 .58 350 .28 84 .50 15 .84 65 .68 30 .48 17 .33
2016 2279 .14 400 .53 68 .72 21 .07 70 .36 30 .31 4 .39
2017 2835 .78 382 .99 79 .77 37 .94 64 .41 28 .53 13 .19
2018 3615 .59 482 .05 79 .03 40 .40 70 .32 25 .07 7 .69
Source: Data from 2000–13 is from China Business yearbook Editorial Board 2001–17 . 
Data from 2014–18 is from General Administration of Customs, China (www .customs .gov .
cn/customs/302249/302274/302277/index .html) .
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Source: Data from 2000–13 is from China Business yearbook Editorial Board 2001–17 . 
Data from 2014–18 is from General Administration of Customs, China (www .customs .gov .
cn/customs/302249/302274/302277/index .html) .
Of the eight Pacific Island countries with which China had diplomatic 
relations until the end of 2018, PNG had the largest trade volume 
with China, followed by Fiji. Vanuatu’s trade with China has increased 
dramatically since 2000, but has fluctuated considerably over the past 
decade. Trade with Samoa and Tonga has not grown rapidly since 2012. 
Trade between China and the Cook Islands declined sharply in 2016 and 
2018, and was lower in 2018 than in 2013.  Trade between China 
and Samoa was lower in 2018 than in 2012, and trade between China and 
Tonga was lower in 2018 than most years from 2013 to 2017. With the 
exception of PNG, Fiji and the Federated States of Micronesia, there 
has been no notable increase in trade relations between China and other 
Pacific Island nations since 2013, and some of them decreased during this 
period. Trade between China and Vanuatu has shown large fluctuations.
As can be seen from Figure 1, trade between China and Vanuatu 
maintained steady growth from 2000 to 2009, with significant increases 
in 2011 and 2013. Since then, however, trade between China and Vanuatu 
fell sharply two years in a row, from 2013 to 2015, by 51.1 per cent and 
54.8 per cent, respectively. Trade between China and Vanuatu in 2018 
was less than one-quarter of that in 2013.
In 2000, China’s total merchandise trade was US$474 billion. In 2018, 
China’s total merchandise trade was US$4,623 billion, about 9.8 times 
that of 2000 (World Bank 2019). Given the rapid growth of China’s overall 
foreign trade over the past 18 years, the pace of growth in China’s trade 




In addition to trade, the international community is also concerned 
about China’s investment in Pacific Island countries. From 2016 to 
2018, Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications giant, launched a national 
broadband transmission network project in PNG and an undersea optical 
cable project to connect Solomon Islands to Australia (ABC News 2017; 
Huawei 2016, 2017). These two projects garnered a lot of attention in 
Oceania (Smyth 2017; Wroe 2017). In one sense, investment can bring 
China’s influence more quickly and directly to the Pacific Islands and 
make China’s presence there more perceptible to local people. While 
there is a  perception that China’s investment in the Pacific Islands has 
risen rapidly over the past several years and that China’s presence in the 
Pacific Island countries has increased substantially, this perception may 










Samoa Tonga Vanuatu Total
2004 10 - - - - - - 10
2005 558 25 - 16 - - - 599
2006 2862 465 - - - - - 3327
2007 19681 249 - 625 -12 - - 20543
2008 2992 797 - −16 - - - 3773
2009 480 240 - - 63 - - 783
2010 533 557 - - 9893 - - 10983
2011 1665 1963 - −289 11773 - 79 15191
2012 2569 6832 12 341 4759 - 293 14806
2013 4302 5832 17 46 −7793 - - 2404
2014 3037 −3716 −27 339 3484 10 604 3731
2015 4177 1240 - 355 9586 98 2245 17701
2016 −4368 4461 0 0 10924 35 542 11594
2017 10161 1706 - −1474 12840 112 2532 25877
Source: China Business yearbook Editorial Board 2001–17 .
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Figure 2. Chinese investment in selected Pacific Island nations 
(US$10,000)
Source: China Business yearbook Editorial Board 2001–17 .
According to Table 4 and Figure 2, 2007 was the peak of Chinese 
investment in Pacific Island countries before 2016, and the flow of 
Chinese investment in these countries did not exceed the 2007 amount 
until 2017. Over the past decade, China’s investment in Pacific Island 
countries has fluctuated greatly. This should not have happened if the 
Chinese Government is trying to increase its presence in Pacific Islands by 
expanding investment.
Statistically, from 2013 to 2016, Chinese investment in PNG did not 
increase or even decline. Chinese investment in Fiji fell sharply in 2017, 
equivalent to only one-quarter of that in 2012. Chinese investment in 
Samoa has risen rapidly since 2014, but was unstable before 2014, and 
the flow of investment to Samoa in 2017 was only slightly higher than 
in 2011.
In the past decade, 2010, 2015 and 2017 were the years in which 
investment flows increased rapidly, with investment in these three years 
increasing by US$102 million, US$140 million and US$143 million 
respectively over the previous year, while investment flows decreased 
significantly in 2013 and 2016, by US$124 million and US$61 million 
respectively over the previous year.  Judging from the investment data, 
China’s investment flows to Pacific Island countries fluctuated greatly and 









2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Figure 3. China’s outward foreign direct investment, 2004–17 
(US$ billion)
Source: China Business yearbook Editorial Board 2001–17 .
From a country-specific perspective, China’s investment has been most 
concentrated in PNG, Fiji and Samoa. China’s investment in Vanuatu 
and the Federated States of Micronesia has also increased in recent years.
With the rise of its economic strength, the scale of China’s foreign 
investment has also rapidly increased. In 2004, the amount of China’s 
outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) was US$5.5 billion. In 2016, 
the amount of China’s OFDI reached US$196.4 billion, a remarkable 
increase of 34.7 times in 13 years. By contrast, Chinese investment in 
seven Pacific Island countries rose 18.4 times from 2005 to 2016. It was 
not until 2017 that China’s net investment flow to Pacific Island countries 
exceeded that of 2007. Over the past decade, Chinese investment in Pacific 
Island countries has grown more slowly than the overall rise in Chinese 
outbound investment.
Some countries have different interpretations of China’s investment in 
the Pacific Islands. From China’s perspective, its flow of OFDI to Pacific 
Island countries accounted for only 0.16 per cent of its global outward 
investment in 2017, an almost negligible share for China.1 But from 
the point of view of the Pacific Islands, China’s investment can have 
a  great impact on the region.  Australia and New Zealand, meanwhile, 
1  Ministry of Commerce, China via CEIC database, www.ceicdata.com.
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are more concerned about the possible geopolitical and social impacts 
of China’s projects on the Pacific Islands. Australia’s 2016 Defence White 
Paper commits Australia to work to ‘limit the influence of any actor 
from outside the region with interests inimical to our own’ (Department 
of Defence 2016:74).
China’s aid to the Pacific Islands
China’s aid to Pacific Island countries has attracted a lot of attention 
from the international community in the past several years (Brant 2013; 
Dornan and Brant 2014; Dziedzic 2018). Some feel that China intends 
to expand its influence in the Pacific Islands and that China’s growing 
influence has eroded Australia’s leadership there; thus, Australia needs 
to do more to rebalance China’s influence (Batley 2017; Hegarty 2015; 
Riordan 2018). However, judging from the actual amount of Chinese aid 
to the Pacific Islands, China’s intentions are likely exaggerated.
Table 5. Aid delivered to Pacific Island countries (in real terms) 
(US$100 million)




2011 13 0 .91 1 1 .8 1 .9 2 .3
2012 12 0 .8 0 .72 1 .5 2 .2 2 .1
2013 11 2 .1 0 .87 1 .4 2 .0 2 .2
2014 11 2 .5 0 .93 1 .3 2 .5 1 .8
2015 10 2 .9 1 1 .3 2 .2 1 .3
2016 8 .8 1 .9 0 .66 1 .8 2 .2 0 .66
2017 9 .5 1 .7 0 .95 1 .9 2 .2 1 .6
Source: Lowy Institute (2019) .
As can be seen from the data in Table 5, China’s aid to Pacific Island 
countries rose continuously between 2013 and 2015, but declined in 2016 
and 2017, with a decline of more than 30 per cent in 2016 compared to 
the previous year.  In 2017, China’s aid to Pacific Island countries was 
lower than that of Australia, New Zealand and Japan and slightly higher 




This should not have been the case if China had strategic intentions in the 
Pacific region. According to data released by the Chinese Government, of 
the RMB89.34 billion (about US$12.8 billion) China spent in foreign 
aid from 2010 to 2012, 4.2 per cent, or RMB3.75 billion (about US$536 
million), went to Oceania (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China 2014). Aid to Pacific Island countries accounts 
for a small proportion of China’s foreign aid, and is not rising very fast.
In terms of the amount of aid given, China’s position among donors to 
the Pacific Islands is not prominent. However, China’s aid is more focused 
on infrastructure projects, and the amount of aid given for a single 
project is often larger than that of other donors, so often attracts more 
attention. While China’s aid program in the Pacific Islands has sparked 
some criticism from countries such as Australia (Dziedzic 2018), based 
on the findings of this study, China’s aid to this region does not appear to 
be the result of conscious strategic design (Colton 2018; Connolly 2016).
Dynamics and the sustainability of China’s 
policy towards the Pacific Island countries
The above analysis shows that although trade and investment between 
China and the Pacific Island countries have been growing rapidly since 
2000, and China’s aid to the Pacific Island countries is also on the rise, 
China’s relations with the Pacific Islands have not changed dramatically 
and high-level exchanges have not become more frequent in recent years, 
despite what officials and the media in countries such as Australia and 
New Zealand have portrayed (Batley 2017; Dornan 2018; DW News 
2018; Peters 2018).
On the other hand, with the improvement of China’s overall strength 
and the development of China’s all-round diplomacy,2 China’s national 
and regional studies underwent a period of relative prosperity. Driven 
by the ‘Going Out’ strategy, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and 
all-round diplomacy, Chinese universities have established a large number 
of national  and regional research centres in a relatively short period of 
2  In October 2017, the report of the 19th CPC National Congress pointed out that since the 
18th CPC National Congress (2012) an important achievement of China’s diplomacy has been 
the in-depth development of all-round diplomacy and the advancing of ‘China’s diplomatic agenda 
in a comprehensive, multilevel, multifaceted way’ (Xi 2017).
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time. In  2017, the Ministry of Education actively promoted national 
and regional studies, documenting 394 country and regional research 
centres to achieve full coverage in country and regional studies (Ministry 
of Education of the People’s Republic of China 2017). Against this 
background, the study of Pacific Island countries in Chinese universities 
has been promoted. At present, there are two research centres specialising 
in Pacific Island countries studies: the Research Center for Pacific Island 
Countries of Liaocheng University and the Center for Pacific Island 
Countries Studies of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies.  This 
gives the impression that the Chinese Government is paying much 
more attention to the Pacific Island countries.  Such an understanding 
is somewhat misleading, as it could be merely a reflection of China’s 
generally rising interests in global affairs. 
An issue worth paying attention to is whether the rise in China’s trade, 
investment and aid to the Pacific Island countries is a unique phenomenon 
with these countries or representative of changes in China’s foreign 
relations as a whole.
If we look only at China’s trade, investment and aid with the Pacific 
Islands, it may seem as though China’s interest in that region has increased 
considerably over the past decade. However, a more comprehensive look 
at the overall transformation of China’s foreign trade, investment and aid 
shows that the Pacific Islands have a limited position in China’s overall 
foreign economic relations. China’s investment of resources in this region 
is not particularly unique.
In the past several years, Australia, New Zealand and some other countries 
have been quite sensitive to the rise of China’s influence in the Pacific 
Islands region (Colton 2018; Hanson 2011; Hegarty 2015; Lum and 
Vaughn 2007; Meich et al. 2018; McAslan 2013; Wesley-Smith 2007; 
Windybank 2005), some believing that China has greater political or 
strategic intentions and is trying to crowd out the influence of Australia 
and New Zealand in this region.  In this context, Australia and New 
Zealand have responded with their respective policies, New Zealand 
launching a principles-based ‘Pacific Reset’ (Peters 2018) and Australia 




As countries that have traditionally had influence in the region, Australia’s 
and New Zealand’s concerns are understandable.  However, it can be 
hypothetically speculated that if China really has political and strategic 
intentions in the Pacific Islands region, China’s trade, investment and 
aid to the Pacific Island countries should not have experienced large 
fluctuations in the past decade, including sometimes notable decreases, as 
shown in the previous data. Chinese investment in Pacific Island countries, 
in particular, has fluctuated widely over the past decade. If the trade and 
investment figures are somewhat coincidental, continued growth is at 
least achievable if the Chinese Government wants to expand aid to the 
Pacific Islands. But the reality is that in 2017 China’s annual aid to Pacific 
Island countries had not increased but declined compared to 2013.
One possible conclusion is that the rise of China’s influence in the 
Pacific Islands since 2010 is, to a large extent, a byproduct of the overall 
rise of China’s international influence.  It was also influenced by the 
BRI as well as President Xi Jinping’s two state visits to Pacific Island 
countries. The Chinese Government has not made great efforts to operate 
in the Pacific Islands region as a key diplomatic direction, nor does it have 
a comprehensive strategic design related to this region.
The overall growth rate of China’s investment in Pacific Island countries 
has been relatively stable in the past decade, but China’s assistance has 
been noticeable for the following reasons: 
1. The relatively limited size of Pacific Island countries, which means 
that small amounts of aid may bring about major changes in the 
socioeconomic outlook of the countries.
2. China is a latecomer in providing aid to the Pacific Islands region; 
under the stable aid structure formed there in the past, the entry of 
China’s aid easily attracts the attention of other donors, especially in 
the context of the rise of China.
3. China’s assistance is more concentrated in areas such as infrastructure 
construction, where the average amount of Chinese aid to projects is 
often greater than that of other donors. Roughly speaking, the average 
size of Chinese aid projects is 10 times that of Australian projects 
(Dziedzic 2018). Meanwhile, China has a very strong capacity for 
and high efficiency in infrastructure construction; the existence of 
China’s local infrastructure projects easily gives people an impression 
of China’s national ability (Zhang 2015).
247
7 . A REEVALuATION OF CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
4. As China’s aid has no political strings attached, it is different from 
that of Western countries; this, accompanied by its high efficiency, has 
prompted Pacific Islanders to compare China’s assistance with that 
of other countries.  In the process, there will be a change in Pacific 
Islanders’ attitudes towards different donors (Malielegaoi 2016), which 
will have a psychological impact on Australia and New Zealand.
On this basis, it is worth discussing how China’s economic ties with the 
Pacific Islands will develop and how China’s investment in the Pacific 
Islands will change over the next five to 10 years. There are four main 
judgements:
1. The economic capacity and economic structure of the Pacific Islands 
have restricted the space for economic cooperation between China and 
the Pacific Island countries. Most of the Pacific Islands are small in 
size and have a singular economic structure. Most of their consumer 
and industrial goods need to be imported from abroad. Their human 
resource base is limited and they lack the capacity for sustainable 
development. Even in the long run, the market capacity of the Pacific 
Island countries is limited. In addition, the natural environment of 
the Pacific Islands is very fragile and the people have a strong sense 
of environmental protection. Under these circumstances, some of their 
economies are quite underdeveloped, which reduces the Islands’ possible 
paths for economic development and limits the investment space for 
Chinese enterprises in the region. Given this, it is unrealistic for China 
to expand its investment in the Pacific Island countries on a large scale 
and substantially increase the level of trade between the two sides. 
2. What kind of return can China get if it increases its assistance to 
the Pacific Island countries substantially? Some scholars have tried 
to explain China’s assistance to the Pacific Island countries from the 
perspective of diplomacy competition between mainland China and 
Taiwan, as six Pacific Island countries maintained official relations 
with Taiwan until the end of 2018 (Meick et al. 2018; Yu 2015; 
Zhang 2015).
Competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition is undoubtedly an 
important factor in the relations between China and the Pacific Islands. 
However, China’s trade, investment and assistance to the Pacific Islands 
are not mainly subject to diplomatic considerations related to Taiwan, 
otherwise it would be difficult to explain the increase in Chinese 
investment and assistance to the Pacific Islands during the ‘diplomatic 
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truce’.  In explaining China’s investment and assistance to the Pacific 
Island countries in terms of Taiwan-related diplomacy competition, 
there exists a logic problem. That is, China’s assistance to Pacific Islands 
should be directed more to those countries that have not established 
diplomatic relations with China, or to countries that lack stability 
in their relations with China, rather than those that have established 
diplomatic relations with China, especially those countries maintaining 
good bilateral relations with China, such as PNG, Fiji and Vanuatu.
Some scholars believe that China is spending more on the Pacific 
Islands in an effort to compete with Australia for influence in 
the region. If zero-sum thinking is adopted, it could be argued that the 
rise of one nation’s influence may mean the decrease of another’s. Some 
have suggested the need to find ways to counter China’s influence in 
the South Pacific (Colton 2018; Edel 2018; Hegarty 2015). If the 
struggle for influence is used to explain China’s behaviour in the Pacific 
region, the questions remain: What does China want that influence 
for? What benefits can this influence bring to China presently and in 
the future? And can China gain more influence in the region under the 
countermeasures of Australia and New Zealand? Is it worth the cost 
China would need to pay for the influence? 
It is a fact that China’s influence in the Pacific region is on the rise, but 
competing for influence with countries such as Australia in the region 
does not seem to be China’s policy goal. For China, there are many 
more valuable regions in which to gain influence, such as Southeast 
Asia, Northeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Africa and other places. 
There is no special necessity for China to compete for influence in the 
Pacific Islands region.
3. The BRI has not significantly increased China’s investment and 
assistance to the Pacific Islands. The introduction and promotion of 
the BRI can, to a certain extent, explain China’s continued aid and 
investment in the Pacific Islands region, though the total amount is 
neither very high nor low. Since the BRI was put forward, China has 
attached great importance to it at all levels, and the Pacific Island 
countries are on the Belt and Road route.3 Additionally, China has 
a huge economic and social mass with a large number of economic 
3  On 20 June 2017, the State Development and Reform Commission and the State Oceanic 
Administration specially formulated and released the Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the 
Belt and Road Initiative, which mentions ‘efforts will also be made to jointly build the blue economic 
passage of China–Oceania–South Pacific’ (Belt and Road Portal 2017). 
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actors. Under such circumstances, it is natural for some enterprises to 
respond to the BRI and invest in the Pacific Islands region. The problem 
with this explanation, however, is that Chinese aid and investment to 
the Pacific Islands did not rise significantly between 2014 and 2016, 
the first few years after China proposed the BRI. Though Chinese 
investment in PNG rose sharply in 2013, this was before the BRI was 
really put into effect. This shows that although the promotion of the 
BRI helps maintain the interest of Chinese enterprises and society in 
the Pacific Islands, it is not as much a boost to China’s investment and 
assistance to the Pacific Island countries as people might think.
In addition to the aforementioned points, the increase in the scale of 
China’s investment and aid to the Pacific Island countries has not been 
very significant over the past few years. It is also difficult to effectively 
explain the increase in Chinese investment and aid to the Pacific 
Islands with a single factor (Hayward-Jones 2013). However, the shift 
in Chinese investment and aid to the Pacific Islands does not appear to 
be the result of significant, coherent strategic intention.
In a certain sense, China’s assistance to the Pacific Islands is also 
a means for China to fulfill its international responsibilities, engaging 
in South–South cooperation with developing countries and  jointly 
responding to the challenge of climate change. For example, Article 4 
of the Measures for the Administration of Foreign Aid (for Trial 
Implementation) promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce (2014) 
clearly states that:
Foreign aid shall respect the sovereignty of the recipient country, 
shall not interfere in the internal affairs of the recipient country, 
shall strive to alleviate and eliminate poverty, improve the 
livelihood and ecological environment of the recipient country, 
promote the recipient’s economic development and social 
progress, and enhance the recipient’s capacity for autonomous 
development,  consolidate and develop friendly and cooperative 
relations with the recipients.
4. The response of countries such as Australia will have some impact on 
China’s Pacific Island policy. Australia has long provided substantial 
economic assistance to the Pacific Islands. It is difficult for Australia 
to obtain obvious economic returns from its aid to the Pacific Islands. 
Providing assistance is an important means for Australia to influence 
the political situations and policy options of the Pacific Island 
countries and maintain Australia’s dominance in the South Pacific 
region. The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper of Australia considers 
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the Pacific Islands a fundamental strategic interest of Australia and 
devotes a chapter to its relations with the Pacific Island countries 
(Australian Government 2017).
Although China believes that the strengthening of its relations with 
the Pacific Island countries is based on the principle of mutual benefit 
and win–win cooperation, it also believes that the development of 
bilateral relations has brought practical benefits to the Pacific Island 
countries. However, it is also an objective fact that the strengthening 
of relations between China and the Pacific Island countries will have 
an impact on China’s relations with Australia and New Zealand. One 
question that arises is whether China is willing to risk damaging 
its relations with Australia and New Zealand because it wants to 
strengthen its relations with the Pacific Islands, and to what extent 
it is willing to take that risk. Relatedly, if Australia and New Zealand 
put more pressure on some Pacific Island countries to influence their 
policies towards China, this will affect the attitudes of the Pacific Island 
countries towards China and thus the relationship between China and 
the Pacific Island countries.
In the process of developing relations with the Pacific Island countries, 
China needs to take into account the concerns of Australia and 
New Zealand.  China–Australia relations may deteriorate for other 
reasons (Beeson 2018), but it is certainly not in China’s interests if 
China’s behaviour in the Pacific Islands becomes a major factor in the 
deterioration of China–Australian relations. This situation should be 




Since 2006, China’s trade, investment and aid to the Pacific Islands 
have greatly increased. President Xi Jinping’s visits to Pacific Islands in 
2014 and 2018 fully demonstrate the importance China attaches to 
this region.  At  the same time, these two visits took place against the 
background of China’s all-around diplomacy in the international arena 
and President Xi Jinping’s participation in the G20 and APEC meetings 
held in Australia and PNG, respectively. We should not overstate the 
importance China attaches to the Pacific Island countries. 
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With regard to the development of relations between China and the Pacific 
Island countries in the coming years, this chapter makes the following 
preliminary judgements: 
1. Relations with Pacific Island countries are an integral part of China’s 
all-round diplomacy. The development of relations with the Pacific 
Island countries will not bring China obvious economic and strategic 
returns, and will even have a certain negative impact on China–
Australia and China–New Zealand relations, but China will not stop 
promoting the development of its relations with the Pacific Island 
countries because of this.  In particular, the Pacific Island countries 
are an important part of the BRI. 
In terms of China’s economic output, which ranks second in the world, 
the total amount of China’s aid and investment to the Pacific Islands, 
although not low, is not very high. Moreover, its share of China’s total 
foreign aid and outward investment is very low. As a rising power and 
the world’s second largest economy, it is natural for China to maintain 
relatively good relations with the Pacific Island countries at such 
a  long-term affordable cost. Given Japan and the European Union’s 
long-term investments in the Pacific Islands, China’s investment in 
this region is highly proportionate and reasonable.
2. China’s input in the Pacific Island countries will develop steadily, 
without dramatic rises.  When examining the relationship between 
China and the Pacific Island countries, some Westerners have 
a feeling that China is entering the Pacific Island countries on a large 
scale, demonstrating that China attaches importance to the Pacific 
Islands.  They feel there is a strategic design behind this.  In  fact, 
what is noteworthy is that although the Chinese president has 
visited the Pacific Islands twice between 2014 and 2018, the rise 
in Chinese investment and aid to the Pacific Islands has not been 
remarkable. With China’s size, and considering China’s investment 
in Southeast Asia and Africa in the name of the BRI, China’s input 
in the Pacific Islands could have risen much faster if it had the will, 
without much economic burden on China.
Given leaders’ visits, the implementation of the BRI and China’s 
attempt to enhance its influence in the international community, 
China’s investment in the Pacific Islands is not rising very fast. This 
means that even if China’s investment in Pacific Island countries rises 
in the future, it will do so steadily. In fact, over the past several years, the 
Chinese Government can be said to have shown considerable restraint 
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in increasing input in the Pacific Island countries.  If the Chinese 
Government is more active in encouraging Chinese companies and 
tourists to visit the Pacific Islands, the resulting Chinese presence in 
the region may be quite different from what we see now. Considering 
that Chinese nationals now make more than 120 million international 
trips a year,4 and that a small island country like the Maldives receives 
more than 200,000 Chinese tourists a year, it can be said that the 
presence of Chinese companies and tourists in the Pacific Islands is 
relatively not as strong. An important consideration behind this is to 
avoid too many businesses and tourists going to island countries in 
a short period of time, thus imposing a burden on the island nations’ 
environments and social economies.
On one hand, China maintains a good relationship with the Pacific 
Island countries at the current level of resource input, so there is no 
need for China to increase its input by a large margin. On the other 
hand, investment and aid to the Pacific Islands is not a big burden 
for China, so there is no reason for China to lower its input in the 
region. As a result, in the future, China’s input in the Pacific Islands 
region will likely remain relatively stable. Due to the small size of the 
Pacific Island countries, the promotion and implementation of 
individual projects cannot be ruled out as bringing about relatively 
large fluctuations in the amount of funds invested, but the political 
significance of such fluctuations should not be exaggerated. 
3. China’s investment in the Pacific Islands will highly respect the wishes 
of the island countries. China neither seeks to nor has the ability to 
establish a sphere of influence in the Pacific Islands region.
China’s interest in the Pacific Islands will help improve the strategic 
position of island countries relative to Australia and New Zealand, 
enabling them to face Australia and New Zealand more equally. From 
this perspective, the Pacific Islands’ demand for Chinese input will 
last a long time. On the other hand, geographically, culturally and 
economically, the Pacific Island countries cannot escape the influence 
of Australia and New Zealand. The Pacific Island countries do not 
want to see tensions with Australia and New Zealand caused by their 
relations with China. The Pacific Island countries have strong tactical 
4  In 2018, the number of Chinese citizens travelling abroad was 149.72 million and, in 2017, 
130.51 million. See the website of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Peope’s Republic 
of China, www.mct.gov.cn/whzx/whyw/201902/t20190212_837270.htm; zwgk.mct.gov.cn/auto255/ 
201802/ t20180206_832375.html?keywords.
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considerations in developing their relations with China. They will 
likely try to maintain a balance in their relations with China, Australia 
and New Zealand.
Due to their small size and relatively limited strength, the Pacific Island 
countries do not have great international aspirations, lack the ability to 
withstand the pressure of major power competition, will attach more 
importance to the acquisition of practical interests and do not want 
to become bargaining chips in the games of major powers. It is not 
in the interests of Pacific Island countries to be involved in strategic 
competition that will cost them a lot.
On the whole, even if China increases investment in the Pacific Island 
countries, China’s influence on them can hardly be greatly enhanced. In 
relations between the two sides, China lacks the means to effectively 
restrict the behaviour of the Pacific Island countries. The Pacific Island 
countries can maintain a great degree of policy freedom in the course 
of their exchanges with China. In the process of investing resources, 
China will highly respect the willingness of the Pacific Island countries 
and avoid the negative consequences of resource input in the Pacific 
Island countries.
4. China will further understand the importance of respecting the 
concerns of Australia and New Zealand in developing relations with 
the Pacific Island countries in the future. Although China will not 
act in full accordance with the wishes of Australia and New Zealand, 
it will take into account some of their concerns. 
In the trilateral relations among China, Australia and New Zealand 
and the Pacific Island countries, if China unilaterally increases its 
investment of resources to the Pacific Island countries, it will stimulate 
counteraction from Australia and New Zealand. The countermeasures 
taken by Australia and New Zealand will make China’s investment in 
the Pacific Island countries fail to achieve an ideal outcome. As a result, 
such an investment increase would have a negative effect on China’s 
relations with Australia and New Zealand, as well as its relations with 
the Pacific Island countries. This is certainly not a situation China 
would like to see.
If China and Australia adopt an approach of breaking up each other’s 
influence in the Pacific region, the result will be a lose–lose situation 
between China and Australia in the region at the expense of China–
Australia relations. Chinese investment in the Pacific Island countries 
is unlikely to yield a reasonable return on its own, and countermeasures 
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taken by Australia will further reduce the long-term return of Chinese 
investment. From this point of view, China does not want its activities 
in the Pacific Islands to cause much agitation in the region.  China 
hopes to promote the steady development of its relations with the 
Pacific Island countries when the overall situation in the region is 
stable. The idea that China has a comprehensive strategic plan in the 
Pacific Islands is logically untenable and lacks factual support.
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China’s rise in the Pacific1 is in the spotlight and provoking growing 
concern from traditional powers. Beijing has substantially increased its 
engagement with the region since 2006. Chinese President Xi Jinping paid 
his first official visit to Papua New Guinea (PNG) in November 2018. 
On the sidelines of APEC held in Port Moresby, he also met with leaders 
of the eight Pacific Island countries (PICs) that have diplomatic relations 
with China. The leaders agreed to elevate the China–PICs relationship 
to a comprehensive strategic partnership of mutual respect and common 
development (China MFA 2018), although China uses this term loosely 
in diplomacy and the meaning remains ambiguous. To push back against 
China’s influence in the region, US Vice President Mike Pence announced 
at the APEC CEO summit that the US would partner with Australia 
and PNG to develop Lombrum Naval Base on PNG’s Manus Island and 
1  In this chapter, the Pacific region refers to the 14 Pacific sovereign states.
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jointly ‘protect sovereignty and maritime rights of the Pacific Islands’ 
(Pence 2018). Competition between China and traditional powers will 
most likely continue and intensify in the Pacific.
At the domestic level, the Xi Jinping administration has been conducting 
political reforms that could have a significant impact on  China’s 
engagement  with other countries including Pacific Island states. 
China’s  diplomacy is becoming more proactive and assertive. Since 
March 2018, Beijing has been implementing a new round of government 
restructuring, much of which is closely linked to its diplomacy. For example, 
in April 2018 China established its first stand-alone aid agency: the 
China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA). This 
vice-ministerial organisation, designed to strengthen the planning and 
monitoring of Chinese aid, has been placed under the supervision of top 
Chinese diplomats Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi. In addition, the Office of 
Overseas Chinese Affairs under the State Council, which is responsible 
for liaising with the Chinese diaspora, has been merged into the United 
Front Work Department, a powerful organisation of the Chinese 
Communist Party.
This chapter aims to add a new perspective to the literature on China 
in the Pacific. By adopting Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration 
on structure and agency, the chapter aims to analyse how China’s recent 
domestic political reforms will affect its engagement with PICs, which is 
rarely touched on in the literature. As foreign aid is a crucial element of 
China’s growing outreach in the Pacific and has been in the spotlight due 
to accusations such as ineffectiveness and the use of debt-for-equity swaps, 
this chapter will examine three questions through the prism of Chinese 
foreign aid: (1) What are China’s national interests in the Pacific? (2) How 
have China’s evolving national interests guided various Chinese actors’ 
work on aid and informed structure changes? (3) In what ways have these 
actors reshaped China’s national interests and the bureaucratic structure? 
The impact of CIDCA on China’s aid program in the Pacific will be 
included in the discussion. I will argue that different Chinese actors have 
been involved in a fierce competition for influence in decision-making on 
aid, and that diplomacy will have more weight in a CIDCA-led Chinese 
aid system—with a consequent impact on the Pacific region.
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Structure and agency theory
The relationship between structure and agent is a recurrent theme in social 
sciences. According to the theory of structuration developed in the 1980s 
by Anthony Giddens, a prominent British sociologist, structure refers 
generally to rules and resources, and agency is defined as actors’ capability 
to do things in the first place (1984:9, 24). The constitution of agents and 
structures represent a duality as structure is both constraining and enabling, 
while the activities of agents constitute and reconstitute social systems 
(ibid.:25). Constructivists in international relations take the discussion 
further. For example, Alexander Wendt argues that structure is not static 
and predetermined but subject to actors’ mutual interaction (1992). 
Based on Giddens’ theory of structuration, a state’s national interests 
inform the creation of its norms and allocation of resources, and form the 
bureaucratic structure. The bureaucratic structure conditions the actions 
of actors. However, purposeful actors are not passive but active. They use 
their agency to alter the state’s national interests and transform/reshape 
the structure. It is noteworthy that the structuration theory is not without 
criticism, such as it is an analytical rather than substantive theory and does 
not generate hypothesis (Wendt 1987). This chapter does not intend to 
engage in these debates or make theoretical contributions, but rather aims 
to use Giddens’ theory as a new approach to analyse China’s diplomacy 
and aid program in the Pacific. Data sources for the research comprise 
existing scholarly works, interviews and the author’s own observation 
of China–PICs relations as a researcher and former practitioner.
China’s national interests in the Pacific
Pacific states are not in the top tier of China’s foreign policy agenda. Chinese 
diplomats categorise the Pacific as part of the broad developing world that 
China is keen to align with. To be more specific, Pacific states are referred 
to as part of China’s ‘greater periphery’ (da zhoubian, 大周边), a term 
first used loosely to label China’s neighbouring Asian countries and then 
extended to include the Pacific (Zhang 2017:45). Nonetheless, China’s 
national interests in the Pacific region are multifaceted and evolving.
The diplomatic competition between China (referred to as the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) or mainland China in China’s official discourses) 
and Taiwan (or the Republic of China) has dominated China’s diplomacy 
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in the Pacific. The Chinese Government defines it as an issue of paramount 
importance to China’s territorial integrity and national reunification 
(Yang 2011). Obtaining Pacific states’ support of the One China policy has 
remained a central task of the Chinese Government since the 1970s when 
China started to establish official relations with Pacific states such as Fiji 
and Samoa. Although most of the 14 sovereign Pacific countries are small 
states and have limited influence in international affairs, they have an equal 
vote to large states at the UN. Most Pacific states are also highly dependent 
on foreign aid. These two factors have made PICs important players that 
both China and Taiwan try to court in the diplomatic wrestling. As Table 1 
shows, this battle has been tense and some Pacific states have switched their 
positions back and forth but, globally, the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic 
allies is decreasing. Since February 2016, another eight countries (Gambia, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, 
El Salvador, Solomon Islands and Kiribati) moved their recognition to 
China, reducing Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to 15. Among them, four were 
from the Pacific; the sheer number of PICs now supporting China gives 
the Pacific region more importance in China’s diplomatic competition with 
Taiwan in the future. 
Table 1. Diplomatic landscape for China and Taiwan in the Pacific
Pacific country Taiwan PRC Taiwan PRC
Fiji 5 Nov . 1975
Samoa 29 May 1972 6 Nov . 1975
PNG 12 Oct . 1976 5 July 1999 21 July 1999
Vanuatu 26 Mar . 1982 3 Nov . 2004 11 Nov . 2004
Federated States 
of Micronesia
11 Sept . 1989
Cook Islands 25 July 1997
Tonga 10 Apr . 1972 2 Nov . 1998
Niue 12 Dec . 2007
Solomon Islands 24 Mar . 1983 21 Sept . 2019
Kiribati 25 June 1980 7 Nov . 2003 27 Sept . 2019
Pacific states that recognise Taiwan
Tuvalu 19 Sept . 1979
Nauru 4 May 1980 21 July 2002 14 May 2005
Palau 29 Dec . 1999
Marshall Islands 16 Nov . 1990 20 Nov . 1998
Source: Compiled by author .
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More broadly, it is wise to position the Pacific states in China’s overall 
diplomacy towards the developing world (Wesley-Smith 2013). The huge 
differences in political systems and values and the ‘century of humiliation’ 
(1840–1949) have made the Chinese Government distrustful of 
developed countries at a deep level and created a strong sense of insecurity 
(Callahan 2012; Gries 2004), which forced China to seek support from 
developing countries. The need to develop a unifying identity with other 
developing countries has been a fundamental principle in China’s foreign 
policy since the establishment of the PRC by the Communist Party in 
1949. Beijing believes that the common identity of being developing 
countries and a shared history of being victims of colonisation will draw 
China and  these countries together. China also considers developing 
countries to be a reliable resource that China can call upon for support 
when needed, such as the PRC’s admission to the UN Security Council 
in November 1971 and after Tiananmen Square in 1989 when developed 
countries imposed sanctions on China. This strategy is a crucial reason 
why China sticks firmly to its identity as a developing country despite 
the fact that it is now the world’s second largest economy and the largest 
emerging donor. It  also explains why Chinese leaders have repeatedly 
highlighted that ‘both China and Pacific island countries are developing 
countries’ in meetings with their counterparts from the Pacific. In a recent 
example, in his group meeting in November 2018 in Port Moresby with 
the leaders of the then eight PICs that had diplomatic relations with 
China, Xi Jinping began by emphasising that ‘China and Pacific island 
countries are all developing countries in the Asia Pacific region, they have 
been good friends … good partners … and good brothers’ (China MFA 
2018). Relations with Pacific states also enables China to demonstrate that 
big and small countries are equal partners. China has lavished red-carpet 
treatment on Pacific leaders during their visits to China. 
Guided by this policy of fostering closer relations with developing countries, 
China has intensified its engagement with the military government in 
Fiji since the coup in 2006 while the latter was under severe sanctions 
from traditional powers, especially Australia and New Zealand. Fiji has 
become the regional hub and one of China’s main diplomatic, trade and 
aid partners in the region. In February 2009, when he was China’s vice 
president, Xi Jinping paid a stopover visit to Fiji despite open opposition 
from Australia and New Zealand. China has also substantially increased 
its assistance and financial support to Fiji. As the Lowy Institute (2019) in 
Sydney estimates, between 2011 and 2017, China’s total aid committed 
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and spent in Fiji exceeded US$379.2 million and US$316.7  million 
respectively, making China the second largest donor behind Australia.2 
Chinese ambassadors dispatched to Fiji are more seasoned career diplomats 
compared with those assigned to other Pacific states. 
China’s economic interest in the Pacific region is minimal in the context 
of its overall global trade. In 2017, China’s exports to and imports from 
the 14 PICs, as well as French Polynesia and New Caledonia, constituted 
0.21  per cent and 0.19 per cent of China’s global merchandise trade 
(Pacific Trade and Investment Office 2018:5). China’s economic activities 
have largely focused on extractive industries in resources-rich PICs, 
with the PNG Ramu nickel mine China’s largest single investment in 
the region (US$1.4 billion). In 2017, fuels represented 43.4 per cent of 
China’s imports from PNG and 25.8 per cent of China’s total imports 
from the region (ibid.:3–4). Since December 2014, China has committed 
to purchasing 2 million tonnes of PNG liquefied natural gas (worth 
US$1 billion) per annum for 20 years. In 2017, China also imported 
wood products from Solomon Islands to the value of US$483.2 million, 
accounting for 13.9  per cent of China’s total imports from the 
Pacific (ibid.). 
China’s military ambitions in the Pacific are limited at present but may 
grow in the near future. Using the ‘three island chains’ theory adopted 
by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as the benchmark—
although Chinese interpretations are diverse and multifaceted (Erickson 
and Wuthnow 2016; Pedrozo 2010)—the Pacific region is an important 
part of the second and third island chains. At present, China’s PLAN has 
been preoccupied with maritime disputes along the first island chain in 
the South and East China seas and it has not given much attention to the 
Pacific. PLAN’s engagement with PICs is still superficial, consisting of 
donations of non-combatant vehicles and uniforms, construction/upgrade 
of military hospitals and visits from PLAN medical ships (the Peace Ark). 
However, there are signs that things are changing and that the Pacific 
may occupy a more significant position in China’s military strategies. 
Since Xi Jinping took power in 2013, the Chinese Government has 
apparently started to move away from ‘hiding the capacity and keeping 
a low profile’ (taoguang yanghui, 韬光养晦), a principle that had guided 
China’s diplomacy since the 1990s. China’s diplomacy has become more 
2  Over the same period, Australian total aid committed and spent in Fiji was about US$551.8 
million and US$408.5 million respectively. 
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ambitious and assertive (Brady 2017:239–40). China PLAN has also 
stepped up efforts to move from a green-water navy to a blue-water navy 
with notable progress. It has had two aircraft carriers constructed and 
a third is under way. In April 2018, President Xi Jinping, who is also 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission, reviewed China’s PLAN 
in the South China Sea, the largest of its kind in PLAN history. He called 
on PLAN to build a ‘world first-class navy’. PLAN leadership’s response 
to this call casts some light on their strategic thinking:
From the geo-strategic perspective, China is placed in 
a disadvantaged oceanic environment, with coastal waters semi-
enclosed and separated by island chains, and access to the sea 
blocked by other powers … Our country has entered into a crucial 
stage of moving from a land power to both a land and sea power … 
PLAN is the most appropriate and needed strategic force within 
PLA to go global (zou chuqu) (PLAN Party Committee 2018).
With increased long-range projection capabilities and heightened US–
China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region, it is likely that 
PLAN will develop substantial engagement with Pacific states in the 
future. However, whether and to what extent China can successfully 
build a closer strategic and defence relationship with these Pacific states is 
questionable. The 2018 announcement by the US to build the Lombrum 
Naval Base in PNG with Australia and PNG, and speculation around 
China’s intention to build a naval base in Vanuatu, reveal traditional 
powers’ growing concerns about China’s military ambitions in the Pacific. 
China’s diaspora might be caught in social unrest in some Pacific countries 
in the future. If this happens, it is more likely that China would arrange 
charter flights rather than use military forces to evacuate affected Chinese 
citizens. The Chinese Government adopted this approach during the 
riots in Solomon Islands and Tonga in 2006. Compared with Africa and 
Asia, Chinese diaspora and companies, especially state-owned enterprises, 
in the Pacific are much smaller in number.
The role of structure
The first half of this section will examine how China’s national interests 
in the Pacific have shaped its bureaucratic structure for foreign aid work 
in the region. The second half discusses some new changes, especially 
CIDCA’s impact on Chinese aid in the Pacific.
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Chinese aid to Pacific states consists of grants, interest-free loans and 
concessional loans. Before the establishment of CIDCA, the Ministry 
of Commerce (MOFCOM) managed grants and interest-free loans. 
The  China Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank) managed concessional 
loans, subject to the approval of MOFCOM as the supervisor. Established 
in 1994 as a vice-ministerial level agency, China Exim Bank is the only 
policy bank to provide concessional loans and has about 600 staff. 
The Corporate Business Department, which is in charge of commercial 
loans and especially export buyers’ credits, and the Concessional Loan 
Department are the two most important sections of the bank and each 
has about 100 staff.3 
When MOFCOM was in charge of Chinese aid, the State Council 
required that it consult China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on 
aid allocation. MFA is responsible for China’s bilateral relations with 
partner countries including in the Pacific. Based on the needs of China’s 
diplomacy, MFA provided advice to MOFCOM on whether China 
should provide aid to the targeted recipient country. To secure diplomatic 
support from Pacific states on the One China policy, MFA encouraged 
MOFCOM to deliver more aid to the region, as well as favouring debt 
relief 4 for Pacific states. About five to six officials in the Division of South 
Pacific and Canada under MFA’s Department of North American and 
Oceanian Affairs manage China’s bilateral relations with the Pacific. 
Provincial-level aid complements Chinese aid from the central 
government to the Pacific. In recognition of its close diaspora links with 
the Pacific, Guangdong Province is tasked with engaging Pacific states and 
providing provincial-level aid. The vast majority of Chinese diaspora in 
Fiji and Samoa are from this province and, in recent years, Guangdong’s 
engagement with PICs has increased. The main activities include short-
term medical tours (song yi shang dao, 送医上岛) and visits by acrobatic/
arts troupes for celebrations. The medical tour program started in 2012. 
It consists of medical specialists of different types selected from hospitals 
in Guangdong and are led by a senior official from the foreign affairs 
office or health department of the province. Between 2012 and 2016, 
the medical tours went to all eight Pacific states with diplomatic relations 
with China, except Niue (Wang and Yu 2017:201–03).
3  Former China Exim Bank official, July 2018. Interview with author.
4  Debt relief means partial or total remission of debt.
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Given the critical importance of decreasing Taiwan’s influence in the 
Pacific, foreign aid is the main component of China’s engagement with 
Pacific states. As noted earlier, MOFCOM had been China’s central 
organisation tasked with managing foreign aid until the establishment 
of CIDCA in April 2018. MOFCOM’s Department of Foreign Aid, 
and more specifically the Division of South Pacific, was responsible for 
Chinese aid to Pacific states. Within this department, three divisions 
focused on Africa, two divisions worked on Asia while one each managed 
Chinese aid in West Africa, North Africa and Europe, Latin America and 
South Pacific (China MOFCOM 2015). This structure alone is a telling 
sign that Africa and Asia receive most of China’s attention in the area of 
aid; the Pacific does not receive particular attention. 
By providing aid to Pacific states, the Chinese Government also aims to 
safeguard its growing economic interests in the region. A good bilateral 
relationship provides a supportive environment for Chinese trade and 
investment activities in these countries. Moreover, the agreements for 
Chinese concessional loans require that the project be awarded to Chinese 
contractors, especially state-owned enterprises. This is a crucial step for 
Chinese companies to establish themselves in the Pacific market, which is 
new to them, before they move on to commercial projects. 
Military aid is a key tool for China to strengthen military ties with 
counterparts in the region and protect its strategic interests, which are 
likely to grow in the near future. Similar to Chinese military aid to other 
regions, the PLA manages the budget for Chinese military aid to the 
Pacific and is deliberately non-transparent. It is even more opaque than 
Chinese aid managed by MOFCOM. Although China’s current military 
aid to PICs is limited in value and scope, Chinese universities are training 
military officers from the region through scholarship programs and short-
term training. For example, in September 2018, Esita Batiniqila became 
the first female officer from the Fiji Navy to be awarded a four-year Chinese 
scholarship to study navy ship service command and navy military science 
at China’s Dalian University (Kumar 2018). Such training could have 
a long-term impact on China–Pacific military relations.  
China has also increased its engagement with Pacific media, expecting 
outlets to portray a benign image of China to the public. This engagement 
is part of a move to ‘tell China’s stories well, present a true, multi-
dimensional, and panoramic view of China’, as envisaged by Xi Jinping 
when he addressed the 19th National Party Congress (Xinhua 2017). 
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Since the establishment of a branch of China’s official news agency, 
Xinhua, in Suva in September 2010—the first in the Pacific—China has 
funded a growing number of Pacific journalists to visit China or attend 
professional training in China. For example, the MFA’s Information 
Department organised tours for Pacific Island journalists in China in 
2013 and 2017. Another delegation of Pacific media visited Beijing and 
Fujian Province (the main source of Chinese diaspora in Tonga) in 2015 
at the invitation of the All-China Journalists’ Association, an organisation 
led by the Chinese Communist Party. Yet, these efforts are compromised 
by other activities; in November 2018, Pacific journalists were denied 
entry to report on the meeting between leaders of China and Pacific states 
in Port Moresby in November 2018.
Recent changes
The Xi Jinping administration has been tightening the Chinese Communist 
Party’s control on government policies including foreign policy. At the 
19th Party Congress held in October 2017, which approved his second 
term, Xi announced that his administration would ‘ensure Party leadership 
over all work’ and ‘the Party exercises overall leadership over all areas of 
endeavor in every part of the country’ (Xinhua 2017), a lexicon used by 
former leader Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution. Although 
the Communist Party has already been leading Chinese foreign aid work, 
even more control could ensue in the future.  
The newly established CIDCA will have a significant impact on Chinese 
aid to the Pacific. In March 2018, China’s State Council announced the 
plan to establish this agency, which is designed to ‘do overall planning 
and coordinating on major foreign aid issues, offer advice and advance 
the country’s reforms in matters involving foreign aid … identify major 
programs, supervise and evaluate implementation of such programs’ 
(Y.  Zhang 2018). The implementation of aid projects was left with 
the existing executing agencies. These include three agencies affiliated 
to MOFCOM: the Executive Bureau of International Economic 
Cooperation (responsible for complete projects—turnkey projects or 
chengtao xiangmu, 成套项目—and technical cooperation projects); China 
International Centre for Economic and Technical Exchanges (responsible 
for in-kind donations); and the Academy for International Business 
Officials (responsible for training programs). Other line ministries such 
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as the ministries of agriculture and education continue to provide foreign 
aid in their specialised areas. China Exim Bank remains responsible for 
concessional loans. 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will be a significant factor in Chinese 
foreign aid in the region; indeed, CIDCA is largely designed to facilitate 
the implementation of BRI, a signature project of Xi Jinping and his 
diplomatic legacy. Xi has relentlessly promoted this initiative during his 
official meetings with leaders from other countries. As of January 2020, all 
10 partner countries in the Pacific had signed up to BRI (see Table 2), with 
PNG the first in the region to sign on. In November 2018, cooperation 
under BRI featured in the bilateral and group meetings between Xi and 
Pacific leaders in Port Moresby, with incentives offered to attract Pacific 
states’ participation in BRI. For example, Vanuatu and China signed the 
MOU on BRI cooperation on 9 November 2018; Xi then announced the 
MOU during his bilateral meeting with Vanuatu’s Prime Minister, Charlot 
Salwai, a week later in Port Moresby. China also signed a further six 
agreements with Vanuatu, including economic and technical cooperation 
(grants provision); a framework for concessional loans; a protocol on 
debt relief; three MOUs on human resource development cooperation; 
exchanges between China’s Guangdong Province and Vanuatu; and the 
establishment of a joint economic and trade commission between China’s 
MOFCOM and Vanuatu’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vanuatu Daily 
Post 2018). Similarly, prior to the bilateral meeting between Xi and Cook 
Islands Prime Minister Henry Puna, China signed the MOU on BRI with 
Cook Islands and provided a grant of US$6.8 million to the Pacific state 
(Radio New Zealand 2018).
BRI is even contributing to China’s debt relief for Pacific countries. Tonga 
has linked its participation in BRI to the debt relief offered by China. 
On the margins of APEC in 2018, Tonga entered into BRI and received 
a five-year extension for repayment of debts owed to China.5 In stark 
contrast, Tonga’s requests in recent years for debt relief had failed to gain 
any traction. Tonga’s then prime minister, ‘Akilisi Pohiva, had attempted 
to unify Pacific states to press Beijing for loan forgiveness and was openly 
mocked by Chinese official media, The Global Times, as a greedy move 
amounting to ‘asking for the cow when milk is given’ (Liu and Zhao 2018). 
5  A similar five-year extension was granted in 2013.
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It is most likely that China will continue to frame its cooperation with 
PICs under BRI, as it has done in other regions—and Pacific states that 
extend more support to BRI could receive more Chinese aid.
Table 2. PICs signing up to the Belt and Road Initiative
PICs Time, Venue and Occasion
PNG June 2018, Beijing, during former prime minister Peter O’Neil’s visit 
to China .
Niue July 2018, Niue, signed by the Chinese ambassador to New 
Zealand (also accredited to Niue) and Prime Minister Sir Toke Talagi .
Samoa September 2018, Beijing, during Prime Minister Tuilaepa 
Malielegaoi’s visit to China .
FSM November 2018, Port Moresby, during the meeting between 
former president Peter Christian and Chinese President Xi Jinping . 
Vanuatu November 2018, Port Vila, signed by the Chinese ambassador 
to Vanuatu and the Government of Vanuatu .
Fiji November 2018, Suva, signed by the Chinese ambassador to 
Fiji and the permanent secretary of the Office of the Prime Minister 
of Fiji .
Cook Islands November 2018, Wellington, signed by the Chinese embassy 
in New Zealand with the Government of Cook Islands .
Tonga November 2018, Port Moresby, during the meeting between former 
prime minister ʻAkilisi Pohiva and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Solomon Islands October 2019, Beijing, during Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s 
visit to China .
Kiribati January 2020, Beijing, during President Taneti Maamau’s visit 
to China .
Source: Compiled by author .
A heightened geopolitical competition between traditional powers and 
China will also affect China’s aid program in the Pacific. China’s rise in 
the region has triggered grave concerns about China’s intentions and the 
erosion of traditional powers’ interests. In response, traditional powers 
have embarked on a mission to contain China’s influence. In November 
2017, the Trump administration introduced its Indo-Pacific strategy, 
which largely targets China. As part of the effort to implement the 
strategy, the US Government has merged its Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation and USAID’s Development Credit Authority to facilitate 
provision of loans and compete with China in the infrastructure sector in 
developing countries.
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In Australia, both the Coalition Government and the opposition Australian 
Labor Party endorsed in 2019 a plan to provide loan facilities to Pacific 
Island states for infrastructure development. Similarly, the New Zealand 
Government is reenergising its regional approach and increasing technical 
and financial assistance to PICs. Clearly, these decisions have been taken 
in response to China’s growing presence in the region. Powers outside the 
immediate region, such as Japan and India, are also devoting more resources 
to the Pacific amid China’s rise. At the eighth Pacific Islands leaders 
meeting in May 2018, Japan committed US$515.8 million (55 billion 
yen) to the region over three years, and funds for more than 5,000 Pacific 
Islanders through human resources development and people-to-people 
exchanges (Japan MOFA 2018). Although India’s aid program is small 
in the Pacific, it is increasing notably. The Indian Government increased 
its annual grant aid to each of the 14 Pacific states from US$100,000 to 
US$125,000 in 2009, and further to US$200,000 in 2014 (D. Zhang 
2018:7). In November 2014 and April 2016, India also pledged two lines 
of credit, worth US$75 million and US$100 million, for Fiji and PNG 
respectively (ibid.). 
In the near future, the dynamics of geopolitical competition in the Pacific 
coupled with China’s growing strategic ambitions, could force China to 
increase its diplomatic and economic engagement with Pacific Island 
states to protect China’s national interests. Geopolitical competition with 
traditional powers could gain more significance in China’s diplomacy 
towards the region, making it another primary factor after the status of 
Taiwan. The weight of Pacific Island states in China’s overall diplomacy 
could increase in the long term.
Actors and their agency
Actors involved in China’s aid activities in the Pacific are active 
implementers. While their actions are shaped by China’s bureaucratic 
structure and driven by their own interests, they also help define 
Chinese national interests and reshape the structure. The Party has the 
final say, but  different ministries and other actors compete with each 




Competition between MOFCOM and MFA is prominent in this game. 
As the two most important ministries in China’s aid program, their 
competition for control of Chinese aid resources has persisted since the 
1950s when China started to provide foreign aid. In August 1952, China 
set up the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the predecessor of MOFCOM, 
to manage Chinese foreign aid, which was then mostly in the form of 
in-kind donations. Compared with MFA, the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade was in a better position to deliver aid because it could instruct 
its subordinate export and import companies to purchase materials for 
provision to recipient countries. From this point, MOFCOM remained 
the main custodian of the Chinese aid program until the establishment 
of CIDCA. Another reason for MOFCOM’s control of Chinese aid is 
that former MOFCOM ministers were promoted to higher positions 
in the State Council or the Party than their counterparts from MFA. 
As a result, despite MFA’s occasional proposals that it take control of the 
aid program, the central government has always ruled in MOFCOM’s 
favour (Zhang and Smith 2017:2336). 
Chinese embassies overseas, including in the Pacific, provide a new 
window to observe the subtle battle between MFA and MOFCOM on 
aid management. Normally the ambassadors are career diplomats selected 
within MFA.6 Officials in the Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s 
office come from MOFCOM or subordinate agencies at provincial/
city levels. In principle, commercial officials need to receive the political 
leadership of the ambassador, report to the latter on aid issues and take 
into account his/her advice on aid delivery. Differences may arise, as 
commercial officials tend to consider economic benefits for China while 
the ambassador places greater weight on China’s diplomatic interests. 
These two types of interests can be in conflict on some occasions. 
For  example, provision of substantial loans to a resource-low country 
may not produce tangible economic returns for China, but is conducive 
to China’s diplomatic objectives such as winning support for China on 
Taiwan or the South China Sea. Where such conflict arises, the Economic 
and Commercial Counsellor’s office will wait for final instructions from 
MOFCOM rather than MFA, although MOFCOM and MFA may consult 
6  In recent years, the Chinese Government has selected a growing number of senior officials from 
other ministries and provinces to serve as ambassadors in Chinese embassies overseas. In the Pacific, 
current Chinese ambassadors to Samoa and Vanuatu used to work in China’s Communist Youth League 
and Heilongjiang province respectively. The impact of non-MFA ambassadors on Chinese diplomacy 
and aid in the Pacific is unclear.   
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each other in Beijing. Also, the commercial offices will report directly to 
MOFCOM and only copy MFA in. These offices in large countries have 
more budget and autonomy and have separate office buildings from the 
embassies. In the Pacific, China’s Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s 
office in PNG has its own office building.
Other line ministries in China have different organisational interests from 
those of MFA and MOFCOM. These ministries are responsible for aid 
delivery in their own areas and have specialised budgets, which represent 
a  small proportion of Chinese total foreign aid spending. Their main 
interest is to deliver their aid to Pacific states well and maintain this business. 
Through providing foreign aid, the line ministries are keen to increase 
professional engagement with Pacific states in areas such as agriculture, 
health and education. For example, China’s medical cooperation with PNG 
on malaria control presents an opportunity for Chinese experts to test and 
apply malaria technologies in a new environment.7 The implementation 
of line ministries’ aid projects are shaped directly by the agency of the 
Chinese experts involved, as they are motivated by a variety of factors 
to work overseas. Some of the motives include a sense of glory as aid 
workers, economic benefits (the salary overseas is a few times higher), less 
family burden (for senior level experts), career bottleneck at home, and 
vision expansion (Lu et al. 2015:17–18). The agency of these aid experts 
can be constrained by other factors. For example, the tenure for Chinese 
agricultural aid experts in the Pacific is normally two years, which is too 
short a period to gain familiarity with the local agricultural situation and 
apply their skills.
China Exim Bank has played a growing role in Chinese aid in the Pacific. 
Since 2006, concessional loans have become China’s largest aid component 
in the region. The Chinese Government committed concessional loans to 
Pacific states to the value of US$463.1 million (RMB3 billion) at the first 
China–Pacific Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in Fiji 
in April of that year, which marks the beginning of China’s concessional 
loans to the region. A similar US$1 billion loan facility was announced in 
November 2013. China Exim Bank officials on the ground enjoy plenty 
of autonomy on loan implementation.8 The bank has closer relations with 
MOFCOM than with MFA. The approaches of Exim Bank, MOFCOM 
and MFA to debt relief requests from recipient countries can also differ. 
7  Chinese medical aid scholar and practitioner, August 2015. Interview with author.
8  Former Chinese aid official, July 2018. Interview with author.
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In recent years, the rapid growth of Chinese concessional loans in PICs 
has triggered debt-for-equity concerns—that is, that China may seek to 
control strategic assets in recipient countries when they default on loan 
repayment. MOFCOM and China Exim Bank, in particular the latter, 
require recipient countries to honour loan repayment. The careers of bank 
officials who approved the loans in the first place would be damaged if 
recipient countries defaulted on repayment. MFA officials, however, are 
inclined to support repayment extension or even loan forgiveness for the 
sake of China’s bilateral relations with the recipient country. Currently, 
it is more likely that China will allow Pacific countries to postpone loan 
repayment rather than write the loans off.
The role of Chinese enterprises as aid contractors in the Pacific deserves 
greater analysis than is currently discussed in the literature. Chinese 
enterprises are attracted to the Pacific market, which is under-explored 
compared to other regions. State/province/city-owned enterprises have 
implemented Chinese aid projects in PICs and through those projects 
established themselves. Examples include the:
• China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (Fa‘onelua 
International Convention Centre in Tonga)
• China Rail First Group (Nabouwalu highway project in Fiji)
• China Harbor Engineering Company (National Capital District 
Commission road upgrade in Port Moresby)
• Guangdong Foreign Construction Company (University of Goroka 
dormitory project phase 2–4)
• China Jiangxi Corporation for International Economic and Technical 
Cooperation (International Convention Centre in Port Moresby). 
Such companies operating in the Pacific receive political guidance from 
Chinese embassies. They engage principally with the Economic and 
Commercial Counsellor’s office to whom they report. Companies working 
on Chinese concessional loan projects also need to report to China Exim 
Bank. In 2017, Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s offices in the 
Pacific recorded a total of 53 Chinese enterprises operating in PNG, Fiji, 
Vanuatu, Tonga and FSM (see Table 3), with PNG home to the largest 
number of Chinese companies in the region. About 70 per cent of them 
are operating in the engineering/construction sector. 
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Table 3. Sample of Chinese enterprises in the Pacific
PIC Total number Breakdown by sectors
PNG 24 Engineering/construction: 17
Building materials/equipment: 4
Mining and metallurgy: 2
Information technology: 1




Vanuatu 11 Fishery: 6
Information technology: 2
Building materials/equipment: 1 
Manufacturing: 1 
Investment: 1
Tonga 4 Engineering/construction: 3
Manufacturing: 1
FSM 2 Fisheries: 1
Hotel: 1
Note: This sample refers to Chinese companies registered with the Economic and 
Commercial Counsellor’s offices in the Pacific. Data on Chinese companies in Samoa, 
Cook Islands and Niue is unavailable .
Source: Compiled by author from MOFCOM website data .
While commercial interest is the principal driver for Chinese enterprises, 
they have an impact on the Chinese aid system in three ways. First, in the 
past decade, a growing number of Chinese enterprises have moved into 
the Pacific, which forces the Chinese Government, especially MOFCOM, 
to devote more attention to the region. Second, these enterprises are 
contractors for the majority of Chinese aid projects. Their performance 
directly affects the implementation and image of China’s aid. Project 
quality, cost and use of local labour are the main challenges. Substandard 
quality of construction has been found in some Chinese aid projects such 
as the Police, Justice and Sports complex in Cook Islands. Some Chinese 
contractors, such as China Harbour Engineering Company, have been 
slammed for inflating the project cost after they win the bidding with an 
intentionally lower quote. Insufficient use of local labour has provoked 
growing concerns about opportunities for the recipient countries. Chinese 
contractors do have agency on how to handle these concerns. In addition, 
there are complex relations between large Chinese state-owned enterprises, 
as the main contractor for Chinese aid projects, and other sub-contractor 




Chinese contractors can also wield influence on Chinese aid through 
a bottom-up approach. By using their close relations with Pacific Island 
governments, Chinese enterprises, on some occasions, have actively pushed 
those governments to approach the Chinese Government to request 
aid. In this process, they use their local insight to provide assistance—
ranging from policy advice to project designs—to help these countries 
get the aid projects. As a reward, the Chinese enterprises then become the 
project contractors. Some contractors tend to bypass normal bureaucratic 
procedures in Pacific states and approach individual politicians, which 
breeds corruption. 
CIDCA
The roles of MFA and MOFCOM in Chinese aid management are 
changing since the establishment of CIDCA in April 2018. As the Xi 
Jinping administration expects the Chinese aid program to play a more 
important role in supporting China’s big power diplomacy and the 
BRI, MFA has been given greater power than MOFCOM in this new 
agency, which reports to Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi. Yang is director of 
the Party’s Office of Foreign Affairs, the top decision-making organ 
overseeing China’s diplomacy, and former minister of foreign affairs 
(April 2007 to March 2013). Wang is the incumbent Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (since March 2013) and State Councilor (vice premier level, since 
March 2018). 
The change will have a significant impact on Chinese diplomacy in the 
Pacific and the competition between MOFCOM and MFA. To date, and 
compared with Africa and Asia, this competition in the Pacific has been less 
notable as most PICs are small and have limited natural resources except 
fisheries. For the most part, MFA has dominated the agenda due to the 
paramount importance of managing Taiwan in China’s diplomacy in the 
region. However, foreign aid, which had been controlled by MOFCOM, 
is China’s most important tool to gain support from Pacific states, which 
gives MOFCOM weight in this game. Foreign aid has dominated China’s 
pledges to deepen China–Pacific cooperation since the visit of former 
premier Wen Jiabao in 2006 (coinciding with the first meeting of the 
China–Pacific Islands Economic Development and Cooperation Forum 
in April 2006), the second Forum meeting in November 2013 and the 
visit of President Xi Jinping in November 2014. 
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However, with the creation of CIDCA, MFA and Chinese embassies 
in the Pacific will have more influence over Chinese aid. In particular, 
more aid projects will be framed within BRI. BRI dominated Xi Jinping’s 
meetings (group meeting and bilateral meetings) with leaders of the eight 
PICs in November 2018, where Xi repeatedly called for Pacific states to 
focus on BRI cooperation. MFA’s growing influence will also affect China’s 
arrangement of debt payments for PICs as they need to start repaying 
Chinese concessional loans in the next few years.9 Relative to MOFCOM 
and China Exim Bank, the MFA will be more supportive of debt relief 
efforts in exchange for Pacific states’ support of the One China policy and 
China’s rise in the region. These efforts include the forgiveness of interest-
free loans and extension of concessional loans, as the Tonga case suggests.
Embassy staffing also affects China’s diplomacy and aid delivery in 
the Pacific. The Chinese ambassador to New Zealand is concurrently 
accredited to Cook Islands and Niue. China has resident embassies in 
PNG, Fiji, Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa and FSM, and it will soon open 
embassies in Solomon Islands and Kiribati. There are more MFA officials 
working in the embassies than their counterparts from MOFCOM. 
The Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s offices in China’s embassies 
in PNG and Fiji have four staff each while the offices in Vanuatu, Tonga, 
Samoa and FSM have two staff each. Understaffing is a serious problem, 
as these officials need to work on trade, investment and aid. Moreover, 
trade and investment attract more of their attention as they have more 
weight than aid in the officials’ annual performance evaluation. 
The establishment of CIDCA will not solve understaffing unless more aid 
staff are allocated to the Economic and Commercial Counsellor’s offices, 
which is unlikely in the near future, as these offices in other regions and 
CIDCA face similar, if not more serious, challenges. CIDCA has about 
90 staff assigned from three sources.10 The primary source is MOFCOM’s 
Department of Foreign Aid. The whole department of about 60 staff has 
relocated to CIDCA, except for a small number of retiring officials who 
preferred not to move. This is the largest concentration of aid technocrats 
in CIDCA. The second main source is MFA, where about 20 officials 
transferred to CIDCA of their own choice. China’s National Development 
and Reform Commission is the third source with a small number of staff 
(mainly in the sections of personnel and logistics) moved to CIDCA with 
9  The grace period is five to seven years.
10  Chinese aid official and scholar, July 2018. Interviews with author.
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Wang Xiaotao. Wang was a former deputy director of the commission 
and was appointed CIDCA’s first director in April 2018. With Wang’s 
extensive experience in policy planning and the commission’s leading role 
in coordinating BRI among China’s ministries, it is not surprising that 
CIDCA will largely focus on Chinese aid planning and BRI overseas, 
including in the Pacific. 
CIDCA has three deputy directors. Zhang Maoyu is the most senior 
deputy director in rank. His appointment could be perceived as a political 
decision as his previous three-decade career in the China National 
Intellectual Property Administration is unrelated to Chinese aid or 
diplomacy. The other two deputy directors, Zhou Liujun and Deng 
Qingbo, have a strong background in China’s Communist Youth League, 
a previously powerful party organisation that contributed a number of top 
echelon leaders, but the league’s prominence has declined significantly in 
the Xi Jinping era. Between 2010 and 2018, Zhou was director-general of 
MOFCOM’s Department of Trade in Services and Commercial Services 
and the Department of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation. 
As CIDCA’s deputy director, he will be likely to show strong interest in 
China’s trade and investment activities in the Pacific. In contrast, Deputy 
Director Deng has nearly two decades of experience in the MFA since 
2000. He was China’s former ambassador to the Dominican Republic and 
Nigeria, and director-general of the Department of Party Related Affairs 
(also known as Department for Diplomatic Missions Overseas). Deng is 
likely to focus CIDCA’s work in the Pacific more on China’s diplomatic 
interests as identified by MFA.
The appointment of these senior officials as CIDCA’s senior management 
reflect fierce competition between Chinese government agencies, especially 
MFA and MOFCOM for control of China’s aid program, which is likely 
to continue. Wang Xiaotao’s appointment as CIDCA director was a big 
surprise to many observers of Chinese aid and even MOFCOM officials. 
It could be interpreted as a compromise—a balance between MFA and 
MOFCOM interests. Internally, CIDCA has set up seven departments, 
focusing on general affairs, policy and planning, regional affairs (divided 
between two departments), supervision and evaluation, international 
cooperation, and party-related affairs (also in charge of personnel) 
(CIDCA 2018). This arrangement aligns with its intended objectives of 
prioritising Chinese aid planning and monitoring. 
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Conclusion
Structure and agents are interdependent. This chapter analyses China’s 
national interests in the Pacific, main actors and their nuanced interactions 
around Chinese diplomacy and aid in the Pacific region. As the discussion 
shows, China’s national interests inform the work of these actors 
while the latter take agency to affect the structure. In particular, MFA 
and MOFCOM have competed to prioritise China’s diplomatic and 
economic interests respectively. The creation of CIDCA will give MFA 
more influence in the formation of aid policy. The objective of support for 
China on Taiwan and the role of Pacific Island countries in China’s overall 
diplomacy towards the developing world, as well as in China’s geostrategic 
competition with traditional powers, could receive more attention from 
China in the future. The research also suggests that China will frame 
much of its aid program in the Pacific within the BRI.  
Compared with previous administrations, the Xi Jinping administration 
has greater ambitions for China as a rejuvenating superpower in the world. 
China’s diplomacy is becoming more proactive and assertive. China is 
expected to devote more resources to the Pacific, leaving China’s mark 
and complicating regional dynamics. As traditional powers, such as the 
US and Australia, pledge to increase their engagement with Pacific states, 
more open competition between China and these powers is likely to take 
place in the region. This competition could motivate China to provide 
more aid to the region. 
As a new agency, the impact of CIDCA on the Pacific, including in the 
sectors of Chinese aid planning, implementation and monitoring, needs 
to be observed into the future. How China and Pacific Island countries 
will develop their cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative also 
deserves attention.
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In the summer of 2017, I sat down for a conversation with Zhang, 
a  Chinese businessman, at his family-owned restaurant in Nadi, Fiji. 
Over lunch, I asked him to talk about his time as a migrant to Fiji since 
the mid-2000s. He explained how he had built successful restaurant and 
retail businesses and discussed his appreciation for the opportunity to 
create a life in Fiji. ‘The good relations between Fiji and China helped 
me get started here’, he said. Taking note of my interest in his comment, 
Zhang pressed on, ‘Of course, it took a lot of my hard work to make it 
all happen, but I wouldn’t be here without the support of family and the 
new policy to find opportunities abroad’. Changing the topic toward the 
future of Chinese investment in Fiji, he added: ‘It will be different, you 
watch, there will be more people looking for openings and all of it will be 
Belt and Road’.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) incorporates over 60 countries in 
a transnational network of anticipated trade routes centred on China. 
Comprising land- and ocean-based infrastructure corridors, the BRI 
connects China with Europe and Africa through the subregions of Asia. 
The inclusion of Oceania appears as an anomaly, as the region is not 
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usually thought of as a direct thoroughfare to the ports and cities of Europe 
and Africa. The growing scholarly literature on the BRI, particularly in 
political geography, has defined the BRI as anything from China’s spatial 
fix for overcapacity in the domestic economy, to no less than a bid for 
global hegemony to sometimes both at the same time. In Pacific Island 
Studies, the discussion of the BRI’s arrival in Oceania has revolved around 
the intervention as either an expression of Beijing’s ascendency in a region 
long influenced by Australia and the US or an opportunity for Pacific 
Island governments to assert agency over these traditional partners with 
China as the enabling factor (Fry and Tarte 2015).
In this chapter, using a variety of media articles and government 
statements, I argue that the BRI is a marker for a new discursive phase 
of Chinese activity in the Pacific Islands region. In addition to its often-
stated material outcomes, the BRI is also a narrative vehicle that attempts 
to bring international and domestic coherence to China’s overseas 
political and economic engagement. In the Pacific Islands region, the 
notion of a harmonising BRI counters claims, frequently emanating from 
Australian legislators and media, of China’s erratic approach to economic 
interactions with the Pacific Islands. As a domestic instrument, the BRI 
harmonises and makes legible a variety of Chinese state and nonstate 
actors in Oceania under a single policy. This attempt at legibility not only 
captures Chinese political and economic activity in the region, but also 
exposes the actors involved to possible state discipline. As Smith et  al. 
(2014) note in the context of China’s aid programs in Pacific Island 
countries (PICs), perceptions of Chinese communities overseas have 
a bearing on the image of China. Conversely, Chinese officials have built 
BRI coherence on a broad interpretation of what the initiative constitutes, 
giving rise to the labelling of all manner of Chinese endeavours as under 
the BRI.
This ‘flexible coherence’ offers distinct advantages in creating an umbrella 
for the variety of activities Chinese actors undertake in the Pacific Islands 
region. Not all Chinese actors desire state legibility and many employ 
strategies of evasion or display indifference to state disciplining; however, 
some private actors have attached the Belt and Road label to their projects 
seeking political endorsements for their investments. Furthermore, an 
opaque BRI also opens opportunities for PICs to interact flexibly with 
the initiative and present the intervention as consistent with Pacific Island 
interests. Through visit diplomacy, memoranda of understanding, project 
branding, integration with Pacific Island government development 
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strategies and membership in alternative financing mechanisms, the BRI 
is increasingly defining Sino–Pacific Island engagement. In a section 
examining Fiji’s relations with China from the ‘Look North’ to the BRI, 
this chapter shows how Sino–Fijian discourses have become increasingly 
entangled through a co-constructed discourse that establishes continuity 
between the two countries’ frameworks. As a result, I argue that while 
attempting to convey a coherent global, regional and bilateral vision to the 
world, the BRI also presents opportunities for some governments, such as 
those of the Pacific Islands, to co-define the terms of their relationships 




The presence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now an 
indisputable aspect of political and economic life in the Pacific 
Islands region. From 2006 to 2016, Chinese aid to Oceania totalled 
US$1.8  billion (Brant  2016) and China is the region’s second largest 
trading partner (Zhang 2015). Migrants from China to the Pacific Islands 
region are more visible in PICs; nevertheless, Chinese people constitute 
less than 1 per cent of the population in any one PIC (D’Arcy 2014). The 
current engagement between China and Pacific Island governments and 
peoples fits in to a longer arc of Chinese presence in Oceania. Scholars 
have identified staged migrations traceable to the 19th century of Chinese 
traders, indentured workers and political refugees settling in the Pacific 
Islands (Willmott 2007).
The historical context of Pacific Island and Chinese relations is important 
to consider, as it demonstrates that exchanges are not only long-
standing, but also evolving with political and economic conditions. With 
contemporary Chinese presence in the Pacific Islands region as his focus, 
D’Arcy (2014) provides a useful guide to understanding the current stage 
and its roots in the past. He wrote that the Chinese Government’s 1999 
‘Going Out’ policy (走出去战略), encouraging Chinese companies and 
individuals to invest overseas, initiated a new phase in relations given 
increased opportunities for aid, trade and mobility. D’Arcy added that 
analyses, generally external to the region, of this post-1999 phase have 
clustered into two narratives: fear and agency. Fear discourses characterise 
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China’s economic and political interventions as potentially destabilising, 
while a somewhat contrasting body of literature has sought a more 
nuanced analysis reflecting the ways in which these interventions enable 
Pacific Island government agency. Both discourses suggest that Chinese 
presence has been neither coherent, consistent nor long-term. I  use 
D’Arcy’s post-1999 framework to critique fear and agency discourses to 
2015 and suggest that the BRI presents a successor narrative indicating 
the Chinese state’s push for a discourse of coherence. 
Discourses of fear
The literature on China’s post-1999 presence in the Pacific Islands region 
initially leant toward emphasising the threats posed by a ‘new’ power to 
the established economic and political interests of the US and Australia. 
Emanating from influential think tanks and a loud media, particularly in 
Australia, fear narratives singled out Chinese aid as a notable disruptive 
factor to these interests. Chinese largesse through unconditional loans 
and grants, primarily for infrastructure projects, undermined the long-
term Australian goal of building good governance through conditional 
assistance. The 2006 Australian Senate’s inquiry into Australia’s relationship 
with China included testimony from several researchers, including Susan 
Windybank, Ron Crocombe, Benjamin Reilly and John Henderson, who 
would go on to write and speak about the negative aspects of renewed 
Chinese state interest in Oceania. Taking broad characterisations as a basis 
for analysis, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade noted:
Being relatively poor and tending to lack the appropriate 
institutional mechanisms to ensure political and bureaucratic 
accountability, many Pacific Islands are vulnerable to financial 
influence and corruption (Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade References Committee 2005:175). 
Furthermore, the committee highlighted how ‘funds provided to local 
politicians or government officials without proper conditions attached 
can encourage fraudulent behaviour and undermine political stability’ 
(ibid.:179).
Following the 2006 inquiry, two reports from the Lowy Institute also 
proved influential in circulating a narrative of Chinese aid as a disturbance 
to regional order. The first, published in 2009, stressed China’s lack of 
coordination with in-country funding priorities and the so-called 
excessive secrecy of Chinese aid financing. In addition, maintenance or 
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repair budgets were frequently not included in loans and grants, and 
these costs ended up placing Pacific Island governments further in debt 
(Hanson 2009). The 2009 report concluded that embedded conditions, 
such as the procurement of labour and materials for infrastructure projects 
from China, encouraged anti-Chinese sentiments among Pacific Islanders 
due to the denial of employment opportunities (ibid.). The second Lowy 
Institute report, published in 2011, upped the risks facing Pacific Island 
governments who had accepted Chinese aid. Increasing levels of debt to 
China, especially in Samoa and Tonga, opened the possibility of political 
and economic pressure or demands from Beijing in exchange for debt 
forgiveness. The report added that the growing lawlessness of Chinese 
migrants needed to be addressed if the Pacific Islands were not to become 
incorporated into the territories of Chinese criminal gangs (Hanson and 
Fifita 2011). Crocombe (2007) arrived at a similar conclusion, voicing 
concern over how Chinese migrants were introducing startling levels of 
criminality to Pacific Island states through illegal gambling, prostitution 
and drug dealing; nevertheless, like Hanson and Fifita, Crocombe is 
unable to parse the Chinese state from Chinese migrants, simply labelling 
all Chinese presence as destabilising. Seib (2010) likewise conflated the 
Chinese state and migrants into a monolithic entity, claiming Chinese aid 
has opened the region to ‘streams of migrants’ who deny locals economic 
opportunities. 
Chequebook diplomacy between China and Taiwan is often cited as 
a  further source of inconsistent and opportunistic aid and investment. 
Since the 1949 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) victory in the Chinese 
Civil War and the Nationalist retreat to the island of Taiwan, the two 
administrations have sought legitimacy through diplomatic recognition. 
Beijing’s and Taipei’s search for diplomatic partners has fluctuated between 
contest and truce, leading to accusations of waning interest during times 
of détente. 
Atkinson (2010) wrote of the incoherence and unscrupulousness of 
China’s and Taiwan’s assistance to the Pacific Islands, emphasising a lack 
of monitoring procedures and adding that ‘involvement is primarily due 
to the capacity of the Pacific Islands to accord diplomatic recognition, and 
only to a lesser extent the region’s economic and strategic characteristics’. 
He claimed that local elites tend to be the chief beneficiaries of chequebook 
diplomacy, describing kickbacks such as luxury cars and travel expenses. 
Falling back on a narrative strongly asserted in the Australian Senate 
inquiry, he concluded that ‘diplomatic competition between China and 
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Taiwan is destabilising island states in the South Pacific, making Pacific 
politics more corrupt and more violent’. However, there is little analysis 
of the strategic advantages China’s interventions offer Pacific Island 
governments regarding leverage over traditional partners.
Discourses of Chinese presence in Oceania as part of a grand hegemonic 
strategy also mark the post-1999 period and illustrate how some scholars 
view Beijing’s interest in the region as little more than an exploitative 
opportunity (Henderson 2001; Henderson and Reilly 2003). Aid and 
investment are not only tools to win diplomatic partners, but also means 
to achieve political influence regionally or globally. Chinese assistance is 
not coordinated with domestic priorities and PIC agency is relegated to 
irrelevance. Windybank (2005) wrote: ‘The expansion of Chinese influence 
reflects more than a benign attempt to gain access to the region’s abundant 
minerals, timber and fisheries. Strategic issues often have economic faces’. 
Shie (2007) took the logics of this argument further, adding that China’s 
economic interventions will convert to military dominance in the Pacific 
Islands, an eventuality enabled by the ‘passive’ interest of the US and 
Australia in addressing this geopolitical shift. 
Discourses of agency
In response to discourses of fear, a group of scholars emphasise the 
‘disingenuous’ character of these analyses (Wesley-Smith 2007). China’s 
augmented presence is neither a grand strategy nor imposed. Discourses 
of agency emphasise how PICs as sovereign entities are free to choose 
alternative economic partners, and rightfully so, given the damaging 
effects of neoliberal conditionality attached to aid from traditional 
donors in the 1990s. It was not that Australia and the US were passive 
in the Pacific Islands region, but rather that their harmful insistence on 
privatisation and deregulated markets opened new opportunities for 
China. Traditional donors’ concern over the nature of relations between 
PICs and China as part of their own strategic fears also tend not to play 
well in Pacific Island capitals.
However, discourses of agency also underscore the lack of a systematic 
Chinese approach to political and economic engagement in Oceania. 
Chinese presence in the Pacific Islands is merely a byproduct of Beijing’s 
increasing interests across the globe and the need for natural resources to 
drive its domestic economy (Yang 2009, 2011). In a sharp and justifiable 
critique, Wesley-Smith and Porter (2010) wrote that fear discourses tend 
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to concentrate on the supposed loss of Australian or US influence and 
‘it is apparent that the condition of island states or the welfare of Pacific 
Islanders are, at best, of secondary concern’. Pacific Island governments’ 
positive responses to China’s interest have been driven by pressing 
contemporary needs such as upgrading or building infrastructure, the 
financing of which is unavailable in Australian social aid programming. 
In addition, evidence supporting the notion that traditional powers have 
lost significant soft or hard power in Oceania is lacking. Therefore, China’s 
predominant interests in the Pacific Islands region are quite modest: 
seeking new markets and opportunities for muting Taiwanese diplomatic 
initiatives, both of which mean Chinese officials pay significantly less 
attention to Oceania than other regions (Wesley-Smith and Porter 2010). 
Discourses of agency challenge the myth of Chinese aid driven by a quid 
pro quo for resources and argue that the Chinese state was brought 
to the Pacific Islands region by Chinese contractors and Pacific Island 
governments seeking financing for infrastructure projects (Brant 2013). 
This practice does not indicate a long-term strategy, aid effectiveness or 
a systematic approach to development planning. Dornan and Brant (2014) 
make the important point that the responsibility for aid effectiveness sits 
not only with donors, but also recipients. In a comparison of Chinese 
interventions in Tonga, Vanuatu, Samoa and Cook Islands, Dornan and 
Brant found that ‘the way in which governments have pursued, overseen 
and implemented projects has differed considerably, and is an important 
determinant of the effectiveness and developmental impact of Chinese 
assistance’. Consequently, if projects should not (or  even should) meet 
expectations, the Chinese actors involved are not the only accountable 
parties. Nevertheless, Sullivan and Renz (2012) showed the influential 
role of Australia’s and New Zealand’s media in promoting a narrative of 
Chinese presence in Oceania as offering little of lasting value, especially 
its aid assistance, noting: ‘China is seen as the cause of numerous ills 
affecting the island Pacific and unlikely to contribute to their solution’ 
(Sullivan and Renz 2012:388). Their examination of press coverage since 
1999 concluded that the China-as-destabilising force discourse was linked 
to security anxieties in Canberra and Wellington rather than any alarm 
for Island societies. As Sullivan and Renz suggested, these findings reveal 
more about the self-interests of former and current colonial powers than 
the aspirations of the Pacific Islands region and its residents, as well as 
a retreat to well-trodden ‘yellow peril’ narratives, adding: ‘China and the 





In 2012, Wang Jisi, a professor at Beijing University, suggested a shift in 
China’s foreign policy towards Eurasia. According to Wang, a ‘march west’ 
would offer China political and economic advantages as the US scaled 
back its presence in Central Asia and the Middle East and embarked on 
an Asia-Pacific pivot in 2011 (Wang 2012). Wang considered his proposal 
a transcontinental successor to the state-led development campaigns in 
China’s northwest, such as ‘Open Up the Northwest’ (1992) and ‘Western 
Development’ (2000). This intellectual antecedent of the BRI is important 
to note because the initiative not only built on the Going Out policy 
of 1999, but also was driven by domestic development campaigns built 
on infrastructure construction and mobility. In 2013, Chinese President 
Xi Jinping first proposed the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (一带一路) policy, 
officially renamed in 2016 as the Belt and Road Initiative. The BRI 
planned to reconfigure global trade and the governance of international 
finance  through China. Encompassing the land-based Silk Road 
Economic Belt (丝绸之路经济带) and the ocean-based 21st-century 
Maritime Silk Road (21世纪海上丝绸之路), the initiative would link 
China with Europe and Africa through infrastructure corridors across 
subregions of Asia. 
The principal financing agency for the BRI is the multilateral Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) founded in 2013. Over 90 nations 
are currently members of the AIIB and initial capital was established at 
US$100 billion, of which China provided 50 per cent. China holds the 
largest voting share in the AIIB at 28.7 per cent; the second largest voting 
member, India, holds 8.3 per cent. Given this dominance, some analysts 
claim the AIIB is an attempt to rebalance the limited influence Beijing 
exercises over the Bretton Woods institutions (Subacchi 2015). Other 
funding mechanisms for the BRI include the Silk Road Fund, a US$40 
billion investment fund created by Beijing, as well as other bilateral-
lending entities, such as the Export-Import Bank of China and the China 
Development Bank.
China’s purpose in initiating the BRI has not been fully articulated; 
however, the literature can be broadly divided into accounts offering 
internal motivations or overseas motivations. The BRI is mooted as 
a  solution to an overheated domestic economy or as a geoeconomic 
strategy to confirm China’s place as a global power. A more critical body 
291
9 . A SEARCH FOR COHERENCE
of research has examined the discursive aspects of the BRI, especially its 
comparisons with the Silk Road, through which internal and domestic 
motivations flow. The range of these analyses clearly indicates a lack of 
consensus on the motivation for and the goal of the BRI. However, this 
ambiguity of purpose is advantageous if viewed from the perspective of 
coherence building across the broad scope of China’s overseas political and 
economic engagements. In sum, the assortment of ventures (infrastructure 
and social programming), financial mechanisms (multilateral, bilateral 
and, at times, private investment) and discourses form a catch-all project 
defying specific definition. As Shepard (2017) noted: 
The vagueness, lack of institutionalisation, and very broad 
definition of the China’s Belt and Road [sic] is probably one of its 
greatest strengths … the initiative can be whatever China says it 
is in any given circumstance as they devise and adapt policies and 
trade deals to fit any given country, in any given situation, at any 
given time. Within this open framework, inconsistencies and even 
outright contradictions are not theoretical problems but standard 
operating procedures.
The open-ended character of the BRI has confounded some observers. 
One Center for International and Strategic Studies analyst called Beijing’s 
BRI statements akin to ‘Delphic utterances’ (Clover and Hornby 2015). 
Graham (2018), however, while acknowledging the enigma of the BRI, 
claims ‘it is also possible to see in BRI the clear contours of a thought-
through,  full-spectrum  grand strategy for China,  straddling economic, 
political, military and even psychological domains’. I argue differently. 
While the BRI certainly expands China’s presence in regions and states 
across the globe through infrastructure projects, enhanced trade and 
alternative financing mechanisms, its discursive power also captures an 
array of domestic actors, state and nonstate, engaged in current and 
future enterprises with bilateral partners. It is not so much a blueprint 
for a grand strategy as it is a means of harmonising overseas relations with 
China’s protagonists.  
Overseas Chinese and coherence
Taking a discursive view of the BRI, Ferdinand (2016) reasons the 
initiative is a project of Chinese national rejuvenation. As such, it is an 
expression of President Xi Jinping’s China Dream to harness the Chinese 
peoples’ material and intangible aspirations into state revitalisation, 
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albeit encouraged through overseas economic cooperation. The 2015 
Chinese Government white paper Vision and Actions on Jointly Building 
Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road mentions 
people-to-people contact five times as one of the integral aspects of the 
BRI. At the 2017 Belt and Road Forum, President Xi underscored how 
the human dimensions of the BRI are just as relevant overseas, claiming 
person-to-person relations as a cornerstone of BRI connectivity. At  the 
opening ceremony to the forum, Xi remarked that ‘“moving closer 
towards a community of shared future for mankind” is the ultimate goal 
of the Belt and Road Initiative’ (D. Zhang 2018:196). Ferdinand (2016) 
concluded that the success of a transnational BRI meant the China 
Dream must become that of the world. As such, mobility of not only 
Chinese capital, but also Chinese citizens would play an integral role 
in China’s revitalisation. Muttarak (2017:2) wrote that ‘the impacts of 
China’s growing presence … go beyond the macro-economic effects … 
Along with investments and trade—either state-owned or private—comes 
movement of labour, entrepreneurs, accompanying family members’. 
In  a  2018 speech, Xu Yousheng, the Deputy Director of the United 
Front Work Department, outlined how overseas Chinese could as serve as 
facilitators for Chinese companies looking to start businesses outside of 
China, as well as, critically, ‘active promoters of mutual political trust and 
mutually beneficial relations between China and neighbouring countries’ 
(Lo 2018). 
James To (2014) argued that there is little doubt over the Chinese state’s 
desire to exercise influence over diaspora communities. Through a study 
of the policies of Beijing’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (侨务), since 
merged into the United Front Work Department and a key indicator of 
strengthening coherence between China’s overseas agencies, To proposed 
the Chinese Government is purposefully organising new migrants (新 侨) 
and established diasporas (老侨) to promote China’s political and 
economic interests overseas. The main objectives of this strategy are to 
secure resources for continued domestic economic growth and to improve 
China’s image with governments and people abroad. To supports this 
thesis with evidence of Chinese embassy support for community-driven 
Chinese cultural events and outreach into the organisations of established 
Chinese migrants. The purpose of the latter is to offer new migrants social 
support and financial capital, as well as encourage older generations to 
restore ties to China. To also claimed that China disciplines migrants 
once they are overseas and seeks to enhance their ‘quality’ (素质) through 
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education campaigns to represent China positively. Edney (2014) wrote 
that this process exemplified the Chinese state’s aim to create cohesion, 
even in civil society, between domestic and overseas state narratives.
In sum, state and nonstate voices unify through rearticulating Chinese 
Government discourses. The umbrella of the BRI reterritorialises a diverse 
set of investors and labourers beyond China’s borders as legible to the 
Chinese state and harnesses individual and collective enterprise under 
the China Dream toward national revitalisation. As such, the people-
to-people discourses and the state promotion of investment outside of 
China under the BRI framework enmesh with the state disciplining of 
new overseas Chinese and existing diaspora communities to stage the BRI 
as a unifying project for an assemblage of Chinese presence abroad.
Liu and van Dongen (2016) challenge James To’s top-down flow of 
relations between the Chinese state and overseas Chinese. The notion that 
migrants, new or old, are co-opted into state priorities does not present 
a complete understanding of the state–migrant interface. Chinese migrants 
are empowered in this relationship and frequently lead policy formation 
in state entities charged with overseas Chinese work (ibid.). In a study 
of the ‘five overseas Chinese structures’ (五侨) within the government 
apparatus, especially the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, Liu and van 
Dongen found that Chinese officials incorporated the recommendations 
and concerns of overseas Chinese into policy. Alternatively, Ong (1999) 
suggested the acquisition of second or third citizenships as a means by 
which Chinese migrants evade the state as an individual response to Chinese 
Government reterritorialising processes. Despite the Chinese Government’s 
nonrecognition of dual citizenship, through naturalisation overseas, 
migrants not only open new commercial opportunities in host countries, 
but also circumvent the disciplining projects of the Chinese state. Though 
still disciplined by ‘markets and families’ (Ong 1999), Chinese migrants 
leverage citizenship toward personal, rather than state, benefit. As noted, 
interactions with the BRI’s flexible coherence is contingent on position. The 
amorphous BRI framework offers advantages (or disadvantages) to a variety 
of Chinese state and nonstate actors. The following section examines 
the increasing dominance of the BRI as the basis of Sino–Pacific Island 
relations, demonstrating the harmonisation of China’s regional approach 
at the state-to-state level. After this appraisal, the chapter surveys Fiji to 
highlight the capture of Chinese activity under the BRI umbrella, as well 
as how the Fijian state has developed the flexible coherence of the BRI to 




The People’s Republic of China maintains diplomatic relations with 
10  PICs:  Fiji (since 1975), Samoa (1975), Papua New Guinea (1976), 
Vanuatu (1982), Micronesia (1989), Cook Islands (1997), Tonga (1998), 
Niue (2007), Solomon Islands (2019) and Kiribati (2019). Aid and 
investment to the region have notably grown in the post-Going Out 
policy period. Between 2006 and 2016, China dedicated an estimated 
US$1.8  billion in loans and grants to its partners in the Pacific Islands 
(Brant 2016). This placed China as the third largest donor in the region after 
Australia (US$7.7 billion) and the US (US$1.9 billion). China committed 
US$632 million to Papua New Guinea, the largest recipient, and US$360 
million to Fiji, the second largest. Aid was disbursed as grants, interest-
free loans or concessional loans across a wide range of sectors, including 
education, transport and agriculture (Brant 2016). At the second meeting 
of the China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and 
Cooperation Forum in 2013 China pledged US$2 billion in commercial 
and concessional loans (Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China 
2013). Between 2000 and 2012, trade between China and its diplomatic 
partners in the region increased from US$248 million to US$1.77 billion 
with zero tariffs levied on 95 per cent of products from the Pacific Islands 
region (Taylor 2016). 
At a 2014 meeting in Nadi between Xi Jinping and political leaders from 
the then eight PICs recognising China, the Chinese president welcomed 
the dignitaries to ‘take a ride on the Chinese “express train” of development’ 
under the framework of the Maritime Silk Road (Xinhua 2014). In the 
2015 government white paper, Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk 
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, China included 
the Pacific Islands region in the BRI network of trade corridors with the 
addition of the southern leg Maritime Silk Road (National Development 
and Reform Commission 2015). Maps displaying the BRI show the 
incorporation of the region with a line either south or north of Papua New 
Guinea. The addition was warmly received by regional leaders, leading to 
an outburst of BRI enthusiasm in 2017. In March of that year, then Pacific 
Island Forum (PIF) deputy secretary general Andie Fong Toy called the BRI 
‘a contribution to global economic leadership’ (Pacific Islands Report 2017), 
and at the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, PIF representative in 
China David Morris noted the ‘great potential of the Maritime Silk Road’ 
to build regional infrastructure (ABC News 2017). Fijian Prime Minister 
Bainimarama, Pacific Islands Development Forum Secretary General 
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François Martel, as well as delegations from Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu also 
attended the forum (Pacific Islands Development Forum 2017). In the same 
year, China took the BRI to its diplomatic partners in the region with a series 
of regional meetings, including the Belt and Road International Financial 
Exchange Cooperation Seminar in June and the Post-Forum Dialogue in 
Apia in September. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry report on 
the latter event, Chinese Special Envoy Du Qiwen introduced ‘China’s 
policies toward Pacific Island countries and the “Belt and Road” initiative’, 
and PIC attendees ‘expressed their willingness to actively participate in the 
“Belt and Road” cooperation’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China 2017). At meetings with PIC leaders prior to the 2018 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Port Moresby and in an op-
ed published in the PNG press, Xi made the case for the BRI, writing: 
I am convinced that the BRI will open up new pathways for 
Pacific island countries to enhance business ties and connectivity 
with China, among themselves and with the rest of the world, 
and for the island countries to take a greater part in economic 
globalization (Xi 2018).
Despite these impressive official declarations, observers have scaled the 
importance of this rhetoric. As a region representing only 0.12 per cent of 
China’s global trade volume, the Pacific Islands are of minor importance 
to China’s BRI priorities (Dornan and Muller 2018; Zhang, D. 2017). 
However, these observations have not prevented a renaissance in grand-
strategy narratives. For example, in a 2018 report, the US–China 
Economic and Security Review Commission wrote: 
Although the Pacific Islands receive less of China’s attention and 
resources compared to other areas of the world, Beijing includes the 
region in its key diplomatic and economic development policy—
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—which suggests China has 
geostrategic interests in the region (Meick et al. 2018:1). 
The geostrategic intent behind the BRI is understood in the context of 
Beijing’s desire to establish a presence in the Pacific Islands in order to 
break free from containment on its eastern seaboard. To this end, Oceania 
will not be as peripheral as some observers argue (Lanteigne 2017). As one 
argument claims:
Inclusion within BRI of a maritime corridor through Oceania 
speaks to strategic intent, because there is no convincing economic 
case for China to invest in ‘connectivity’ infrastructure for small 
Pacific island states (Graham 2018).
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However, such discourses dismiss Island agency in participation and 
the flexible interpretation of the Chinese state’s opaque BRI narratives. 
Less dystopian analyses advance the possibilities the BRI offers in terms 
of infrastructure construction and greater access to markets through 
connectivity (Hannan and Firth 2016). Given the difficulties in 
participating in markets in the Asia-Pacific, the BRI makes sense to Pacific 
Islanders long restricted to trade with Australia, New Zealand and other 
Pacific states. Access to BRI financing mechanisms is critical in taking 
advantage of BRI opportunities. Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, 
Cook Islands and Vanuatu are all members or prospective members of the 
AIIB as of 2019.
Papua New Guinea
Bilaterally, BRI discourses have been enacted among PICs either through 
visit diplomacy, memoranda of understanding (MOU) or the development 
of material projects. In a November 2014 Beijing meeting, then Papua 
New Guinea Prime Minister Peter O’Neill and Chinese President Xi 
Jinping declared the opening of a strategic partnership between the two 
states. Such arrangements are usually a means to demonstrate wide-
ranging bilateral engagement; yet, on O’Neill’s 2016 return visit to 
China, bilateral relations were staged under the BRI umbrella. In addition 
to signing concessional loan agreements for a variety of infrastructure 
projects, the leaders agreed to synergise the BRI with Papua New Guinea’s 
Development Strategic Plan 2010–2030 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China 2016). A year after the November 2016 
meeting, a third visit to Beijing saw Papua New Guinea formally sign on 
to the BRI and the announcement of a new round of Chinese-financed 
projects. These projects included a significant upgrade to the road systems 
on the mainland, New Britain and New Ireland, the construction of 
a US$ 4 billion industrial park in Sandaun Province and the improvement 
of the water supply to Eastern Highlands Province. The US$3.5 billion 
road project was penned with China Railway Group, a private entity 
whose major shareholder is the state-owned, and stock exchange–listed, 
China Railway Engineering Corporation. The Sandaun deal was agreed 
with China Metallurgical Group, the controversial majority investor in 
the Ramu Nickel mine. As Smith (2017) noted, these projects, especially 
the overhaul of the road network, could transform Papua New Guinea’s 
economy and delivery of social services, all of which he called ‘PNG’s Belt 
and Road dream’.
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Former prime minister O’Neill said these deals were the result of Papua 
New Guinea’s new status as a location on the Maritime Silk Road, and 
talked up the benefits of market access through the BRI in April 2018 as 
then foreign minister Rimbink Pato was in Beijing to discuss the feasibility 
of a free trade agreement (Radio New Zealand 2018a). Two months later, 
O’Neill was in China for his sixth visit since assuming office and signed an 
MOU confirming Papua New Guinea’s ties to the BRI and membership 
in the AIIB, calling the initiatives ‘crucial to lifting the standard of living 
for our people’ (ABC News 2018a). However, the lucrative and ambitious 
nature of Chinese projects in Papua New Guinea also points to corporate 
incentives for Chinese companies to interact with the BRI in the Pacific 
Islands region. In an interview with Xinhua, Wu Dongzheng, a senior 
official at China Railway International Group’s South Pacific branch, 
stated that he had invited the Papua New Guinea Government to join 
the BRI (Parsons 2018). In a meeting with then prime minister O’Neill, 
Zhang Zongyan, President of China Railway Group, discussed how 
China Railway would:
actively implement the national ‘Belt and Road’ initiative, give 
full play to its advantages in capital, technology, talents and 
management, and contribute more to the economic and social 
development of Papua New Guinea (CREC 2018). 
Smith reminded us that these corporate incentives do not always fit with 
the ‘strategic designs of the Chinese central government’ (2013:349).
Samoa
In 2017, Chinese and Samoan officials elevated BRI discourses into their 
bilateral relationship, beginning in May with a visit to Samoa by China’s 
Vice Foreign Minister in charge of Oceania Affairs Zheng Zeguang 
and continuing in September through Samoan Minister of Commerce, 
Industry and Labour Lautafi Fio Purcell’s presence at the China–Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Forum. At the latter meeting, Purcell highlighted 
the role of Guangdong Province in facilitating BRI cooperation, and 
the visit of a Samoa parliamentarian delegation to Fujian underscored 
the importance of China’s provincial governments in leveraging BRI 
financing (Government Press Secretariat of Samoa 2018; Purcell 2017). 
Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi’s September 2018 
trip to China strengthened Samoa’s commitment to the BRI. The 
prime minister met with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang 
and signed an MOU agreeing to conduct future economic cooperation 
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with China under the BRI framework, as well as a pledge to synergise 
Samoa’s national development strategy with the BRI (Government 
of Samoa 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China 2018d; Xinhua 2018e). Samoa’s prime minister told the Chinese 
media that Samoa’s interest in the BRI was principally about market 
access (Global Times 2018). Discussions in the Samoan media indicate 
contrasting opinions on this positive-outcomes note. Mata’afa Keni Lesa, 
editor of the Samoa Observer, argued that the lack of alternatives to the 
financing opportunities available through the BRI means Samoa should 
make itself ‘China ready’ (Lesa 2018). In the same publication, journalist 
Alexander Rheeney (2018), mindful of Samoa’s debt burden, tempered 
BRI expectations by stating the initiative represented a ‘step into the deep 
unknown’, especially since other countries are beginning to question 
participation in the initiative.
Tonga
Tonga’s initial engagement with the BRI arose in October 2015 when 
a  CCP delegation introduced the initiative’s trade and financing 
benefits to then Tongan prime minister ‘Akilisi Pōhiva and members 
of parliament. As in the case of Samoa, it took a visit by the nation’s 
head of state to China to mainstream BRI discourses into the bilateral 
relationship. At a March 2018 Beijing meeting between Xi Jinping and 
Tongan King Tupou VI, the two leaders underscored the BRI as the basis 
for infrastructure construction financing in Tonga (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2018a; Xinhua 2018b). At a 
subsequent meeting, King Tupou VI and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang 
agreed to integrate Tonga’s development strategy with the BRI, a now 
familiar policy outcome in the visit diplomacy to China of Pacific Island 
leaders (Y. Zhang 2018). Though Tonga did not sign up to the BRI, it 
was accepted as a member of the AIIB (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China 2018b). However, in December 2018, prior 
to the APEC summit in Port Moresby, Tonga formally committed to the 
BRI through an MOU and received a five-year deferment on concessional 
loans (ABC News 2018b). 
Federated States of Micronesia
Visit diplomacy also dominates Micronesian engagement in the 
discourses of the BRI. In March 2017, Federated States of Micronesia 
President Peter M. Christian travelled to China and met Xi Jinping, 
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with Xi extending an invitation for Christian to participate in the BRI 
(Xinhua 2017a). Following up on the visit a month later, Li Zhanshu, 
Chairman of the National People’s Congress, noted Micronesia’s interest 
in joining the BRI and AIIB, however, no formal application to the AIIB 
had been made by 2019. Within the nuances of diplomatic protocol, and 
conceivably as an effect of the Federated States of Micronesia’s status as a 
freely associated state of the US, Micronesia’s engagement with the BRI 
initially appeared less enthusiastic than other PICs, and the possibility 
of an MOU on economic cooperation under the BRI framework was 
discussed with Chairman Li in May 2018 (Kaselehlie Press 2018). As if 
to press the issue, the offer to participate in the BRI was again extended 
to Micronesia in July 2018 by Huang Zheng, Chinese Ambassador to 
the Federated States of Micronesia (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China 2018c), and once more by the ambassador 
in September 2018 at a region-wide seminar. On the latter occasion, the 
ambassador eagerly stated: 
Let’s hand in hand, work hard together, jointly pursue the Belt and 
Road international cooperation and the building of a community 
with a shared future for the humanity and jointly create a better 
future! (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of 
China 2018e). 
By November 2018, the Federated States of Micronesia and the PRC 
entered into an MOU on BRI cooperation, an event noted by the 
Chinese ambassador to Micronesia in a commentary piece for the local 
press (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Federated States 
of Micronesia 2019). In December 2019, the then new president of the 
Federated States of Micronesia David Panuelo visited China, calling Beijing 
Micronesia’s key economic partner and Washington DC Palikir’s leading 
security partner, an indication of how PICs balance the reintroduction of 
great power politics into the region (Tobin 2019). 
Vanuatu
Vanuatu’s engagement with the discourses of the BRI have been 
overshadowed since the 2018 uproar over the Shanghai Construction 
Group’s construction of the Luganville wharf. In April, media articles 
circulated in Australia, and then globally, that claimed Canberra had 
raised alarm over a possible agreement the facility could be used for 
Chinese military purposes, an allegation denied by Vanuatu Prime 
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Minister Charlot Salwai (Bohane 2018). Salwai stressed that China’s 
assistance was not imposed and was instead a response to requests from 
the Vanuatu Government. Nevertheless, the incident displayed regional 
sensitivities and the difficulties PICs are beginning to experience in 
managing competing bilateral economic partners. 
Prior to the controversy, Vanuatu’s attendance at the Belt and Road Forum 
in May 2017 was pitched at the ministerial level and Port Vila joined 
the AIIB on 6 March 2018 (Daily Post 2017). Johnny Koanapo Rasou, 
Member of Parliament for Tanna, captures the pragmatic view of the BRI 
in Vanuatu, writing: 
We in Vanuatu must also be able to navigate in this policy and 
see what legislations and policy we need to have in place to take 
advantage of the opportunities that China has to offer and where 
we need to avoid and give opportunities for our own people to 
prosper (Koanapo 2017). 
On the sidelines of the APEC summit in Port Moresby in November 
2018, Vanuatu formally signed on to the BRI through one of seven 
MOUs signed with China (Radio New Zealand 2018e). Vanuatu Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Ralph Regenvanu underscored the open-endedness of 
BRI agreements, telling the media: ‘It’s very vague, and it doesn’t really 
commit us to anything except cooperation. And that’s fine by us’ (Radio 
New Zealand 2018f ). However, the MOU does contain some significant 
commitments—for example, that the resolution of conflicts should be 
conducted between the two parties without the possibility of an outside 
arbitrator (McGarry 2018).
Niue and Cook Islands
The two self-governing states in free association with New Zealand 
have also engaged with the BRI, which has generated some debate in 
Wellington about Chinese influence. Niue announced a US$14 million 
road reconstruction project financed by China in 2017, and the following 
year Premier Toke Talagi signed an MOU with China on BRI cooperation 
(Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Zealand 2018). 
However, despite Premier Talagi’s subsequent statement that he ‘was not 
in any rush for projects under the strategy’ (Radio New Zealand 2018b), 
media in New Zealand have raised the spectre of Niue coming under 
China’s political influence through the BRI. As a reflection of this, and in 
perhaps the world’s first example of ‘dumpling diplomacy’, the Chinese 
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ambassador cooked for Premier Talagi and locals on Niue’s Constitution 
Day celebrations, at which ‘the New Zealand flag, controversially, was not 
raised’ (Rosenberg and Rutherford 2018).
On 27 December 2017, Cook Islands joined the AIIB, with Finance 
Minister Mark Brown stating it could provide an alternative to financing 
infrastructure development (Harwood 2017). An announcement that 
Cook Islands would join the BRI followed in November 2018 (Radio 
New Zealand 2018d). In the same month, Cook Islands also attended 
the first China International Import Expo in Shanghai, a BRI mechanism 
to bring overseas companies to China to meet with domestic buyers 
(Radio New Zealand 2018c). New Zealand media alleged that China was 
offered a contract to construct a deepwater port on Penryhn in exchange 
for participation in the BRI. According to the government source in 
Wellington, Cook Islands would be ‘the next Pacific domino to fall’ 
(Scott  2018). The story drew a complaint from New Zealand’s Office 
of the Prime Minister (ibid.).
Solomon Islands and Kiribati
In September 2019, Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched diplomatic 
recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The move signalled a swing towards 
regional alignment with the PRC, leaving Taiwan with four Oceanic 
partners (Nauru, Tuvalu, Palau and Marshall Islands). In the case of 
Solomon Islands, the switch involved a drawn-out fact-finding process 
in Oceania and China to assess the potential benefits and drawbacks of 
recognising Beijing. Once Solomon Islands made the decision to switch on 
21 September 2019, Kiribati soon followed on 27 September. By October, 
both states had signed on to the BRI following a state visit by Solomon 
Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and an announced visit of 
Kiribati’s President Taneti Maamau to China in January 2020. In a post-
recognition round of investment enthusiasm, China and Solomon Islands 
announced the initiation of several projects, including the multimillion-
dollar revival of the Gold Ridge mine and construction of facilities for the 
Pacific Games. An attempt by a consortium of Chinese interests to lease 
development rights for the island of Tulagi was stymied by the Solomon 
Islands’ attorney general, indicating not only limits to China-takeover 
narratives, but also how the exercise of Oceanic sovereignty remains 





The government of Fijian Prime Minister Bainimarama has been active 
in diversifying Suva’s economic partners. The 2006 coup prompted 
the adoption of a Look North policy that aimed to attract investment 
from nontraditional bilateral partners, as Australia and the US imposed 
economic sanctions on the new administration. Prime Minister 
Bainimarama branded the Look North as an expression of Fijian agency 
shaped by Fijians for Fijians in a bid to link state and individual aspirations. 
Because of this policy setting, Chinese economic interventions and people 
have become more visible across the Fijian islands. By 2017, China was 
the largest bilateral aid donor and source of foreign direct investment to 
Fiji (Pacific Islands Report 2016).
On 12 November 2018, Suva inked a long-hinted-at MOU with China on 
cooperation with the BRI framework following an enthusiastic exchange 
of BRI participation pledges between Fijian President Jioji Konrote and 
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi the previous month (Xinhua 2017b, 
2018f, 2018g). Since the introduction of the BRI into the Pacific Islands 
region, the Fijian and Chinese states have co-constructed a discourse of 
the Look North and the BRI as mutually compatible projects. This shift 
from a singular Look North narrative to an integrated discourse does 
not signal an overwrite of an indigenous policy framework; the thematic 
continuity from the Look North to the BRI indicates how some PICs are 
adapting the new paradigm to local conditions. This integrative process 
is also noted in the previous individual country profiles, as PICs combine 
the priorities of national development plans with the BRI, giving an 
impression of coherence between the BRI and domestic priorities.
In an analysis of Fijian and Chinese media and official texts on the Look 
North and the BRI, the integrative shift in Sino–Fijian economic relations 
began as early as 2015 (Szadziewski 2020). Clearly, this date overlaps with 
the formal announcement of the Pacific Islands region as a Maritime Silk 
Road corridor, as well as Prime Minister Bainimarama’s Beijing meeting 
with President Xi Jinping in July of the same year. Prior to 2015, Look 
North narratives dominated media and official discussion of Sino–Fijian 
relations; however, by 2017, the swing toward the BRI framework appears 
absolute, with Look North mentions barely registering in Chinese and 
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Fijian sources. That year also coincided with Prime Minister Bainimarama’s 
attendance at the Belt and Road Forum as the only PIC state leader. There 
is continuity in the claims officials make in both projects, including the 
creation of investment opportunities (potentiality) and the movement 
toward shared prosperity (mutuality) (Embassy of the People’s Republic 
of China in the Republic of Fiji 2017a; Q. Zhang 2017). The BRI has not 
displaced Look North narratives, just repackaged them and underscored 
its integration and coherence with Fijian interests as articulated by Fijians 
in the Look North framework. 
State legibility
The China–PICs economic relationship includes a range of Chinese 
actors, such as private investors, state contractors, state-owned enterprises, 
provincial and central government agencies, media outlets, academic 
institutions, community associations, migrants and labourers. Brant 
(see Wesley-Smith 2016) suggested the Chinese state is brought into the 
region by contractors responding to Pacific Island governments’ requests 
for infrastructure project funding. I argue this is still the case, as more 
financing options are made available under the BRI; however, the Chinese 
state is not passive in these processes. The range of Chinese projects and 
activities labelled as Belt and Road in Fiji demonstrates a broad capture 
of Chinese actors under the BRI umbrella. Emblematic of the BRI’s 
visibility in Suva is the construction of the Wanguo (WG) Friendship 
Plaza, which will house retail, hotel and office units. The project has been 
described as an ‘inspiration from China’s “One Belt and One Road”’ and 
has visible symbolic value, as it is set to become the tallest building in the 
country (Bolanavanua 2017). The private investment of approximately 
US$75 million is the first by WG International through a locally 
registered company. At the August 2017 groundbreaking ceremony, 
former Chinese ambassador to Fiji Zhang Ping told assembled dignitaries 
that the construction of the building ‘reflects the confidence that Chinese 
companies have in the future of our bilateral relations’ (ibid.).
Near Komave, 90 kilometres west of Suva, private Chinese investors have 
proposed a resort complex with a value of US$240 million. Conditions 
for securing the land lease included financial aid to Komave residents 
and employment once the facility opens. The Silkroad Ark Fiji Hotel 
was announced as one of the first BRI projects in Fiji and construction 
was scheduled for 2018 using Chinese labour. However, on a visit to 
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the site in 2018, there was no visible sign of work underway and the 
project appears to have come to an end. In conversations with residents 
of Komave in 2017 and 2018, I documented conflicting responses to the 
intervention, especially concern over the import of Chinese labour for 
construction. As a goodwill gesture, the investors offered a scholarship for 
a Fijian scholar to study at Jinan University, and even though sponsorship 
came from the Silkroad Ark Investment Company, the award was labelled 
a  Belt and Road enterprise (Kalouniviti 2017). The broad labelling of 
tourist visits from China to Fiji and the funding of students from Fiji to 
China as BRI activities is also evident in announcements made in 2017 
and 2018 (Tuimasala 2018; Wang 2017). 
Notable BRI-labelled construction projects involving state contractors 
include:
1. the US$9.5 million redevelopment of the Suva Civic Centre 
under an agreement between Guangdong Province and Suva 
City Council, with the work contracted to the Nam Yue 
Group (Xinhua 2018d)
2. the US$6 million construction of the Stinson Parade and 
Vatuwaqa bridges in Suva under a grant. China Railway 14th 
Bureau Group undertook the project, and its executive director 
told Xinhua upon completion of the project in January 2018: 
As [a] Chinese company, we are proud of doing something 
like building the bridges to help promote the friendship 
between the two peoples and make contributions to the 
Belt and Road Initiative (Xinhua 2018a)
3. the completion of a US$6 million medical training centre and 
emergency centre at Navua Hospital, as well as the handover 
of medical equipment donated by Guangdong Province. 
Construction was financed under a grant and contracted 
to the Yanjian Group. At the July 2017 opening ceremony, 
Zhang Ping said: 
The cooperation between Guangdong and Fiji 
responds to the ideas of the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative 
… The  B&R Initiative not only emphasises on 
infrastructure connectivity, but also on people-to-
people bond (Embassy of the People’s Republic of 
China in the Republic of Fiji 2017b)
4. the upgrading of the Nabouwalu/Dreketi Road on Vanua Levu. 
The project was funded with a US$135 million concessional 
loan and work undertaken by the China First Railway Group 
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(CRFG) (Xinhua 2018c). CRFG are also contracted to build 
the new Fijian Holdings Limited Tower in Suva, another BRI-
inspired project (Chanel 2018)
5. and the construction of the Panda Power Plant. Prime Minister 
Bainimarama proposed the deal at the 2017 Belt and Road 
Forum when he met with Su Huaisheng, the deputy general 
manager of Panda Green Energy Group. The prime minister 
situated the BRI and the project as potential measures in tackling 
the PIC priority of climate change (Panda Green 2017). 
As an indicator of provincial authorities in China taking BRI opportunities 
to the region, in May 2017, the China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade Guangdong Committee displayed in Suva over 
30  companies specialising in manufacturing, tourism and real estate 
(CCPIT 2017). At the community level, the Belt and Road label has 
been applied to any number of events and projects, from art displays at 
the Chinese Cultural Centre in Suva to communal celebrations of the 
Mid-Autumn Festival (Vakaema 2018). Similarly, local groups such as 
the Chinese Association and state-linked entities such as the Confucius 
Institute at the University of the South Pacific’s Laucala Campus have 
enacted the discourses of the BRI in their community engagement 
(China Daily 2018). In December 2018, the Chinese embassy held 
a symposium on its overseas Chinese work with over 40 representatives 
from the Chinese community in Fiji. The meeting indicated a readiness to 
harmonise state messaging with nonstate actors. Then Chinese ambassador 
Qian Bo explained new reforms in the government’s administration 
of overseas Chinese affairs and commended the delegates on their role 
in ‘promoting China–Fiji exchanges and cooperation’ as well as the 
embassy’s commitment to ‘protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
overseas Chinese in Fiji’ (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in 
the Republic of Fiji 2018). Then ambassador Qian also encouraged the 
community representatives to participate in the BRI as a means of realising 
their ‘personal dreams’ (ibid.).
Conclusion
China’s bid for coherence in its approach to the Pacific Islands regions 
through the BRI is as much a domestic as an international project. The 
flexible coherence of a vaguely defined BRI not only counters narratives 
external to the Pacific Islands over China’s so-called erratic interactions 
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with the region, but also harmonises a range of Chinese activities within 
the BRI framework. However, this discursive process has not put to rest 
questions, in some cases justifiable, over how projects play out on the 
ground and the seemingly strategic intent of the capture of Chinese 
economic activity under a singular state policy. Some familiar criticisms 
persist. Wallis (2017) argued that unmanageable debt to China may bring 
regional instability, and Pryke (2018) noted the lack of transparency in 
Chinese interventions. Drawing on extensive research of the finer details 
of Chinese economic interventions, Smith (2018) commented that 
‘most large Chinese aid projects in the Pacific are reverse-engineered by 
a Chinese contractor and their Pacific partners, then presented to China 
Exim Bank as local initiatives’. The debate over Chinese influence that blew 
up in Australia in 2018 prompted an examination of increased Chinese 
presence in the Pacific Islands region, including accusations of projects 
as ‘white elephants’ and ‘roads to nowhere’ (AFP 2018; Wyeth 2018). 
The rhetoric of legislators and alarmist media in Australia indicates the 
arrival of the BRI in the Pacific has not dispelled fear discourses. In sum, 
while state discourses make for clean analyses for the purposes of this 
chapter, the ground-level outcomes are much messier, a theme widespread 
in analyses of Chinese interventions in Africa and Latin America (Narins 
2016; Power and Mohan 2010). As such, the flexible coherence of a policy 
in which states and China can co-construct development narratives is 
a considerable advantage in building a ‘community of common destiny’ 
through the BRI (D. Zhang 2018). Discourses often cleanse untidy 
ground-level implementation of aid and investment projects. As a result, 
the urgency is clear for research into ground-level impacts of BRI projects 
and activities in Oceania to demonstrate the kinds of material, rather than 
discursive, changes that are in process through China’s BRI projects and 
to challenge the sweep of coherence narratives.   
It is also important to emphasise that the BRI is not the only anticipatory 
geography currently on offer in the Pacific Islands region. The Pacific 
Islands Forum’s Blue Pacific framework, Australia’s Pacific Step-Up, 
New Zealand’s Pacific Rest, the US’s Pacific Pledge, Indonesia’s Pacific 
Elevation, the Republic of Korea’s New Southern Policy, Taiwan’s New 
Southbound Policy and Austronesian Forum, the UK’s Pacific Uplift and 
various iterations of the Indo-Pacific concept emanating from Washington 
DC, Canberra, New Delhi, Paris and Tokyo offer competing geopolitical 
futures. The emerging complexity of Oceania’s geopolitical map raises the 
critical issues of Pacific Island agency and where Pacific Island governments 
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and Pacific Islanders exert their own vision of a regional future. Even 
though, as Zhang, the Chinese entrepreneur in Nadi, stated, the BRI will 
come to define Sino–PIC engagement, this chapter concludes that it is 
not an imposed project and some of the narratives of its introduction 
to the region are co-constructed. Furthermore, China represents one of 
several bilateral engagements between Pacific Island governments and 
other states. While the BRI may represent Beijing’s proposal to the world 
on how it will conduct its global presence, it may also embody how the 
Pacific Islands intend to manage their interests on the regional geopolitical 
stage with many suitors.
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Switch from Taiwan to China
Transform Aqorau
Introduction
In September 2019, Solomon Islands severed its diplomatic relations with 
the Republic of China (Taiwan) and recognised the People’s Republic 
of China (China). This followed months of public discussions about 
the Solomon Islands Government’s proposal to ‘switch’, illustrating the 
uncertain nature of its relationship with Taiwan, which was established 
in 1983. However, this is not unique to Solomon Islands; it characterises 
Taiwan’s diplomatic relations around the world. As China’s global 
influence grows, Beijing has been able to persuade a number of countries 
to abandon Taiwan. Central to this are Beijing’s One China policy and 
its claim that Taiwan is a renegade province. In 2017, Panama severed 
relations with Taiwan, followed by El Salvador, the Dominican Republic 
and Burkina Faso in 2018. In September 2019, Solomon Islands and 
Kiribati switched relations from Taiwan to China. This leaves only 
14 countries, plus the Holy See, that continue to have diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan, including four Pacific Island countries: Palau, the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands (RMI), Tuvalu and Nauru.
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This chapter examines the nature of the diplomatic relationship between 
Solomon Islands and Taiwan and discusses the factors underlying the 
Solomon Islands Government’s decision to sever that relationship. 
It asserts that the decision to switch was influenced largely by the increase 
in trade between China and Solomon Islands over the past two decades. 
It also discusses how the relationship has been influenced by a new wave 
of Chinese migrants who dominate the retail sector in Honiara and, 
increasingly, the provinces. It also highlights how these new Chinese 
migrants have had a negative influence on the quality of governance in 
Solomon Islands. It then discusses issues the Solomon Islands Government 
should be cognisant of in its new relationship with China. The government 
should be conscious of the fact that it does not currently have the 
resources, moral fortitude and knowledge capital to effectively manage 
this relationship, a relationship that will be characterised by Beijing’s 
assertive influence, an increase in the number of Chinese companies in 
the country, especially with investments in natural resource–extractive 
industries and the potential for a continuing increase in the Chinese 
migrant population and their dominance in retail businesses. The chapter 
proposes that the Solomon Islands Government should work on building 
knowledge capital about the Chinese state, corporations and peoples. 
This will enable it to best manage the relationship and ensure that there 
is mutual benefit between the two countries. The chapter concludes by 
reflecting on the future implications of Solomon Islands’ diplomatic 
relationship with China.
The underlying questions of this chapter are: What were the factors 
that influenced Solomon Islands’ relationship with Taiwan? What were 
the rationales for the switch to China? What are the implications of the 
switch for Solomon Islands? What can and should Solomon Islands do to 
ensure that it benefits from its relationship with China?
Taiwan or China? Solomon Islands’ 
foreign policy dilemma
Following independence in 1978, the Solomon Islands Government 
contemplated establishing diplomatic relations with China. In April 1982, 
the then minister of foreign affairs and international trade Ezekiel Alebua 
visited China for talks that were expected to lead to the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. On his return, Alebua said that ‘a good diplomatic 
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foundation has been laid for future sound diplomatic and trade relations 
between both countries’ (Solomon Islands Government Monthly Magazine 
1982). But the Solomon Islands Government was at the same time warming 
up to Taiwan, sending officials to Taipei. So, the battle between China and 
Taiwan for diplomatic relations with Solomon Islands started at the dawn 
of independence. In 1983, Honiara established diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan, beginning a 36-year relationship (Kabutaulaka 2010).
At various times in the past three decades, prominent Solomon Islanders 
have flirted with the idea of abandoning diplomatic relations with Taiwan 
and switching to China. As recently as 24 January 2019, for example, 
the Democratic Alliance Party (DAP) of then prime minister Ricky 
Houenipwela announced at their convention that they would review 
Solomon Islands’ diplomatic relations with Taiwan if they were reelected 
to government in the April 2019 national general elections. Prime 
Minister Houenipwela noted: ‘The possibility of actively pursu[ing] 
opportunities on South–South cooperation1 and partnership is one of the 
DAP international affairs policy’ (Fanasia 2019). These sentiments cannot 
be underestimated, as they came from the party of the incumbent prime 
minister whose government had courted and enjoyed a long relationship 
with Taiwan. As far as I am aware, this was the first time that any political 
party had made the issue of the country’s diplomatic relationship with 
Taiwan part of its political platform. It was also a reflection of China’s 
growing importance to Solomon Islands. 
By the eve of the April 2019 elections, Solomon Islands was at a diplomatic 
crossroads. The reasons that had led other countries to sever relations with 
Taiwan since its pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 
won the presidential elections in 2016 could not be ignored. Since the 
end of the DPP’s informal diplomatic truce with Taiwan’s other major 
political party—the nationalist Kuomintang Party—even more countries 
have left Taiwan for China. This partly reflects these countries’ desire to go 
along with the global trend, wherein the majority of countries recognise 
China, an economic and political superpower that cannot be ignored.
This trend also impacted Solomon Islands. Following the April 2019 
elections, Manasseh Sogavare was elected prime minister and formed the 
Democratic Coalition Government for Advancement (DCGA). In its 
1  China regards itself as a developing country and hence frames its development assistance as 
South–South cooperation rather than aid, which implicitly requires a donor and recipient.
THE CHINA ALTERNATIVE
322
First 100-Days Policy Framework, the DCGA stated that it would review 
its development partners and engage in a ‘comprehensive assessment on 
the China question’ (DCGA 2019:7). In the months that followed, the 
DCGA Government unveiled its policy to switch diplomatic relations to 
China and began an assertive campaign to implement it. A bipartisan task 
force was established to ‘assess the gains of the current bilateral relations 
with ROC and to provide a strategy for the government to counter any 
positive and negative impacts of a potential switch’ (Solomon Islands 
Government 2019:5). The task force visited Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, Samoa 
and China, then wrote and submitted its report to caucus. At the same 
time, the Solomon Islands parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee 
was tasked to:
initiate this inquiry to examine, observe and make recommendations 
on the question of severing existing ties with the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) and the conduct of government’s foreign policy in 
light of the same (National Parliament of Solomon Islands Foreign 
Relations Committee 2019:15). 
The following discusses in some detail the debates surrounding the switch. 
Even the contemplation of a switch was a major blow to Taiwan, especially 
given the fact that Solomon Islands was the largest, and perhaps most 
important, of the six Pacific Island countries that had diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan at the time. It was also one of three Pacific nations, along with 
Tuvalu and Palau, that had never had diplomatic relations with China. 
The other three—Marshall Islands, Nauru and Kiribati—previously had 
diplomatic relations with China, but later switched to Taiwan. Nauru 
provides an interesting example of a country that switches to whoever 
writes it a cheque. It initially had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, 
switched to China in 2002, then reestablished ties with Taiwan in 2005 
when it discovered that China was not going to subsidise their national 
airline, which had been declared bankrupt by the courts in  Australia. 
Taiwan’s method of keeping Nauru members of parliament in line was 
simple. According to a 2010 report published in The Australian:
The Taiwanese money man comes once a month. An official from 
the local embassy, he doles out $US4000 in Australian currency 
to every one of Nauru’s 18 members of parliament (Maley 2010).
In keeping with this practice of chequebook diplomacy, Nauru was one 
of the few nations to recognise the Russian proxy states of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia (Wyeth 2017).
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In the past decade, there has been renewed interest in China’s aid and 
investment in the Pacific Islands region and the alleged security threat 
this poses (Smith 2018). It is interesting to see how this attention has 
transformed to be characterised in negative terms, as if aid from other 
donors has not also created a dependency syndrome amongst Pacific Island 
countries. These security threats are largely manufactured, fuelled-up fears 
led mainly by some in the Australian media (Wroe 2018) and think tanks 
(Dobell 2018), stoking fear amongst the Australian, New Zealand and 
broader Western security axis. This fear is not for the safety and security 
of the people of the Pacific Islands. The Pacific Islands are important 
from  a traditional security perspective because they provide a buffer 
against a forward attack on Australia and New Zealand, as well as because 
Chinese engagement in the Pacific Islands region is increasingly viewed 
as a threat to historical Western dominance. This powerplay between the 
Western axis and China in recent years has resulted in increased support 
to the Pacific Islands region, most notably in infrastructure and military 
aid. All of the Western Axis countries have increased their engagement; 
even Great Britain has reopened diplomatic posts in Tonga, Vanuatu and 
Samoa (Bourke 2018). Australia, New Zealand, France and the US have 
all increased their aid and propped up their security apparatus, arguably 
increasing the aid dependency of Pacific Island countries at a time when 
they need to reduce their dependency and become more self-reliant in 
terms of their economic and social wellbeing. 
It was against this backdrop that Solomon Islands confronted the choice 
between Taiwan and China. Like other Pacific Island countries, Solomon 
Islands is seeking a sense of purpose, wanting to become more self-
reliant, especially after the departure of the Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), a regional intervention that was deployed 
from mid-2003 to 2017 following civil unrest in Solomon Islands that 
led to the near collapse of the state, the deterioration of the country’s 
economy and the death of about 200 people (Hameiri 2009; Moore 
2004). The  country is confronted with security issues born not out of 
external threats from war or terrorism, but from internal threats ranging 
from a lack of employment opportunities to a lack of entrepreneurial skills 
that would allow people to participate effectively in the global trading 
system; the loss of biodiversity and ecosystems through changes in the 
climate; the loss of habitat and arable land from rising sea levels; and 
the devastating health effects of noncommunicable diseases brought by 
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changes in diet and lifestyle. These are some of the challenges Solomon 
Islands faces, which it has to navigate in its relations with other countries, 
including China.
In addition to these issues is, as mentioned previously, the increasing 
population of new Chinese migrants who dominate the retail sector, 
especially in the urban areas. The only provinces that have so far been 
able to withstand the wave of Chinese migration and the takeover of their 
retail sector are Choiseul, Temotu, Isabel and Makira/Ulawa. It is not 
clear whether they will be able to withstand pressure from other growing 
businesses, especially in the mining sector, which might become the 
dominant natural resource sector as the forestry industry winds down.
While the wave of new Chinese migrants seeking to establish retail shops 
may be limited to urban centres, the presence of Malaysian Chinese–
owned logging companies is widespread throughout the country. To that 
extent, the level of integration between ethnic Chinese-owned businesses 
and the Solomon Islands society is almost complete, with the exception of 
remote places such as Tikopia and Anuta in the east. The major provinces 
of Guadalcanal, Malaita and Western have been unable to withstand 
the migration of Chinese nationals who have established retail shops 
and dominated the retail sector. In Honiara, these migrants—largely 
from Guangdong province (Smith 2012)—have already taken most, if 
not all, of the capital’s commercial sites. This migration is enabled by 
a combination of domestic factors, most notably the corruption of 
government officials; the corrosion of state institutions, particularly 
the departments of immigration and labour; and the crowding out of 
Solomon Islanders from the financial sector, which has encouraged them 
to sell their land to new arrivals because they have not been able to secure 
funds to develop it. While the switch in diplomatic relations from Taiwan 
to China was determined largely by trade and investments, Solomon 
Islands needs to carefully consider the underlying contributing issues.
Now that Solomon Islands has made the switch, there is a need to learn 
from the Pacific Islands countries that appear to be struggling with the 
debts they owe to China. Solomon Islands needs to reassess its governance 
capacities to see how it can best manage this new relationship. As it is, 
Solomon Islands does not have the wherewithal to manage the trade-
offs that will be required to handle the links between a sudden influx 
of no-strings-attached development finance and the further opening up 
of its natural resources. Since the departure of RAMSI, and despite the 
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exorbitant investments it made to the machinery of government and the 
control of public finances, Solomon Islands public service and institutions 
have become weaker and tainted by a level of corruption never before 
seen. The government is therefore in a weak position to manage this new 
relationship that will require trade-offs for grants and loans. Currently, 
the Solomon Islands Government is unable to properly manage its 
natural resources sector effectively. Consequently, having state-backed 
Chinese companies exploiting the mineral, forestry and fisheries resources 
of Solomon Islands with in-country support from a new embassy could 
prove disastrous for the people of Solomon Islands. In order to save the 
country from itself and possible exploitation, Solomon Islands should 
carefully consider how it will manage this new diplomatic relationship.
Taiwan–Solomon Islands relations: 
An unstable ship?
Prior to the switch, Solomon Islands Government officials typically 
described their country’s relationship with Taiwan as strong. I would 
argue, however, that it was an uneasy and unstable relationship at best. 
Invariably lurking in the background was China, threatening to lure 
Solomon Islands to switch. This was a factor that some government 
officials and politicians in Solomon Islands took advantage of. While the 
Solomon Islands Government had not officially considered a switch prior 
to 2019, some government officials and politicians had at least considered 
it, especially as China’s trade and investments increased. For example, 
former prime minister Gordon Darcy Lilo, who contested the April 
2019 election, commented that ‘sooner or later, when we see our country 
hasn’t been able to grow out of this relationship [with Taiwan], we are at 
liberty to review our relations and to explore other avenues’ (Greenfield 
and Westbrook 2019). Taiwan and China have often taken advantage of 
their respective vulnerabilities at the highest political level. It was initially 
the government of Taiwan that propped up the discretionary funds—
the Rural Constituency Development Fund (RCDF)— controlled by 
politicians. These funds have transformed Solomon Islands’ political 
landscape by shifting the political power base away from voters and 
government bureaucracy and into the hands of politicians. Though 
there has been a decline in the level of Taiwan’s contribution to the 
RCDF in recent years to around 20 per cent, and the Solomon Island 
Government’s contribution has risen sharply, there is still a perception 
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amongst urban elites that Taiwan has contributed to their funding and 
created a system that entrenches the power of politicians. The RCDF has 
caused controversy, especially amongst the urban elite and the Solomon 
Islands diaspora, because it is viewed as supporting political corruption 
and giving incumbent MPs undue advantages in elections. Regardless of 
the accuracy of this view, it has coloured people’s views of Taiwan. 
The relationship between Taiwan and Solomon Islands is not one based 
on mutual trust and goodwill, but one Solomon Islands politicians have 
used to gain political mileage, often at the expense of good governance 
and the social and economic wellbeing of the people. Solomon Islands 
politicians have played on this relationship and used it to support their 
political base. Criticisms of the RCDF have been elitist, urban-based and 
largely focused on the ineffectiveness of the fund as a mechanism for rural 
development. This is particularly important given the fact that the RCFP 
represents around one-third of the government’s development budget and 
between 10 and 15 per cent of overall budget outlays (Wiltshire and Batley 
2018). However, it is also important to note that the RCDF has helped 
some people and served its purpose. But in a Least Developed Country 
like Solomon Islands, there are better ways of ensuring a more equitable 
delivery of health, education and other social services. The government of 
Taiwan has been complicit in the way the national parliamentarians have 
undermined the budgetary and development processes. This perception 
is borne out by Taiwan’s initial support for the RCDF, and it is felt that 
Taiwan is always ready to help Solomon Islands at any costs.
However, beyond the urban centres, most rural people have no particular 
view of Taiwan’s support for the RCDF and are probably grateful for 
whatever materials they have received through Taiwan’s support. Some 
of the most popular Taiwanese projects channelled through the RCDF 
are the rural solar lighting programs, administered by the MPs. There 
has been no evaluation of the ways in which solar lighting projects have 
impacted Solomon Islanders’ livelihoods. The quality of the products 
used, however, is poor, and most of the solar panels, batteries and lights 
do not have long life spans. But most people who receive these projects do 
not care about the quality of the solar panels or batteries and are only too 
happy to receive a free gift. This dependency mentality cultivated through 
the RDCF and the wasteful allocation of limited resources has led to 
criticism of Taiwan’s laissez-faire approach to aid in Solomon Islands.
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No other country with which Solomon Islands has diplomatic relation has 
generated this level of controversy. Once again, only educated elites have 
expressed disquiet about the way Taiwanese aid supports a mechanism 
that is, in effect, a slush fund for national parliamentarians. Consequently, 
the widespread view among the general public in Taiwan that their aid 
to Pacific Island nations is wasted (Huang 2017) seems well-founded in 
Solomon Islands. The relationship between Taiwan and Solomon Islands 
has changed over the years; while it has been based on mutual trust, respect 
and support for Taiwan’s independence, the emergence of the RCDF has 
changed the nature of the relationship. 
In 1983, four years after gaining independence, when Solomon Islands 
chose to establish relations with Taiwan, the world was very different. The 
Cold War was still the major international influence that polarised the 
world between capitalism and communism, and China was only starting 
its 30-year journey of economic transition. Cold War dynamics drove the 
Solomon Islands Government to establish relations with Taiwan. They 
were attracted to the idea that Taiwan was a democratic country and not 
part of communist China, even though Taiwan no longer represented 
China at the United Nations. The international order at that time was 
clearly demarcated between the West, led by the US, and the communist 
countries, led by the Soviet Union. China was not the economic force it is 
now, and Solomon Islands leaders were sensitive to the communist regime 
in China. Taiwan was more influential and had diplomatic relations with 
many more countries, so it was not a difficult decision for the Solomon 
Islands Government to establish diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
Solomon Islands did not immediately establish full diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan, however, first going through a period during which Taiwan 
had only consular-level representation. The geopolitical dynamics of the 
region were tense, as Kiribati had just entered into a fisheries agreement 
with the Soviet Union. US purse seine fishing vessels were fishing illegally 
and there were uncertainties over fishing rights. Biddick provides insight 
into the rivalry between China and Taiwan over Solomon Islands in the 
early 1980s, and suggests why Solomon Islands established diplomatic 
ties with Taiwan:
The continuing competition for political influence was particularly 
evident in the Solomon Islands, as suggested by the contretemps 
surrounding Prime Minister Alebua’s participation in the launching 
ceremony for a PRC-funded ship in Honiara on October 12, 1988. 
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The launching ceremony, just two days after Taiwan’s ‘Double Ten’ 
celebration in Honiara, symbolised the sister province relationship 
between China’s Guangdong Province and Guadalcanal Province 
in the Solomon Islands. Guangdong officials had earlier signed 
a memorandum of understanding for development of a joint venture 
fishery project, reportedly to include Chinese technical assistance 
and funding for development of shipbuilding and tuna processing 
operations in Guadalcanal. Taiwan’s ambassador apparently took 
exception to Alebua’s participation in the ship-launching ceremony, 
and on October 14 the Solomon Islands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Taiwan embassy issued a joint statement clarifying that 
Alebua had participated in a private capacity and reiterating that 
the two countries remained committed to maintaining ‘warm, 
cordial and friendly’ diplomatic relations. In fact, this was but 
the most recent episode of a protracted triangular drama dating 
from Alebua’s trip to Beijing in 1982 as foreign minister of the 
Mamaloni government. He had publicly indicated at that time that 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC was imminent. 
Instead, the Mamaloni Government ultimately decided to recognise 
Taipei, apparently in response to inducements offered by the Taiwan 
authorities (1989:807).
It would not be surprising if Solomon Mamaloni’s government did make 
the decision based on an inducement from Taipei. As chief minister, 
Mamaloni was forced to resign in 1975 when it was discovered that he 
agreed to receive funds in return for having his face on Solomon Islands 
coins. The scandal was known at the time as the Letcher Mint Affair, 
named for the US company that tried to get a favour in return for an 
inducement offered to Mamaloni. That a political relationship should be 
defined by its origins arising from an inducement perhaps reflects the 
uncertainties that plagued this relationship and the vulnerabilities that 
can arise from weak states led by corrupt leaders. It is no surprise that the 
RCDF was initiated when Solomon Mamaloni served as prime minister 
from 1989 to 1993, and that he asked Taiwan to fund it. Understanding 
the backdrop of the decision that led to the establishment of political ties 
with Taiwan helps explain why Taiwan has been willing to support the 
RCDF and prop up the Solomon Islands political establishment, thereby 
defining to some extent the nature of the relationship between the two 
countries, which also influences the contest between China and Taiwan. 
Graeme Dobell, writing soon after the 2006 Honiara riots, quoted former 
head of Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Stuart Harris, 
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who testified to an Australian Senate Foreign Affairs Committee that the 
diplomatic contest is dangerous because it can easily tear at the structure 
of a weak Island government: 
We found this in the Solomons, where governments are totally 
disorientated—in fact just about destroyed—by interventions of 
this kind. You can disorient a government in the Pacific Islands 
with a very limited amount of money—just a few bribes to the 
right people at the top and you have undermined the whole 
governing system (Dobell 2007:11).
Despite these challenges and negative perceptions about the debilitating 
effect of the relationship with Taiwan on the quality of governance, it is 
precisely because of Taiwan’s support to the RCDF that the Solomon 
Islands–Taiwan relationship may be described as healthy and stable at 
the political level. Indeed, former prime minister Ricky Houenipwela 
reversed his intent to review the relationship only two weeks after 
announcing the DAP would do so. However, those who deal closely 
with Solomon Islands foreign relations were not surprised by the DAP’s 
desire to review the relationship. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official 
stated that the Solomon Islands–Taiwan relationship, while strong and 
enduring, should be broadened to the general community to include 
people-to-people contacts.2 The strength of the relationship was based 
largely on the contacts Taiwan had with political leaders and government 
officials, and the various visits and exchanges that often took place at the 
highest political level reflected this. This observation is surprising as it 
ignores the support the Taiwan Agriculture Technical Mission gives to 
farmers, not only through spending time at the farms providing training 
on vegetable farming, piggery and poultry, but also through workshops it 
runs in the provinces for agriculture extension officers and farmers. One 
of the successful aspects of the Solomon Islands–Taiwan relationship is 
the Taiwan Agriculture Technical Mission, because it aims to both support 
the government’s agricultural assistance to farmers and, more importantly, 
reach ordinary farmers throughout the country. The success of the program 
can be seen in the improved quality and variety of vegetables sold in the 
main market in Honiara, reflecting the training farmers have received.
2  Acting High Commissioner to Australia, 26 January 2019. Canberra. Personal communication.
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Taiwan’s relationship with Solomon Islands was shaped around influencing 
the political leadership and supporting state institutions. There is limited 
evidence of investment in areas that influence the daily lives of Solomon 
Islanders in the same way the Chinese have done through Chinese 
migrants and their stranglehold on the retail sector. Taiwan’s development 
assistance to Solomon Islands has focused around a number of areas, such 
as support for scholarships for Solomon Islanders to study in Taiwan, 
including support for the regional scholarship scheme administered 
by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. In addition to agriculture, 
they also support the health sector. Their best-known project was the 
construction of the National Referral Hospital. Though the same level 
of daily interaction might not be seen as between the Chinese retail shop 
owners and Solomon Islanders, there are important people-to-people 
links through the exchange of specialist doctors and visits by Taiwanese 
health teams in the provinces.
There was generally a lot of goodwill at the highest political level in Solomon 
Islands towards Taiwan, and there should have been, because the political 
elites had found a partner who largely had a more-willing ear to lend than 
other countries, who were less likely to support the political elites. It came 
as no surprise when, at the 2018 Taiwan Double Ten celebrations, then 
prime minister Rick Houenipwela said the government ‘remained very 
optimistic about the positive direction which Solomon Islands and Taiwan 
is heading as is shown in the increasing number of high-level visits made 
by both government representatives’ (Kekea 2018). Other than political 
convenience, another reason for enduring strong political links was a little-
known fund administered personally by the prime minister. In 2008, while 
president of the Kossa Football Club (FC), I approached the ambassador of 
Taiwan in Honiara to see if they were able to assist Kossa FC. As reigning 
club champions, they were to represent Solomon Islands in the FIFA 
Oceania Football Confederation Club championship. The ambassador told 
me that they did not have any funds he had discretion over, but advised 
me to approach then prime minister Dr Derek Sikua. He said there was 
a fund only the prime minister could authorise the use of, through which 
they would be able assist Kossa. Few people knew of the existence of this 
fund. The ambassador said the funds could be released by Taiwan only if 
a request was personally signed by the prime minister. The next day, I saw 
Dr Sikua and asked if he could make a request to the government of Taiwan 
to use this fund, as our club was representing Solomon Islands and our 
pride and national interest was at stake. He  liaised with the secretary to 
the prime minister’s office, who at the time was Jeremiah Manele. I drafted 
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the required letter and the prime minister duly signed it. The request 
was to fund the team to play in Vanuatu and Fiji in the last leg of the 
championship, which Kossa FC eventually lost in the final to Waitakere FC 
of New Zealand. US$30,000 was released by the government of Taiwan 
to the Solomon Islands Football Federation to enable Kossa to meet all its 
travel expenses. I was surprised by the existence of this fund, as I had no 
idea there was such a fund that could be used at the discretion of the prime 
minister. This illustrates the comfortable relationship between Taiwan and 
the political leaders of Solomon Islands. It is not hard to imagine that this 
fund could have been used to persuade MPs against a switch to China. 
No other country with whom Solomon Islands has diplomatic relations 
would agree to provide such funds. This supports the view that Taiwan’s aid 
fuelled bad governance.
There is also a regional dimension to Solomon Islands’ relationship with 
Taiwan. The six Pacific Island countries that previously had relations 
with  Taiwan would hold the Taiwan–Pacific Islands Forum Dialogue 
on the margins of Pacific Islands Forum leaders meetings. One of the 
features of these dialogues was the announcement of projects to be funded 
by Taiwan. Representatives from the various regional agencies who 
submitted bids through the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat took a keen 
interest in the dialogue. Taiwan’s overseas development assistance (ODA) 
to the region, including Solomon  Islands, between 2011 and 2016 is 
provided below (Table 1). Solomon Islands was the largest recipient of 
funding support from Taiwan, which was the fourth largest donor to 
Solomon Islands.
Table 1. Taiwan’s support for the Pacific, 2011–16
Country Amount Donor Ranking Aid Share
Kiribati $45,451,985 4 10%
Marshall Islands $44,591,120 3 10%
Nauru $4,111,000 5 2%
Palau $3,590,000 6 2%
Solomon Islands $76,387,935 4 5%
Tuvalu $73,394 20 0 .04%
Total $174,205,436 5 6%
Note: Despite having a high donor ranking, aid share remains relatively low because aid 
in the Pacific is often heavily concentrated in a select number of donors, usually either 
Australia or the uS, or Japan in the case of Palau .
Source: Dayant and Pryke (2018) .
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An important feature of the relationship between Solomon Islands and 
Taiwan was that during the ethnic tensions in Solomon Islands between 
1998 and 2003, it was Taiwan’s ODA that kept Solomon Islands foreign 
reserves intact. Atkinson states that:  
as the crisis developed and international donors began 
withholding aid due to serious governmental irregularities, 
the Solomon Islands’ leadership turned to Taiwan to meet the 
spiraling compensation demands of the conflicting parties. The 
Chen Shui-bian Government, elected in March 2000, aimed to 
improve Taiwan’s tarnished donor image, but was unable to resist 
being pulled deeper into the crisis. In June 2001, Taiwan’s state-
owned EXIM Bank agreed to a US$25 million loan after the 
Solomon Islands Government threatened to switch diplomatic 
recognition to China. The package was used to finance hundreds 
of payouts routed through Allan Kemakeza’s Ministry of National 
Unity, Reconciliation and Peace. Kemakeza himself was at the 
top of the list, and was later sacked for embezzlement over the 
issue. Parliament nonetheless elected Kemakeza prime minister 
following the 5 December 2001 elections. The final tranche of the 
EXIM loan arrived in September 2002, and as the money ran out 
the crisis reached its nadir, with Cabinet and the Finance Ministry 
invaded by armed men, including police, demanding money 
(2009:50).
In an analysis of Taiwan’s overall approach to the Pacific, Michael Nguyen 
and Jonathan Pryke (2018) argued that Taiwan attempted to offset China’s 
appeal by working with Pacific partners in different ways. It recognised that 
it could not exceed the monetary value of Chinese aid and thus identified 
areas of Pacific development where its smaller contributions could still 
be effective. Nguyen and Pryke contend that Taiwan’s ‘projects targeting 
sectors such as agriculture, health and industry … emphasise Taiwan’s 
advantage: people-to-people relationships’. An example is Taiwan’s 
horticultural projects. These sought to increase the sustainable productive 
capacity of local populations through training workshops, internships 
and extended foreign missions by envoys.  Increased exposure of local 
Pacific communities to Taiwanese experts was a key element driving 
Taiwanese aid. The working relationships that arose created goodwill and 
fealty that can only come about through prolonged cooperation. I have 
argued previously that this aspect of the relationship was highly visible 
and successful. 
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Observers invariably contextualise Taiwan’s political relations in terms 
of the tussle it has with China and compare the aid both countries give 
to the  Pacific Islands region. In an analysis of the impact of Taiwan’s 
aid to the region, Jonathan Pryke and Alexander Dayant (2018) said this 
of its assistance to Solomon Islands:
That isn’t to say Taiwan’s engagement has been unnoticed. It has 
significantly impacted lives of those in the Pacific, in some cases 
profoundly. The clearest case of this is in Solomon Islands. The 
primary mechanism for Taiwanese support to Solomon Islands 
comes in the form of supporting ‘Constituent Development 
Funds’—a discretionary fund that is allotted to each of the 
country’s 50 MPs for investing in their electorates (with minimal 
oversight). Taiwan has provided close to $90 million to these funds 
between 2011 and 2018. Solomon Island politicians like these 
funds so much that they have allocated around one-third of the 
development budget, or between 10 and 15 per cent of the total 
budget, to these funds. In this regard, Taiwan’s aid program has 
contributed to profoundly changing, and perhaps undermining, 
public financial management in its largest supporter in the Pacific. 
(For a more nuanced discussion on the challenges of being an MP 
in Solomon Islands, take a look at now Prime Minister Rick Hou’s 
reflections for the Department of Pacific Affairs in 2016).
Underscoring the fickleness of the Solomon Islands–Taiwan relationship, 
in 2018 the then prime minister Rick Houenipwela ‘hailed’ Solomon 
Islands bilateral relationship with Taiwan as ‘growing steadily’ (Radio New 
Zealand 2018). Even though a number of other countries had switched 
relations from Taipei to Beijing, prime minister Houenipwela said 
‘his government was committed to maintaining and further consolidating 
relations … [and that] Taiwanese funding had helped with agricultural 
programmes, medical assistance and the fight against climate change’.
Solomon Islanders as well as outside observers have always questioned 
the future of Solomon Islands relations with Taiwan. Australian diplomat 
James Batley (2018), for example, observed that:
Taiwan faces a number of challenges in shoring up its links with 
Solomon Islands. For the past couple of decades, Taiwan has 
invested heavily in Solomon Islands’ political elite through its 
support for the notorious ‘constituency development funds’, which 
is the discretionary funds provided for members of parliament to 
spend in their own constituencies.
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In some respects, though, Taiwan has become a victim of its own 
success in supporting these schemes: as the size of these programs 
has grown, the Solomon Islands Government itself has picked up 
ever more of the tab, to the point where Taiwan is now funding 
under 20 per cent of the total, down from 50 per cent less than 
10 years ago. So the relative importance and impact of Taiwan’s 
contribution has shrunk.
Even more worrying from Taiwan’s point of view, China is far and 
away Solomon Islands’ largest export market. The most recent 
figures (for 2016) from the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade in Australia state that over 62 per cent of Solomons’ exports 
go to China. (This is virtually all logs.) By contrast, Taiwan takes 
around only one per cent of exports from Solomon Islands.
Such a level of economic dependence on China leaves Solomon 
Islands highly vulnerable to economic pressure—should this be 
exercised. Senior Solomon Islanders will be aware of claims made 
earlier this year that Palau, another of Taiwan’s Pacific allies, has 
been the victim of economic pressure with China essentially 
turning off the tap of a lucrative flow of Chinese tourists to the 
small northern Pacific country.
Given the importance of Solomon Islands’ trade with China, in the past 
few years Taiwan’s relations with Solomon Islands went through periodic 
waves of unease, with visits by government officials and politicians to 
China. I have described how Solomon Islands politicians view their 
relationship with Taiwan, to some extent taking advantage of Taiwan’s 
vulnerabilities. In return for flexible funding arrangements, and perhaps 
the discretionary funds the prime minister has access to, Solomon Islands 
has always used its statement to the annual general meeting of the United 
Nations General Assembly to call for the reinstatement of Taiwan as a full 
member of the United Nations and its various organs.
There is never going to be any support for Taiwan’s reinstatement in the 
United Nations. But this never stopped Solomon Islands from staging 
the theatre of appeals to the international community to allow Taiwan to 
rejoin. This was a small trade-off for the aid that was administered through 
the prime minister’s office. It gave Taiwanese officials a sense of lien, 
a right of access other diplomatic missions do not have. My conversations 
with senior officials indicate that staff at the Taiwanese embassy felt 
they could meet with the permanent secretary and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs at any time, even though they were not at the ministerial level and 
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protocol dictates they should meet with relevant officers in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs before accessing more senior staff. They were also the 
only diplomatic mission in Honiara that had the keys to the VIP lounge 
at the airport and could use it without necessarily going through the 
Protocol Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This shows that 
money can buy access.
The China factor
Hovering in the background of the Solomon Islands–Taiwan relations 
was China. This is the unavoidable, and almost inconvenient, truth of 
the relations Taiwan enjoys with any country, including Solomon Islands, 
and perhaps explains why the number of countries that have diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan is heading rapidly towards single figures. China is 
a global economic and political power and Solomon Islands’ largest trading 
partner. These are important considerations and must have been playing 
in the minds of current and aspiring MPs. However, there are broader 
policy issues the government must canvass when viewing its relations, as 
trade is only one factor. Table 2 shows the trade data for Solomon Islands. 
It is evident that China is an important actor in the economic affairs and 













Source: Global Edge (2019) .
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Tables 3 and 4 show the bilateral trade between Solomon Islands and 
Taiwan. China’s trade with Solomon Islands dwarfs that of Taiwan, 
reflecting the strong commercial ties Solomon Islands has with China.
Table 3. Solomon Islands–China bilateral trade (SB$ million)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Average 
Balance 1,344 1,502 1,451 1,634 2,000 1,586 
Exports 1,600 1,944 1,842 2,169 2,566 2,024 
Imports 256 441 390 535 566 438 
Source: Central Bank of Solomon Islands (2019) .
Table 4. Solomon Islands–Taiwan bilateral trade (SB$ million)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Average 
Balance 51 26 30 28 33 33
Exports 95 40 45 53 59 58
Imports 44 14 16 25 27 25
Source: Central Bank of Solomon Islands (2019) .
Table 5 shows how imports from China compare with those from Taiwan 
and the rest of the world from 2007 to 2017. Over a 10-year period, 
imports from China far surpassed those from Taiwan, underlining the 
importance of China to the Solomon Islands economy. 
Table 5. Percentage of Solomon Islands imports from China and Taiwan
2017  2016  2015 2014 2013  2012  2011  2010  2009 2008  2007 
China 13% 15% 11% 12% 1% 8% 11% 15% 10% 6% 5%
Taiwan 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1%
Rest of the 
world 
87% 85% 89% 88% 98% 91% 89% 85% 89% 94% 94%
Source: Central Bank of Solomon Islands (2019) .
Table 6 illustrates the percentages of Solomon Islands’ exports and 
imports with its major trading partners. Taiwan does not feature in the 
statistics, but China features quite prominently, once again underscoring 
the importance of China to the Solomon Islands economy. 
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Commodity % of 
imports*
Items
China 58 Logs Australia 30 Food, mixed
Australia 7 Timber, mixed Singapore 14 Fuel
Italy 7 Fish China 11 Household, 
mixed
uK 5 Palm oil Japan 8 Machines, 
cars
Philippines 3 Copra New 
Zealand
7 Food, mixed
Total SB$m 3,506 Total SB$m 3,864
* 5-year average .
Source: Central Bank of Solomon Islands (2019) .
Three aspects pertaining to China are important to Solomon Islands. 
The first is the volume of trade and the size of the trade surplus with China 
in contrast to the large trade deficits run with Australia and Singapore 
(the main source of fuel imports). However, most, if not all, of the exports 
to China are round logs from unsustainable commercial logging. Foreign 
logging companies that control the industry have been responsible for the 
corrosion of good governance and extremely poor environmental practices 
for logging. There is a lot of controversy surrounding this industry and 
China’s demand for round logs is exacerbating the deforestation of Solomon 
Islands (Global Witness 2018). The bribery of officials, politicians and 
villagers by the logging industry has led to a culture of corruption that is 
pervasive throughout Solomon Islands society (Aqorau 2008). 
Solomon Islands’ trade surplus with China, impressive as it is, remains 
tied to an industry that has undermined good governance and degraded 
the natural environment. Despite the RAMSI intervention, corruption 
by government officials has become more pervasive. Parliament passed 
anticorruption legislation in 2018, which provides a framework to address 
the problem. However, is not clear if the government has the resources to 
make the legislation effective. According to Transparency International, 
Solomon Islands dropped two points in the 2019 Corruption Perceptions 
Index, from 44 points in 2018 to 42 points (Radio New Zealand 
2020). The weak state institutions that characterise the Solomon Islands 
Government have thus far been incapable of addressing the impact of the 
exploitation of Solomon Islands forests. Mining represents the extraction 
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of another natural resource that Chinese businesses have shown an interest 
in, and, like the forestry sector, the mining sector has suffered from weak 
compliance stemming from weak state institutions.
The second factor is the migration of new Chinese, who now dominate 
the retail sector. Most, if not all, the prime retail sites in Honiara are 
owned by these new arrivals, creating increasing levels of animosity 
towards them from locals. They are known to bribe their way through 
government offices to secure licences, work and residential permits and 
planning permissions, further exacerbating the level of corrosion in the 
public service. Despite the Honiara riots in 2006, which saw many of the 
new Chinese businesses burnt and looted, their presence has increased 
and expanded to the provinces as well. The dominance of Chinese 
businesses in the retail sector has firmly entrenched Chinese interests, and 
arguably integrates Solomon Islands’ economy, jobs, trade and businesses 
with China. In contrast, Taiwan’s relationship with Solomon Islands is not 
integrated across the business sector. 
To provide a long-term perspective on the new Chinese arrivals, 
I  interviewed John Leong, a Chinese Solomon Islander from Malaita. 
His father Leong Kee married a woman from Langalanga in Malaita, and 
he grew up knowing both his mother’s Solomon Islands culture and his 
father’s Chinese culture. When he was small, he was sent to stay with 
his grandmother in Hong Kong and they would visit their relatives in 
Guangdong in mainland China. He returned to Solomon Islands after 
completing secondary schooling in Hong Kong. He explained that many 
of the new Chinese immigrants were not interested in investing in the 
country to help the Solomon Islands economy, but were really there to 
do business for themselves and then move to the US, Australia or New 
Zealand. Most have no particularly strong feelings for the country, unlike 
many older Chinese who initially immigrated to Solomon Islands, settled 
down and have family who have taken over their shops. Most, if not all, 
of the newly arrived Chinese retain strong links back to their homeland 
and families.
The third factor is Guadalcanal Province’s sister relationship with 
Guangdong Province in China, which has allowed provincial government 
officials and politicians to engage with the Chinese in a deeper and more 
integrated way than is the case with Taiwan. The Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Office of Guangdong Province, now subsumed by the United 
Front Work Department, is responsible for the Chinese community in 
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Solomon Islands (this includes all people of Chinese descent, even those 
from Taiwan and Hong Kong—including John Leong). For Solomon 
Islanders, the most important factor is their public presence in the shops, 
on the road driving vehicles, in the rural areas working in the logging 
camps and in the warehouses. They have a noticeable presence in the 
community that allows Solomon Islanders to interact with them on a daily 
basis. Even if they have brought some practices that have corroded good 
governance within the public sector, their involvement in the community 
is providing employment opportunities for Solomon Islanders. Moreover, 
the corruption occurs because local conditions encourage it.
In an article published in the Solomon Star on 28 January 2019, former 
immigration officer Richard Mana claimed that he had witnessed extensive 
corruption in the government system. He said:
Between 2009 and 2011, three Asian girls were deported after they 
were caught engaging in an underground prostitution ring. ‘These 
girls were brought in by those running the ring and entered the 
country on tourist visas’, Mana said. He said the girls were then 
used to serve customers of the prostitution ring, which operates 
from a well-known commercial establishment in town. ‘There were 
locals involved in the organisation to bring the girls over. They are 
those in authority who I believe were paid to assist organisers of 
the ring’. He also claimed that a lot of foreigners have overstayed 
their visas. Mana said that in cases like this, they should be fined 
but due to leniency from authorities, the country loses much-
needed revenue. He said he was also aware of top public officers 
who accepted gifts of cars from foreign business people in return 
for their favours when it comes to matters like visas and licenses. 
Mana said that as a junior officer, they were left at the mercy 
of their bosses, who dictated decisions on issues from the top. 
He stated government officers were easy prey because they worked 
for very small salaries so it is easy for them to be manipulated. 
He further claimed that junior officers knew what the bosses are 
doing but they were powerless to do anything. ‘An example is the 
issuing of work permits to foreigners just within days after arrival. 
Some of these foreigners, especially those working in the logging 
industry, should not be issued with work permits because they are 
not qualified. Yet they were given work permits to go and drive log 
trucks, operate chainsaws, and do other jobs that could be easily 
filled locally. That’s the kind of corruption going on within our 
system’ (Babasiana 2019). 
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Interactions with Chinese and other foreign nationals have introduced 
a level of corrosion to good governance and the government machinery, 
highlighted by the former immigration officer, that should also have some 
bearing on the way in which Solomon Islands will be able to conduct 
its relations in the future. But the interactions with the new Chinese 
provide an economic pathway for Solomon Islanders to learn from the 
entrepreneurialism of the Chinese. This is perhaps something the Solomon 
Islands Government can do through a program of affirmative support for 
indigenous Solomon Islanders to participate in business, not as bystanders 
but as drivers. It is not hard to imagine a policy of affirmative support 
for indigenous Solomon Islanders through a program that guarantees 
loans for them to construct buildings, which they can then rent to the 
Chinese. There is no reason for indigenous Solomon Islanders to sell their 
land because they are unable to develop it because they lack the capital 
to build retail space. This is one path the Solomon Islands Government 
can pursue, rather than complaining about the influx of new Chinese 
migrants who are buying land from indigenous Solomon Islanders and 
developing it for their own benefit.
The China switch
Following Solomon Islands’ national general election in April 2019, 
Manasseh Sogavare was elected prime minister, making it his fourth stint 
as the country’s leader. He subsequently formed a coalition government 
dubbed the Democratic Coalition Government for Advancement. 
One of the new government’s most prominent policies was the review 
of the country’s relationship with Taiwan and the exploration of the 
possibility of switching relations to China. Discussions about the China 
switch, especially amongst MPs and their associates, started prior to the 
election and intensified following it. Not long after his election as prime 
minister, and in referring to Solomon Islands’ relationship with Taiwan, 
Sogavare acknowledged that ‘we are under a lot of pressure to rethink this 
relationship’ (Dziedzic 2019). This was fanned largely by the anticipation 
that diplomatic relations with China would attract greater financial 
assistance, particularly for infrastructure development and the RCDF. 
In Solomon Islands, there were mixed reactions to the proposal. Many 
entrepreneurs of Chinese descent supported the switch. This included 
people like Tommy Chan, a former MP and well-known businessman, and 
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owner of the Honiara Hotel. For him and other Chinese and indigenous 
Solomon Islander entrepreneurs, diplomatic relations with China could 
potentially improve trade and investment opportunities, which would be 
good for business. This was a sentiment held by many politicians and their 
supporters. For example, in an interview with ABC News, former prime 
minister Gordon Darcy Lilo asked:
What is wrong for this country to consider the opportunities that 
can come out from a China that is a reformed China and a China 
that can offer a better economic opportunity? (Dzeidzic 2019)
This was partly a reaction to concerns expressed by traditional partners 
such as Australia, New Zealand and the US. While acknowledging that 
this was a sovereign decision for Solomon Islands, there was disquiet in 
Canberra about the switch. In June 2019, following his election as prime 
minister of Australia, Scott Morrison’s first official visit was to Honiara, 
where he pledged AU$250 million worth of Australian assistance to 
Solomon Islands (The Guardian 2019). Even the US weighed in, offering 
to assist Solomon Islands in light of growing Chinese influence. When the 
Solomon Islands Government cut ties with Taiwan, the US subsequently 
reassessed its proposed aid to the country (Reuters 2019).
Other Solomon Islanders were opposed to the proposal largely due to 
concerns about Chinese domination of businesses; allegations that 
Chinese citizens and their money have corrupted Solomon Islands 
politics and public service; and fears that Chinese Government assistance 
could lead to increasing national debts. There were also concerns about 
the lack of consultation in the decision-making process on the matter. 
Then opposition leader Matthew Wale, for example, accused the Sogavare 
Government of rushing the issue and argued that:
there’s been no discussion at all about what are our national 
interests. What are we trying to achieve? What are we looking 
for? Are we just looking for more money? At the moment it seems 
that’s the driving force (Dziedzic 2019). 
For many Solomon Islanders, their opposition to the switch was influenced 
by the fact that their encounters with China had mostly been with 
Chinese shopkeepers, loggers, fishermen, etc. As discussed previously, 
these Chinese were largely seen as unscrupulous individuals with a no-care 
attitude towards the place and its people. That is the lens through which 
most Solomon Islanders see, interact with and understand China. 
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While public debates were still ongoing and the Foreign Relations 
Committee still carrying out its assessment, the Solomon Islands 
Government in September 2019 severed its 36-year diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan. The decision was based on the report of the bipartisan task 
force, which recommended the switch. The issue was never debated in 
parliament. In fact, the report of the Foreign Relations Committee, which 
was released in November 2019, criticised the switch and recommended 
that the government ‘should deepen its relationship with the Republic 
of China (Taiwan) instead of severing existing ties’ (National Parliament 
of Solomon Islands Foreign Relations Committee 2019:11). It was 
obvious, however, that most MPs wanted to see a deeper engagement 
in their foreign relations and were therefore attracted by the potential 
for increased Chinese investments. They had seen and were lured by 
the Chinese investments in the other Pacific Island countries they have 
diplomatic relations with. It was also obvious that China already had 
a strong informal presence in the country through its citizens, its trade 
and ongoing investments from Chinese-owned businesses. The potential 
for greater investment and trade was a major driver to switch to China. 
It was anticipated that China would bring additional resources to facilitate 
much-needed infrastructure to foster rural development so that Solomon 
Islands’ untapped natural resources, including its wealth in minerals, 
could be explored and developed. 
But while the relationship with China is sealed, Beijing has not yet won 
over the entire country. As Zhang and Futaiasi point out:
Although China presently has an upper hand in the diplomatic 
wrestle with Taiwan in Solomon Islands, the controversies 
surrounding the switch suggests it is too early for Beijing to claim 
victory. The challenges are serious, whether they are objections 
from politicians or grassroots in Solomon Islands (2020:5). 
The most vocal challenge to the switch was from the Malaita provincial 
government. In October 2019, a Malaita Communiqué was published, 
‘stating that the province “rejects the Chinese Communist Party-CCP 
and its formal systems based on atheist ideology”, and pledged to prevent 
“willful and exploitative investors”’ (ibid.). More concerns emerged when, 
a month after the switch, the government of the Central Province signed 
an agreement with China Sam Enterprise Group Ltd for a long-term 
lease of the island of Tulagi. The agreement was later nullified by the 
attorney general, but it illustrated how Chinese companies could bypass 
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the national government and target subnational governments, which 
‘are a  softer target for influence operations, being subject to less media 
oversight and scrutiny by civil society’ (Foukona and Smith 2019). 
In this discussion, it is important to consider what Solomon Islands will 
likely lose as a result of the switch to China. One of the key features of 
this new relationship is the potential for flexibility. There is a perception 
that Taiwan meddles in the political affairs of Solomon Islands by 
supporting the provision of funds, which politicians use as RCDF. There 
is also the discretionary fund administered within the Solomon Islands 
prime minister’s office that requires only the prime minister’s signature 
for funds to be provided from Taiwan. However, there are broader policy 
issues that need to be canvassed. China’s global power and outreach is 
a matter of interest for politicians who want to see the villages in their 
constituencies connected with roads and electricity. China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) offers possibilities that are more difficult to obtain 
from other donors, though Taiwan recently signed an MOU to provide 
US$30 million in ‘strategic loans’, including support for Solomon Islands 
to host the 2023 South Pacific Games (Yeh 2019). 
Solomon Islands does not have a clear foreign policy framework, and the 
dilemma of whether or not to switch offered an opportunity to reshape 
their foreign relations. There were—and still are—concerns about the 
trade-offs that would be made with its natural resources if Solomon Islands 
were to receive substantial loans from China. Solomon Islands may be 
expected to further open its mineral, forestry and fisheries resources to 
Chinese businesses. There are important lessons to be learned from the 
impact of the loans taken out by Sri Lanka and Zambia, and how these 
countries have had to give up the management of state assets to Chinese 
state-owned enterprises. 
As discussed previously, there are elements of the Solomon Islands’ 
relationship with China that are a cause for concern. Arguably, the new 
Chinese migrants have contributed to the corrosion of the quality of 
governance in Solomon Islands. Having diplomatic ties with the Chinese 
Government will enable it to provide consular protection and may put 
stress on the already weak institutions of the Solomon Islands Government. 
It is also possible that some of the worst excesses of Chinese businesses—
at least in Honiara—may be curbed with the arrival of Chinese officials 
charged with managing the diaspora. Under the BRI, a major priority of 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to improve China’s international 
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image, and new migrants from Guangdong have done little to aid that 
cause. Previous research indicates a less-than-harmonious relationship 
between Chinese officials and China’s economic migrants to the Solomon 
Islands (Smith 2012).
Conclusion
The previously mentioned concerns raise questions about whether or not 
Solomon Islands rushed into making a decision, and perhaps the timing 
was not right to switch. Solomon Islands had not fully explored the 
range of its relationship with Taiwan. Perhaps it should have pushed to 
have a more structured relationship with Taiwan that extended beyond 
the narrow confines of the political establishment and government 
institutions. There should have been more people-to-people interactions 
and more Taiwanese investments in technology and other areas where jobs 
can be created for Solomon Islanders. 
How the decision was made and the personalities involved cannot be 
underestimated as a reason for the outcome; there were influential 
Solomon Islanders working behind the scenes to facilitate the switch to 
China. Former prime ministers Sir Francis Billy Hilly and Danny Philipp 
are known to support the switch, as does Sir Tommy Chan. The decision 
to switch was influenced largely by the business and personal connections 
of former politicians and certain local Chinese business houses. Though 
it was a political decision determined by the cabinet, the influence of 
powerful individuals was paramount. Whilst there was broad public 
debate about the switch, the decision was ultimately made by a few men: 
members of caucus and cabinet. There is much to suggest that Solomon 
Islands is not ready; rather, it should have looked to augment its relations 
with Taiwan. Now that China has established diplomatic relations with 
Solomon Islands, Beijing must carefully consider whether or not it wants 
to contribute to the RCDF or other discretionary funds administered by 
politicians. Supporting such funds is not the way a normal diplomatic 
relationship should be conducted. Furthermore, doing so could exacerbate 
corruption and damage this new relationship between Solomon Islands 
and China.
Economics and trade are the major factors that influence Solomon Islands 
foreign policy. With the predicted decline of the logging industry, it is 
not clear whether this dominant influence will be maintained. They are, 
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however, important considerations for now. However, it is respectfully 
argued that Solomon Islands should be conscious of the cost of Chinese 
aid. It will not be free. As the example of Papua New Guinea suggests, 
China’s funding support may come at the cost of further opening up 
natural resources to Chinese companies. Given the poor quality of 
government—worsened in part by Taiwan’s support for the RCDF—and 
the poor track record of natural resource management, it is argued that 
the switch will only exacerbate the already weak governance settings in 
Solomon Islands.
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In the 1970s, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) initially 
established diplomatic relations in the Pacific, it was motivated mainly 
by competition with Taiwan (the Republic of China) (Yang 2011:51–52). 
This was because, until the late 1980s, both Taiwan and the PRC claimed 
to exclusively represent the Chinese Government and accumulating 
diplomatic allies was seen as bolstering this assertion (Hu 2015; Wesley-
Smith 2016). Overt competition for allies slowed in 2008 with Taiwan’s 
election of then president Ma Ying-jeou, who was friendly to the PRC. 
However, since the 2016 inauguration of President Tsai Ing-wen, who 
represents an independence-leaning party, the PRC has again moved 
to openly forge ties with Taiwan’s allies, this time to mute Taiwan’s 
sovereignty claims.
As Taiwan has sought to cultivate alliances in this fraught context, it has 
adopted numerous discourses to differentiate itself from the PRC and 
highlight its status as the superior ally. Early on, Taiwan’s anti-communist 
stance was undoubtedly persuasive diplomatic rhetoric (see Aqorau, 
Chapter 10, this volume; Government of Tuvalu 1979). However, given 
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economic reforms in the PRC, Taiwan now emphasises its democratic 
government and strong human rights record to distinguish itself and 
encourage and reinforce ties with like-minded nations. These discourses 
are clearly compelling, even to Taiwan’s unofficial partners like the US 
(Hu 2015; Office of the President, ROC [Taiwan] 2002, 2013, 2017a; 
van der Wees 2018).
In addition, Taiwan has established a special discourse for relationship-
building with the Pacific: Austronesian diplomacy. Because the languages 
of Taiwan’s indigenous populations and numerous Pacific peoples all 
belong to the Austronesian language group, these linguistic similarities are 
used to strengthen diplomatic ties while simultaneously asserting Taiwan’s 
innate difference from the PRC (Blundell 2011; Ciwidian 2018; Guo 
2017). This strategy is akin to the anticipatory geographies and mapping 
exercises described by Henryk Szadziewski in Chapter 9 and Tarcisius 
Kabutaulaka in Chapter 1.
Unfortunately, however, the term ‘Austronesia(n)’ is understood differently 
from the perspectives of both Taiwan and the Pacific nations represented 
in Taiwan as of August 2019. These nations include Taiwan’s Pacific allies: 
Tuvalu, Palau, the Marshall Islands and Nauru; two allies that broke 
relations in September 2019: Solomon Islands and Kiribati; and one 
non-ally: Papua New Guinea (PNG), which has a trade office in Taipei. 
These multiple understandings of Austronesia(n) lead to conflicting 
perspectives on how Austronesian diplomacy should be implemented 
and whether it is a persuasive diplomatic tool. This suggests that, 
although Taiwan pursues creative strategies to maintain alliances in  the 
independent Pacific, the effectiveness of these strategies in deflecting PRC 
encroachment is debatable.
From the perspective of previous work with Tuvaluan diplomatic 
communities in Taiwan and doctoral research on Tuvaluan–Pacific 
diplomacy, in this chapter, I explore the effectiveness of Taiwan’s 
Austronesian diplomacy from Tuvaluan and other Pacific perspectives.1 
The first section discusses the background of Taiwan’s Austronesian 
diplomacy, positing Taiwan’s focus on diplomacy with the Pacific as 
1  Information for this chapter is derived from semi-structured interviews conducted in Taiwan 
and Tuvalu between 2017 and 2018. Interviewees included Taiwanese diplomats, officials and 
indigenous and non-indigenous participants in cultural diplomacy projects; Tuvaluan diplomats, 
officials and students/trainees with experience in Taiwan; and diplomats from all other Pacific nations 
with embassies/representative offices in Taiwan at the time, except the Nauru embassy.  
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partially embodied in the rise of Austronesian discourse and indigenous 
rights movements. It also examines conflations of the terminology involved 
in Taiwan’s official promotion of Austronesian diplomacy, specifically 
the conflation of the terms Austronesian, Pacific and indigenous. This 
merging of terminology demonstrates the complexities of Austronesian 
diplomacy and suggests that Taiwan maintains greater conceptual affinity 
with non-allied Pacific settler colonies than with its Pacific allies (or other 
independent Pacific nations represented in Taiwan). The second section 
considers how Austronesian diplomacy links Pacific allies to Taiwan’s 
indigenous peoples, sometimes leading to demeaning views of these allies 
in Taiwan’s mainstream Han Chinese society rather than empowering 
Pacific relations in Taiwan. These trends indicate how Taiwan’s settler 
colony status colours its imaginings of the Pacific and suggest that, even 
domestically, Austronesian diplomacy is far from convincing. 
The second half of the chapter outlines how Pacific diplomats in Taiwan, 
as well as Tuvaluan diplomats, officials, students and trainees, interact with 
Taiwan’s Austronesian diplomacy. It focuses on the seven Pacific nations 
represented in Taiwan in 2017–18, before Solomon Islands and Kiribati 
severed ties in September 2019. Consequently, the third section considers 
interviews with Pacific diplomats, outlining their understandings of 
Austronesian diplomacy and their opinions on whether this discourse 
has fortified Pacific–Taiwan relations. It argues that Pacific ideas of the 
term Austronesia(n) do not align with those forwarded by Taiwan and 
that Pacific diplomats are divided as to whether Austronesian diplomacy 
is effective. The fourth section uses Tuvalu as a case study to explore 
how a  range of Tuvaluan citizens engage with Taiwan’s indigenous/
Austronesian discourse. Generally, the Tuvaluan case dovetails with that 
of Pacific diplomats. However, it also shows how Austronesian diplomacy 
affects numerous Tuvaluans beyond diplomats and has even been 
appropriated in Tuvalu’s official government discourse. 
Finally, the conclusion argues that Taiwan’s conflation of terms such as 
Austronesia(n), Pacific and indigenous is misinformed and insufficient 
to preserve diplomatic ties in the face of PRC pressure, except when 
Pacific allies use Taiwan’s discourse to assert the cultural/ethnic legitimacy 
of relations. It also addresses Austronesian diplomacy as it relates to 
the decisions by Solomon Islands and Kiribati to break relations with 
Taiwan in September 2019 and discusses the role Taiwan’s indigenous 









This section outlines what the term Austronesia(n) entails from an 
academic perspective before examining how its meanings have both 
expanded and contracted in Taiwan. While the term Austronesia(n) refers 
to a linguistic group encompassing languages from Madagascar to Rapa 
Nui, including the languages of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, discourse 
of Austronesian diplomacy in Taiwan has expanded the meaning of the 
term so that it refers to linguistic, cultural and ethnic ties. However, 
this expansion has emphasised links between Taiwan and countries 
in the Pacific rather than the entire Austronesian region. Thus, as the 
similarities shared by Austronesian peoples expand to the ethnic level, 
the Austronesian language group contracts to include only the Pacific and 
Taiwan. This phenomenon also creates conflations where the sociocultural 
situations of Taiwan’s indigenous populations, which are most like those 
of Pacific settler colonies such as New Zealand and Hawai‘i, are taken to 
represent those of all Pacific nations. 
The Austronesian language group was first identified in the 19th century, 
but the ‘overarching term … Austronesian [was applied to the] language 
family’ only in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Austronesian 
‘languages number about 1,200 [and] are spoken by 270 million to 
300 million people’ in a region extending from Rapa Nui in the east to 
Madagascar in the west and from Taiwan in the north to New Zealand in 
the south (Blundell 2011:77–79). Due to work by linguist Robert Blust and 
archaeologist Peter Bellwood in the 1980s and 1990s, Taiwan’s indigenous 
languages have been promoted as the possible origin of all Austronesian 
languages (Blundell 2011:77; Everington 2017; Munsterhjelm 2014:28).
Because Taiwan’s indigenous languages are included in and the potential 
source of the Austronesian language group, in the 1990s, the term 
Austronesia(n) was adopted in Taiwan. Austronesian linguistic connections 
were first mobilised by indigenous peoples to contest the erasure of their 
languages and cultures by the Kuomintang (KMT), a ruling party that 
moved from mainland China to Taiwan in the 1940s, imposed martial 
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law and saw Taiwan as the legitimate seat of the Chinese Government and 
nothing more (see Dvorak and Tanji 2015; Munsterhjelm 2014:28). When 
martial law ended in 1987, official opposition parties emerged to challenge 
the KMT, and groups like the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) that 
champion Taiwanese independence (but not necessarily indigenous 
sovereignty) have co-opted the Austronesian concept to highlight 
Taiwan’s innate difference from the PRC and develop connections with 
the Pacific (Dvorak and Tanji 2015; Munsterhjelm 2014; Wang 2013).2 
Taiwan’s participation in Festival of Pacific Arts, which is an important 
indicator of the unique status of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples but which 
was also initially facilitated by a DPP government, is demonstrative of this 
discursive confluence/appropriation.3 
In 2007, indigenous scholar Awi Mona termed Taiwan’s use of 
Austronesian discourse 台灣的南島民族外交 (Taiwan’s Austronesian 
ethnicity diplomacy), and, as of 2017 and 2018, the Taiwan Government 
and Taiwanese scholars have referred to this practice as 南島外交 
(Austronesian diplomacy) (Ciwidian 2018; Guo 2017; Office of  the 
President, ROC [Taiwan] 2017b). Yet, Mona’s use of the phrase 
Austronesian ethnicity diplomacy suggests tension in how the term 
Austronesia(n) has been adopted to conceptualise relations with the 
Pacific. As numerous Taiwanese interviewees noted, although the term 
Austronesia(n) is consistently used in Taiwan Government and media 
discourse, its original academic meaning is not necessarily apparent to 
the public or even the government.4 Consequently, though Blundell 
cautions that Austronesia(n) refers to a language family not a group of 
people (2011:81), the term is used flexibly in Taiwan to suggest that 
linguistic similarities necessarily imply cultural and ethnic ties. Thus, 
while Mona referred to ‘Austronesian ethnicity diplomacy’ in 2007, in 
2  Staff at Taiwan’s National Museum of Prehistory, 30 September 2017. Taitung. Interview with 
author; Former Mayor of Taitung City, 23 October 2017. Taipei. Interview with author; Head of 
the Amis Kakeng Musical Group, 16 November 2017. Taitung. Interview with author; Anonymous, 
22 November 2017. Kaohsiung. Interview with author; Officials from Taiwan’s Council of Indigenous 
Peoples, 29 November 2017. New Taipei City. Interview with author; Ambassador for Taiwan Embassy 
in Tuvalu, 25 April 2018. Funafuti. Interview with author.
3  Former Mayor of Taitung City, 23 October 2017. Taipei. Interview with author; Head of 
the Amis Kakeng Musical Group, 16 November 2017. Taitung. Interview with author; Officials 
from Taiwan’s Council of Indigenous Peoples, 29 November 2017. New Taipei City. Interview with 
author; Indigenous Amis singer-songwriter, 19 December 2017. Taipei. Interview with author.
4  Chairman of the Formosa Indigenous Song and Dance Troupe, 10 November 2017. Taipei. 
Interview with author; Head of Amis Kakeng Musical Group, 16 November 2017. Taitung. Interview 
with author; Anonymous, 22 November 2017. Kaohsiung. Interview with author; Officials from 
Taiwan’s Council of Indigenous Peoples, 29 November 2017. New Taipei City. Interview with author.
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2017, Taiwan’s vice president urged that ‘Austronesian culture [be used] 
to explore the present and future prospects of indigenous peoples’ (Office 
of the President, ROC [Taiwan] 2017c) (emphasis added). This flexible 
linking of the term Austronesia(n) to language, culture and ethnicity 
alters the power of the term, as a shared Austronesian culture/ethnicity 
indicates affinities that linguistic similarities may not. An indigenous 
choreographer contested the level of rapport the term Austronesia(n) now 
implies between indigenous Taiwan and other Austronesian language-
speaking nations, explaining that ‘[other countries in the language group] 
are different from us. Only some words are [the same]’.5
However, while the term Austronesia(n) has been expanded within 
Austronesian diplomacy to suggest cultural and ethnic connections, 
it has also been contracted, so that instead of indicating all countries in 
the language group, it often only refers to Pacific nations and Taiwan. 
For example, a 2007 Taiwan Today article referred to ‘Austronesian 
communities’ as ‘the indigenous peoples of the Pacific region’ (Tsai 2007). 
Furthermore, the Kaohsiung Museum of Fine Arts, a major exhibitor 
of contemporary Pacific art in Taiwan, has hosted exhibitions featuring 
Pacific artists and indigenous artists from Taiwan for which the Mandarin 
exhibition title includes the term 南島 (Austronesian), but translates it 
into English as ‘Pacific’ (KMFA 2017). A researcher involved in these 
exhibitions explained that she knows the Austronesian language group 
and the Pacific region are different, and ‘Pacific’ was only used in the 
English translations because the term Austronesian is unfamiliar to native 
English speakers. However, later in the interview, she directly conflated 
Austronesian and Pacific by describing a Caucasian artist as follows:
This person isn’t Austronesian, but [at] that time, I was 
collaborating with another colleague. He thought [that artist’s] 
works were extremely Pacific, extremely ocean, so, no matter what, 
he definitely wanted to include her.6
Thus, in Taiwan, the Austronesian language group is removed from its 
original academic contexts, and the shape this removal takes suggests 
that fostering ideas of Austronesian culture and ethnicity focuses more 
on ties between Taiwan and the Pacific than with other countries in the 
5  Member of Tai Body Theatre, 24 November 2017. Hualien. Interview with author.
6  Anonymous, 22 November 2017. Kaohsiung. Interview with author; Former mayor of Taitung 
City, 23 October 2017. Taipei. Interview with author; Head of Amis Kakeng Musical Group, 
16 November 2017. Taitung. Interview with author.
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Austronesian group. However, compared to previous administrations, 
President Tsai Ing-wen’s Government (2016–present) has promoted 
the economically oriented ‘New Southbound Policy’, which sometimes 
highlights Taiwan’s Austronesian connections with Southeast Asia at 
the expense of Pacific ties;7 Taiwan’s Austronesian links with the Pacific 
are still strongly emphasised throughout the government (Office of the 
President, ROC [Taiwan] 2017b).8
Finally, conflation of the Austronesian language group and the Pacific 
region (plus Taiwan) has led to a second phenomenon that is particularly 
troublesome for Taiwan’s Pacific allies (and other independent Pacific 
nations represented in Taiwan). That is, in Taiwan, the peoples of all 
countries included in Taiwan’s Austronesian conception are considered 
indigenous peoples who see themselves as indigenous and encounter 
problems similar to indigenous peoples in settler colony Taiwan. In an 
interview with Taiwan’s Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIP), three 
officials explained that because indigenous peoples constitute the 
majority of the populations in Taiwan’s Pacific allies, ‘they don’t have 
a concept of “indigeneity”’ and ‘we don’t specifically emphasise that they 
also have indigenous peoples’. However, during the same interview, the 
officials referred to Pacific allies as 南島原住民族的國家 (Austronesian 
indigenous countries). Additionally, CIP representatives explained that 
it was not until 2016, during a workshop for indigenous students and 
students from Pacific nations studying in Taiwan, that they even realised 
that the problems of indigenous students in Taiwan differed from those 
of Pacific students in their home countries.9 
In Taiwan, this conflation of Austronesian language, culture and ethnicity, 
as well as the terms Austronesia(n), Pacific and indigenous, emerges 
from  a realisation that locations such as New Zealand, Guam and 
Hawai‘i, all settler colonies like Taiwan where ‘there is articulation of … 
7  Deputy Chief of Mission for Marshall Islands embassy in Taiwan, 4 December 2017. Taipei. 
Interview with author; Ambassador for Palau embassy in Taiwan, 1 March 2018. Taipei. Interview 
with author.
8  Though Austronesian languages are spoken in Madagascar, Taiwan rarely extends its Austronesian 
diplomacy into the Indian Ocean. This may be because Madagascar is neither an ally nor a settler 
colony, and because Taiwan has no representation in the country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC 
[Taiwan] 2000), but it also seems that, in Taiwan, Madagascar is less intelligible as an Austronesian 
space than other countries in the language group (Anonymous, 22 November 2017. Kaohsiung. 
Interview with author).




Pacificness and indigeneity’ (Te Punga Somerville 2018:102), possess 
similar institutions to Taiwan; similar concepts of indigeneity;10 and even 
shared ancestral ties (CIP 2016:37; Sissons 2005:11–25).11 Thus, Taiwan’s 
Austronesian diplomacy, though broadly applied to all Pacific countries, 
is most relevant to non-allied Pacific settler colonies. This suggests that 
even for diplomatic strategies ostensibly targeted at Pacific allies, these 
allies are only a secondary focus, which raises questions regarding the 





Besides revealing Taiwan’s conceptual affinity with Pacific settler colonies, 
Austronesian diplomacy has also had negative domestic consequences 
where portions of the Taiwanese population have disparaged Pacific 
peoples. This phenomenon demonstrates the domestic tension in which 
Austronesian diplomacy and, by extension, Taiwan’s Pacific partners are 
implicated in Taiwan and further suggests questions regarding the potency 
of Austronesian discourse. 
Rather than cultivating affinity for Pacific partners, Austronesian 
diplomacy has sometimes promoted negative ideas of Pacific peoples 
among Taiwan’s Han majority. This is because, though some people in 
Taiwan now claim to embrace indigenous cultures/concepts (e.g. Dvorak 
and Tanji 2015; Lai 2017), indigenous populations in Taiwan are still 
marginalised (Munsterhjelm 2014:1–30)12 and comparisons between 
10  Though conceptualisations of indigeneity are more prevalent in Pacific settler colonies than 
independent nations, acceptance, use and definitions of indigeneity are not identical within either 
category. These diverging ideas undoubtedly influence different Pacific framings of identity vis-à-vis 
indigeneity in Taiwan.
11  ANZTEC, a 2013 free trade agreement signed by Taiwan and New Zealand that includes 
a chapter on indigenous issues, is demonstrative of this trend (New Zealand Commerce and Industry 
Office Taipei 2019). Staff at Taiwan’s National Museum of Prehistory, 30 September 2017. Taitung. 
Interview with author; Chairman of the Formosa Indigenous Song and Dance Troupe, 10 November 
2017. Taipei. Interview with author; Member of Tai Body Theatre, 24 November 2017. Hualien. 
Interview with author.
12  Indigenous Taiwanese activist, 6 December 2017. Taipei. Interview with author.
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indigenous and Pacific peoples under the umbrella term Austronesia(n) 
allow for a similar marginalisation of Pacific partners.13 For example, 
when discussing Tuvalu, a Taiwanese medical volunteer said: 
Now, about the people … [they] lead lazier lives. For example, 
you don’t see many people fishing … If you said—a hypothetical, 
if Taiwanese people lived here, they would definitely always be 
fishing, but you don’t see the people here fishing. Instead, they sell 
their EEZ to other people. So, maybe that’s just the nature of the 
Austronesian people (emphasis added).14
Here, the interviewee separates the industrious Taiwanese from the lazy 
Austronesians, marginalising Taiwan’s indigenous peoples by intimating 
that they are not Taiwanese. The quote also demonstrates how the term 
Austronesia(n) is used to simultaneously stereotype indigenous and 
Pacific peoples. 
Furthermore, the Taiwan Government’s international application of 
Austronesian diplomacy has led to backlash from conservative portions 
of Taiwan’s Han population. For example, during President Tsai Ing-wen’s 
2017 visit to the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Solomon Islands (which 
was an ally at the time), official references to the trip as a 尋親之旅 
(search for relatives) (Cui 2017) generated intense debate regarding Tsai’s 
attempt to de-Sinicise Taiwan. An editorial from the time captures the 
major concerns of the debate:
What relatives are we searching for? … [Whether] from the 
perspective of race, blood, language, culture, or other aspects, 
Taiwan’s majority [population] moved from mainland China to 
Taiwan and has been Han Chinese for generations … Tsai Ing-wen 
can say this is [a trip] to search for the relatives and roots of Taiwan’s 
indigenous peoples but cannot purposefully expand and mislead so 
that it becomes a search for the relatives of all people in Taiwan … 
If, to achieve the political goal of shaping a ‘new Taiwan ethnicity’ 
and the ‘historical perspective of an independent Taiwan’, only … 
Austronesian culture is presented, how can we look the twenty-three 
million people of Taiwan in the face? … That [Tsai Ing-wen] has … 
traveled far across the ocean to find a disproportionate and distant 
relative … sends the wrong signal (China Times 2017).
13  In Taiwan, there are also negative feelings toward Pacific allies separate from Austronesian 
diplomacy (Huang 2017). Nevertheless, Austronesian diplomacy may compound these feelings or 
create new negativity or ambivalence.
14  Taiwanese medical volunteer, 14 April 2018. Funafuti. Interview with author.
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More inflammatory reactions to Tsai’s ‘search for relatives’ trip included 
that by a Taiwanese actor/singer who proclaimed that Tsai, who is 
a quarter indigenous, ‘is perhaps an aborigine of the South Seas and wants 
to go [there] to search for relatives, but this has nothing to do with us! 
We are Chinese!’ (Liberty Times 2017).
Consequently, Austronesian diplomacy sometimes incites negative 
feelings toward Pacific partners because ambivalent or adverse views of 
Taiwan’s indigenous populations are linked to Pacific peoples when both 
groups are categorised as Austronesian. Additionally, when Austronesian 
diplomacy is seen by certain portions of Taiwan’s Han population as 
reconfiguring Taiwanese culture and ethnicity, indigenous and Pacific 
peoples are further ostracised. 
Austronesian diplomacy indicates that Taiwan’s settler colony status affects 
its relations with the Pacific in two ways: (1) it shows that Taiwan imagines 
all Austronesian-language speakers as Pacific peoples who are similar to 
Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, regardless of whether indigenous peoples are 
viewed positively or negatively; and (2) it demonstrates that portions of 
Taiwan’s settler population are uncomfortable with diplomacy that might 
privilege indigenous peoples or increase their international visibility by 
connecting them to broader networks. Thus, even domestically, the efficacy 
of Austronesian diplomacy is debatable both because it is not adequately 
structured to promote ties with Pacific allies (and other independent 
Pacific nations) and because it involves divisive issues regarding Taiwan’s 
ongoing colonisation.
Yet, as complex as Austronesian diplomacy is from a domestic perspective, 
Taiwan’s Pacific allies/Pacific nations represented in Taiwan have also 
developed their own extremely varied perceptions of this diplomatic 
discourse. The next section explores how Pacific diplomats in Taiwan 
understand Austronesian diplomacy.
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Austronesian diplomacy is also open to interpretation by Pacific diplomats 
stationed in Taiwan, at whom this diplomatic discourse is most regularly 
targeted. However, Pacific diplomats typically engage with Austronesian 
diplomacy differently than the government and people of Taiwan do. 
Rather than immediately accepting Austronesian ties between the 
Pacific and indigenous Taiwan, Pacific diplomats focus on ascertaining 
the meaning of Austronesia(n) (a term not widely used in the Pacific), 
determining whether there are ties between Taiwan’s indigenous peoples 
and Pacific peoples and examining Taiwan’s application of the term 
indigenous to Pacific contexts.
During interviews conducted in 2017 and 2018, many Pacific diplomats 
noted that they were unfamiliar with the term Austronesia(n) before 
travelling to Taiwan. For example, the Palau ambassador and PNG trade 
representative explained that:
Palau ambassador: I first heard about … the term when I came 
here before I became ambassador. So, then I went back and 
I searched for it, and there’s really a term used, you know, but it’s 
not really familiar.15
PNG trade representative: Yeah, so, [Austronesian] may have 
come out of some terms, but I heard it here, because I’m more 
used to like Melanesia, Polynesia, Micronesia.16
Furthermore, when Pacific diplomats were familiar with the term 
Austronesia(n), they often developed meanings for it that did not overlap 
completely with either academic or Taiwanese conceptions. The Marshall 
Islands deputy chief of mission (DCM) posited that, within Taiwan’s 
population, indigenous and Austronesia(n) did not necessarily refer to the 
same groups of people:
15  Ambassador for Palau Embassy in Taiwan, 1 March 2018. Taipei. Interview with author.




[Sometimes] I forget that there’s the indigenous and the 
Austronesian and then the Taiwanese. [To] play it safe, I just say 
Austronesians—or indigenous, I like to use indigenous, because 
[it’s a] better way to say it, because I don’t know who classifies 
themself as Austronesian.17
In contrast, a Solomon Islands student18 noted that Austronesia(n) referred 
only to Pacific Islanders and excluded indigenous Taiwanese:
That [television] program that they ask all the Pacific Islanders 
to go and dance and to showcase the traditional food is just us 
Austronesians. That’s what we were called. I recall that program. 
So, it was only the Pacific Islanders … So, there wasn’t any 
aboriginal Taiwanese.19
Clearly, because it is unfamiliar, the word Austronesia(n) is subject to 
interpretations from Pacific Islanders that reshape the term, and this 
process often involves definitions different from those posed by Taiwan. 
Even when Pacific diplomats did understand Taiwan’s conception of 
Austronesia(n), only some were persuaded by Austronesian diplomacy. 
Those who were persuaded had typically attended events (often in 
unofficial contexts) that involved Taiwan’s indigenous peoples and 
confirmed to them the validity of their mutual connections. Thus, the 
Solomon Islands ambassador and the PNG trade representative used 
personal experiences to advocate for Austronesian diplomacy and the 
value of Pacific–indigenous links:
Solomon Islands ambassador: [This is] a bamboo raft … that 
belongs to the Fara’ngau tribe in [Taitung, Taiwan] … [A] couple 
of years ago, they decide to revive [the raft] as part of the … 
Austronesian Studies program … but they had problems with the 
sail [of their raft] … [Then], they heard about this group from 
Duff Islands in Solomons: the Taumako Group … [So,] end of 
this July this year, I took my holiday, went home to Solomons. 
I didn’t realise, in my absence, they were already communicating, 
and, lo and behold, by the time I got back here … they’ve gone 
to Taitung … [So, we] took [the boat] to this artificial lake and 
17  Deputy Chief of Mission for Marshall Islands embassy in Taiwan, 4 December 2017. Taipei. 
Interview with author.
18  Though this quote is from a Pacific student and not a diplomat, it is cited here to demonstrate 
conflicting views on the term Austronesia(n) that emerge among Pacific peoples in Taiwan.
19  Solomon Islands student who formerly studied on scholarship in Taiwan, 27 August 2017. 
Skype. Interview with author.
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launched [it], and, then, they took the—oh, there was a ceremony. 
They did a ceremony and we also did our ceremony—and 
launched, took the sail, hoist it on. Then, everybody stood quiet, 
and there was no wind … This elder—from Taiwan, he just said 
something, he talked in their language, and the next thing is 
I heard everybody whistling … It’s like they were chanting—it’s 
unbelievable, but, you know, my hairs actually grew … and the 
breeze came … So, that to me was the expression of this is culture 
at its liveliest form … So, suddenly, this tend to be the binding 
over everything else, the politics, the economic dialogue, the trade 
(Everington 2017).20
PNG trade representative: I mean, the difference between 
Chinese and Taiwanese is the Taiwanese aborigines. I think we 
have a better connection in terms—culturally, that’s what I see 
because looking at some of their dances and even dressings, they 
are more related to some of our Islanders … [There] was another 
[indigenous] Amis Festival [in 2016], and my first secretary and 
the driver actually attended … [So], my first secretary came back 
and then said, ‘Oh, well, it’s like our dance. So, it was comfortable 
for me to join in!’ … So, coming here was a big eye opener, you 
know. You could see that, no, these people are totally different. 
They’re not Chinese, you know, they are Pacific.21
However, other Pacific diplomats found Taiwan’s Austronesian diplomacy 
far from compelling. For example, the Kiribati ambassador saw Taiwan’s 
claims of Pacific–indigenous links as highly unconvincing:
I don’t feel that connection because … [Taiwan’s Council of 
Indigenous Peoples (CIP)], they are more focused on New 
Zealand, you know, the Māoris and probably the ones in American 
territories and they don’t really go out of their way to—so, they 
don’t know our islands, they don’t know. They know more about 
the Māoris and Guam … [Because], for us, there’s really no other 
race to say that we are the indigenous people, you know? So, our 
experiences are very different.22
20  Former ambassador for Solomon Islands embassy in Taiwan, 20 October 2017. Taipei. Interview 
with author.
21  Representative for the PNG Trade Office in Taiwan, 21 November 2017. Taipei. Interview with 
author.




This quote highlights a concern raised by several Pacific diplomats and 
discussed in previous sections: while linking terms like Austronesia(n), 
Pacific and indigenous might be effective for Pacific settler colonies like 
Taiwan, Pacific allies/independent Pacific nations often have different 
concepts of indigeneity. 
Taiwan’s Austronesian diplomacy reveals tension between Taiwan and its 
Pacific partners over ideas of indigeneity and whether using indigeneity to 
strengthen relations is appropriate. Both the Marshall Islands DCM and 
the Palau ambassador discussed how their national or ethnic identity was 
challenged within Austronesian diplomacy:
Marshall Islands DCM: [The Taiwan Government says] 
‘Austronesian’ and ‘indigenous’, and it’s all foreign concepts to me 
because we’re Marshallese. I mean, there’s not a certain … group 
of Marshallese that are not considered … Yeah … we have some 
similarities, and I think we value the same things, but we don’t 
have the same challenges.23
Palau ambassador: [Taiwan’s CIP] wanted to know about 
our issues as indigenous people. I’m like, ‘You know, we’re not 
indigenous. We’re just, we’re us, and we rule our country’. [So,] our 
issues—we don’t have issues like you … I just want to speak on 
what is the culture, and … what our youth are going through … 
but issues fighting with the government and that—you know, no. 
It’s so different.24
Austronesian diplomacy is a unique layer in Taiwan’s Pacific relations 
and highlights conflict not only within Taiwan’s domestic population but 
also in Pacific–Taiwan relations. Domestically, Austronesian diplomacy 
incites discord over the identity and place of indigenous peoples in 
foreign affairs, revealing how Taiwan’s settler colony status influences its 
imaginings of and interactions with the Pacific. Multilaterally, Pacific 
understandings of Austronesian diplomacy and diverging opinions of its 
efficacy indicate that this diplomatic discourse clashes with how some 
Pacific diplomats identify themselves. 
23  Deputy Chief of Mission for Marshall Islands embassy in Taiwan, 4 December 2017. Taipei. 
Interview with author.
24  Ambassador for Palau embassy in Taiwan, 1 March 2018. Taipei. Interview with author.
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The next section explores how various Tuvaluan citizens have engaged with 
Taiwan’s discourse on Pacific–indigenous links, as well as their views on 
Austronesian diplomacy. This discussion dovetails with the current section 
but also shows how widely Taiwan has promoted Austronesian diplomacy 





This section outlines how Tuvaluan diplomats, officials, students and 
trainees engage with Austronesian diplomacy. It first discusses how the 
Taiwan Government and other Taiwanese institutions have successfully 
inserted ideas of similarity between Tuvalu and indigenous Taiwan into 
interactions with various Tuvaluan citizens. Subsequently, it demonstrates 
that this ‘success’ does not indicate the ultimate triumph of Austronesian 
diplomacy. Because the potential for ancestral links between Tuvalu and 
Taiwan’s indigenous populations is not clearly explained to all Tuvaluans 
who engage with indigenous Taiwanese peoples, Tuvaluans define 
Austronesia(n) in multiple ways, and Taiwanese claims of indigenous/
Austronesian ties are not entirely persuasive. However, the end of 
the section examines how the Tuvalu Government now appropriates 
Austronesian diplomacy when dealing with Taiwan and even uses this 
discourse to assert cultural or ethnic links that naturalise its choice of 
Taiwan as an ally. Thus, though Austronesian diplomacy is contested, 
both the Tuvalu and Taiwan governments recognise it as beneficial to 
official diplomatic rhetoric.
In interviews, not all Tuvaluan citizens discussed similarities between 
Tuvalu and indigenous Taiwan. However, relevant concepts had been 
introduced to diplomats, officials, students and trainees by the Taiwan 
Government, Taiwanese universities, Mandarin-language training centres 
and indigenous and non-indigenous Taiwanese citizens. For example, in 
2017, the Tuvalu ambassador to Taiwan explained her knowledge of the 
term Austronesia(n) as coming directly from the Taiwan Government.25 
25  Ambassador for Tuvalu embassy in Taiwan, 10 November 2017. Taipei. Interview with author.
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Similarly, during short visits to Taiwan, Tuvaluan officials and their 
spouses were introduced to Tuvalu–indigenous commonalities by the 
Taiwan Government, and some officials who had not visited Taiwan were 
informed of these connections by the Taiwan embassy in Tuvalu or even 
by other Tuvaluan officials: 
I was privileged to be part of the prime minister’s delegation to 
the state visit to Taiwan. We visited the … eastern part of Taiwan 
… [We] were welcomed by the traditional—there was a tribe … 
[And] I was surprised too because we [both] said ‘lima’: ‘lima’ for 
figure five and ‘lima’ for hand … I’ve heard of Tuvaluans, maybe 
our ancestors came from Taiwan. So, I was thinking, maybe we 
are part of that.26
[The] first time I knew about that we had ties [with Taiwan’s 
indigenous peoples] was because my mom [another official’s 
spouse] said it … Because they had a visit, and she was telling 
me how the dance was similar to fatele [a Tuvaluan performative/
dance form] … [So], I heard first from my parents because they 
had [a] foreign-service background … Yes [Taiwan’s embassy in 
Tuvalu also brings up indigenous ties].27
Tuvaluan students who were studying or had previously studied for 
tertiary degrees under Taiwan Government scholarships were also aware 
of similarities between Tuvalu and indigenous Taiwan. However, their 
information was derived from more diverse sources that included the 
Taiwan Government, their educational institutions and indigenous and 
non-indigenous friends or acquaintances:
I just had a meeting … with the big boss for the indigenous 
people in the government … Because of my [academic] advisor … 
[The indigenous official] told me he wanted me to … tell him one, 
two, three in my language, so I told him ‘tahi,’ ‘lua’—and, then, he 
also told me the similar thing in—up to ten. And, then, he said, 
‘Oh. We are the same’. ‘Cause the counting, it’s very similar.28
26  Anonymous, 30 May 2018. Funafuti. Interview with author.
27  Foreign affairs official for the Tuvalu Government, 20 April 2018. Funafuti. Interview with author.
28  Former scholarship student in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 30 October 2017. Taipei. Interview with 
author.
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I mean, some of [the indigenous] performances are similar … 
Yeah. I saw them in the mountain … And, I mean, the costumes 
are different, but the way they move their body is the … same with 
us. It’s a school trip. Yeah. For Ming Chuan [University].29
I was playing for the university’s volleyball team, and, then … 
a teammate, he’s actually indigenous. So, we went up to where he 
lives. Surprisingly, you know, some of the words they are using, 
like the fish, ‘ika’, you know, the nose, you know … I got surprised 
because it’s very similar to … Tuvaluan.30
Even Tuvaluans involved in short-term leadership or vocational training 
programs in Taiwan developed similar ideas based on trips arranged by 
the Taiwan Government or their training institutions:
Well, it was really nice my experience in Taiwan [during the 
leadership program] ‘cause I get to see that, in Taiwan, the villages 
that we visited, they were similar with our Tuvaluan culture, and 
even their language … [The] counting is similar with us, and even 
with [a] few words[:] your ear, for us is ‘taliga’ and for them is 
‘taliga’. So, it’s really similar.31
We went to Sun Moon Lake [with our vocational training 
program] … Yeah, yeah. [I saw aboriginal dancing there] … Yeah. 
It’s good. I asked my friends—nearly the same as ours, eh?32
Consequently, Taiwan’s discourse on Pacific–indigenous similarities is 
not only being successfully disseminated to various Tuvaluans in Taiwan, 
but even to Tuvaluans, especially officials, who have not visited Taiwan. 
This suggests that the Taiwan Government sees Austronesian diplomacy 
as a  powerful tool in fortifying Pacific–Taiwan relations while also 
showing how, in Taiwan, ideas of Austronesian diplomacy reach beyond 
the government and structure how other institutions and citizens engage 
with Tuvaluans.
However, Taiwan’s success in promoting Pacific–indigenous similarities 
among Tuvaluans is not indicative of the ultimate effectiveness of 
Austronesian diplomatic discourse. For example, interviewees who 
identified commonalities between Tuvalu and indigenous Taiwan were 
29  Former scholarship student in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 15 April 2018. Funafuti. Interview with author.
30  Former scholarship student in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 24 May 2018. Funafuti. Interview with author.
31  Former scholarship student in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 21 May 2018. Funafuti. Interview with author.
32  Former vocational trainee in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 3 May 2018. Vaitupu. Interview with author.
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not always provided enough information to fully contextualise indigenous 
peoples in Taiwan’s multicultural society (see Damm 2012). Thus, some 
interviewees mistakenly referred to one of Taiwan’s Han minorities, the 
Hakka, as an indigenous group (see Leo 2015).33 Additionally, several 
Tuvaluan students who had been exposed to Taiwan’s indigenous cultures 
during school field trips explained that it was not until their interviews 
that they learned the Tuvaluan language may have originated in Taiwan.34 
Finally, though the Tuvaluan citizens interviewed detected similarities 
between Tuvaluan language and culture and the languages and cultures 
of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, none used the term Austronesia(n) to 
discuss these similarities. Thus, Taiwan’s promotion of Pacific–indigenous 
commonalities does not elicit well-formed Tuvaluan understandings of 
these ties and Austronesian discourse is not a prevalent talking point 
among Tuvaluans.
Furthermore, like Pacific diplomats, when Tuvaluan citizens did address 
the term Austronesia(n), they often adopted definitions different from 
those used in Taiwanese discourse. They also frequently focused on 
linking Austronesia(n) to more common (if not equally problematic) 
terms used to delineate the Pacific, such as Polynesia(n), Micronesia(n), 
and Melanesia(n). The former Tuvalu ambassador to Taiwan described 
Austronesia(n) as mainly meaning Polynesia(n):
[Taiwan is] trying to prove the fact that we have a trace from 
Taiwan or from the Philippines to come this way … [But] the trace 
here is more or less to do with Polynesian, not the Melanesian and 
the Micronesian.35
In contrast, a Tuvaluan student explained that he thought Austronesia(n) 
referred only to Melanesia(n):
[When] I hear ‘Austronesian’, I don’t take into consideration 
Polynesia or Micronesia. I just think Melanesia and Australia, 
like—Aboriginal, like the Solomons, Vanuatu. I wouldn’t think 
Taiwan.36
33  Former scholarship student in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 14 October 2017. Hualien. Interview with 
author; Former scholarship student in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 24 May 2018. Funafuti. Interview with 
author.
34  E.g. former scholarship student in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 15 April 2018. Funafuti. Interview with 
author.
35  Former ambassador for Tuvalu embassy in Taiwan, 20 May 2018. Funafuti. Interview with author.
36  Scholarship student in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 19 October 2017. Taipei. Interview with author.
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Even when Tuvaluan citizens engaged with Taiwanese understandings 
of Austronesia(n), they were not necessarily persuaded by Austronesian 
diplomacy, especially its reliance on concepts of mutual indigeneity. This 
is again consistent with the perspectives of Pacific diplomats. For instance, 
three Tuvaluan students expressed doubt regarding arguments that 
intimate ties existed between Tuvaluans and Taiwan’s indigenous peoples 
and were concerned by Taiwan’s attempts to classify Tuvaluans as 
indigenous/aboriginal: 
[This] is what [the Taiwanese volunteers in Tuvalu] said, ‘We also 
have aborigines in our country’. They’re like super excited to tell 
me. ‘Ok’. I didn’t understand what that meant at the time because 
I’d never been to Taiwan … I think someone just asked me that. 
Yeah, someone just asked me that a couple days ago. ‘Do you 
guys have aborigines in Tuvalu?’ … We wouldn’t think of [being 
aborigines]. We think of things like, ‘Oh. Now we have Chinese 
in Tuvalu’ … It’s not really a thing for us. I don’t know. ‘Do you 
guys have aborigines there?’ ‘What?’.37
When I was in Taiwan—yes, I attended that indigenous workshop 
thing [hosted by the government] … [The language] was written 
up on—so, ‘taliga’, ‘lima’, some words—the counting even [was 
similar] … [But] there are questions they give us. [They] put 
us in these groups, and I forgot what our topic was, but mainly 
our topic referred to [the] losing of our mother tongue. [What] 
can they [indigenous students in Taiwan] do in order not to lose 
the language and all? And us [Pacific students] sitting there were 
like, ‘There are many ways, and how can these people lose their 
language when everyone’s still here and all?’ … You should have 
asked [another Tuvaluan student]. She thought that thing was 
a waste of time.38 
We [the Pacific Island Students Association (PISA) in Taiwan] are 
trying to also reflect members of the Forum … [so] that we don’t 
… give a wrong perception of what the Pacific Islands is like … 
So, we did invite them [the indigenous Taiwanese] to come. It’s 
not a problem. [Interviewer: But just maybe not as, like, a full—] 
A full member, yeah. Because we know very well that if we invite 
them, I think we might as well just change [our name to] Pacific 
Indigenous Students Association (PISA Facebook Post 2009).39 
37  Scholarship student in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 19 October 2017. Taipei. Interview with author.
38  Former scholarship student in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 11 May 2018. Funafuti. Interview with author.
39  Former scholarship student in Taiwan from Tuvalu, 24 May 2018. Funafuti. Interview with author.
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Obviously, the Taiwan Government and other Taiwanese institutions have 
successfully introduced indigenous languages and cultures to Tuvaluan 
citizens and indicated their relevant similarities. However, Austronesian 
diplomacy is not ultimately effective, both because this diplomatic 
discourse is not clearly explicated and because Taiwan’s conflation of 
Austronesia(n), Pacific and indigenous unravels when Taiwan imagines 
Tuvaluan citizens as identical to Taiwan’s indigenous peoples. Rather than 
supporting Austronesian diplomacy, Tuvaluan citizens who have interacted 
with Taiwan’s indigenous peoples and conceptions of indigeneity actually 
undermine this diplomacy, asserting that Tuvaluans are not indigenous, 
that indigenous concerns are different from their own and that indigenous 
Taiwan is not part of the Pacific.
Yet, it is critical to note that despite contested Tuvaluan views of 
Austronesian diplomacy, at the official level, the Tuvalu Government 
clearly sees Austronesian diplomacy as a powerful tool for communicating/
negotiating with the Taiwan Government. In 2013, then Tuvalu prime 
minister Willy Telavi highlighted Austronesian ties when he opened 
the Tuvalu embassy in Taiwan (Telavi 2013:2). Furthermore, the 
Tuvalu Government now uses Austronesian diplomacy as a cultural/
ethnic rationale to explain why it maintains relations with Taiwan and 
undercut analysis attributing the country’s diplomatic decisions to greed 
or corruption (see Hu 2015; Langa‘oi 2010). A Tuvaluan foreign affairs 
official used Austronesian discourse to justify Tuvalu–Taiwan relations 
as follows:
Yes [Taiwan’s Embassy in Tuvalu brings up indigenous ties.] 
[And] we also bring it up because when President Tsai Ing-wen 
came, she brought a minister of indigenous who was actually also 
indigenous, and the president is also—they made a comment 
that she’s actually … [a] quarter Polynesian … So, yeah, they 
really tried to reinforce that, that connection, which is good in 
any diplomatic relationship … ‘Cause people ask us why Tuvalu 
still sticks with  ROC and not with mainland China. I mean, 
we’ve been with them since independence, and we have the same 
principles, and same—we have some cultural, you know, ethnic 
connections.40 
40  Foreign affairs official for the Tuvalu Government, 20 April 2018. Funafuti. Interview with author.
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This discursive strategy is by no means isolated to Tuvalu. Other Pacific 
diplomats similarly asserted the advantages of using Austronesian discourse 
when communicating/negotiating with Taiwan,41 or when delineating 
cultural/ethnic links that justify maintaining separate relationships with 
Taiwan and the PRC.42
Conclusion
Since DPP President Tsai Ing-wen’s inauguration in 2016, the PRC has 
exerted increased pressure on Taiwan, and between 2016 and 2018, 
a number of Taiwan’s allies in Africa and Central America severed relations, 
forging ties instead with the PRC. Taiwan’s Pacific allies appeared secure 
in their commitment to Taiwan until September 2019, when Solomon 
Islands and Kiribati broke relations in the same week. Though Austronesian 
diplomacy is one aspect of Taiwan’s official diplomacy unique to the 
Pacific, I contend that Taiwan’s use of Austronesian diplomacy does not 
explain why Taiwan’s Pacific allies began severing ties later than other allies. 
Furthermore, this form of diplomacy has clearly not dissuaded Pacific 
allies from switching to the PRC. From a domestic Taiwanese perspective, 
the term Austronesia(n) is not clearly defined and even elicits backlash 
from conservative portions of the population. From a Pacific perspective, 
contested understandings of Austronesia(n) exist among Pacific diplomats 
and citizens, and they often feel that Taiwan’s categorisation of them as 
indigenous requires that they demonstrate differences from (rather than 
similarities to) indigenous Taiwan.
Though the Taiwan Government is now cultivating more nuanced 
understandings of divisions in the Pacific, especially between settler 
colonies and independent nations,43 the implementation of Austronesian 
diplomacy has been disorganised and inconsistent. For Taiwan, enhanced 
success of this discourse requires recognition that simply including the 
term Austronesia(n) in speeches and event titles does not immediately 
inspire Pacific affinity for Taiwan. It also requires the commitment of 
greater human and financial resources to understanding, coordinating 
41  Deputy Chief of Mission for Marshall Islands embassy in Taiwan, 4 December 2017. Taipei. 
Interview with author.
42  Representative for the PNG Trade Office in Taiwan, 21 November 2017. Taipei. Interview with 
author.




and developing Pacific–indigenous ties with and in the Pacific. Moves in 
2018 and 2019 to (re)open an Austronesian Forum headquarters in Palau, 
a plan forwarded by Taiwan, Taiwan’s Pacific allies and the Philippines 
in 2007 but abandoned shortly thereafter, signal new possibilities for 
Pacific–Taiwanese co-constructions of Austronesian discourse (Ciwidian 
2018; Formosa News 2019; Liberty Times 2018). Additionally, I would 
argue that, as of 2019, the advantage of Austronesian diplomacy lies not 
in how the Taiwan Government implements it but rather in how Pacific 
governments and officials appropriate it to negotiate queries regarding 
their decisions to ally themselves with Taiwan and how long their alliances 
will last. As seen in the Tuvaluan case, Taiwan’s Austronesian discourse 
acts much like Taiwan’s democratic government or human rights record, 
allowing Pacific officials to assert the legitimacy of relations with Taiwan 
and discursively bypass arguments that their foreign policy is motivated 
by avarice or malfeasance.
Finally, another group that must be mentioned vis-à-vis Austronesian 
diplomacy is the indigenous population in Taiwan, which does not 
necessarily share the same views as the Taiwan Government on whether 
or how Austronesian diplomacy should be implemented. Based on 
interviews with indigenous Taiwanese people who have participated in 
official and unofficial cultural exchange in the Pacific, it is clear that the 
settler colony bent of official Austronesian diplomacy is shared by the 
general indigenous population of Taiwan, which highlights close ties with 
New Zealand, Guam, Hawai‘i, Tahiti and New Caledonia. What also 
emerges from these interviews, however, is that indigenous populations 
in Pacific settler colonies tend to reciprocate ideas of shared identity and 
kinship with Taiwan.44 This suggests that while Austronesian diplomacy 
is not highly effective for Pacific allies, it is more compelling to non-allied 
settler colonies. Though not beneficial to maintaining official diplomatic 
ties, this phenomenon can allow Taiwan and its indigenous peoples to 
strengthen unofficial links in ways that increase visibility and empathy 
throughout the Pacific.
44  Staff at Taiwan’s National Museum of Prehistory, 30 September 2017. Taitung. Interview with 
author; Indigenous Taiwanese participant in a Taiwan Government cultural diplomacy program, 
9 November 2017. Taipei. Interview with author; Head of Amis Kakeng Musical Group, 16 November 
2017. Taitung. Interview with author; Member of Tai Body Theatre, 24 November 2017. Hualien. 
Interview with author; Indigenous Amis singer-songwriter, 19 December 2017. Taipei. Interview 
with author.
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Fiji and China celebrated a ‘double anniversary’ in 2015. It was the 40th 
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and Fiji and 160 years since the arrival of the 
first Chinese settlers in Fiji. This milestone was commemorated by the 
exchange of congratulatory letters between the two governments and 
declarations highlighting their close and mutually beneficial relationship. 
The then Fijian foreign minister described engagement with China as 
forming ‘a fundamental part of our government’s Look North Policy’ and 
‘crucial to Fiji’s economic development’ (Kubuabola 2015). Meanwhile, 
the Chinese ambassador to Fiji described the China–Fiji relationship as 
‘a model of friendly cooperation between China and island countries in 
the South Pacific’. He also later referred to China’s policy towards Fiji as 
‘an epitome of China’s foreign policy towards the South Pacific countries’ 
(Zhang 2015, 2016).
Relations between China and Fiji have strengthened considerably over 
the past decade. As the Chinese ambassador to Fiji commented in 2018, 
‘China has had a very good relationship with Fiji, particularly after 2006’ 
(Kumar 2018b). By 2016 China had become Fiji’s largest aid donor and 
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its largest source of foreign investment. Politically China established itself 
as a close and valued partner on both regional and global issues, in the 
context of Fiji’s more assertive and independent foreign policy after 2009 
(Komai 2015). For China, Fiji has long held a special place in its Pacific 
regional diplomacy. In part this stems from the strategic location of Fiji 
at the centre of the Pacific Islands region, making it a hub for regional 
diplomacy as well as a communications crossroads. Fiji has also played an 
increasingly influential role in regional affairs. Moreover Fiji is home to 
an influential and growing Chinese population, now numbering about 
10,000, and has thus been a focal point for both Taiwan’s and China’s 
regional engagement (Tarte 2010a; Yang 2011). 
As these developments have taken place, concerns have been voiced both 
domestically and beyond about China’s growing influence in Fiji, in 
particular the perceived loss of influence of traditional Western partners 
and the impact of Chinese aid and investment on Fiji’s sovereignty, 
security and development. These concerns echo those voiced about 
China’s influence in the region more broadly and which have become 
more heightened in recent times (see 60 Minutes 2018; Brady 2015; 
Chang 2018).
This chapter surveys developments in the Fiji–China relationship over the 
past decade (2008–18) in order to highlight the way the relationship has 
strengthened in that time politically, economically and culturally. It will 
locate these developments within two broad frameworks: Fiji’s new foreign 
policy after 2009 and China’s new strategic initiative—the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI)—since 2013. This will not only show the convergence 
of Fiji’s and China’s interests that helps to underpin the relationship, 
but will also highlight the extent to which the Fiji Government has 
been instrumental in driving and shaping this relationship. Contrary to 
concerns about China’s increasing influence in Fiji, the analysis suggests 
that Fiji has proactively exploited opportunities within this partnership, 
while maintaining and exercising its autonomy and agency. Moreover, 
the return of traditional partners in recent years (Australia and New 
Zealand) appears to have diluted China’s influence, as Fiji has taken 
advantage of a growing range of foreign policy and defence options. These 
developments underscore the point made by Wesley-Smith (2013:369) 
about Pacific Island leaders ‘making rational decisions about what they 
see as their best interests in the face of changing opportunities in the 
external environment’.
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Evidence of a growing relationship
While 2015 was an auspicious anniversary year for China–Fiji relations, 
it was in fact 2014 that marked a highpoint in bilateral ties, when the 
relationship was elevated to a ‘Strategic Partnership of Mutual Respect 
and Cooperation’.1 This was a year marked by intensifying diplomatic 
activity culminating in a two-day state visit to Fiji in November 
by Chinese President Xi Jinping. As the first such visit to the region by 
a Chinese head of state, the Fiji Government hosted other Pacific Island 
leaders (those with diplomatic ties with China) in a collective meeting with 
the Chinese leader, as well as a series of bilateral meetings. According to 
China’s ambassador to Fiji, the goal of the visit was ‘to exchange opinions 
on the development of China–Pacific relations and to promote practical 
cooperation and friendly communication of both sides’ (Tarte 2014).
The backdrop to the state visit was a series of high-level political meetings 
between Fiji and China in 2014. The foreign ministers of China and 
Fiji met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in 
September, the first meeting following the Fijian election on 17 September, 
and reaffirmed the close relationship between the two states. As the 
Fijian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated: ‘Fiji will not forget that when 
other countries were quick to condemn us following the events of 1987, 
2000 and 2006, China and other friends in Asia demonstrated a more 
understanding and sensitive approach’ (Tarte 2014).
Another high-level meeting took place in August 2014, when the then 
president of Fiji, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, met President Xi in Nanjing, 
while attending the second Summer Youth Olympic Games. President 
Xi used the opportunity to describe the ‘development of China–Fiji 
relations’ as being in the ‘fundamental interests of both peoples and 
conducive to peace, stability and development of the region’ (Tarte 2014). 
He foreshadowed the visit to Fiji and other Pacific Island countries of the 
Peace Ark, a Chinese naval hospital ship. The Fijian president responded 
with a call for more Chinese investment in Fiji as well as more exports 
(of agricultural and fishery products) to China. There has also been 
a longstanding view that Fiji could reap some benefits from the growth 
1  According to official Chinese sources, the term Strategic Partnership for Mutual Respect and 
Cooperation connotes a relationship that is experiencing ‘long-term growth’. Designating the Fiji–
China partnership in this way indicated a ‘step forward’ in the relationship (Embassy of PRC in Fiji, 
March 2019. Personal communication with author).
THE CHINA ALTERNATIVE
378
of Chinese tourism to the region. In order to give weight to this declared 
goal, the Fijian president officiated at the opening of Fiji’s consulate 
general in Shanghai (the Fijian embassy in Beijing opened in 2001). 
High-level political visits between China and Fiji reflected a pattern of 
so-called ‘visit diplomacy’ that had emerged over the previous decade and 
underscored the increasing priority both sides accorded the relationship 
(Tarte 2010a). These visits provided opportunities to promote and 
advance key diplomatic, economic and strategic objectives of both states. 
President Xi’s 2014 state visit was not his first visit to Fiji. He also visited 
in February 2009, as the then vice president of China. While the visit 
was described by Chinese media sources as a ‘transit stopover’ it served to 
reaffirm China’s appreciation of Fiji’s ‘adherence to the one-China policy’ 
(Smith 2015).2 The visit also appeared to be a significant show of support 
for the Bainimarama Government at a time when Fiji was under pressure 
from the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) to hold elections by May 2009.
As president, Mr Xi first welcomed Prime Minister Bainimarama to Beijing 
in May 2013—once again stating that China appreciated Fiji’s support on 
issues ‘related to China’s core interests’, that being Fiji’s support for the 
One China policy. The Fijian prime minister also held meetings with his 
counterpart, Premier Li Keqiang, who supported an agreement on visa 
exemption between the two countries. He also pledged China’s support 
for increased coordination with the Pacific on climate change. 
The bilateral visa exemption arrangement was implemented in 2014 and 
sought to further boost visitor arrivals from China. These have been steadily 
increasing—from 4,000 in 2009 to 48,796 in 2017 (Meick et al. 2018),3 
aided by the launch by Fiji’s national airline of direct flights between Fiji 
and Hong Kong in 2009. Chinese investment also increased and in 2016 
a China Chamber of Commerce in Fiji (CCCF) was established. By 2019 
it had 40 member companies, and was chaired by China Railway First 
Group, with China Railway Fifth Group, Shanghai Deep Sea Fisheries 
and Ge Zhou Ba Group as vice chairs. According to its Secretary General, 
Zhou Yang, in the two years since its inception, CCCF member companies 
had invested US$100 million in Fiji (Chambers 2019). 
2  The One China policy declares the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government and 
sovereign state of China, with Taiwan Province an inalienable part of its territory.
3  Fiji’s total tourist arrivals in 2017 reached 772,013. Arrivals are dominated by visitors from 
Australia and New Zealand (Meick et al. 2018:23). 
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Meanwhile, Fiji benefited from concessional loans, scholarships, 
professional training and agricultural and green energy assistance, offered 
as part of aid packages announced by China at the second China–Pacific 
Economic Development and Cooperation Forum held in Guangzhou 
in November 2013, and subsequently by President Xi during his state 
visit to Fiji in 2014. Infrastructure funded by Chinese loans and grants 
included roads, bridges, a hydropower project and public rental board 
housing. (P. Zhang 2015; then Chinese vice premier Wang Yang, cited 
in J. Zhang 2015:49). According to the Lowy Institute, aid to Fiji from 
China (between 2006 and 2016) amounted to AU$485 million, compared 
to AU$408 million from Australia for the same period (Chang 2018).
Fiji reciprocated by cooling its relations with Taiwan. There was some 
suggestion that this may have been at the initiative of the Taiwanese 
Government—a response to Fiji’s post-2006 coup isolation by ‘important’ 
Western countries and the ‘diplomatic truce’ between China and Taiwan 
after 2008 (Yang 2011). However, Taiwan had long enjoyed a good 
relationship with Fiji (predating Fiji’s diplomatic ties with China) as well 
as good relations with the local Chinese community in Fiji. Nor had it 
shied away from capitalising on previous post-coup crises that forced Fiji 
to search for new friends and partners. Indeed, following the 2000 coup, 
when Fiji reached out to China under its ‘Look North’ policy, it also 
strengthened ties with Taiwan. This invariably prompted protests and 
pressure from China to desist from these links, but to no avail (see Tarte 
2010a:124–25).
Since 2006, however, there has been a gradual distancing and 
downgrading  of the relationship. Taiwanese representatives have been 
left out of key events (such as the Fijian-hosted summits of the Pacific 
Islands Development Forum from 2013–15). High-level visits have 
ceased. In 2017 Fiji closed its Trade and Tourism Representative Office 
in Taipei (that had been established with Taiwanese Government 
funding). A Taiwanese politician claimed the move was ‘orchestrated 
by China to embarrass Taiwan’, but from the Fijian Government’s 
perspective the decision was in line with its commitment to the One 
China policy (Meick et al. 2018). Significantly, the closure of the Taipei 
office coincided with Prime Minister Bainimarama’s visit to Beijing to 
attend the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation hosted 
by President Xi. In a  further downgrading of the relationship in 2019, 
the Fijian Government directed that the Taiwan Trade Mission in Fiji be 
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renamed the Taipei Trade Office in Fiji. This move coincided with the 
70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC and the diplomatic switch 
by Solomon Islands and Kiribati from Taiwan to the PRC. 
Alongside the strengthening of bilateral ties (and commensurate cooling 
of Fiji’s relations with Taiwan), the Fiji Government has also welcomed 
more ‘people-to-people ties’ and cultural diplomacy with China. China’s 
stepped-up efforts in this area may be viewed as a way to counter the 
negative perceptions and stereotypes of China and Chinese immigrants 
that prevailed in Fijian public opinion (for examples see Tarte 2010a; also 
J. Zhang 2015). A Fiji–China Friendship Association was launched in 
2012 as a branch of the Pacific China Friendship Association, aiming 
to  strengthen ‘bilateral exchanges in the area of poverty reduction, 
culture, sports and women’s involvement in trade and investment’ 
(PCFA n.d.). In 2015 its interim president was the Fijian Minister for 
Women, Children and Poverty Alleviation. There have been two visits by 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) hospital ship, Peace Ark, providing 
free medical care to thousands of local patients. A Confucius Institute 
was established at the Suva campus of the University of the South Pacific 
in 2006 and a China Cultural Centre was opened in the Fijian capital 
(announced by President Xi during his 2014 state visit). Scholarships for 
study in China expanded and were increasingly utilised by Fijian students 
who in the past had appeared reluctant to take up these opportunities 
(Tarte 2010a). In 2018, 23 Fijians graduated from various universities 
in Beijing alone. Fijians receive between 30 and 40 scholarships a year 
for study in China. Senior public servants regularly receive leadership 
training at the China Executive Leadership Academy in Pudong.
Perhaps most significant, however, has been the effort by the Chinese 
Government, through its embassy in Suva, to cultivate the local 
(Cantonese-speaking) Chinese community, including by regular 
invitations to conferences and cultural events in China. In the past, this 
community, comprising the descendants of original Chinese settlers, was 
more closely associated with Taiwan, while Beijing focused its attention 
on the more recent arrivals from mainland China. Now the embassy ‘gives 
equal attention to the Cantonese and Mandarin speakers’,4 according 
to community representatives, making inroads in what was previously 
Taiwan’s stronghold. The next section explores the drivers behind Fiji’s 
shift towards closer ties with China.
4  Interview with Chinese community leader, December 2018. Personal communication.
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Fiji’s new foreign policy orientation
The 2009 abrogation of the Fijian constitution (which deferred for five 
years the holding of fresh elections following the coup of 2006) triggered 
the unprecedented suspension of Fiji from the PIF in May 2009 and its 
subsequent suspension from the Commonwealth in December. These 
events, coupled with existing sanctions and censure from traditional 
partners, were the catalyst for a major reorientation of Fiji’s foreign 
policy, beginning in 2010. This in turn formed an integral part of the 
Bainimarama Government’s Strategic Framework for Change, the set of 
reforms that Bainimarama was committed to implementing before Fiji 
returned to elected government in 2014. A number of strategies were put 
in place, aimed at not only countering Fiji’s diplomatic isolation but also 
enhancing Fiji’s overall standing in international affairs.  
A key component of this reorientation was a revamped Look North 
policy. Like the earlier versions of this policy (initiated in 1987 and 
2000) the Look North policy aimed to diversify Fiji’s foreign relations, 
primarily economic partners (Tarte 2010a). But unlike its antecedents, 
this was not limited to new markets and donors in Asia. In fact, the 
foreign policy trend from 2010 onwards was an ‘open door’ policy of 
engaging with ‘all members of the international community’. The Fijian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Ratu Inoke Kubuabola explained the policy 
to an Australian audience in 2013:
Jolted from our complacency by the doors that were slammed in 
our faces, we looked north—to the great powers of Asia, especially 
China, India and Indonesia and more recently to Russia. We 
looked south to the vast array of nations, big and small, that make 
up the developing world … And we looked to our Melanesian 
neighbours, to forge closer ties with them and use our collective 
strength to make our voices heard in global forums and secure 
better trading deals for us all (quoted in Komai 2015:13).
In line with this more activist foreign policy, in 2010 Fiji sought 
membership of the Non-Aligned Movement. It announced new embassies 
in South Korea, Indonesia, Brazil and South Africa. It hosted a visiting 
delegation from Russia, led by the resident ambassador in Canberra 
(Tarte 2011). At the United Nations, Fiji was instrumental in boosting 
the role of Pacific Small Islands Developing States group as an alternative 
caucus to the PIF group and successfully lobbied for the renaming of 
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the Asia group to Asia-Pacific Small Islands Developing States group. 
This name change was more than cosmetic. It became the springboard 
to greater Pacific representation in the group and within the UN and was 
instrumental in Fiji being elected Chair of the Group of 77 plus China, 
in 2012 (Komai 2015). 
Within this evolving foreign policy context, relations with China 
assumed an especially prominent place. It was the most frequent foreign 
destination for Fiji’s leaders in 2010, including the prime minister, foreign 
minister and president—the latter at the invitation of the Governor of 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, thus not a state visit. Prime Minister 
Bainimarama chose to mark the 40th anniversary of Fiji’s independence 
in China, attending the World Expo in Shanghai. Although these visits 
were mainly exploratory and few concrete outcomes were announced, 
a number of future deals were mooted, including new arms procurement 
(to support Fiji’s peacekeeping operations) and Chinese investment in the 
expansion of the government shipyard and slipway in Suva (Tarte 2011).
A key motivation for Fiji in building new partnerships, and strengthening 
those with China, was to ‘fill the gaps’ left by Australia, New Zealand 
and others in the aftermath of the coup of 2006. Nowhere was this more 
apparent than in the area of defence and law enforcement cooperation. 
This was evident as early as 2007 when Bainimarama declared, ‘We have 
to talk to China about continuation of military courses which have been 
stopped by Australia and New Zealand’. He went on to explain:
We have always had close ties with Beijing. I have already made 
one official visit there at the invitation of the People’s Liberation 
Army and we have had two senior officers at China’s defence 
college since 2000 (quoted in Tarte 2010a:124). 
Fiji actively pushed for closer military ties with China after the 2006 
coup, although China did not always appear willing to reciprocate. 
Significantly, Chinese authorities did not approve the accreditation of 
a defence attaché to the Fijian embassy in Beijing. Despite this, defence 
links have grown stronger since President Xi took office in 2013, including 
bilateral meetings of senior military officers and a biannual forum hosted 
by the PLA for senior defence officials from the Caribbean and Pacific 
(Meick et al. 2018:17). The Fijian navy has also benefited from training 
opportunities for its officers (including scholarships for degree studies in 
China) and, most significantly, the donation of a hydrographic vessel 
in 2018. According to the Commander of the Fiji Navy, Captain Tawake, 
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the new vessel would assist the Fijian navy in the ‘measurement and 
description of the physical features of the coastal areas’ as well as assist 
with maritime surveillance (Qaranivalu 2018).
In 2011 Fiji and China signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) on the enhancement of bilateral law enforcement cooperation, 
especially targeting transnational crime. Since then the Fiji Police Force 
and China’s Ministry of Public Security have developed what has been 
described as ‘a close working relationship’, with Fijian police officers 
undertaking training in China on tackling cybercrime, drugs and 
corruption, as well as receiving equipment. According to the Fijian Police 
Commissioner, ‘When other countries had closed their doors on us, 
China had stood by us and continued with their assistance to the Fiji 
Police Force’ (Kumar 2018a).
This collaboration came to the fore in 2017 when a joint operation between 
the Fijian police and their Chinese counterparts led to the deportation 
(under somewhat dramatic circumstances) of 77 Chinese nationals 
from Fiji. According to a joint statement from the Chinese embassy in 
Fiji and the Fiji Police Force, the deportees were suspected of telecom 
and online fraud in China worth FJ$1.1 million and had breached their 
visa conditions. 
While there was media speculation about the actual nature of the criminal 
activity, the operation appeared very similar to those China had conducted 
in other countries, including Kenya, Indonesia and Cambodia, where 
Chinese nationals suspected of telecom and cyber fraud were deported to 
China. It has been claimed that China has become ‘increasingly assertive’ 
in extraditing suspected cyber criminals targeting victims in China 
(Agence France-Presse 2017).5 
There has been a longstanding (popular) perception in Fiji of China 
‘as  a  country that produces criminals’ and of links between recent 
Chinese arrivals and organised crime (Tarte 2010a:127). While the above 
operation may have served in part to demonstrate the Chinese state’s 
determination to deal with such activities, it also fuelled concerns in Fiji 
about the impact of the visa waiver agreement on the country’s border 
control. According to the Fijian Leader of the Opposition, ‘This may be 
5  I am grateful to Dr Nicola Baker for these insights. 
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just the tip of the iceberg … People are just moving in and out [of Fiji] 
and involved in all sorts of criminal activities, which we only get to hear 
about after the fact’ (Hill 2017).
The government of Prime Minister Bainimarama weathered the adverse 
international environment following the 2006 coup (and subsequent 
political events of 2009) through implementing a proactive and innovative 
foreign policy. It has been argued that China, in turn, strengthened 
‘Bainimarama’s hand’ and ‘he was able to afford to ignore economic and 
political sanctions imposed by New Zealand and Australia’ (Brady 2015). 
China has become an increasingly important trade, investment and aid 
partner of Fiji (Meick et al. 2018). It also stood by Fiji in international 
forums. Significantly, China refused to support a move led by Australia 
and New Zealand to ‘shut Fiji out of peacekeeping duties’. This move had 
been strongly condemned by Prime Minister Bainimarama, as it targeted 
a cornerstone of Fiji’s international role as well as a longstanding approach 
to nation-building.6 A resolution to the UN Security Council against 
Fiji’s peacekeeping participation in 2010 was subsequently withdrawn 
(Komai 2015:115).    
The following section examines China’s reasons for supporting Fiji at this 
time and the motivations behind its steadily increasing engagement with 
Fiji, especially since 2013.
China’s evolving regional strategy
Following the December 2006 coup in Fiji, some commentators predicted 
that the ‘hostile reaction’ of traditional partners (particularly Australia and 
New Zealand) provided China with ‘its best chance yet of gaining a more 
substantial presence in Fiji and the surrounding region’ (journalist Graham 
Davis quoted in Tarte 2010a:128). A dominant argument (propagated by 
the Fijian Government as well as by observers) has been that Australia 
(and others) left an opening that China stepped into.7 China’s policy of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of states has been highlighted as 
facilitating this growing relationship. As Prime Minister Bainimarama 
6  Between 1978 and 2008, over 25,000 Fijians served in overseas peacekeeping missions. It has long 
been a source of national pride that, on a population basis, ‘no nation can approach Fiji’s peacekeeping 
performance’ (Tarte 2010b:81).
7  See, for example, comments by the Fijian Attorney General, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum (60 Minutes 
2018).
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stated in 2009, ‘The Chinese authorities are very sympathetic and 
understand what’s happening here—the fact that we need to do things 
our own way’ (quoted in Komai 2015:113). It is significant perhaps that 
this comment was made after the abrogation of the constitution and just 
prior to Fiji’s suspension from the PIF.     
Evidence of China’s ‘sympathy and understanding’ can be found in the 
lack of criticism of the coup in 2006—it instead expressed the hope 
that ‘all parties involved resolve their problems for the sake of economic 
development, political stability and people’s harmonious life’ (Embassy of 
the PRC in Fiji statement, December 2006, quoted in Tarte 2010a:130). 
In 2007 the Chinese Government accepted a Bainimarama appointee as 
Fiji’s new ambassador to China. As noted above, in early 2009 then vice 
president Xi Jinping made a two-day visit to Fiji, pledging to enhance 
Sino–Fijian cooperation. On subsequent occasions Chinese officials 
defended Fiji’s human rights record, in the face of international criticism, 
and spoke against the ‘imposition of isolation by some countries over Fiji’ 
(Brady 2015).
But in the initial post-coup years (up to 2013) it was not clear that China 
‘pursued a well calculated strategy of displacing the traditional western 
players in Fiji’ (Yang 2011:318). This reflects a broader point made by 
Wesley-Smith, ‘Most commentators struggle to identify any coherent 
policy in Beijing regarding Oceania, let alone a grand strategy driven by 
hegemonic aspirations’ (2013:360). China’s priorities with Fiji remained 
centred on the One China policy. This was emphasised by then vice 
president Xi during his 2009 stopover in Fiji (Smith 2015).
As noted above, China did not respond to Fiji’s request to accredit 
a military attaché to the Fijian embassy in Beijing. According to informed 
sources, Chinese officials gave no reason for the non-approval; they simply 
failed to act on the request.8 This could be interpreted as a sign of caution 
on China’s part, as it sought to navigate competing foreign policy interests 
in the region. An important consideration in this regard was managing its 
relations with Australia and New Zealand. It was clear that Australia was 
‘pressing China to curb its support for Fiji’ (Yang 2011:314). According 
8  Fiji has not pursued this request. At the time of writing, it had deployed only one defence 
attaché, accredited to Fiji’s mission to the United Nations, overseeing peacekeeping operations. Nor is 
there a Chinese defence attaché accredited to the Chinese embassy in Suva. The only foreign missions 




to Yang, ‘China has a big stake in a good relationship with Australia and 
New Zealand’, including trade, support for the One China policy and as a 
conduit to the US on security matters (Yang 2011). It has also been argued 
that in order to maintain influence in the region, China ‘may not want 
to be too much out of step with the position on Fiji taken by the Pacific 
Islands Forum’ (Tarte 2010a:129). 
The beginning of President Xi’s first term in office in 2013 and the launch 
of the strategy of global engagement dubbed the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) marked the shift towards a more assertive engagement with Fiji. 
It was on his two-day state visit to Fiji in 2014 that President Xi set out 
a plan for heightened engagement with the Pacific Islands region, based 
on five diplomatic priorities. These were to build a strategic partnership; 
enhance high-level exchanges; deepen economic cooperation, including 
through the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative; expand people-
to-people exchanges; and increase multilateral cooperation through the 
PIF and Pacific Islands Development Forum (Meick et al. 2018:16).
President Xi backed up this announcement by restating economic 
commitments made at the second meeting of the China–Pacific 
Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in 
Guangzhou in November 2013. At this gathering, then vice premier 
Wang Yang had ‘announced an aid package of $1 billion in concessional 
loans and promised to set up a $1 billion special loan fund to support 
infrastructure development in the region’ (J. Zhang 2015:49).
The BRI provides the overarching framework for China’s enhanced 
relations with the Pacific Islands region. The 21st-Century Maritime Silk 
Road Initiative is one component of BRI (Meick et al. 2018:3). While 
the BRI has been described as ‘a gigantic economic belt across Asia, 
Africa and Europe … [that] carries the spirit of the ancient Silk Road’, 
the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road is seen as an ‘important maritime 
passage connecting China’s coast with Europe through the South China 
Sea and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South 
Pacific’ (Tuimaisala 2018).9
9  According to President Xi, ‘BRI aims to achieve policy, infrastructure, trade, financial and 
people-to-people connectivity, building a new platform for international cooperation and creating 
new drivers of shared development’ (Tuimaisala 2018). 
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The rolling out of the BRI and Maritime Silk Road Initiative has shaped 
the narrative underpinning China’s relations with the Pacific and with 
Fiji.10 BRI is now referred to by China as the ‘framework’ for building 
the China–Fiji ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ (Xinhua 2018b).11 
In his address on the 40th anniversary of China–Fiji diplomatic ties, 
the then Chinese ambassador to Fiji, Zhang Ping, linked the BRI with 
Fiji’s national development plan. He declared that ‘the two sides should 
proceed from long-term interests and overall national development goals 
to find ways to integrate our development strategies’ (P. Zhang 2015).
This was reaffirmed during a visit by the Chinese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Wang Yi, in 2018, when he declared that ‘China stands ready 
to step up all-round practical cooperation with Fiji and align the 
China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative and Fiji’s 20-year National 
Development Plan’ (Xinhua 2018a). Prime Minister Bainimarama in 
turn said, ‘Fiji would firmly support and actively take part in the Belt and 
Road Cooperation between the two countries’ (Xinhua 2018a). A Fijian 
BRI working committee, headed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, was 
tasked to negotiate a BRI MOU with China. The signing of this MOU on 
12 November 2018 was described by the Chinese ambassador as marking 
a ‘new chapter’ in relations between China and Fiji (Xinhua 2019).
While the narrative has focused on BRI as an economic partnership, 
from China’s perspective the value of the relationship with Fiji goes much 
beyond that. As the Chinese foreign minister declared in a 2018 meeting 
with Prime Minister Bainimarama, ‘China attaches importance to Fiji’s 
role in the South Pacific island countries’ (Xinhua 2018a). The key factor 
for China is the influential role Fiji plays in regional affairs and as a leading 
Pacific Island state in the international arena, including at the UN. While 
Fiji has grown more steadfast on the One China policy in the past decade, 
it has close and influential relationships with two of Taiwan’s remaining 
allies in the Pacific (Tuvalu and Nauru). It remains an important diplomatic 
hub in the region (it hosts the secretariats of the PIF and the Pacific 
Islands Development Forum) and a communications crossroads in terms 
10  Some accounts of the BRI and Maritime Silk Road fail to include the South Pacific. However, the 
second edition of China’s Blue Book on Oceania, released in 2015 and subtitled ‘China’s 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road Initiative and the South Pacific Countries’, describes the Pacific Islands as ‘the natural 
extension of China’s new Maritime Silk Road Initiative and can be a testing ground for South-South 
cooperation’ (Smith and Zhang 2015). 
11  According to Meick et al., the use of the term ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ is reserved 
for China’s ‘more important partners’ (2018:16).
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of air and sea connectivity. Fiji is also home (and destination) to a growing 
number of Chinese migrants and visitors, who in turn provide a vanguard 
for China’s cultural diplomacy and people-to-people links.  
But the growing presence and visibility of China in Fiji has also fuelled 
fear-mongering (in some cases politically motivated) about its impact and 
intentions. In an Australian television documentary in 2018, the leader 
of Fiji’s main opposition party (former prime minister Sitiveni Rabuka) 
declared that he was ‘not comfortable’ with China’s involvement in Fiji’s 
affairs. He expressed the view that China planned ‘domination’ of the 
region and to take over Fiji’s ports and airports (60 Minutes 2018). 
Other opposition leaders have also indicated their reservations. One 
of the foreign policy priorities of the National Federation Party in the 
2018 general election was to ‘reduce our dependence on countries that 
do not share democratic values and respect for human rights’, an oblique 
reference to China (Nacei 2018).12
These concerns have resonated with an environment of heightened 
anxiety, if not paranoia, surrounding China’s regional presence. In 2018, 
Australian media reported that a Chinese space surveillance ship, on 
a  regular stopover in Suva harbour, was spying on a visiting Australian 
naval vessel. This prompted the Chinese ambassador to Fiji to denounce 
the claims as ‘sheer fabrication’, adding that ‘spying is not at all the 
Chinese technique’ (Kumar 2018b).
It is clear that China’s growing engagement with Fiji and the region, 
underpinned by the BRI strategy, has ignited renewed geopolitical 
rivalry in the Pacific (Morgan 2018). But ironically this has transpired 
at a time when Fiji’s foreign policy was again on the move. As China’s 
interests in building closer relations with Fiji have grown in recent years, 
so too have the interests of other more traditional partners, willing to 
reembrace Fiji once it returned to elected government in 2014. This has 
important implications for the China–Fiji relationship, as discussed in the 
next section.
12  While the government of Prime Minister Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama, from the FijiFirst party, 
has appeared uniformly committed to the Fiji–China partnership, it is perhaps significant that the 
powerful Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for the Economy, Civil Service and Communications, and 
Attorney General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum has not made an official visit to China.
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New dynamics in Fiji–China relations
The adverse international environment facing Fiji after 2006 compelled 
Fiji to reach out beyond its ‘traditional’ comfort zone to forge new 
partnerships and diplomatic strategies. The success of this new foreign 
policy was perhaps beyond the expectations of the government—as Fiji 
reached new heights on the world stage. These included being the first 
Pacific Island state to chair or preside over the Group of 77 plus China, 
the UN General Assembly and the UN Climate Change conference 
(COP23). Such achievements have in turn bolstered the confidence of 
the Bainimarama Government to pursue a foreign policy that is both 
independent and assertive (Fry and Tarte 2015).
Evidence of this independence in its relations with China came in 2016 
in the context of jurisdiction over the South China Sea. Following 
a meeting in Beijing between the Chinese foreign minister and his Fijian 
counterpart, a so-called joint press release was issued that claimed—
among other things—that ‘Fiji supported China’s proposition on the 
issue of the South China Sea’. According to the press release, both sides 
stressed the right of states to ‘independently choose the means of dispute 
settlement’, adding that ‘prior consent of parties to the dispute must be 
sought before proceeding with any third party settlement’ (Xinhua 2016). 
This referred to the arbitration case brought by the Philippines against 
China under provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS); an arbitration that China has rejected. 
Almost immediately the Fijian Government issued a separate ‘clarification’, 
stating that the press release by China ‘incorrectly depicts Fijian policy 
towards China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea’. The statement 
explained that: 
In line with our policy of strict non-alignment, Fiji enjoys friendly 
relations with all countries bordering the South China Sea, 
including China. We also believe in the strict adherence to and 
enforcement of international law. In relation to the South China 
Sea, Fiji calls on all relevant parties to resolve any territorial disputes 
by peaceful means under international law (Delaibatiki 2016).
In its jingoistic editorial on this issue, the pro-government daily 
newspaper Fiji Sun declared that ‘this emphatic statement sends a clear 
message to the international community that we will not be forced into 
a foreign policy position by anyone’ (Delaibatiki 2016). It went on to 
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describe the Bainimarama Government as working hard since 2006 ‘to 
show that Fiji no longer dances to the Australia/New Zealand/USA foreign 
policy tunes … The same applies equally to all countries, including our 
good friends in China’ (ibid.). It would also have been pertinent to point 
out that, as one of the architects of UNCLOS, Fiji was not likely to take a 
stand that would undermine the authority of the convention in resolving 
such maritime disputes.
Since Fiji returned to parliamentary rule in 2014, Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States have resumed their high-level political, diplomatic 
and military engagement. There has also been a reassertion of traditional 
economic partnerships. For example, Fiji commissioned a new consulate 
general and trade commission in Sydney in 2018. Speaking at the opening, 
Prime Minister Bainimarama declared:
We’re leaving old disagreements in the past, where they belong, 
and we’re writing a new chapter in our partnership— putting Fiji 
and Australia in a position to take our cooperation to historic 
heights, particularly when it comes to opening up new and greater 
flows of trade and investment (Islands Business 2018:32).
But in the context of heightened geopolitical competition, it is the security 
relationships that have taken on greater significance. The  Australian 
Government has refitted a Fijian naval vessel (which also took part in 
a  naval exercise in Darwin in 2018). Coincidently, the return of the 
refitted vessel occurred just before the arrival of a new hydrographic vessel 
from China. Between 2020 and 2022 Australia will deliver two new 
patrol boats to Fiji’s navy. Meanwhile the New Zealand Defence Force 
has for two consecutive years (2017 and 2018) deployed one of its inshore 
patrol vessels to Fiji to assist with surveillance of Fiji’s exclusive economic 
zone. The Fiji Navy also received a new hydrographic vessel in early 2019, 
donated by South Korea.
The US has also stepped up its defence cooperation. In 2018 a US guided-
missile destroyer (USS Shoup) visited Fiji as part of its Oceania Maritime 
Security Initiative deployment. In a symbolic gesture, the Fiji naval 
maritime commander was transferred to the vessel by a US Black Hawk 
helicopter to welcome the crew. In 2018 Fiji became the 11th Pacific 
Island state to conclude a ‘Shiprider agreement’ with the US Government 
to allow Fijian law enforcement officers to be deployed on US coast guard 
and naval vessels. In the words of the US chargé d’affaires, the agreement 
demonstrated that ‘the United States is a committed security partner with 
Fiji and other Pacific island nations’ (United States Embassy in Fiji 2018).
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These renewed relationships have reduced or diluted China’s influence in 
Fiji, essentially by offering Fiji more options and choices. Nowhere was 
this more evident than the announcement in June 2018 that the Black 
Rock military camp in Fiji would be redeveloped by Australia as a regional 
hub for police and peacekeeping training. According to a Fiji military 
source, while China had an interest in Black Rock, Australia had offered 
a more ‘holistic’ package, providing troop training as well as infrastructure, 
‘something that China was reluctant to do’ (Radio New Zealand 2018). 
For some commentators, this incident reflected how Australia was willing 
to ‘outbid’ China. But there has also been speculation that China is not 
getting the same attention from Fiji it once enjoyed and that the ball game 
has now changed.
Conclusion
In the decade since 2008 the Fiji–China relationship strengthened 
significantly—politically, economically and culturally. This was propelled, 
on the one hand, by Fiji’s own efforts to redefine its foreign policy and 
place in the world, as it navigated a difficult (if not hostile) diplomatic 
environment following the political upheavals of 2006 and 2009. On the 
other hand, the Chinese Government has elevated the relationship to 
a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’, signalling the importance China 
attaches to relations with Fiji, especially in the context of its evolving 
strategy of global and regional engagement: the BRI and 21st-Century 
Maritime Silk Road Initiative.
The evidence suggests that Fiji has benefited from these closer ties with 
China. On the political and diplomatic front, China has proven to be 
a  close and valued supporter and partner, especially as Fiji sought to 
define a more independent foreign policy after 2009. On the economic 
front, Fiji and China have exploited new opportunities, especially in 
trade and investment. The economic relationship has been increasingly 
underpinned by the BRI, which is seen as providing the catalyst for rapidly 
growing Chinese investment in Fiji and for increasing Fiji’s ‘exposure in 
the Chinese market’ (Fiji Broadcasting Corporation 2017). The BRI has 
also become the framework for future development cooperation between 
Fiji and China and for promoting people-to-people ties. 
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For China, Fiji is crucial to the implementation of the five diplomatic 
priorities announced in 2014 by President Xi in his policy of heightened 
engagement with the Pacific Islands region. Relations with Fiji serve to 
bolster China’s credentials as an economic power in the region. They also 
help to curtail Taiwan’s regional influence, which has waned in Fiji over the 
past decade. But this relationship has not been without its controversies 
and setbacks. It has been observed that some of the purported investment 
from China (especially in the tourism sector) has either failed to materialise 
or encountered major obstacles. These obstacles include alleged violation 
of environmental laws, sometimes leading to prosecution (such as the 
Freesoul real estate development on Malolo Island) and conflicts with 
landowning units (such as the Guangdong Silkroad Ark Investment (Fiji) 
Company’s hotel project on the Coral Coast). Such controversies in turn 
complicate the political relationship, fuelling criticisms in Fiji of the 
Chinese connection.13
In recent years, Fiji has welcomed the return of traditional partners—
especially Australia, New Zealand and the United States; all three 
motivated by a common interest to counter the perceived influence of 
China in Fiji (and the region more broadly). This ‘changing external 
environment’ has opened up new opportunities for Fiji—economically, 
politically and strategically. It is clear that the Bainimarama Government 
(elected for a further four years in November 2018) takes a pragmatic 
approach to its foreign and defence relations, making decisions based on 
its calculations of Fiji’s national interest. These decisions seem unlikely 
to privilege relations with China over other foreign relationships. How 
China responds to these changing dynamics in relations with Fiji remains 
to be seen. 
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The decision by Papua New Guinea (PNG) to sign on to China’s 
ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has reignited concerns regarding 
the intentions, impacts and long-term sustainability of Chinese financial 
activities in the Pacific. As one of the first Pacific nations to sign on to the 
BRI, PNG’s decision is a manifestation of increasing engagement with 
China by Pacific Island countries (PICs). China’s relations with PICs were 
recently scrutinised over allegations that China planned to build a military 
base in Vanuatu, which was denied by both countries. Though some 
traditional donors to the Pacific, like Australia, suspect that Beijing aims 
to become the dominant power in the region, these concerns are likely 
influenced by Australia’s own intentions to incorporate the Pacific within 
the ‘rules-based global order’ (Australian Government 2017). Research 
and media reports on the BRI tend to be dominated by this ‘China threat’ 
discourse that envisions the BRI as a monolithic, centralised and primarily 
strategic policy that exploits partner countries to enable Chinese access 
to foreign natural resources, markets and critical infrastructure. Some 
studies, such as the widely cited report by Harvard University researchers, 
extend this narrative by arguing that unsustainable loans associated with 
Chinese-funded infrastructure projects render certain PICs vulnerable to 
Beijing’s influence (Kehoe 2018). Through this zero-sum lens, PICs are 
often envisioned as the passive victims of China’s exploitation.
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Despite the significant academic and political interest in the BRI’s varied 
impacts, this narrative is rarely interrogated. This focus may lead to scholars 
overlooking the reasons PICs sometimes select Chinese financing over 
other sources and the multifaceted nature of Chinese investing entities and 
projects. Furthermore, the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ narrative tends to divert 
attention away from the more nuanced, and often more immediate, risks 
that joining the BRI may pose to PNG’s environment and governance. 
These risks may not be due to the Chinese nature of investment, but rather 
to the inexperienced or unethical character of certain companies, which 
may be paralleled by similarly damaging behaviour by firms from other 
nations. While certain Chinese projects in the Pacific do generate negative 
results for PICs, treating all Chinese financial activities the same may lead to 
an overly assertive response from countries like Australia that see China as 
interfering in Canberra’s ‘backyard’ (Wallis 2012). As PNG’s involvement 
in the BRI is likely to intensify these assumptions and the fears that China 
will entrap PNG in unsustainable debt, this chapter seeks to explore the 
credibility of popular narratives surrounding the BRI and determine the 
likely impacts of the BRI in PNG, as well as traditional donors’ responses. 
Though development is a contested concept and aid to the Pacific is 
increasingly securitised, this chapter attempts to provide an objective view 
of the likely opportunities and risks PNG faces when engaging in the BRI. 
Similarly, while the China–PNG relationship is considered in this chapter, 
it should be noted that the actions of other regional actors, such as Australia, 
may deliver similarly mixed outcomes for PNG.
This chapter is divided into three sections that each assess one broad 
perceived risk the BRI presents to PNG: the ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ 
theory, the BRI’s socioeconomic impacts and the influence of Chinese 
financing on governance. The first section introduces the BRI and ‘debt-
trap diplomacy’. It then investigates PNG’s current debt situation, the 
likelihood that the BRI in PNG is a coherent foreign policy manoeuvre by 
Beijing that aims to erode the influence of traditional regional powers, and 
the potential threats that Chinese investment poses to PNG’s sovereignty. 
This section argues that Chinese financing in the Pacific is fragmented, 
which may reduce the likelihood that these funds are part of a deliberate 
strategic ploy by China to exploit PICs. Nonetheless, PNG’s indebtedness 
does present an economic risk if Port Moresby’s revenue crisis continues 
and the country refrains from adopting fiscal consolidation policies (Pryke 
2017). Similarly, a continuation of China’s current lending practices, 
particularly the US$4.1 billion financing for the promised BRI roads 
project, could imperil PNG’s debt sustainability (Rajah et al. 2019).
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The second section evaluates the BRI’s impact on PNG’s economy and 
environment to argue that PNG and China’s current policy frameworks 
may be unable to ensure that BRI projects are conducted legally, 
sustainably and with the consent of relevant local stakeholders and 
landowners. Failure to meet these criteria will reduce the development 
benefits that accrue to locals. This may spark local protests that are able 
to delay and, in some cases, even stop foreign investment projects. Using 
data from the American Enterprise Institute’s China Global Investment 
Tracker, this section argues that large-scale Chinese investments in PNG 
tend to be concentrated in resource-intensive, extractive and polluting 
industries. This investment history, coupled with concerns that the BRI 
may ‘lock-in’ poor environmental practices in developing nations, raises 
particular concerns for island states like PNG (Hong and Johnson 2018).
The final section investigates the impact of Chinese financing on 
governance in PNG and finds that while certain Chinese companies abide 
by international norms to the extent of winning lucrative contracts from 
international lending bodies like the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
others may engage in corrupt practices that harm governance in PNG. 
However, this corruption is often believed to be facilitated by PNG partners. 
This indicates that it is not purely the presence of Chinese investment that 
harms governance in PNG, but rather the combination of corrupt Chinese 
and PNG entities, which may complicate reform attempts in PNG. 
The reaction to PNG’s decision to join the BRI by traditional donors like 
Australia is also considered. The extent to which PNG’s decision to join the 
BRI alters the current regional dynamics may depend on PNG’s ability and 
willingness to exploit Australia and China’s competition to access higher-




Under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, China’s international engagement 
has come to be defined by the US$1 trillion BRI. The aims of the BRI are 
multifaceted and contentious, with some commentators envisioning the 
BRI as a purely commercial mechanism while others argue that the BRI 
has geopolitical dimensions and may undermine the US’s post–World 
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War  II global leadership. Announced in 2013 as a means to connect 
Eurasian markets, the BRI was later incorporated into the Constitution of 
the Chinese Communist Party during the 19th National Party Congress 
in 2017 as a method of achieving ‘shared growth through discussion and 
collaboration’ (Xinhua 2017). At present, US$4.46 billion is earmarked 
for three BRI infrastructure projects in PNG: the High Priority Economic 
Roads Project, the Goroka Town Water Supply Upgrade Project and the 
PNG–China Integrated Agriculture Industrial Park.
The most significant concern raised by analysts regarding the BRI in PNG 
is the belief that Beijing aims to entrap partner countries in unsustainable 
levels of debt. Proponents of this theory argue that Beijing aims to then 
use this debt as leverage to achieve a combination of commercial and 
geopolitical aims. These purported objectives include acquiring ownership 
stakes in debtor countries’ natural resources and infrastructure assets 
(which may allegedly be used for Beijing’s military purposes), compelling 
debtor nations to support China’s diplomatic initiatives (particularly 
as they relate to Taiwan) and transforming debtor nations into ‘wholly 
owned subsidiaries of China’ (Chefitz and Parker 2018).
However, PNG’s debt-related risks are not primarily driven by Chinese 
lending but rather ineffective domestic policies. One of the most tangible 
BRI-related threats to PNG may be the exploitation of natural resources. 
Yet this risk is not unique to the BRI. Foreign companies from a variety 
of countries are also accused of exploiting PNG’s natural resources. One 
example is the controversial Exxon-led and partly Australian Government–
financed PNG LNG project, which is accused of significantly decreasing 
economic welfare in PNG across a range of measures, including aggregate 
employment and household disposable income, while increasing real gross 
domestic product (GDP) by just 10 per cent instead of the expected 97 per 
cent (Jubilee 2018). While the risk of exploitation by foreign companies 
may be intensified by the increased investment associated with the BRI, 
it can only be resolved by improved domestic regulation and enforcement 
mechanisms regarding economic and environmental policies.  
The China–PNG relationship
PNG’s decision to join the BRI is a relatively natural continuation of the 
dynamic relationship between Port Moresby and Beijing. Though China’s 
aid and trade presence in the Pacific are outstripped by other non-Pacific 
countries, China is now the region’s largest bilateral lender—and PNG is 
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no exception (Greenfield and Barrett 2018). In 2017, China was PNG’s 
fourth largest export and import partner after Australia, Singapore and 
Japan. From China’s perspective, PNG was China’s second largest trading 
partner and largest investment destination in the Pacific (Kenneth 2017a). 
Though Australia’s substantial aid program means that Canberra, rather 
than Beijing, is the main financial backer in the South Pacific, China is 
the Pacific’s and PNG’s largest bilateral creditor.
There is substantial uncertainty regarding PNG’s financial reliance on 
China due to confusion between Chinese investment and debt in PNG 
as well as a lack of year-on-year official data. According to the Chinese 
Ambassador to PNG Xue Bing, China had invested US$1.9 billion in 
PNG by the end of 2017. Media outlets such as the Asia Times and South 
China Morning Post have quoted this figure as representing the total 
volume of concessional loans PNG owes to China. Contrastingly, in 
2017, PNG budgetary documents revealed that PNG’s debt to China was 
approximately US$588 million, comprising 23.7 per cent of PNG’s total 
external debt (PNG Department of Treasury 2017a, 2017b). However, 
it is difficult to update this figure, as PNG’s most recent budget refrains 
from identifying the total amount of debt owed to China. This omission 
challenges attempts to track variations in PNG’s debt to China over time, 
an important indicator of the sustainability of PNG’s debt and the overall 
nature of the PNG–China relationship. Moreover, in some areas of the 
2020 PNG National Budget, data on PNG’s debt obligations to China is 
grouped with PNG’s debt obligations to Taiwan, rendering it difficult to 
track variations in PNG’s debt obligations to China specifically over time 
(PNG Department of Treasury 2019a).
There is no universally accepted formula or debt ratio that can indicate 
whether foreign debt accumulation is sustainable or unsustainable 
(Roubini 2001). Moreover, it is not solely the volume of debt accumulation 
in aggregate or relative-to-GDP terms that presents risks. PNG must 
also be able to regularly service its debts in order to avoid defaulting 
on any loans. Most research outputs and media reporting on China’s 
alleged ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ in the Pacific focus on the total volume 
of debt owed to China and the associated risks of insolvency. This close 
scrutiny of PNG’s and PICs’ total indebtedness to China may, somewhat 
ironically, lead observers to overlook the significant debt-servicing risks 




A debt sustainability analysis by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
published in November 2017, calculated PNG’s central debt-to-GDP ratio 
at 33.4 per cent, a relatively low figure within the domestic and regional 
context. This figure was already higher than the debt-to-GDP ratio of 
30  per  cent mandated by PNG’s Fiscal Responsibility Act (IMF  2017). 
In October 2019, the PNG parliament reported that PNG’s debt-to-GDP 
ratio had risen to 39.8 per cent, a figure some officials appeared to blame on 
the ‘many, many poor investment decisions’ and ‘risky and often irresponsible 
loans’ of the previous O’Neill administration (PNG  Department of 
Treasury 2019b). A subsequent report confirmed that PNG’s debt-to-GDP 
ratio rose to 38 per cent in 2018, which the IMF attributed to ‘persistent 
overshoots on personnel costs, together with falling revenues’ (IMF 2020). 
As it appeared unfeasible to lower the debt-to-GDP ratio to below the 
legally advised level of 30 per cent within the year, the PNG parliament 
agreed to raise the mandated debt-to-GDP ratio to a maximum of 45 per 
cent. However, the IMF projects PNG’s public debt to reach 45 per cent 
of its GDP over the medium-term. The 2019 PNG National Budget’s goal 
to reduce the country’s debt ratio to 30 per cent of the GDP by 2022 may 
prove difficult to achieve in this context. 
A lingering concern is whether official data captures all outstanding debt 
owed by the PNG Government and its various statutory authorities and 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Recent research suggests that as much 
as half of Chinese overseas loans to developing nations may be ‘hidden’ 
and not captured in official reporting (Horn et al. 2019). The varying 
transparency of both PNG and Chinese government data means that 
PNG’s debt situation may become more ambiguous—and potentially 
more precarious—over time. 
PNG’s deteriorating debt profile led to Standard & Poor’s (S&P) lowering 
PNG’s sovereign credit rating from B+ to B in April 2018—five levels 
below ‘investment grade’. The PNG Secretary for Treasury Dairi Vaele 
criticised the downgrade and argued that it was based on ‘outdated data 
and failed to comprehend fully the more positive fiscal outturn in 2017 
and early 2018’ (PNG Department of Treasury 2018). Regardless of 
whether the S&P downgrade was an accurate reflection of PNG’s debt, 
the situation is likely to worsen unless Port Moresby implements the IMF’s 
recommendations of consolidating its fiscal position through measures 
that include acquiring more cost-effective and longer-term financing. 
Whether China is able to offer financing that meets these requirements 
and partially alleviate PNG’s debt situation is uncertain.
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The burden of debt-servicing repayments may present a more immediate 
risk to PNG. Debt servicing is persistently the government’s third largest 
area of expenditure, comprising more than 10 per cent of total expenditure 
in the past three budgets. Recent estimates suggest that PNG’s annual 
debt repayments to China will increase 25 per cent to approximately 
US$67 million by 2023 (Barrett and Greenfield 2019). However, these 
calculations appear to draw on data from the PNG 2020 National Budget 
that groups China and Taiwan together as a single creditor, making it 
challenging to identify the proportion of the debt obligations driven by 
China and the proportion driven by Taiwan. Despite this limitation of the 
data, two insights can be drawn: China and Taiwan combined represent 
PNG’s largest ‘bilateral’ creditor, and PNG’s debt-servicing obligations 
will increase notably over the short to medium-term. 
The growth of PNG’s debt obligations is particularly concerning 
given PNG’s challenges with its ‘revenue crisis’, which may impede 
Port Moresby’s capacity to address outstanding debts (Howes 2017). 
In 2017, the PNG Government’s revenue declined to 2006 levels. The 
2020 budget offers hope that PNG’s total revenue will reach its highest 
levels in the country’s recorded history, but expenditure is expected to 
similarly rise such that PNG is left with a ‘historic’ budget cash deficit 
of K4,631.1  million (PNG  Department of Treasury 2019c). The 
previous O’Neill administration refrained from implementing the IMF’s 
recommendations to resolve the revenue crisis by reducing government 
expenditure on funds for members of parliament and depreciating the 
kina. However, the current Marape administration has signalled its 
willingness to consider an IMF bailout, heralding stricter financial 
measures to improve PNG’s economic sustainability.
PNG’s level of debt and related solvency and liquidity risks are 
further obscured by the lack of transparency surrounding Chinese aid. 
Some observers argue that Chinese aid, when disbursed as a loan, may 
increase the indebtedness of recipient nations (Var and Po 2017). Attaining 
an accurate understanding of the impact of Chinese aid on PNG’s debt is 
particularly important, as a single Chinese project in PNG may have both 
aid and investment aspects, conflating the boundaries, aims and impacts 
of both sources of funding. One notable example is the US$1.4 billion 
Ramu Nickel mine, which is among China’s largest investment projects 
in PNG. The exact proportions of aid and commercial funding to Ramu 
Nickel are uncertain, and made more unclear by contradictory statements 
by the mine’s operating company, the Metallurgical Corporation of 
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China Ltd (MCC). Given Ramu Nickel’s significant size and importance 
for both PNG and China, it is probable that BRI projects could 
incorporate similarly blurred boundaries between commercial finance and 
development aid.
According to the Lowy Institute’s Pacific Aid Map, actual Chinese aid 
spending in PNG peaked in 2014 at approximately US$120 million and 
declined to US$22 million in 2017 (Lowy Institute 2019). However, 
Chinese aid spending is likely to increase in PNG over the medium-
term as the two countries implement BRI-affiliated aid projects. China’s 
aid commitment to PNG soared to a record-high $4.7 billion in 2017, 
largely driven by the High Priority Economic Road Project. Analysing 
the funding composition of spent Chinese aid to PNG reveals that, in 
aggregate, concessional loans comprised 80.48 per cent of spent funds 
between 2009 and 2019. The loan composition of Chinese aid funding to 
PNG rose from 0 per cent in 2009 to a peak of 98.72 per cent in 2016, 
but then dropped year-on-year to 66.79 per cent in 2017, 14.46 per cent 
in 2018 and 0 per cent in 2019. In contrast, the loan composition of 
China’s committed aid remains generally high at 99.35 per cent in 2017, 
86.87 per cent in 2018 and 0 per cent in 2019. The decline in the loan 
composition of China’s spent aid is a significant reversal, but it is uncertain 
whether this trend will hold once China begins to realise its BRI-related 
aid commitments.
Given the burden posed by PNG’s existing debts, the likelihood that 
joining the BRI will be accompanied by further Chinese lending, and 
Port Moresby’s potentially limited capacity to service its debts, it is 
understandable that some observers are concerned about the economic 
risks posed by PNG’s decision to join the BRI. However, China’s ability to 
exploit this debt for political or strategic purposes is more unclear.
The view from Beijing: The organisation, funding 
and delivery of the BRI
Contrary to China’s centralised government structure, the 
conceptualisation, funding and implementation of BRI projects exhibit 
notable decentralisation. President Xi and other prominent Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) leaders direct top-level national strategy and 
rhetoric surrounding the BRI and urge Chinese government agencies 
to realise BRI goals. Yet there is significant scope for implementing 
agencies, banks and SOEs to construe Xi’s direction in a way that serves 
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the organisation’s political or commercial interests. As these substate 
entities are bound by diverging mandates and interests, different 
institutions are likely to generate different development outcomes for BRI 
partner countries like PNG. Thus, recognising the variabilities between 
the Chinese substate organisations involved in the BRI is crucial to 
understanding how the BRI may function in PNG and the overarching 
strategic or commercial intents that drive it. Fundamentally, the impacts 
of the BRI in PNG are likely to be influenced not only by the combination 
of Chinese institutions involved but also the ability of these institutions to 
cooperate with relevant PNG government agencies.
Several Chinese government agencies are involved in the BRI. 
The  National  Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and 
sectoral agencies appear to provide more policy input for BRI projects 
than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) (Ye 2018). Unlike the MFA and MOFCOM, the NDRC 
has made several new policy proposals and risen as the central agency 
guiding the BRI. As the NDRC’s mandate relates to domestic economic 
planning, this indicates that the BRI may be guided more by China’s 
domestic needs rather than its foreign policy.
Some of the most important funding bodies for BRI projects are Chinese 
policy banks, Chinese commercial banks and multilateral development 
banks. These institutions often provide ‘concessionary loans’ with terms 
that vary widely from interest-free to commercial rates. These terms may 
be less favourable than funding offered by organisations like the World 
Bank and the ADB (Slattery et al. 2018). However, given the lack of 
transparency surrounding most Chinese lending agencies, it is difficult 
to understand the full scope of PNG’s debt obligations to China or 
the likelihood of renegotiating onerous debt. Tonga’s deferment of its 
US$115  million debt to China suggests that China remains willing 
to provide debt relief in specific—albeit unclear—situations. Tongan 
officials denied speculation that China provided debt relief to Tonga in 
exchange for the country signing on to the BRI (which occurred five days 
after China provided debt deferment), but the reliability of these claims 
is uncertain. The modes of financing and types of lending institutions 
associated with the BRI generate widely different opportunities and risks 
for debtors, particularly small debtors like PNG that may possess limited 
negotiating power or leverage over China.
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The primary implementing bodies of the BRI are SOEs. Despite their 
linkage to the state, the motivations of individual SOEs are often a unique 
combination of political and commercial rationales that may be distinct 
from similar SOEs and the CCP itself. While Chinese private businesses 
in PNG abound, particularly in the retail sector, large-scale investment 
projects are generally driven by SOEs. Indeed, the vast majority of 
Chinese firms that have made investments of over US$100 million in 
PNG are SOEs (Appendix 1). This trend reflects the differing preferences 
of Chinese SOEs and private firms, with SOEs tending to align more 
closely with Beijing’s strategic objectives, prioritise natural resource 
acquisition and demonstrate neutrality to political and economic risk 
(Amighini et al. 2013:312–25). However, SOEs are also incentivised to 
‘brand’ their intended projects as being part of the BRI in order to gain 
easier and greater access to state-backed finance (Financial Times 2017). 
In contrast to popular conceptualisations of the BRI as a cohesive and 
pre-determined strategy crafted by the CCP, the commercial motivations 
of SOEs may fragment the selection and implementation of BRI projects.
In addition, the practice of reverse engineering Chinese aid projects in 
PNG may herald further fragmentation of China’s involvement in PNG 
and the broader Pacific (Smith 2015). This process refers to Chinese 
contractors and their Pacific partners developing a project and then 
misleadingly framing it as a local initiative to Chinese lending institutions. 
The complexity surrounding the implementation of the BRI generates 
two key implications for PNG. First, statements regarding a clear Chinese 
strategy in PNG may be overblown due to the diversity of interests, public 
agencies and private entities involved. Second, it may fall on the shoulders 
of PNG officials to ensure that Chinese investment projects are cohesive 
and work towards PNG’s longer-term economic goals, rather than deliver 
a piecemeal and fractured result.
The complex bureaucratic processes that underlie the BRI suggest that BRI 
project selection may not always be rational or part of a larger overarching 
strategy driven by the core CCP leadership. In contrast, the number of 
Chinese government agencies involved, their competing interests and 
their unclear hierarchies are all factors that complicate the process of 
BRI project selection and suggest that the BRI’s implementation may be 
more fragmented than assumed by many foreign commentators. While 
it is almost certain that many BRI projects are driven by Chinese foreign 
policy objectives, this cannot be assumed for any or all BRI projects. 
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Given PNG’s late entry to the BRI and the Pacific’s somewhat peripheral 
importance to Beijing, it is unlikely that all Chinese and BRI investment 
in PNG are driven primarily by Beijing’s geopolitical objectives.
The argument that Chinese lending in the Pacific is not driven by strategic 
means or debt-trap diplomacy is further supported by empirical data. 
Tonga is the only Pacific nation at ‘high risk’ of debt distress and where 
Chinese lending comprise the majority of debt (Fox and Dornan 2018). 
However, Tonga’s debt to China is the result of the 2006 Nuku’alofa riots 
that damaged Tonga’s central business district and political moves by 
Tongan leaders to direct loan-financed expenditures to their electorates. 
These loans were enabled by for-profit Chinese construction firms rather 
than strategic ploys or opportunism by Beijing. Fundamentally, the 
origins, terms and contractors of BRI projects vary widely. A multiplicity 
of public and private entities from China and the host country are often 
involved in delivering BRI projects, and each of these entities is driven 
by its own unique objective. Even if the CCP desired to exert debt-trap 
diplomacy in PNG and the Pacific, corralling the various Chinese firms 
and government agencies involved in the region may prove a difficult task.
Is PNG selling its sovereignty?
The dominance of the debt-trap diplomacy theory raises the questions of 
why PNG and other debtor nations continue to seek Chinese financing 
and the extent to which PNG’s sovereignty is threatened by Chinese 
investment. While China has been accused of exploiting PNG’s natural 
resources, projects like the Pacific Marine Industrial Zone (PMIZ) indicate 
that PNG companies and individuals have also gained significantly at the 
expense of Chinese interests. Moving beyond such zero-sum dynamics, 
Chinese and PNG partners have also cooperated to engineer mutually 
beneficial and successful development projects, such as the dormitories at 
the University of Goroka (Smith 2012).
While ineffective Chinese projects harm PNG’s development outcomes 
and fiscal space, they do not dissuade PNG from continuing to seek Chinese 
financing. One reason for PNG’s ongoing reliance on Chinese investment 
and aid is PNG’s critical need for infrastructure development. This need 
may be more easily financed through China’s ‘flexible’ and infrastructure-
targeted support than Australian support, which prioritises governance 
initiatives (Packham 2018). The recently announced AU$2  billion 
Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP) could 
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see Canberra’s priorities shift from governance to infrastructure, but it 
is currently too early to tell. The ADB estimates that the Pacific needs 
US$46 billion in infrastructure financing over the period 2016–30. When 
compared to other parts of the Asia-Pacific, the Pacific Islands region has 
the highest proportion of investment needs as a percentage of GDP at 
9.1 per cent (ADB 2017). The BRI could thus fulfil a crucial need for 
investment funding in PNG and its PIC neighbours if the funds are used 
appropriately to finance productive assets.
The focus on China’s alleged debt-trap diplomacy may also overlook more 
tangible threats to PNG’s sovereignty. Of particular concern is the fact 
that PNG has permitted certain concessional loan agreements, such as the 
agreement for the PMIZ, to be ‘governed by and construed in accordance 
with the laws of China’ rather than PNG and ‘irrevocably waived any’ 
sovereign dispute for PNG in the event of loan disputes (PNG Exposed 
2012). Agreements of this nature are not always adhered to in practice. 
For example, a PNG court successfully ordered a block on further 
construction on the PMIZ in October 2012 (ABC News 2012). Yet even 
if these agreements are not acted upon, PNG’s waiving of its sovereign 
immunity in certain loan disputes is concerning. This practice may carry 
greater risks under the more ambiguous dispute resolution mechanisms 
of the BRI, which are alleged to prioritise Chinese over foreign interests.
Fundamentally, while PNG’s level of debt may not be ideal, any debt 
crises are likely to be driven more by domestic mismanagement rather 
than Chinese strategising. China’s ability to capitalise on any debt crises 
in PNG is constrained by the level of fragmentation inherent in the BRI 
process. This fragmentation is particularly noticeable in PNG due to the 
practice of reverse-engineering projects, the country’s late entry to the BRI 
and the region’s lesser importance to Beijing. The focus on the debt-trap 
diplomacy theory of China’s geopolitical ambitions may thus overlook 
threats that are less grand than transforming PNG into a ‘tributary state’, 
but of more immediate risk to PNG’s economy and sovereignty.
The economic impact of the BRI in PNG
While the quantity of Chinese investment is rising, its quality and 
spread across PNG’s economy are often ambiguous. Certain projects, 
like the University of Goroka dormitories built by Guangdong Foreign 
Construction (GFC), are recognised as successful Chinese projects 
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(Smith  2018). Indeed, the dormitories were so favoured by locals that 
during the 2009 anti-Asian riots, students from the University of Goroka 
defended the Chinese GFC workers from rioters. In contrast, some 
Chinese projects, such as Lae Port and a rice monopoly project in Central 
Province, attract substantial criticism for overblown budgets, defective 
workmanship and breaches of customary landowners’ rights (Eroro 2012; 
Papua New Guinea Today 2016). Other projects, like MCC’s Ramu 
Nickel mine, receive both substantial criticism for environmental 
damages, delayed royalty payments and land ownership issues, and some 
praise for MCC’s provision of ‘schools and clinics, business opportunities 
and roads and bridges’ (Joku 2009).
The variable quality of Chinese investment in PNG is likely due to the 
fact that the investing firms are often highly diverse in size, history, 
capabilities and organisational and operational culture—all of which 
influence development outcomes for PNG. However, these firms may be 
united in their similar levels of inexperience in PNG. As only two Chinese 
companies have invested in multiple projects worth over US$100 million 
(Appendix 1), many large-scale investments in PNG are undertaken by 
Chinese firms with limited to no experience in similarly sized projects 
within a PNG context. Even Chinese firms with long histories in PNG 
may not adapt to the local context. For example, though MCC has been 
involved in PNG through the Ramu Nickel mine since 2005, the firm 
is still attempting—and struggling—to apply Chinese approaches in 
a PNG context (Moyle and Dayant 2018). While this inexperience does 
not characterise all Chinese firms in PNG, it may create challenges for 
future BRI projects and their Chinese contractors. 
In the absence of comprehensive official data, the American Enterprise 
Institute and the Heritage Foundation’s China Global Investment Tracker 
(CGIT) can be used to evaluate China’s history of large-scale investment 
in the Pacific and identify likely BRI projects (Appendix 1). The CGIT 
compiles all Chinese foreign investments greater than US$100 million in 
value from 2005–17. While these figures are unlikely to be precise due to 
the lack of official government sources, the data provides valuable insights 
into broad patterns of Chinese investment that are likely to be intensified 
under the BRI.
Chinese investments in the Pacific worth more than US$100 million were 
already concentrated in PNG prior to Port Moresby signing on to the 
BRI. Timor-Leste and Fiji were the only other PICs that received Chinese 
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investments of over US$100 million. The limited sample size of Chinese 
investment in other PICs makes a cross-country comparison with PNG 
difficult, but it is interesting to note the role of China Railway Engineering 
(CRECG). CRECG was responsible for the first and largest-recorded BRI 
investment in Timor-Leste at US$290 million, and is a major shareholder 
of China Railway Group Limited—the company that was contracted to 
build PNG’s first three BRI projects, collectively worth US$4.46 billion 
(Kenneth 2017b).
Only two Chinese companies—China Communications Construction 
Co., Ltd. (CCCC) and China State Construction Engineering (CSCEC)—
have completed multiple US$100 million or more investments in PNG. 
CCCC is the only Chinese company to pursue investments of more than 
US$100 million in the same sector multiple times, having invested twice 
in the PNG transport sector in 2012 and 2013. Out of the 15 listed 
Chinese investments in PNG, 60 per cent were concentrated in one of 
three sectors: transport (four projects), real estate (three projects) and 
metals (two projects). The three sectors that attracted the most Chinese 
investment were metals (US$930 million), energy (US$880 million) 
and real estate (US$730 million), cumulatively making up 65 per cent 
of the total recorded US$3,880 million in Chinese investment. If these 
trends continue under the implementation of the BRI, PNG is likely to 
experience an influx of investment bids from new Chinese companies 
targeting the energy, metals, real estate and transport sectors. The 
predominance of extractive and polluting industries in China’s historical 
investment portfolio in PNG may threaten environmental sustainability 
and protections in PNG.
PNG’s environment and land tenure
Given PICs’ vulnerability to the risks of environmental degradation, 
pollution and climate change, the allegations that China is using the BRI 
to exploit foreign natural resources and outsource pollution-intensive 
production must be examined. Some observers argue that the BRI is 
partly driven by an attempt to alleviate China’s oversupply of steel and 
cement production and will thus promote carbon- and pollution-intensive 
development models in host countries (Pike 2017). Indeed, rather than 
assisting host countries in developing renewable energy sources, the BRI 
may ‘lock-in’ their fossil-fuel dependency (Ascensão et al. 2018). China 
also has significant commercial interests in PNG timber, nickel and 
natural gas that may be expanded under the BRI. 
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The PNG–China timber trade reveals that the failure by both the 
PNG Government and Chinese investors to exert due diligence harms 
the reputations of both countries and may enrich certain political and 
economic elites at the expense of PNG citizens. While Chinese firms are 
not the only foreign entities complicit in illegal logging, they deserve 
particular scrutiny as PNG is China’s largest supplier of tropical logs and 
PNG exports roughly 80 per cent of its timber to China (PNG Exposed 
2010). Illegal logging has been recognised as a problem in PNG since 
the Barnett commission in 1989. The issue recently received renewed 
attention due to investigations by the non-government organisation 
Global Witness and the controversies associated with PNG’s Special 
Agriculture and Business Lease (SABL) licences. In 2017, major Chinese 
and US hardware companies were forced to halt sales and review their 
supply chains following a Global Witness investigation that revealed 
a third of PNG’s timber was illegally obtained from land owned by local 
communities (Global Witness 2017). PNG landowners allege that the 
government is attempting to ‘give away’ local land to foreign logging 
companies, often originating from Malaysia, and that police personnel 
intimidated protestors (Pacific Media Centre 2017). These observations 
corroborate the Revenue Watch Institute’s finding that resource governance 
in PNG is ‘poor’ due to weak government oversight, corruption and 
opaque data (Papua New Guinea Mine Watch 2014).
Many of these controversies occurred under the widely criticised SABLs, 
which saw up to 12 per cent of PNG land loaned to foreign entities for 
up to 99 years. Though the PNG Government claimed to have cancelled 
the leases following a commission of inquiry and international criticism, 
illegal logging has continued (Blades 2018). While much of the criticism 
regarding SABL licences has focused on the complicity of the Department 
of Lands and the PNG Forestry Authority, it is also speculated that 
elements of PNG customs contributed to illegal exports of timber to 
China. The wide variety of government agencies and officials complicit in 
illegal logging may complicate reforms that aim to eradicate the practice.
The SABL issue may reaffirm PNG landowners’ fears that some foreign 
entities are attempting to alienate customary land. Certain Chinese 
companies are among the many foreign investors that have allegedly 
infringed upon landowners’ rights. For example, the Basamuk Landowners 
Association threatened to shut down the MCC-run Basamuk refinery due 
to MCC’s perceived neglect of local landowners and illegitimate use of the 
land. The association’s criticism of the Madang Provincial Government’s 
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mismanagement of the dispute raises concerns regarding PNG officials’ 
ability to mediate tensions between locals and foreign investors, and the 
credibility of government officials in the eyes of local landowners.
It must be noted that Chinese companies are not the only foreign firms to 
exploit PNG’s environmental regulatory system. For example, Australian 
mining businesses and Malaysian logging entities have been implicated in 
significant environmental infractions in PNG. This suggests that PNG’s 
current policy and enforcement mechanisms may be unable to prevent 
foreign exploitation of local resources and land. 
As such, it is worth considering the BRI-related regulations that are 
intended to ensure Chinese investments under the BRI are legal, ethical 
and green to discern the extent to which PNG’s natural resources are 
vulnerable to further exploitation. Though the Chinese Government has 
produced numerous policies that call for BRI projects to be environmentally 
friendly, such as the Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road, few 
of these policies are binding (Zhu 2015:27). Even compulsory policies 
possess weak enforcement mechanisms and are unevenly implemented. 
Enforcement mechanisms often rely on the host country reporting 
environmental infractions, which may be challenging in countries like 
PNG where accountability mechanisms may be underdeveloped, or 
local politicians may have stakes in Chinese projects. Despite Chinese 
and international rhetoric surrounding ‘greening’ the BRI, there may be 
little difference between BRI and non-BRI investments in the context 
of environmental risk in PNG.
The ability of the BRI to destabilise PNG
PNG’s decision to join the BRI has reignited concerns that Chinese 
financing may prove to be a destabilising force in PNG and the Pacific. 
These arguments do not necessarily rely on assuming the BRI is a strategic 
ploy by China to control the Pacific, but rather that Chinese assistance 
adheres to weaker standards than other foreign development partners, 
contributes to corruption in PNG and threatens the security interests of 
traditional donors (Wallis 2017:5). This section argues that while certain 
Chinese investors in PNG are able to meet international standards to the 
point of winning competitive and lucrative ADB contracts, some Chinese 
companies and PNG officials exploit PNG’s relatively weak regulatory 
environment for personal and commercial gains and erode good governance 
in the country. In addition, traditional donors like Australia view Chinese 
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investment in certain PNG industries, such as telecommunications and 
defence, as a potential security risk and intervene accordingly. PNG may 
be able to exploit this competition between Australia and China to secure 
preferable lending arrangements. Fundamentally, joining the BRI may 
increase the risk of corruption in PNG if the influx in foreign lending is 
not accompanied by anticorruption measures and improved bureaucratic 
and enforcement capabilities. 
Adherence to international norms
Though Chinese financing may be valued by PNG and other recipient 
countries for its flexibility, it has often been criticised for failing to 
adhere to international standards and practices, particularly in regards to 
transparency and accountability. While China’s model of investment does 
not always reflect international norms, some Chinese companies in PNG 
play significant roles as contractors in projects funded by multilateral 
institutions like the ADB. This indicates that a notable proportion of 
Chinese work in PNG does abide by international standards and suggests 
that Chinese companies’ cooperation with the ADB may inculcate 
Chinese contractors with more internationally acceptable practices. 
From 2011 to 2016, the most significant contractor for ADB projects 
in PNG was the China Overseas Engineering Group Co. Ltd (PNG), 
also known as Covec (PNG) Ltd (Appendix 2). Covec is a subsidiary of 
China Railway Group Limited, which is in turn a subsidiary of the state-
owned China Railway Engineering Corporation—the same SOE that was 
contracted to complete US$4.46 billion in BRI projects in PNG. 
Covec is notable not only for ranking first among the ADB’s top 
contractors, but also for the contract amount. In the periods 2011–15 
and 2012–16, Covec’s ADB contract alone made up the majority of 
the ADB’s total contract funds for PNG at 63 per cent and 56 per cent 
of total funding, respectively. The US$80–88 million contracts won 
by Covec are also unusual, with the next highest ADB contract being 
US$14.17 million, roughly one-sixth of this amount. Another Chinese 
company, Hunan Lishui Hydro and Port Co. Ltd (JV), became one of 
the top five most significant ADB contractors in 2012–17 by pursuing 
a joint venture partnership with UK company AG Investment Limited to 
deliver the Divune Hydropower Plant (Post-Courier 2016). Combining 
the contract amounts awarded to Covec and Hunan Lishui reveals that 
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Chinese companies were awarded 63 per cent, 63 per cent and 26 per 
cent of total ADB contract funds in the 2011–15, 2012–16 and 2013–17 
periods, respectively.
Though Covec has become increasingly well-established in PNG over the 
past decade, its history in the country is not spotless. In 2017, the PNG 
National Court ordered Covec to pay US$15.5 million to Kundiawa-
based business man Peter Kama and his family for illegally extracting 
road building materials from Kama’s land in 2006 (Pacific Islands Report 
2017). This figure was the largest ever awarded by the National Court. 
Covec’s history and more recent relationship with the ADB indicates that 
while certain Chinese companies may act dubiously, this is not always 
an indicator of their future behaviour. Some Chinese firms in PNG 
may be able to progress and deliver improved development outcomes. 
The cooperation between Chinese contractors and multilateral institutions 
like the ADB indicates that Chinese organisations in PNG are more diverse 
in terms of their operations than assumed by some commentators, which 
is a promising assessment for PNG’s ability to ensure that the benefits of 
the BRI accrue proportionately and transparently to PNG.
Given the recent referendum for independence held by Bougainville, 
China’s ties to the region are worth briefly noting, particularly as 
Beijing has reportedly offered valuable investments and may support 
Bougainville’s bid for sovereignty diplomatically. Chinese representatives 
have approached Sam Kauona, a former Bougainville Revolutionary Army 
general and possible presidential candidate, with a detailed infrastructure 
plan that Australia and the US have reportedly not matched (Danckert 
and Bohane 2019). Unspecified Chinese officials also reportedly expressed 
interest in reopening the controversial US$58 billion Panguna mine, 
which could be linked to a proposed US$1 billion package for investment 
in mining, tourism and agriculture to assist Bougainville’s transition to 
independence (Bohane 2019). However, Bougainville has experienced 
its own challenges with Chinese investment. Attempts to encourage 
Chinese investment in Bougainville from 2011 onwards resulted in joint 
venture Chinese–Bougainvillean companies either disappearing, failing 
to pay local contractors or stifling local competition. An anonymous 
Bougainville official claimed that the Bougainville Government ‘cannot 
control [the Chinese companies] … they are doing whatever they want on 
Bougainville’ (Roka 2014). In March 2019, the Chinese partners of the 
Bougainville Import Export General Corporation allegedly disappeared 
after failing to pay taxes and ‘took all the cash [out of the company] and 
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left nothing’ (Tseraha 2019). While it is possible that Chinese investment 
in Bougainville under the BRI would prove to be more organised and 
reliable, increased involvement by the Bougainville Government seems 
critical to ensuring that the mistakes of the past are not repeated.
Corruption
Chinese investment may exacerbate PNG’s challenges with corruption, 
public sector mismanagement and poor governance by offering less 
regulated funding opportunities for projects of dubious development 
value. Most recently, former PNG prime minister Michael Somare was 
accused of accepting a US$1 million bribe from Chinese company ZTE 
(Grigg and McKenzie 2018). 
Prior to joining the BRI, the PNG Government vowed to crack down on 
business dealings with China by mandating local participation in Chinese 
projects in PNG, among other measures (Kenneth 2018). It is unclear 
how Port Moresby’s promises will be incorporated into BRI projects. 
Given Port Moresby’s history of awarding contracts worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars to Chinese companies blacklisted by the World Bank 
for fraud and corruption, PNG may struggle to further regulate its 
business dealings with China.
In 2012, PNG awarded CCCC’s subsidiary China Harbour Engineering 
Company (CHEC) a US$290 million contract to develop PNG’s Lae 
Port, despite the company being blacklisted by the World Bank for fraud 
at the time. The PNG Government’s response to CHEC’s mismanagement 
may be more concerning than the faulty development itself. Port Moresby 
refrained from publicly disclosing the results of government inquiries into 
the Lae Port mismanagement. In addition, though a relevant PNG authority 
stated that CHEC would fund the repairs, then opposition leader Don 
Polye alleged that CHEC refused to cooperate with the PNG Government 
(Papua New Guinea Today 2016). Despite these controversies, the PNG 
Government attempted to shortlist CHEC as a contractor for the Lae 
Port’s second phase of development prior to the announcement of the 
tender process. This alleged behaviour may undermine the political will 
and ability of the PNG Government to further regulate Chinese business 
dealings in PNG. Indeed, some PNG government officials may be active 
participants in, rather than the passive victims of, corruption involving 
Chinese companies. This distinction suggests that attempts to reform 
governance in PNG that only target Chinese investment are unlikely to 
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be successful, as this would only address one side of the problem. Greater 
transparency regarding investment deals is necessary to reduce the risk of 
corruption and improve both commercial assets for Chinese investors and 
development outcomes for PNG.
Foreign reactions
While Chinese investment in PNG and the broader Pacific is generally 
viewed with suspicion in foreign policy circles, certain BRI projects are 
likely to be more controversial than others and may influence PICs’ 
relationships with other countries. The BRI incorporates technology, 
information and communication projects that, if pursued in PNG or 
other PICs, may spark security concerns from nations like Australia. 
For  example, Australia intervened to majority fund a US$136 million 
cable project to PNG and Solomon Islands, planned to be developed by 
Huawei, due to Canberra’s suspicions regarding Huawei’s links to the 
Chinese Government. Canberra controversially announced that it would 
fund the US$136 million project through the aid budget, which critics 
argued could reorient Australia’s aid spending away from its traditional 
priorities of governance and towards infrastructure (Graue 2018; 
SBS News 2018).
While the Australian Aid Budget Summary 2018–19 does not disclose how 
the cable project will be funded, infrastructure spending as a percentage 
of overall official development assistance by investment priority was 
higher than the Pacific average of 21.7 per cent in both Solomon Islands 
(42.6 per cent) and PNG (22.5 per cent) (Australian Government 2018). 
Australia’s promise that it will ‘compete’ with China’s infrastructure 
spending in the Pacific and the establishment of the AIFFP indicate 
that similar episodes of competition over infrastructure projects in the 
Pacific—and in PNG in particular—are likely to reignite (Wroe 2018).
PNG may be able to capitalise on this competition to attain more 
preferable lending arrangements, but whether this would deliver better 
outcomes for the PNG economy as a whole or solely for certain PNG 
officials is unclear. On one hand, PNG appeared to benefit from regional 
competition by securing a US$300 million loan from Australia that 
‘replaces’ a similar loan proposed by the China Development Bank in 
late 2019, despite claims by the Australian Government that the loan 
was ‘completely unrelated’ to China (Clarke 2019). On the other hand, 
then PNG prime minister Peter O’Neill is accused of using China’s and 
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Australia’s regional rivalry to fund the construction of the controversial 
Western Pacific University in O’Neill’s own electorate of Ialibu, Southern 
Highlands (PNGi 2018). O’Neill’s electorate was selected as the location 
for the new university without any public feasibility study or independent 
valuation of the land. As PNG’s existing universities are in need of funding 
and repair, the economic benefit the new university may generate is not 
guaranteed. If the Western Pacific University is indicative of an emerging 
trend in PNG development, the competition between Australia and 
China could worsen, rather than improve, economic outcomes in PNG.
It is highly likely that PNG’s decision to join the BRI will herald more 
infrastructure projects that are concerning to traditional partners like 
Australia, which views the Pacific as its ‘part of the world’ (The Australian 
2018). Hence, Chinese investment in PNG does not only affect the 
behaviour of Chinese and PNG stakeholders, but also the behaviour of 
other countries with strategic stakes in the Pacific. The Pacific could stand 
to gain from the increased foreign attention and investment from China 
and potential competitors that come with the BRI, but this depends on 
the ability of PICs’ governments to manage these funds appropriately. 
Without greater transparency and stronger anticorruption measures—
both challenging endeavours in their own right—Port Moresby may find 
it difficult to ensure that BRI projects are sustainable, non-fraudulent and 
benefit the local and national economies.
Conclusion
Like its Pacific neighbours, PNG is in significant need of infrastructure 
financing that the BRI could provide. However, the BRI presents 
a  myriad of risks to PNG’s economy and governance that may have 
been overlooked by the current discourse, which tends to focus on the 
debt-trap diplomacy theory. The ability of PNG to harness the potential 
development benefits associated with the BRI will depend on the quality 
of the Chinese contractors involved and the aptitude of the responsible 
PNG officials. Attempts by traditional donors like Australia to dissuade 
PNG from relying on China are unlikely to be successful and may 
entrench the commonly held perception by PNG locals and leaders alike 
that Australia is a paternalistic force in the region. Accordingly, foreign 
critics of PICs’ debt to China are often met with significant criticism 
from Pacific leaders, particularly when these critics do not offer alternative 
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funding arrangements. The nascent AIFFP may mitigate these criticisms 
if Canberra is able to provide more cost-effective loans and fund higher-
quality projects than the BRI. The exact impact of the AIFFP is difficult 
to predict given the lack of clarity regarding the proportion of grants to 
loans offered, the allotment of financing across the Pacific, the sources 
of the AIFFP’s funds and whether the AIFFP will affect Australia’s aid 
budget for the Pacific.
Current criticisms of China’s increased involvement in the Pacific and 
PNG’s decision to join the BRI in particular tend to focus solely on the 
level of debt owed by PICs to Beijing. In certain cases, such as Tonga, 
the country’s level of debt is likely to be a genuine threat to its economy 
and, potentially, its sovereignty. The situations of other PICs with 
relatively lower levels of debt, larger economies and nuanced relations 
with traditional donors, such as PNG and Fiji, may be more complex. 
The diplomatic and development efforts of traditional donors may gain 
greater traction with Pacific leaders if they focus on the specific high-risk 
elements of PNG’s decision to join the BRI that this analysis has identified, 
rather than solely criticising the overall level of debt. This is particularly 
relevant when traditional donors offer debt-financing organisations of 
their own, such as Australia’s AIFFP.
Moreover, traditional donors like Australia, New Zealand and France are 
unlikely to be able to outspend all Chinese investment and aid if Beijing 
is truly determined to control the region. Identifying and attempting to 
outbid specific Chinese projects in PNG that represent perceived risks 
to the region may represent a more realistic and effective strategy for 
traditional donors concerned about China’s growing influence in the 
Pacific. Australia’s outbidding of China to become the only foreign donor 
for the Fijian Military Forces’ Black Rock Camp and the Pacific subsea 
cable project are two notable examples. Such reactive activity should also 
be accompanied by improvements in traditional donors’ own aid and 
investment activities in the region, as this engagement is not without its 
flaws. As observed by a local leader in PNG, like all traditional donors to the 
Pacific, ‘Australia needs to recognise reality: China is rising’ (Clarke et al. 
2018). Traditional donors like Australia may not be able to stop China’s 
rise—and would incur backlash from Pacific leaders by attempting to do 
so—but they can prioritise efforts to ensure that Chinese influence in 
the Pacific leads to improved development outcomes, rather than debt 
dependency or destabilisation.
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Year Chinese entity Quantity 
($m)
Sector Subsector Country
2005 MCC $670 Metals Steel Papua New 
Guinea
2009 Sinohydro $150 Energy Hydro Fiji
2012 China Communications 
Construction
$290 Transport Shipping Papua New 
Guinea




$100 Agriculture Papua New 
Guinea
2013 China Communications 
Construction
$140 Transport Autos Papua New 
Guinea
2013 Huawei $200 Technology Telecom Papua New 
Guinea
2013 Sinomach $170 Transport Autos Papua New 
Guinea
2014 State Construction 
Engineering
$250 Real Estate Construction Papua New 
Guinea
2015 China Railway 
Engineering
$290 Transport Autos Timor-
Leste
2015 Zijin Mining $300 Metals Papua New 
Guinea
2015 China Communications 
Construction
$100 Transport Autos Papua New 
Guinea
2015 Shandong Gaosu $270 utilities Timor-Leste
2016 State Construction 
Engineering
$180 utilities Papua New 
Guinea
2016 Jiangsu International $120 Logistics Papua New 
Guinea
2016 China Railway 
Engineering
$130 Real Estate Construction Papua New 
Guinea
2017 Shenzhen Energy, Power 
Construction Corp
$880 Energy Hydro Papua New 
Guinea
2017 Minmetals $350 Real Estate Construction Papua New 
Guinea
Source: American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, www .aei .org/china-
global-investment-tracker/ .
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2011–2015 Covec (PNG) Ltd 80 .27 1 Industry, Trade, 
Transport
2011–2015 Global Constructions Ltd 14 .17 2 Transport
2011–2015 Shorncliffe (1967) Ltd 6 .38 3 Transport
2011–2015 Avenell Engineering 
Systems Ltd
2 .98 4 Health
2011–2015 ARPI Ltd 2 5 Energy
2011–2015 Total 127.1
2012–2016 COVEC (PNG) 88 .34 1 Transport
2012–2016 Global Constructions Ltd 14 .07 2 Transport
2012–2016 Ag Investment Ltd 11 .52 3 Energy
2012–2016 Hunan Lishui Hydro and 
Port Co . Ltd (JV)
11 .52 3 Energy
2012–2016 Shorncliffe (PNG) Ltd 7 .7 5 Transport
2012–2016 Total 158.26
2013–2017 Global Constructions Ltd 14 .06 1 Transport
2013–2017 Ag Investment Ltd 12 .44 2 Energy
2013–2017 Hunan Lishui Hydro and 
Port Co . Ltd (JV)
12 .44 2 Energy
2013–2017 COVEC (PNG) 11 .72 3 Transport
2013–2017 Shorncliffe (PNG) Ltd 7 .71 4 Transport
2013–2017 Pacific Development 
Contractors Ltd
5 .16 5 Health
2013–2017 Total 91.95






Fei Sheng and Graeme Smith
This chapter attempts to bring into focus one of the more contentious 
aspects of the People’s Republic of China’s engagement with the Pacific: 
migration. Overseas Chinese communities have been both the source 
and the target of social unrest in Pacific urban centres, and Pacific leaders 
identify tensions around these communities as one of the major barriers 
to China’s engagement with the Pacific (Little Red Podcast 2019). This 
chapter will focus on historical trends among the Chinese migrant 
community in Vanuatu and question a number of concepts that have 
become accepted in Pacific Studies. In particular, we question the sharp 
distinction drawn by scholars and media commentators between ‘old’ and 
‘new’ Chinese communities in the Pacific, even though this shorthand has 
been adopted by the Chinese communities themselves.1 
Academic circles in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) know almost 
nothing about the history of Oceania and the overseas Chinese in this 
region.2 This is unsurprising. The Pacific was never a major destination 
1  In Vanuatu, ‘old’ Chinese are taken to be those from Guangzhou who arrived before 1980, while 
the ‘new’ Chinese came after that time and may hail from other provinces.
2  The entire Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand, lacks Chinese-language research on 
the history and current situation of Chinese migrants. In recent years, a more representative study is 
Zhang Qiusheng’s A History of Chinese Emigrants to Australia (1998). Research on the Pacific Islands 
is even more limited. Chinese literature includes ‘Chinese Labor in Oceania’, the eighth section of 
Chen Hanzao’s Compilation of Historical Materials on Overseas Chinese Labor (1985). There is also 
Australian scholar Liu Weiping’s A History of the Chinese in Oceania (2000), published in Hong Kong. 
See also Fei Sheng, The Overseas Chinese in the South Pacific Islands (2014).
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for Chinese migration. The absolute number of Chinese migrants remains 
small and historical ties with the modern Chinese state are limited—
Cold War competition in parts of Africa, which saw Maoist China 
spend close to 3 per cent of its GDP on foreign aid (Kitissou 2007), was 
largely absent from the Pacific. From a geopolitical perspective, Pacific 
nations are surrounded by ocean, far from China, and are not crucial 
to the development of China’s foreign relations. From the perspective of 
the PRC state, Pacific issues are insignificant. However, the Pacific was 
one of the earliest regions to accept Chinese migrants, it is still absorbing 
new migrants, and their scale and impact on the changing geopolitics of 
the Pacific should not be underestimated. While much of the history 
of Chinese migrants in Australia has been elided in favour of the white 
settler narrative (Loy-Wilson 2014), Chinese migrant families in the 
Pacific maintain a strong sense of their history.
With the rising status of the Pacific in China’s international strategy—the 
Pacific was added to the Maritime Silk Road in November 2014 when 
President Xi Jinping visited Suva—the Pacific Chinese community is not 
only more influenced by China, but is also an important medium for China 
to expand its overseas influence, even though the migrants themselves are 
not encouraged by the Chinese state. The formation and development of 
Chinese migrant society in Oceania is inseparable from the extension 
of  the ocean network in which an outward-looking and more assertive 
China is situated. This chapter provides an overview of the evolution of 
Chinese communities in Oceania and incorporates new findings from 
archival research, field investigations and interviews in Vanuatu. These will 
be used to analyse changes in Chinese migrants’ livelihoods, complicate 
the sharp distinction between old and new Chinese that has developed in 
the literature3 and provide context for the new forms of migration that are 
emerging among Chinese communities in the Pacific.
The Asia-Pacific Ocean network and 
Chinese migrants in the Pacific
China and the Pacific Islands had close ties before the arrival of Western 
colonial powers, especially in Melanesia due to its proximity to Southeast 
Asia. These ties can be seen as an extension of China’s trade network, 
3  See, for example, Chin (2008).
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which operated alongside many other ethnicities—Malays, Jews, 
Tamils and Gujartis. With the rise of the pearl, beche-de-mer and, later, 
sandalwood trades, China and Oceania belonged to the same trading 
network (Shineberg 2014). The influx of Chinese migrants into Oceania 
and their impact on the Pacific began with indentured Chinese labourers 
in 1850. China was dragged into the global colonial system built by 
European capital. China began to deploy its labour resources according to 
the needs of the global market. Large-scale Chinese migration to Oceania 
began in 1848 when about 390 contract workers were transported from 
Xiamen to the colony of New South Wales in Australia (FitzRoy 1849). 
However, after the 1851 gold rush, Cantonese people, largely from the 
Pearl River Delta, became the main drivers of immigration to Australia.
Early Chinese migrants to the Pacific can be divided into two types. 
The first was individual migrants, largely to Australia. The second type, 
common from the 1860s and found mainly in the Pacific, was Chinese 
labourers recruited by colonial labour companies. The cause of the latter 
was a new regulation that emerged from the treaty signed after the Second 
Opium War legalising the commodification of Chinese labour. Foreign 
merchants were no longer prohibited from recruiting workers directly 
from China. Concurrently, Pacific islands were claimed and developed 
by European (and later American) powers in the mid-19th century, 
driving demand for plantation labour. There were, however, significant 
differences among colonial powers in their attitudes towards recruiting 
Chinese labour. Germany promoted large-scale labour recruitment in 
German New Guinea and German Samoa while strongly discouraging 
any interbreeding between Chinese labourers and the local population 
(Steinmetz 2007).4 British and Australian colonial administrators tended 
to oppose Chinese migration, but would often find the commercial 
interests of plantation owners in conflict with their sympathy for the 
racist underpinnings of migration restrictions, which included poll taxes 
and a restriction on steamers that only one Chinese could be carried for 
each 100 tonnes of cargo (Fitzgerald 2007:164–66).
Further driving the demand for Chinese labour was the tough natural 
environment and living conditions on the Islands, which made it difficult 
to develop a large workforce without the use of contract or forced labour. 
Spread from German New Guinea to as far as French Polynesia, the 
4  German administrations were often bent on keeping ‘native populations’ in a museum-like 
state—an obsession that extended to prohibiting the use of corrugated iron for roofing.
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indentured labourers were geographically isolated. Many of those who 
survived continued on to Australia and New Zealand, becoming vegetable 
farmers and small traders (Chen 1984). The spread of Chinese migrants 
to the Pacific Islands was the result of the Western colonial project and 
their control of the Pacific exchange network. But Chinese migrants, both 
forced and free, took advantage of emerging maritime traffic to establish 
their own transnational networks. Even under the White Australia Policy, 
retail empires such as Wing On stretched from London to Hong Kong to 
Fiji (Fitzgerald 2007).
The maritime colonial network dominated by the Western powers broke 
down in the 1940s and the development of overseas Chinese communities 
in Oceania entered an important transition period. With the outbreak of 
the Pacific War, the momentum of Chinese migrants gathering in the 
Pacific Islands and dominating local economies was curbed as Micronesia 
and much of Melanesia were occupied by Japan. Many Chinese migrants 
were forced to relocate to Australia or safer Pacific islands. Chinese workers 
in then phosphate-rich Nauru were evacuated to Melbourne or the Gilbert 
Islands. At the end of World War II, the Chinese indentured-labour 
export system, with its overtones of slavery, was completely abolished in 
the Pacific. Many Pacific Islands governed by European and American 
powers also introduced bans on Chinese migrants, often justified in terms 
of avoiding the mixing of races and social stability. Large-scale, organised 
Chinese migration to the Pacific Islands ceased.
Chinese migrants intensified their engagement with the Pacific Islands 
during the post-war years, and the Chinese community dispersed 
throughout the region. Changes in the international situation, particularly 
the onset of the Cold War, further encouraged the localisation of Chinese 
migrants. The first generation of migrants were fully naturalised and 
married into local communities, bringing them higher social status 
when their host countries gained independence. Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), which was home to the largest Chinese community, became, like 
many island colonies, a trustee of Australia. At the time, the Australian 
Government (which, along with the British, had opposed Chinese 
migration to PNG) resolutely maintained the White Australia Policy, 
which prohibited Chinese from continuing their migration journey to 
Australia. As a result, the existing Chinese community, predominantly 
male and with no prospect of finding brides from China, faced the choice 
of a rapid demise or marriage with the local population.
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After the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Nationalist 
Government was defeated and fled to Taiwan. Most Chinese communities 
in the Pacific were affiliated with the Nationalists and so were forced to 
interrupt their ties with the mainland, but also did not have the means 
to return to Taiwan. As a result, the pressure on these communities to 
integrate with local societies grew. By the end of the 1950s, Australia 
began to allow Chinese born in the trusteeship to become naturalised. 
The statistics of the PNG authorities in 1966 showed 2,455 residents 
were believed to be Chinese. Among them, 566 were born in China, but 
only 282 retained Chinese nationality (Nelson 2007:2). By the 1970s, the 
Chinese community in the Pacific was no longer in close contact with the 
regimes on either side of the strait, and its Chinese identity was weakening. 
In 1971, PNG had 50,000 expatriates, including 3,500 Chinese; however, 
almost none of them still had Chinese nationality or had been born in 
China. By 2000, the census no longer counted whether people were of 
Chinese descent—almost all Chinese populations identified as Papua 
New Guinean or Australian (Nelson 2007:4). Many localised migrants 
and their descendants gained prominence; PNG’s second prime minster 
Sir Julius Chan is an obvious example.
Between 1960 and 1980, most of the island nations of Oceania 
achieved independence or autonomy, leading to the adjustment of their 
immigration policies. Although former colonial powers such as Australia 
and New Zealand supported the island countries through development 
assistance, the burden of self-reliance for remote island nations was 
considerable. The leaders of many countries regarded the development of 
foreign trade and the attracting foreign investment as means of building 
modern nation-states, which gave the populations of neighbouring Asian 
countries an opportunity to expand their trading networks. At the same 
time, the White Australia Policy was abandoned in 1972 and under the 
Hawke–Keating Government (1983–96) Australia promoted a national 
development strategy of engagement with Asia, which encouraged Pacific 
countries to relax controls on Asian immigration. This saw a spike in 
Chinese migrants to the Pacific from neighbouring Asian countries such 
as Malaysia and Indonesia. From the early 1990s, migrants came directly 
from mainland China, largely from Fujian and Guangdong provinces. 
This has seen the emergence of a new group of Chinese in the Pacific: 
the ‘new Chinese migrants’. Within the Chinese community in Vanuatu, 
the dividing line between ‘new’ and ‘old’ is understood to be 1980, a less 
complex division than that required in PNG (Chin 2008:119–24).
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In migration history, scholars usually divide immigrants into two categories: 
‘sojourners’ and ‘settlers’. The former emphasises the roots of immigration 
from China as either a result of migrant preference or differential 
exclusion (Castles 2003:11), while the latter emphasises the establishment 
of migrants in local communities. Over the past three decades, these 
categories have coexisted in the emerging Chinese immigrant groups in 
the Pacific Island countries, but the former predominates. There are four 
sources of emerging Chinese immigrant groups. One is the resource-
development activities of Southeast Asian Chinese enterprises in the 
Pacific Island countries since the 1980s, especially deforestation activities 
in PNG and Solomon Islands (Global Witness 2018; Nelson 2007:6). 
The second is Chinese project labour since the 2000s—that is, the large 
number of workers brought by Chinese companies to develop local mineral 
resources and infrastructure, some of whom seek further  commercial 
opportunities when the project finishes (Smith 2013a:184–85; Smith and 
Dinnen 2015).5 The third is migrants who acquire nationality through 
legal procedures, mainly through marriage or investment migration; these 
migrants dominate the retail trade in many Pacific nations (Firth 2006; 
Smith 2016). The fourth source is middle-class migrants relocating to 
the Pacific for health or lifestyle reasons; these will be described briefly in 
this chapter.
When discussing emerging Chinese migrant groups in the Pacific, it is 
difficult to apply the usual concept of immigration that implies a long-
term commitment to a new country. Since few Pacific Island countries 
have elements that attract ordinary Chinese people, particularly in terms 
of personal safety and the standard of schooling available (Smith 2013b), 
a large number of new migrants are simply ‘passing through’. In an era 
of continued facilitation of the trans-Pacific transportation network 
and  China’s growing influence in the Asia-Pacific, their mobility is 
remarkable and their livelihoods closely tied to Chinese society and 
domestic markets.
5  Ramu Nickel remains the largest Chinese-owned mining company in the Pacific, but they have 
been joined by other state-owned enterprises, including Zijin (China’s largest gold mining company) 
in partnership with Barrick at the Porgera gold mine and Guangdong Rising Asset Management at 
the Freida River copper mine in partnership with Australian mining company Highlands Pacific. 
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The rise of the Chinese business 
community in Vanuatu
Among Chinese communities in the Pacific, the number of people 
who identify as Chinese in Vanuatu is relatively small. Official PRC 
statistics put the number at 2,000 legal settlers, estimating that more 
than half of them are new migrants who have arrived in the past 10 years 
(Guillain 2018). However, as of 2018, local sources say the number is 
between 4,000 and 5,000, though the extreme mobility of the population 
makes a reliable estimate difficult.6 The political situation in Vanuatu is 
relatively stable, there is no history of anti-Chinese riots and Chinese in 
Vanuatu are concentrated in Port Vila and Luganville, the capital of the 
largest island. Over the past century, Chinese traders in Vanuatu have not 
closely integrated with the broader population. This is in contrast to other 
Pacific nations—such as Tonga and PNG—where Chinese settlement 
now reaches into the hinterlands.
The emergence of Chinese migrants in Vanuatu was initially the result of 
colonial expansion by Britain and France into a country of extraordinary 
linguistic and cultural diversity (Bedford and Spriggs 2014). Due to this 
unusual joint colonial project, Vanuatu was integrated into a regional 
market that relied on maritime transport links, and this regional market 
established direct links with China’s southeast coast. The first Chinese 
migrants who appeared in Vanuatu were chefs and carpenters aboard 
British merchant ships in 1844, but locals knew of no descendants of 
these early voyagers. The first Chinese who survived and set down roots 
were Chinese retailers (huashang 华商) who appeared in the mid-to-late 
19th century. 
The Chinese community of Vanuatu can be traced back to Cheung 
Yabao (张亚宝), widely known as ‘Ah Pow’, who arrived from Fujian 
in 1912, having worked as a chef with the merchant vessel Euphrosyne 
(Willmott 2005:7, 2007:37).7 After he settled in Port Vila, he opened 
a bakery, importing ingredients from Australia through British merchants. 
The  Cheung family has prospered for four generations, becoming 
the most powerful merchant family in Port Vila and leaders of the 
Chinese community there. Cheung Yabao’s grandson, Charles Cheung 
6  Second author’s interviews, July 2018. Port Vila.
7  This family will be referred to as the Cheung family in this chapter.
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(Cheung Zhali 张查理), is head of the family and, together with his uncle 
Cheung Lianzhong (张连仲), owns Vanuatu’s largest supermarket chain, 
Au Bon Marché.8 Charles Cheung is the chairman of the Vanuatu Chinese 
Club, the largest Chinese community organisation in Vanuatu, and serves 
as Vanuatu’s Consul General in Shanghai. In a country like Vanuatu that 
lacks industrial diversification, the Chinese business community has 
significant economic and political influence. The Chinese Association of 
Port Vila in the capital is registered as a corporate legal entity and has 
a charter in accordance with company law (Chinese Club 2004).
It is no accident that merchants with strong overseas ties dominate 
Vanuatu’s Chinese society. Vanuatu’s economy was born out of a single 
crop plantation introduced by the colonial powers. From the mid-to-late 
19th century, the pillar of the colonial economy was coconut planting. 
Today, Vanuatu’s main exports are copra, which can be used for oil 
extraction, and medicinal kava. As of 2016, the value of merchandise 
imports was seven times greater than the value of exported goods, an 
imbalance partially offset by tourism, which accounts for 80 per cent 
of service exports (WTO 2018:16–17). French colonists mixed cattle 
in coconut plantations and established a profitable beef export industry. 
But until World War II, Vanuatu lacked an industrial base and the 
proportion of foreign workers was low. This can partly be attributed to 
a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the colonial powers. In Colonial Office 
communications, British officials disparaged the climate as unsuitable 
for white settlers and even attempted to swap their stake in the colony 
with France in return for French territory in Africa. The French refused. 
Vanuatu still relies heavily on the import of consumer goods, and early 
Chinese merchants such as the Cheung family used this to dominate the 
retail trade and accumulate wealth.
World War II created further opportunities for Chinese businesses. 
On the one hand, the southwestern Pacific battlefield established by the 
United States made Vanuatu a military supply base and a defence facility. 
The US military began the construction of a large-scale infrastructure, 
altering the local landscape and consumer culture. While the urban 
population expanded, introduced pests and diseases caused hardship in 
8  Zhang Yabao had a wide range of operations, including the sale of a small amount of opium, 
as Zhang Yabao himself had a preference for smoking opium, though he abstained after getting married. 
Zhang Yabao had three sons: Zhang Lianfang, Zhang Liansheng and Zhang Lianzhong. Charles 
Cheung is the son of Zhang Lianfang (Zhang Liansheng (the second son of Zhang Yabao), 22 August 
2016. Interview with first author; Charles Cheung, 23 August 2016. Interview with first author).
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rural areas (Bennett 2004), leading to the near collapse of subsistence 
economies in the port areas and increasing reliance on export earnings and 
imports. In the shadow of war, many Chinese in Vanuatu began to invest 
in Australia and New Zealand while gradually establishing a monopoly 
over imported consumer goods. After the withdrawal of US troops from 
Luganville, US military camps became the centre of a new urban area, 
with Chinese merchants building new shops along the hardened roads. 
The Huang family drew on their connections in Australia to become 
the main rice suppliers, establishing exclusive sales rights.9 Similarly, the 
Liang family in Luganville established a monopoly over potatoes, onions 
and non-perishable vegetables from New Zealand. Supply ships regularly 
visited Luganville to provide fresh vegetables and receive the hospitality 
of Chinese businessmen.10
Chinese business forces not only benefited from wartime conditions, but 
their identity within colonial society was unique. Unlike other Pacific 
Island colonies, Vanuatu was under the joint management of Britain and 
France. The two colonial authorities cooperated, but also displayed mutual 
restraint and even competition, which Chinese businesses exploited. 
Due to its large number of colonies in the South Pacific, Britain neglected 
Vanuatu, while the French focused more resources there.11 In  order to 
compete with the British, French authorities provided free basic education 
and limited the penetration of the British forces in various ways, giving 
Chinese merchants more scope than they enjoyed in neighbouring 
colonies such as Solomon Islands or PNG, where colonial authorities 
restricted Chinese merchants to favour British trading companies such 
as Swires.
Unlike neighbouring New Caledonia, Vanuatu attracted few European 
migrants. There were missionaries and farmers, but Vanuatu’s 
European population had few industrialists or commercial operators, 
making it difficult for the colonial authorities to replace or suppress 
Chinese businessmen. On the contrary, colonial authorities relied 
on Chinese  businessmen to maintain the local private economy, and 
9  The surname of the merchant has been changed, respecting the interviewee’s wishes.
10  Suppliers in New Zealand and Australia regularly visit Vanuatu retailers. After updating or 
confirming contracts, they often travel the islands with their hosts and attend banquets hosted by 
local Chinese businessmen.
11  Many Chinese merchants expressed the view that those with high academic qualifications have 
English and French bilingual ability, while less-educated people only speak French (Liang Wenhua 
(owner of the Luganville Port Iowa store), 19 August 2016. Interview with first author).
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so rarely restricted their activities. Unlike most in Pacific or Southeast 
Asian countries, there has never been an anti-Chinese movement in 
Vanuatu, though there are signs of the sentiment emerging in present-
day Port Vila. Because the island’s pillar industries, coconut cultivation 
and cattle farming, do not require intensive labour input, the colonists 
did not introduce a large number of Chinese workers from overseas. The 
main imported agricultural labour force in Vanuatu were Vietnamese 
introduced by France. While they largely returned to Vietnam during the 
first Indochina War, with over 500 current residents they still represent 
the second largest foreign community in Vanuatu (Willie 2018). The 
concept of private property in Vanuatu is also weak, making it difficult 
for local business groups to compete with Chinese businesses.12 Thus, 
since World War II, the Chinese community has controlled Vanuatu’s 
economic lifeline.13 After Vanuatu’s independence, local communities 
took ownership of land, but control was typically concentrated in the 
hands of the chiefs. Because their sources of monetary income are limited, 
clan leaders often exchanged land for the Chinese migrants’ money and 
goods, allowing them to advance socially through contact with local elites 
and commercially by building up holdings of urban and rural land.
The Vanuatu Chinese community in a 
shifting Asia-Pacific regional network
In the 20th century, especially after World War I, Pacific Island countries 
were integrated into the colonial system dominated by Britain and France. 
Under British–French joint management, the Vanuatu Chinese could use 
both British and French maritime routes built in the Pacific, resulting in 
strong mobility. For example, before the founding of the PRC, Vanuatu 
Chinese enjoyed visa-free or loosely reviewed access to the majority 
of British and French colonies in the Asia-Pacific, allowing Chinese 
12  Chinese merchants held the belief that the lack of private property ownership means local 
merchants face filial pressures to extend credit and goods, and in a tight market bankruptcy comes 
extremely fast. They also frequently expressed the view that the leisurely lifestyle of local people 
makes them reluctant to engage in regular wage employment (Liang Wenhua and Yaxiu (wife of 
Liang Wenhua), 19 August 2016. Port Vila. Interview with first author. For privacy reasons, Yaxiu is 
a pseudonym). These comments echo those by Chinese business owners in PNG in the 1970s, who 
claimed, ‘The native trade store can never survive long simply because it usually is “eaten” by relatives 
of the storekeeper before he can make any profit’ (Wu 1982:106).
13  Other ethnic Chinese businessmen such as Zhang Liansheng and Liang Wenhua agreed with 
this proposition.
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businessmen to travel freely throughout the region. The following case 
study of the Huang family in Tahiti, French Polynesia and, ultimately, 
Vanuatu reflects this.
French Polynesia began importing Guangdong Hakka labourers into their 
sugar cane farming industry via Hong Kong in 1865, and they eventually 
formed a relatively large community of Chinese traders.14 In 1911, Huang 
Cai, a three-year-old Hakka child from Dongguan, accompanied his mother 
Yumei to Tahiti, joining his father, Huang Jin, who had already settled in 
the local area. Huang Cai grew up in Tahiti and attended a local Chinese 
elementary school run by the Chinese Nationalist Party from 1916 to 
1922 before making a living from farming for the next 25 years. In 1941, 
he married across the racial divide, taking E Tama of Tahiti as his wife. 
At the same time, his younger sister Huang Yajiao married a Frenchman 
and they moved to Luganville.15 In 1947, there was a rumour that France 
wanted to send more troops to Indochina to fight and would recruit from 
the Asian population of Tahiti, so Huang Cai fled with his wife and two 
sons to Dongguan, close to the border with Hong Kong. In  February 
1950, following the fall of the Nationalist Government in China, Huang 
Cai fled back across the border and worked as a carpenter on Hong Kong 
Island. However, after three years, he transferred to Kowloon to work 
on a farm. Since his economic situation was not improving, he returned 
to the Pacific, joining his sister in Vanuatu in 1958. He started farming 
with his younger sister Huang Yajiao while his younger brother Huang 
Yasheng entered the retail industry. Huang Cai died in early 1960. His 
son, Huang Wan, though born in Tahiti, completed high school in Hong 
Kong and worked at airport customs. Taking on his father’s career, Huang 
Wan went to Vanuatu in about 1970 and ran the family store with the 
help of his aunt. He founded Luganville’s first commercial cinema and 
hired local Chinese to serve visiting international sailor consumers. 
In 1979, on the eve of Vanuatu’s independence, Huang Wan decided to 
sell his assets in Luganville and move to French Polynesia to work with his 
14  English-language sources on the history of the Chinese diaspora in French Polynesia are limited. 
The most authoritative source in French is Coppenrath (1967).
15  Huang Wan, 20 August 2016. Port Vila Bakery. Interview with first author. Information from 
the resume submitted by Huang Wan in 1970 to the Vanuatu Government when applying for 
citizenship. Held by the Huang family. The name is written like this, but it seems to be transliterated 




father’s old friends, fearing expropriation by the new regime.16 In 1988, 
Lena Li, a niece who had married into the Cheung family in Port Vila, 
invited Huang Wan to come to Vanuatu to settle down again, sponsoring 
the reopening of the cinema. Huang Wan eventually joined the Cheung 
family’s pastry business.
Immigration and secondary migration caused by changing times increased 
the international mobility of the Pacific Island–based Chinese. Vanuatu, 
as an English–French co-managed colony, created new opportunities 
for the Chinese to establish their status and expand overseas exchanges. 
Changes in the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific, including the Pacific War 
and the Cold War, greatly influenced the Chinese Pacific Island diaspora. 
Due to the remoteness of the islands, misinformation, rumours and scams 
frequently affected the life choices of Chinese migrants. However, Huang 
Cai, Huang Wan and his son were able to shuttle freely between French 
Polynesia, Vanuatu and China, demonstrating the centrality of the trans-
Pacific network to the livelihoods of Chinese people in the Pacific.
China’s rising influence and the Pacific 
Islands diaspora
For the Pacific Island Chinese, the opportunities brought by earlier 
geopolitical shifts cannot be compared with the changes wrought by 
the independence of the Pacific Island states and their establishment of 
diplomatic relations with either the People’s Republic of China or the 
Republic of China (Taiwan). After the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between Vanuatu and mainland China in 1983,17 institutional barriers 
to the flow of people and goods were largely removed. Independence in 
the 1970s and 1980s coincided with China’s own efforts to reform its 
economy and open up trade, leading to rapid regional integration. It also 
16  Huang Wan, 20 August 2016. Port Vila Bakery. Interview with first author. He had heard 
rumours there may be anti-Chinese activities after independence. Because the French colonists 
resisted Vanuatu’s independence, they suffered more hatred from the locals. Chinese who maintained 
deep ties with French colonists were worried their property might not be protected after losing their 
British passports. 
17  This is aside from a brief interlude in November 2004 when the government of Serge Vohor 
briefly recognised Taiwan. The Council of Ministers overturned the decision and Vohor, who was 
accused of assaulting the Chinese ambassador (Chen 2004), was removed the following month in a 
no-confidence vote. Vanuatu has since remained a diplomatic ally of the PRC, signing on to the Belt 
and Road Initiative in 2019 and even recognising China’s position on the South China Sea.
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spurred the development of Vanuatu’s foreign trade, which, along with 
remittances, was a major contributor to Vanuatu’s development over the 
next two decades (Kumar et al. 2011).
In 2006, under the auspices of China, Fiji hosted the first Ministerial 
Conference of the China–Pacific Island Countries Economic Development 
and Cooperation Forum in Nadi, attended by state ministers from the 
eight countries that recognise China, including Vanuatu. Vanuatu’s 
Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism demonstrated knowledge of 
both Chinese political slogans of the day and their potential impacts 
on domestic businesses, arguing that:
in order to promote this harmonious development in our 
respective regions we shall ensure to encourage and to undertake 
foreign trade and investment in an orderly way, as foreign capital 
enterprises would certainly take the lead and positive role in our 
region’s economic growth and development. We must also ensure 
that domestic and external capital enterprises develop side by side 
and in a complementary manner (Bule 2006). 
Undoubtedly, increased trade and investment has not only encouraged 
more Chinese citizens to migrate to Vanuatu, but also created opportunities 
for the local Chinese community. The impact goes beyond economics. 
The experience of Liang Wenhua from Luganville illustrates how some 
of Vanuatu’s Chinese residents have seized these new opportunities.
In the 1970s when Huang Wan was running the Luganville cinema, 
he hired a poor grocery store owner, Liang Wenhua (known to locals 
as ‘Ah Hua’), as a partner and ticket seller.18 Liang is second-generation 
Chinese. His father is from Dongguan, but was forced to leave in 1939 
and arrived in Vanuatu with his fellow clansmen, finding work as a 
helper in Chinese shops. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, he went 
to Sydney to work as a market gardener, returning to Port Vila before 
moving to Luganville to run a grocery store. Born in 1955, Wenhua was 
one of eight children—six of them daughters. Because Luganville lacks 
Chinese men of the right age, four of the daughters remained unmarried. 
They assisted their parents in running the store and gave up opportunities 
to make a living in the capital. Wenhua had one sister married in Port 
Vila who eventually left for Hong Kong. The other sister chose to marry 




into a Vanuatu family and ultimately was ostracised from her Chinese 
family. Despite this, his father insisted that Wenhua go to Australia to 
complete secondary education before returning to Luganville. When his 
father died, the family’s economic burden fell on Wenhua. In addition to 
working with his sisters, he also worked for other Chinese businessmen, 
including Huang Wan. During the Maoist era, China and the Pacific 
Island countries had no direct contact. In addition to lacking goods and 
news, it was difficult for Wenhua to find a Chinese woman to marry.19
The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Vanuatu 
was crucial for Wenhua. After 1983, news from China increased. Chinese 
businessmen who visited the Pearl River Delta in southeast China returned 
with photos of single girls from their hometowns for the consideration of 
lonely Chinese men in Vanuatu. In 1993, Wenhua, then 38, saw photos 
of a Dongguan girl named Yaxiu and quickly got in touch. Yaxiu had just 
suffered a short, failed marriage at a time when divorce was uncommon 
in China and the economic and social status of divorced women was low 
(Liu and Chan 1999). She expressed her willingness to leave her hometown 
and start a new life in Vanuatu. They were married in 1994 and started to 
run the store together. Yaxiu’s previous full-time work was in finance, so 
she learned the operation of Wenhua’s store and established a professional 
financial system to reduce losses and waste. She used contacts in her 
hometown to import light industrial products from the Pearl River Delta, 
changing the tradition of relying on re-export trade between Australia 
and New Zealand and greatly increasing the profitability of Wenhua’s 
store. The president of the Santo branch of the Chinese Association of 
Vanuatu said, ‘Yaxiu is really capable, not only her business ability, but 
also her social skills are strong. Unlike the local Chinese, her eyes are open 
and active’.20
Unlike many Chinese born in Vanuatu, Yaxiu frequently travels to 
wholesale markets in Guangzhou to learn about the latest consumer 
trends and source goods directly from China. She is also establishing 
close ties with the Chinese Government’s Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Office (now subsumed by the United Front Work Department) and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that she can grasp the latest developments 
in China’s politics and diplomacy. Since the mid-to-late 1990s, Yaxiu has 
19  Liang Wenhua, 19 August 2016. Interview with first author.
20  Liang Yuyuan (president of the Santo Vanuatu Chinese Association), 17 August 2018. Interview 
with first author.
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also built wealth by buying land from chiefs in Vanuatu and investing in 
real estate in Australia. Through the contacts provided by Yaxiu, Wenhua 
was permitted to open a petrol station adjoining the retail store, which 
became its main source of profit. In the past two decades, Liang Wenhua 
has improved his economic state and that of his sisters, building new 
homes for them. Wenhua’s only regret is that, typical of new Chinese 
traders, Yaxiu is too mobile. She is unwilling to settle in Vanuatu for long 
periods and is mobile between China, Australia and Vanuatu.21 Unlike 
earlier generations of migrants (Wang 1993:927), Yaxiu did not spend 
time in Hong Kong, Singapore or Taiwan before migrating to the Pacific.
Although the case of Wenhua and Yaxiu is striking, it is by no means 
a rare example of ‘old’ and ‘new’ Chinese migrants benefiting each other. 
Cheung Yabao, the first Chinese migrant with a known descendant in 
Vanuatu, once lived with a local Vanuatu woman, but had no children, 
so returned to his hometown to marry. His son explained, ‘The family 
specifically asked, not to find a virgin, but to find a woman who has 
already had a child to get married, to ensure Dad can have descendants.’22 
His second son, Cheung Liansheng, was married to a new migrant from 
Mawei in Fujian province around the age of 45. A number of second-
generation Vanuatu Chinese men born in the 1950s were married to 
Chinese women from China in the mid-to-late 1980s through photos and 
contact with distant relatives. The brides usually came from poor families 
or were willing to go abroad for various reasons. The old Vanuatu Chinese 
families were maintained through the influx of new female migrants. Even 
if the Pacific network exists, without openness and extensive contacts with 
China, old Chinese communities are likely to shrink, as in PNG23 (Nelson 
2007:3; Wu 1982), or to marry into the local community, as seen in 
Samoa and smaller Pacific Island nations (Willmott 2007). As Willmott 
urged, it is important to recognise:
 the enormous importance of chance in migration: where people 
end up depends as much on luck as decisions … Professor Wang 
[Gungwu] would not call them migrants all, but they became such 
by dint of shipwreck or opportunity grasped (Willmott 1995:131). 
21  Liang Wenhua and Yaxiu, 19 August 2016. Interview with first author. Port Vila.
22  Zhang Liansheng, 22 August 2016. Interview with first author.
23  The 1933 census found only five Chinese living in PNG.
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To this, we should add misinformation, rumors and chance, which are 
the basis of many migration decisions for the Chinese in the Pacific, 
a problem that has not improved with the arrival of the internet. This is 
not a complete break from migration based on false promises, common 
in the 19th century. While the element of coercion is no longer present, 
the misinformation obtained by today’s Chinese migrants often has 
a  commercial motive, whether it is found in Pacific-focused WeChat 
groups or a Baidu (China’s main search engine) enquiry for ‘Vanuatu’, 
which at the time of writing yielded the result ‘what are the benefits of 
having more than one passport? A Vanuatu passport is quickly obtained’.
The strengthening of China’s ties with Vanuatu has increased the speed 
of information exchange within Vanuatu’s Chinese community with the 
introduction of social networking platforms such as WeChat and 
the spread of officially approved Chinese culture. An early proposal by the 
Vanuatu Chinese Society (Port Vila) to set up Chinese-language schools 
gives a flavour of the efforts made to standardise Chinese language and 
culture in a community where Mandarin ranked far behind Cantonese, 
English, French and Bislama: 
Going to visit relatives and friends in China and sightseeing has 
become a dream of many people. But when you enter China, you 
need to communicate with each other. To communicate, you must 
use a common language. Mastering Mandarin is the first key to 
roaming the land of China. To this end, in direct response to the 
voice of people who want to learn Chinese, under the advocacy of 
the Chinese Embassy and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, we 
decided to ‘promote Chinese culture’. For the purpose of hosting 
a Chinese school in Port Vila that is both Chinese and friendly to 
Chinese culture (Yuan 1997).
Efforts to promote a ‘friendly’ version of Chinese culture in Vanuatu 
have continued, and in February 2015 the University of the South Pacific 
Emalus Campus in Port Vila opened a Confucius classroom, partnering 
with Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunication.
The position of many new migrants in relation to the Chinese state is 
complex. Researchers have argued that the Chinese state ‘can be a vocal 
advocate of the rights of ethnic Chinese in the Pacific, particularly when 
they are under threat’ (Henderson and Reilly 2003:99). While riots 
against Chinese migrants in the Pacific from 2006 onwards proved the 
opposite proposition—that the Chinese state and Chinese citizens were 
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indifferent or even hostile to recent Chinese migrants to the Pacific 
(Smith  2012)—recent rhetoric around ‘overseas citizen protection’ 
indicates that the geopolitical calculus around these concerns may also 
be shifting (Connolly 2016). This is complicated by growing public 
expectations of what a  powerful Chinese state is able to do for them, 
expectations fostered by  a  series of popular movies based around the 
extraction of Chinese citizens from hostile African environments, notably 
Wolf Warrior II and Operation Red Sea, respectively the highest and third-
highest grossing Chinese films ever made.
A change in the recent geopolitical calculus that has largely gone unnoticed 
is the arrival of middle-class migrants in the more stable countries of the 
Pacific—notably Fiji and Vanuatu. Rather than being driven primarily by 
economic goals, as migrants from Fujian and Guangdong have been, many 
of these new arrivals are drawn by the slower pace and clean environment 
offered by the Pacific Island nations. The owner of a small restaurant in 
Port Vila who had trained as an artist back in China explained her journey 
to Vanuatu:
I came to Vanuatu because of illness. The doctor told me I should 
move to a country where the pace was slower, where there was 
less pollution, no factories. I did a lot of research and settled on 
Vanuatu. At first, I wasn’t used to it. After less than a month, I fled! 
They didn’t have streetlights; the roads were filled with potholes 
or gravel. I remember when I arrived thinking, ‘I had no idea it 
would be so poor’. The airport had no air conditioning, not like 
the huge airports in China. The cars were old and battered. It was 
a shock. I wondered if I’d got on the wrong plane. But the locals: 
I saw how happy they were. When I was applying, I knew that 
of all the developing countries Vanuatu was one of the happiest. 
Their smiles were a comfort, not like the fake smiles you get in 
China (pi xiao, rou bu xiao 皮笑肉不笑). Even though their shoes 
and clothes were simple, happiness radiated from them. After 
a month back in China, I got sick again, I wasn’t sleeping, too 
many obligations (yingchou 应酬). It doesn’t matter whether you 
feel like it, friends will take you out for a meal, go for a drink, 
eat lots of meat, it’s how you express affection—no thought of 
whether it’s good for you. Friends, family, relatives, husband, an 
endless cycle of obligations. I went downhill fast. Now [three years 
later], I don’t even need to take medicine.24
24  Restaurant owner, 9 February 2019. Interview with second author.
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She observed that in Port Vila, while people from Fujian ran shops, most 
migrants from other parts of China were recovering their health, or that 
of their children (liao yang 疗养). Chinese citizens from other Pacific 
Island countries were also migrating to Vanuatu because countries like 
PNG and Tonga felt unsafe. All of this had seen the Chinese population 
rise from 500 or so in 2014 to more than 3,000 in 2019. Medical teams 
visiting on the Peace Ark had been told by the Chinese embassy that 
4,000 to 5,000 Chinese people lived in Vanuatu (including all people of 
Chinese ethnicity). The restaurant owner hesitated to call the new arrivals 
migrants, as it seemed unlikely many would settle in Vanuatu, with most 
looking to move on to Australia or New Zealand or return to China when 
their children’s schooling required it. Many traders also felt there was no 
need to get citizenship—which they were eligible for after 10 years—
because an investment permit allowed them to do everything required to 
run a business. 
A shopkeeper from Shandong said that the money to be made running 
a shop in Vanuatu was scarcely worth the effort, with many finding there 
was more money to be made working off the books on a tourist visa in 
Australia, a short two-hour flight away. She explained, ‘It’s Fujian people 
exploiting other Fujian people’. Aside from exploitation, many migrants 
were brought to the Pacific by misinformation and outright scams, with 
some taken in by a promise that migration to American Samoa would 
enable them to get a US passport. Others were kept hanging for years on 
the promises of migration agents that Vanuatu could be a ‘springboard’ to 
Australia and New Zealand. This shopkeeper knew of one man who had 
waited nearly 20 years to secure a New Zealand passport, finally managing 
to do so when he was 60 years old. True to her word about the worsening 
business environment, she soon returned to China.25 Sources in the old 
Chinese community confirmed that some ‘Chinese shops’ in Port Vila 
now stand empty, with no one willing to take on the lease.26 In some 
ways, this shift reflects the growing prosperity of China—more Chinese 
migrants, but fewer willing to work long hours in shops and restaurants. 
As Patrick Matbob notes in Chapter 15, to reduce their workload, some 
Chinese business migrants in PNG are hiring local workers from an 
area—Misima—they regard as producing hard workers.
25  Shopkeeper, July 2018 and January 2019. Port Vila and on WeChat. Interviews with second 
author.
26  February 2019. Port Vila. Interviews with second author.
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There is a widespread belief in Vanuatu that the sudden spike in the 
number of Chinese arriving on their shores is the result of Chinese state 
support, a belief shared by some senior Vanuatu government ministers.27 
While the opposite seems to be true—in conversations with the second 
author in July 2019, Chinese shopkeepers in Honiara largely did not 
want Solomon Islands to switch diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to 
China (see Aqorau, Chapter 10, this volume)—there is ambition within 
the Belt and Road Initiative to coordinate and harmonise, or at least 
ameliorate the impact of, new commercial migrants from China. The 
second author’s interviews with a range of migrants from Fujian and other 
provinces bring into question the practicality of this approach, at least in 
the short term. Many of these migrants have enjoyed few, if any, positive 
interactions with Chinese officials, and their instinct is to steer well clear 
of the embassy, except when they need to renew their passports. More 
successful businesspeople and leaders of the Chinese community are more 
likely to engage with Chinese officials, not least because of the access to 
information and business opportunities that such networks can bring. 
However, for ordinary shopkeepers, Chinese officials are best avoided 
(Smith 2013b). 
The recent experience of six Chinese migrants who found that Chinese 
authorities were able to exercise extra-territorial power in Vanuatu to 
detain them and remove them from Port Vila without trial—even though 
four of them had Vanuatu passports—will reinforce sentiment that the 
PRC state is best given a wide berth (McGarry 2019a). The embarrassment 
caused to government officials by this case, which included the revelation 
that Vanuatu’s Interior Minister Andrew Napuat did not know which 
Chinese agency he was liaising with, led to the reporter having his work 
permit denied and being the subject of a no-fly order, stopping him from 
rejoining his family in Port Vila (Garrett 2019). This operation echoed 
the deportation of 77 Chinese nationals from Fiji two years earlier. They 
were accused of being involved in telephone and online scams targeting 
China, but an investigation by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
suggested that at least some of them were sex workers (Cohen and 
Webb 2017). 
27  July 2018. Port Vila. Interviews with second author.
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Further complicating the relationship of Vanuatu’s Chinese community 
with the Chinese state is the increasing popularity of Vanuatu passports 
as a second passport for Chinese businessmen, particularly those looking 
to work in the European Union. Strictly speaking, Chinese citizens are 
not allowed to hold another passport, but the sale of these passports to 
‘honorary citizens’28 (US$150,000 for an individual, US$205,000 for 
a family of four) has reached such a scale—1,800 sold in 2018—that they 
are now the largest source of Vanuatu Government revenue, outstripping 
VAT (McGarry 2019b). While it is unclear whether this will result in 
large-scale migration, the experience of Tonga suggests that at least 
some passport holders will look to settle in Vanuatu (van Fossen 2007), 
particularly if China encounters economic or political upheaval.
The evolution of migrant livelihoods 
in the Pacific
Although the Chinese in the Pacific are a branch of the Chinese family 
that China has limited awareness of, they are also distinct. A small 
and scattered population, they are completely dependent on networks 
of cross-sea exchange, not only between their place of residence and 
China, but also between different Pacific Islands. The case of Vanuatu 
indicates that the colonial rule of European powers created opportunities 
for Chinese settlers in the South Pacific. Dependency, the checks and 
balances between different colonial powers, and maritime traffic between 
the Pacific islands improved their economic and social status and shaped 
their business-led livelihoods. Despite distance, the connection with 
China is increasingly vital to the Chinese communities in Pacific Island 
countries. The proliferation of Chinese families and the development of 
their businesses depend on the use of hometown resources. Especially 
since the 1980s, the arrival of ‘new’ migrants allowed the ‘old’ Chinese 
community to develop and grow.
China’s increasing affluence has changed the nature of the Chinese 
community in Vanuatu, with the emergence of migrants seeking not 
just commercial opportunities, but also the health and lifestyle benefits 
offered by a country free of the stress and pollution that characterises 
28  Some limits are placed on the rights of these passport holders, such as the ability to run for 
public office in Vanuatu.
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present-day China. While President Xi Jinping’s focus on the rejuvenation 
of the Chinese nation calls for greater coordination of the activities of 
Chinese overseas, the diversity of Vanuatu’s Chinese population and the 
antipathy of many of its members towards the Chinese state make it 
unlikely this community will advance the lofty goals laid out under the 
Belt and Road Initiative.
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Papua New Guinea (PNG) became the first country in the South Pacific 
to sign on to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in June 2018. Former 
prime minister Peter O’Neill’s decision to join the BRI was no doubt 
driven by his desire for PNG to benefit from China’s offer of funding and 
development opportunities. China’s aid has less restrictive conditions than 
are usually required by PNG’s traditional donor Australia, and is seen as 
attractive despite criticisms and warnings about the risk of falling into 
China’s alleged debt-trap diplomacy (Mantesso 2018). O’Neill rebutted 
his critics, saying that PNG, like Australia and other countries, wanted 
to do business with China, the fastest-growing world economic power. 
O’Neill argued that PNG should have the choice to access China’s markets, 
technology and financing for infrastructure development, reflecting one 
of the key points of the Blue Pacific approach to development endorsed by 
Pacific Island Forum (PIF) leaders in 2017. Secretary General of the PIF 
Dame Meg Taylor has also rejected the dominant narrative in the Pacific 
region that presents the Pacific nations a choice between traditional donors 
and the China alternative. Instead, she says that the PIF seeks genuine 
partnerships with all actors, including China (Taylor 2019). Geopolitics 
in the Pacific region is largely a matter for those in power, especially in 
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developing countries like PNG. Generally, the people have little say, as 
the majority are isolated from the major commercial and administrative 
centres of PNG and affected by increasing poverty and a lack of basic 
government services. They have little knowledge or concern about PNG’s 
foreign relations, except when they become affected by issues such as the 
spillover from the West Papuan independence struggle with Indonesia. 
The country’s citizens remain largely spectators to the government’s 
international relationships and dealings.
However, with O’Neill’s resignation as prime minister and the election 
of his former finance minister James Marape as the new prime minister 
in May 2019, the country’s focus has shifted somewhat. Marape is 
focusing internally with an agenda to fight corruption and ensure his 
people benefit fairly from their resources, part of his vision to ‘take back 
PNG’ and make it ‘the richest Black Christian Nation on earth’ (Kenneth 
2019). Marape has so far kept his word by setting up a commission of 
inquiry into the UBS loan issue and reactivating the parliamentary Public 
Accounts Committee to inquire into the operations of government bodies. 
The inquiry into the AU$1.2 billion loan from Swiss bank UBS is to 
determine whether PNG leaders, including former prime minister Peter 
O’Neill and current Prime Minister James Marape, broke the law when 
acquiring the loan. Marape has not deviated from PNG’s foreign affairs 
policy of ‘friends to all, enemies to none’ and has welcomed all investors 
into the country as long as they follow PNG laws—and there will be no 
favourites, China included. It would be reassuring for many who are wary 
about PNG’s relationship with China that Marape’s first international 
engagement a month after taking office was to visit Australia to reaffirm 
ties with its former coloniser and seek funding assistance. Australia has 
since agreed to loan PNG US$300 million (K1 billion) in direct budget 
assistance to cover its expenses and planned reforms, though details of 
the loan have not been revealed. Australia denied that the loan was to 
stop PNG accepting a loan from China. PNG, however, has formal ties 
with China and the fruits of the relationship are visible on the ground 
with a number of large infrastructure projects, such as roads, stadiums, 
conference centres and institutions, as well as China’s biggest investment 
project in the Pacific, the US$800 million Ramu Nickel project. The BRI 
is the latest initiative in this relationship. 
PNG’s interactions with China, however, have a long history. Contact 
began as early as the 15th century with traders hunting birds of paradise 
and continued when Chinese labourers were brought in to work on 
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German plantations in 1884. There was a small number of Chinese traders 
who came and settled around that time, and their numbers and businesses 
grew over the years, spreading to other towns in PNG. When PNG gained 
independence in 1975, most of the Chinese took the option of Australian 
citizenship and moved to Australia. After that, the ‘new Chinese’, mainly 
from Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, as well as mainland China, 
began to arrive in PNG. While it is difficult to know exactly how many 
Chinese are in PNG, the number is generally estimated at around 20,000 
(Chin 2008). The Malaysian Chinese were initially associated mainly with 
the logging industry, but some later became engaged in the retail industry 
throughout the country.
Other Chinese citizens in PNG are associated with companies like the 
Ramu Nickel mine and the infrastructure projects aid from China is 
funding in the country. These Chinese workers are usually flown into 
PNG to work on the projects and flown out again. Little is known 
about the arrangements the Chinese corporations have with the workers 
they bring into PNG. In a court case I attended in Madang, a Chinese 
construction company worker was charged with dangerous driving that 
caused the death of his Papua New Guinean passenger. He pleaded with 
the court to reconsider imposing a fine on him. He told the court that his 
employer was remitting his pay to his family in China and he therefore 
was not in a position to compensate the relatives of the victim. Whether 
PNG’s signing on to the BRI will translate into increased engagement 
between PNG and China remains to be seen.
Countries like Australia and the US are concerned that PNG signing on 
to the BRI could place the country at risk of debt-trap diplomacy. Broadly 
defined, debt-trap diplomacy is where a creditor country intentionally 
lends excessive credit to a smaller debtor country with the intention of 
extracting economic or political concessions when the smaller country 
cannot service the loan (Doherty 2019). Yet, there are more pressing 
issues for PNG to address at home that may impact its future and stability. 
PNG’s unstable political, economic and social situation, its chronic 
law and order problems and its widespread corruption in all levels of 
government pose the biggest challenges to its development aspirations. 
These problems will have an impact on whatever relationships PNG 
establishes at both regional and international levels. While Australian aid 
to PNG has mainly concentrated on building the capacity of the country’s 
human resources and strengthening its governance system, China’s aid 
has been geared towards building infrastructure. Politicians favour 
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infrastructure developments as they are more visible and easier to quantify, 
adding to their portfolio of achievements during their term in parliament. 
Yet infrastructure development in PNG has its own challenges, including 
the country’s unstable geography, the fact that almost 90 per cent of land 
remains under customary ownership and a lack of capacity and resources 
within the government systems to facilitate and process any government 
plans. In addition, PNG’s problems with governance, especially at the 
subnational level, continue to hinder the effective implementation of 
projects as well as the delivery of government services to communities 
in rural areas of the country.
This chapter demonstrates that PNG’s internal challenges continue 
to impact any planned development, creating tensions among the 
government, developers, landowners and other stakeholders. While the 
national government and politicians may engage with foreign investors 
and sign agreements for development projects at the national level, 
these investments are often stalled and delayed by the government’s own 
incapacity to push the process forward through the bureaucracy at national 
or subnational levels. If the projects involve landowners, which they often 
do, that creates another layer of challenge that has to be negotiated, 
which can further delay and stall investments. Even agreements between 
project developers, the national government and the landowners made 
in the past need to be reviewed over periods of time, which can create 
added tensions. This chapter also details how Papua New Guineans are 
becoming increasingly aware of the issues created by foreign investments 
and agreements negotiated by their government and becoming vocally 
dissatisfied. An example is the PNG LNG project, which is yet to identify 
and compensate landowners, even though production and exports have 
commenced. Currently, the landowners of the Porgera and Ramu Nickel 
mines are demanding, with the support of their governors, that the mine 
agreements be reviewed. These issues create a complex environment 
for development in PNG and an unpredictable future for the planning 
and establishment of new projects. Marape’s catchphrase of ‘take back 
PNG’ is already seen as an attempt to address these issues, particularly to 
ensure resource development has significant benefits for resource owners. 
The Marape Government’s review of the new PNG LNG agreement is 
a move in this direction.
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The new Chinese
As PNG was moving towards independence in 1975, many of the 
‘old Chinese’ who had been in New Guinea for nearly 100 years took the 
option of Australian citizenship and moved south because their future 
was uncertain in the emerging independent country. In June 1957, the 
Australian Government made a decision to give Asians who were born in 
New Guinea or arrived during the Mandated Territory of New Guinea 
years the opportunity to take up Australian citizenship (Sinclair 2006). 
The majority became Australian citizens while a few remained to become 
PNG citizens.
As PNG was moving towards independence, there was a general feeling of 
uneasiness and people did not know what the future would be like. Papua 
New Guineans were being prepared to take over jobs held by Australians 
and other expatriates and there was the expectation for indigenous people 
to run their own affairs. In Rabaul, where the majority of the Chinese 
population lived, the tensions created by land disputes between the Tolais 
and Europeans resulted in the killing of the district commissioner Jack 
Emmanuel (Goldring 1972), and the administration’s introduction of the 
multiracial councils created fear amongst the Chinese population. There 
were also increasing law and order problems in parts of the country.
As the old Chinese were leaving along with other Australian and foreign 
expatriates, a new wave of Chinese migrants moved in to replace them. 
Chin (2008) categorises these ‘new Chinese’ into two groups: the Southeast 
Asian Chinese, who are ethnic Chinese from Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Singapore, and the mainland Chinese and Taiwanese.
The new Chinese migrants were also seeking economic opportunities, 
either to work and/or set up and operate their own businesses, or to 
expand their business empires, as in the case of the Malaysian timber 
merchants. The most successful of the timber merchants is Rimbunan 
Hijau, which has grown into a major diversified company. There has also 
been an increase in Chinese migrants from mainland China as PNG has 
looked north for aid and to attract Chinese investments in the country. 
A  number of major Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested in 
PNG, mostly benefiting from China’s ‘boomerang’ concessional loans that 
restrict the projects to the use of Chinese expertise, labour and equipment. 
Amongst the Chinese who have come from mainland China, Chin (2008) 
stated the largest number have done so under the work permit scheme. 
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This scheme, which was designed to recruit expatriates with specific skills 
and expertise to be engaged by local companies to train locals workers, has 
been much abused. Instead, government officials are bribed and in turn 
have allowed in hundreds of Chinese workers with no skills or knowledge 
of the English language, an entry requirement under PNG law. Once in 
the country, these permit holders are employed in or set up small retail 
operations, mainly kai bars selling food, cheap electronic goods and 
clothing. A number of these operations have been busted by police and 
government officials and the owners convicted and deported. However, 
due to widespread corruption amongst migration officials—including law 
enforcement agencies—illegal migrants continue to come.
It takes two to be corrupt, yet the 
Chinese get the bad name
The large number of Chinese from mainland China who bribe their way 
into PNG and end up doing jobs reserved for Papua New Guineans are 
viewed with contempt by both fellow Chinese migrants and Papua New 
Guineans. They are blamed for giving all Chinese migrants a bad name. 
What is often overlooked is that it takes two parties to initiate a corrupt 
deal. This group of Chinese would never have set foot in PNG if PNG 
officials were doing their jobs honestly in the first place. After all, the 
migrants have to apply for visas and fulfil the requirements, then pass 
through customs and security checks before entering PNG. The fact that 
they are able to get visas from PNG officials while still in China proves 
that PNG officials are also corrupt and easily bribed to break the laws of 
the country. Yet when Chinese who are involved in any criminal activity or 
overstay their visas are caught, they appear in the PNG media as criminals 
who abused PNG laws. Nothing is said about the PNG officials who 
demand bribes and commissions who are also breaking the laws. They 
remain faceless and are not investigated or prosecuted for their crimes.
According to Chin, the mainland Chinese who bribe their way into PNG 
are poorly educated with limited skills and tend to become involved 
in businesses and employment reserved for local people. This brings 
them into daily direct contact with ordinary Papua New Guineans on 
the streets, so when the authorities finally catch up and deal with them, 
the bad news spreads. The majority of Papua New Guineans today were 
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born well after independence and have had little or no experience of the 
good relationships that existed with the old Chinese; they form their 
views of the Chinese from the media and the popular views on the streets.
To add to the problem, the majority of Papua New Guineans do not 
distinguish the origins of the new Chinese and why they came to PNG. 
Instead, they identify the Chinese physically and culturally, not by their 
places of birth or nationalities. Therefore, the well-publicised wrongs of 
the Chinese who break the laws of the country are often used to judge the 
rest of the Chinese who are law abiding and innocent. The old Chinese 
in particular have been critical of the newcomers and have a poor regard 
for them (Smith 2014). Operating retail outlets has its risks and many 
Chinese shops, along with other local and expatriate businesses, have been 
targeted by criminals. The Chinese retailers who are driven by a desire to 
make a lot of money quickly place themselves at a higher risk because they 
tend to operate their shops longer hours into the evenings. Over the years, 
there have been numerous attacks on and killings of the Chinese in PNG, 
especially those involved in retail businesses. Many of the killings occurred 
in armed hold-ups by criminals, but some were by disgruntled employees 
who did not like how their bosses treated them. In 2013, the killing of 
four Chinese in their shop in Port Moresby made international news 
(BBC News 2013) and was condemned by then prime minister O’Neill. 
In Manus Province, the deaths of 10 Chinese retailers who were burnt in 
their supermarket was investigated by police and arrests were made after 
the matter was raised in parliament by the local member of parliament.
In a country of more than 800 languages, the names people give to 
a person or group of people can reveal a lot about how they are perceived. 
The recent poor relationships between the Chinese and the local people is 
revealed in the names the local people use to refer to them. In Tok Pisin, 
a Chinese would be called a Sainaman (Chinese man). If the Chinese 
person is disliked, they are usually referred to using derogatory names 
such as a Saiko or Kongkong. Kongkong (or Singapo) is also the common 
Tok Pisin name for the Chinese taro that originates from Asia. In his 
Melanesian pidgin dictionary, Mihalic says the Chinese object to being 
called Kongkong (1971). Saiko, on the other hand, is a more recent term 
used mainly to refer to the new Chinese. Its origin is uncertain, though, 
like other Tok Pisin words, it likely comes phonetically from the English 
word ‘psycho’, which refers to an insane person. 
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PNG’s vibrant media is also responsible for creating the negative perception 
of the Chinese over time, starting in the late 1970s and 1980s. Soon 
after independence, one of the major corruption cases investigated by the 
Ombudsman Commission and widely publicised in the media was the 
1981 Diary Affair, which involved Singaporean businessman Tony Loh 
and the office of the then prime minister Sir Julius Chan (Ombudsman 
Commission 1982). In this case, officers within the prime minister’s 
department had attempted, without following the due processes of going 
to a public tender or having funds budgeted, to buy 15,000 diaries from 
Loh’s company for the government. The Central Supply and Tenders Board 
had three times rejected the application from the government to approve 
the purchase due to abuse of process, yet the government attempted to 
force the board’s approval. In this case, government officers in the prime 
minister’s department had prior contact and dealings with Loh and his 
company and thus wanted to give him the contract. 
This was soon followed by the Barnett Inquiry, which investigated and 
reported widespread corrupt practices in the forestry industry involving 
PNG leaders and Asian businessmen of Chinese origin. The Barnett 
Inquiry (Barnett 1987) highlighted serious abuses of laws and practices 
that shook the forestry industry, particularly the use of transfer pricing, 
declarations of losses by logging companies to avoid paying taxes and 
the bribing of political leaders. Again, a prominent PNG political leader 
and public servants were involved. Many of the abuses remain today, and 
illegal logging continues with exports to China.
The Ramu Nickel project is a recent experience for Papua New Guineans 
of the way a large Chinese mining company has gone about trying to 
develop a mine in the country. Papua New Guineans have observed and 
experienced large mining projects such as Bougainville Copper Limited, 
Ok Tedi, Misima, Lihir and others where international standards of 
work practices on the project sites were followed by the companies when 
developing and operating the mines. The same was expected of the Ramu 
Nickel project, which began with Highlands Pacific at the exploration 
stages following the standards set in the country. However, when 
Highlands Pacific was not able to attract a developer due to low nickel 
prices at the time, the National Alliance Government of Somare went to 
the Chinese. It was a completely new experience for PNG learning how 
the Chinese develop a world-class project. The biggest initial shock was 
learning how the concessional loans would work, in that the Chinese were 
going to bring in their own workforce, plant and equipment, and there 
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would be limited opportunities for the local workforce and suppliers to 
participate in the project. Locals with mining experience who managed to 
get a job with Ramu NiCo were further dismayed when they saw that the 
Chinese were not adhering to basic standards required in the operation of 
such a large-scale project. There were wide-ranging health, safety and pay 
issues that forced the Department of Labour and Industrial Relations to 
intervene and close down the project until all the basic requirements under 
the labour laws were met. The PNG Department of Labour and Industrial 
Relations issued a detailed list of recommendations in February 2010 for 
Ramu NiCo Management Limited and ENFI PNG Ltd to comply with.
Another major issue with the Ramu Nickel project was the abuse of 
PNG  laws by allowing Chinese workers who could not speak a word 
of  English or Tok Pisin and who had dubious ‘expertise’ to enter the 
country in large numbers. The Department of Labour intervened, 
arresting 178 illegal migrants and taking them to court. Eventually, then 
chief magistrate John Numapo found that the workers had not really 
‘broken’ any laws  because they were brought into the country under 
a special state-to-state agreement. 
In an interview in 2007, then regional MP for Madang Sir Peter Barter 
urged the Chinese to understand the seriousness of the situation and begin 
to improve relations with landowners, the people and their employers:
They [the Chinese] need to improve their communication, 
employ responsible liaison officers, abide by labour and industrial 
laws, conduct regular briefings with the Madang and district 
administrators and to quickly begin initiating some services for 
the people.1
The latest issue affecting Ramu NiCo is the slurry spill at the Basamuk 
refinery, which became controversial when locals found dead fish in the 
area. A group of Swiss scientists independently engaged by the Madang 
Provincial Government investigated the spill, taking away and testing 
samples of the water and dead fish. They found toxic levels of heavy 
metal contamination and accused the company of not managing its waste 
properly. PNG’s Conservation and Environmental Protection Authority 
said it had not authorised the study by the Swiss scientists and promised 
to carry out its own. A Provincial Government ban on the consumption 




of any fish from the area until further tests created hardships for the local 
fishermen who depend on the sale of fish for their livelihood. The ban 
was eventually lifted in March 2020 when the Madang National Court 
declared it ‘unenforceable’ (PNG Report 2020).
Of course, not all Chinese companies operating in PNG performed as 
poorly as those that developed Ramu Nickel, and the Western mining 
companies also had their issues: the first Australian mine in Bougainville 
caused a civil war that took 20,000 lives; the Anglo-Australian Ok Tedi mine 
was responsible for polluting the Ok Tedi river; and the North American 




PNG has been plagued by rampant corruption for years now, with 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2018 placing 
the country at a low 138 out of 180 countries. Much has been said and 
written about the issue, which is widespread within the government 
from the national to the district levels. It is now seen as normal to bribe 
or pay commissions to get anything done. A lack of capacity, resources 
and funding has crippled government services, allowed corrupt practices 
to permeate all sectors of government and is visible and experienced 
everyday throughout the country. From parents bribing teachers to put 
their children in school to hospital staff stealing and selling medicines, 
policemen demanding fuel for their vehicles before they will attend to 
cases, politicians putting their own people in key government positions so 
they can divert funds and public servants colluding and misusing funds, the 
list goes on. The Public Accounts Committee, revived by Prime Minister 
Marape, held its first inquiry at the end of 2019 into the Department 
of Health. It found widespread corruption, a lack of accountability in 
the issuing of contracts to suppliers, officers getting bribes and unlawful 
appointments of persons to key management and administrative roles. 
While many political leaders have spoken out against corruption, none 
were as outspoken as the late former prime minister Sir Mekere Morauta. 
Sir Mekere, former governor of the Bank of PNG, said that when he was 
forced to resign in the 1990s, he detected serious signs of wear and tear 
and a weakening of the structures and processes of government:
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Already a culture of political domination of all aspects of the state 
was developing, undermining the efficiency and profitability of 
state enterprises and the functioning of important institutions 
of the state whose independence formed a basic pillar of good 
governance (Morauta 2010).
The widespread corruption in PNG affects everyone, citizens and foreigners 
alike, and the Chinese are no exception. It can take the form of the bribes 
or commissions Chinese retailers pay to police or government officers to 
obtain protection from criminal elements, gain access to land, property 
or licences to operate a business or get quick services from government 
agencies. It can also take the form of paying kickbacks on the supply of 
equipment and services to government departments or state enterprises.
The PNG Government has strict laws that govern the use of public 
funds through the provincial and district treasuries. Yet politicians and 
administration heads continue to find ways to gain access to these funds 
illegally and do so without fear of being arrested and prosecuted. 
After the anti-Asian riots in May 2009, the government at the time set up 
a parliamentary bipartisan committee to investigate their cause. The key 
government agency officers who appeared before the committee made 
revelations not only about the presence of illegal Asian migrants in the 
country, but that they were protected by top government officials and 
action could not be taken to deport them (Kolo 2009). Senior foreign 
affairs and immigration officers said there was ‘rampart corruption and 
bribery’ in their department, which was underfunded, understaffed 
and unable to do its job effectively (ibid.). The officers said they suspected 
that there were up to 15,000 foreigners living illegally in the country. The 
Philippines embassy revealed at the time that of the 10,120 Filipinos in 
PNG, 670 were permanent residents, 6,600 were temporary migrants and 
2,850 were ‘irregular or undocumented’ (Hernandez 2009). 
Today, the media continues to report on illegal foreigners who have been 
caught in the country. In 2017, the media reported four Chinese men 
had been arrested for illegally entering the country without proper visas. 
Another Chinese man arrested in Port Moresby after customs authorities 
discovered K7 million worth of illegal cigarettes being imported admitted 
to smuggling in a wide variety of goods, including guns, ammunitions, 
pornographic materials and drugs (Wani 2018). He also admitted 
bringing in duplicate documents such as blank bank savings cards, 
driving licences, work permits, passports and motor vehicle registration 
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papers bearing duplicated model numbers. In a more sensational 
case, a  Chinese businessman was arrested by police and charged with 
attempting to bribe police with K10,000 to stop ongoing investigations 
and release documents and items seized by police (Tlozec 2018). Police 
allegedly found the man  in possession of 200 common seals belonging 
to various companies, including 24 owned by the Chinese Government. 
These companies included China Engineering (PNG) Ltd, China Railway 
Construction Engineering Group North Project Company PNG Ltd, 
China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd and Covec (PNG) Ltd, all of 
whom are working on major infrastructure projects.
Other activities revealed before the parliamentary committee included 
the booming guns for drugs trade, prostitution involving Asian women, 
foreigners entering the country illegally by land, sea and ‘through the 
normal process’, government agencies such as customs, foreign affairs 
and immigration lacking the human resources to do their jobs effectively, 
hundreds of millions of kina being lost through tax evasion, false declarations 
being made and companies hiding their books from authorities. PNG’s 
Internal Revenue Commission admitted to the committee that it was only 
able to scrutinise 200 big companies, while the collection of tax from 6,000 
smaller operations was unchecked. The committee also heard from customs 
that at least half or three-quarters of containers coming through the ports 
each week are unchecked, and that counterfeit and illegal products flood 
the country. Meanwhile, authorities said they cannot remove the cheap 
products sold on the streets because of the removal of the anti-dumping 
law. Unfortunately, the work of the committee ended inconclusively after 
the chairman, Anglimp-South Waghi MP Jamie Maxtone-Graham, and his 
deputy were removed by the government after he was accused of doing 
a radio talkback show about the inquiry while it was still in process and 
preempting its final report. Their removal prompted the resignation of 
three other members in protest: Theo Zurecnuoc (Finchhafen), then vice 
minister of public service Anthony Nene (Sohe) and Bulolo MP Sam Basil. 
Maxtone-Graham said he was removed because the committee was about 
to ‘expose the involvement of certain politicians in questionable activities 
with certain people of Asian origin’ (Tannos and Eroro 2009). In PNG, 
the political will and actions to match anticorruption rhetoric are all too 
often missing. 
It is obvious that in order to attract investments and do business, PNG 
has to address the widespread corruption in government and business as 
well as minimise law and order problems. Unfortunately, PNG has not 
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been able to effectively achieve this and genuine investors continue to 
take risks investing in the country and have to beef up their own security 
throughout their operations. Transparency International, when rating 
PNG and other Asia-Pacific countries on anticorruption, pointed out that 
one of the reasons for poor ratings is the overall weakening of democratic 
institutions and political rights. Investors, whether from China or any 
other country, have to negotiate the environment of corruption, law 
and order problems and a lack of effective governance when trying to do 
business in PNG. 
New Chinese and the retail industry
Not all ‘new Chinese’ have entered PNG illegally; some have come legally 
and invested in the retail industry throughout the country. They have 
mainly taken over retail and wholesale businesses that belonged to the old 
Chinese and other expatriates and locals. In places like Madang, they have 
actually taken over recently built shopping complexes. The arrival of the 
new Chinese into the provinces has been received with mixed feelings by 
the indigenous people, with many expressing the view that the country’s 
retail industry is again being dominated by the Chinese after seeing them 
depart in the years leading up to and after independence. 
‘Little by little they are taking slices of our businesses’, says PNG activist 
Martyn Namorong, who campaigns to protect local jobs and communities. 
‘My people feel we can’t compete’ (South China Morning Post 2018). 
Despite their mixed feelings, many locals grudgingly admire the Chinese’s 
strong work ethic and drive to make money. The Chinese also provide 
employment for many Papua New Guineans and contribute to the 
country’s economy. In fact, a number of indigenous shop owners who had 
been struggling with their businesses, mainly due to cultural pressures 
from relatives and kinsmen to share their wealth, have gladly sold or 
rented out their businesses to the Chinese. The main disadvantage of the 
PNG wantok system (social security network), which is at the heart of the 
Melanesian cultures that promote communal values and tribal and family 
allegiance, is that it often works against indigenous businesspeople and 
prevents them from growing their businesses. While having large number 
of relatives and tribespeople can guarantee a businessperson cheap labour 
and security, he/she is expected to reciprocate by contributing to cultural 
feasts, ceremonies and funeral expenses and support the education and 
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health of relatives. In the coastal areas of PNG, there is jealousy of people 
doing well in business. Businesspersons are always at risk of having their 
business assets sabotaged or, worse, being killed. Cultural obligations 
can affect the success of an enterprise and distract businesspeople from 
concentrating on their businesses as much as the Chinese would. In turn, 
local people admire and wonder how the Sainaman (Chinese) can sit 
in a shop from dawn to dusk, seven days a week. 
This is not to say that doing retail business in PNG is easy for the Chinese 
and other expatriates. The risks are equally high for them, as one can see 
when visiting Chinese retail shops. The small shops on the street fronts are 
always vulnerable to criminal elements, and many have been held up and 
money and goods stolen. The Chinese have resorted to constructing steel-
grid fences that enclose their shop fronts, sometimes with rolls of razor 
wire over the top. Grids are also sometimes built around the cash registers 
in the shops. Guards at the gates strictly control the crowds coming in or 
leaving with bags and body searches regularly take place. Body searches 
without authorisation are illegal under PNG criminal laws; however, 
people have come to accept the practice and often raise their arms above 
their heads in surrender when leaving the shops so body searches can be 
done quickly. But the guards are selective, allowing affluent customers 
to leave without body searches. There have been instances where guards 
have been assaulted for body searches, and there is at least one successful 
district court case against a Chinese shop owner in Wewak (Lapmiemben 
v Kuso 2009). In addition to installing CCTV, the Chinese have come 
up with another way of preventing thefts. They build a raised platform, 
usually near the checkout, where they can have a bird’s-eye view of the 
shop interior, and also of their checkout cashiers.
Obviously, the Chinese feel they can never trust anyone and are aware 
that much of the shoplifting is done with the aid of the shop assistants 
and/or security guards. To prevent this, the Chinese have identified 
the products targeted by shoplifters and these are sold over the counter 
in the  front part of the shop, in full view of the shop supervisors and 
guards. One of the old Chinese retailers in Madang complained bitterly, 
saying she had stopped sponsoring local sports team and assisting 
the community because customers steal from her shop. Not long after, 
she began bringing in workers from Nepal to run the supermarket, thus 
creating a community of Nepalese in PNG. In an interesting twist, a new 
Chinese retailer who opened a shop in Madang has brought in checkout 
assistants from Misima Island in Milne Bay. Misima, a historic island that 
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has had gold mine operations since 1900s, has three sizeable supermarkets 
in its small township, all operated by Chinese. These shops, which sell 
everything from groceries to electronics, fuel and hardware, were originally 
owned and run by locals. The Misima economy is largely supported 
by remittance from the island’s workforce, many of whom were trained 
by Misima Mines in the 1980s and are working in other mining projects 
in PNG and internationally. Business there is brisk, especially during the 
end of the year when workers return to the island for Christmas to fulfil 
their cultural obligations. The Islanders are generally hardworking and 
reliable, and it seems the Chinese have recognised this.
The wide variety of cheap goods sold by the Chinese are often of poor 
quality. Many are imitation products of popular international brands, 
often with slight differences in the spellings of the brand names or in 
the logo designs that are hard to detect. Imitation products with popular 
international sports team brands abound, as do shirts with PNG’s national 
colours, flags and souvenirs for independence and provincial days. In fact, 
in the past, one could not purchase the PNG national flag so easily, but 
today every Chinese shop has flags of all sizes ready for any occasion.
Illicit trade poses the biggest threat
The anti-Asian riots investigation, while inconclusive, highlighted another 
problem facing PNG: the incapacity of government agencies to carry 
out their functions effectively. Where there is a lack of law enforcement, 
corruption flourishes. Often, government officers collaborate and take 
advantage of the situation to abuse the system for bribes and favours. 
Many illegal activities and illicit trades are not done in secret anymore, 
but quite openly, as there is no longer respect for and fear of the law. 
An example is the smuggling of firecrackers into PNG, a product that 
has been banned since the 1970s. Today, firecrackers are smuggled in and 
openly exploded without fear of prosecution by the authorities. In many 
cases, police officers themselves are involved in selling the banned product.
The Manufacturers Council of PNG (MCPNG) has warned of rampant 
illicit trade in PNG despite steps being taken to address it. MCPNG chief 
executive Chey Scovell said an illicit trade taskforce has been set up by 
the government but has not been operational, and his biggest concern is 
public safety, followed by brand damage and loss of business by council 
members (The National 2018). PNG’s popular local beer South Pacific 
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was one of the products to have counterfeits imported and sold in the 
country, but Scovell said other products like ‘biscuits, water, canned 
foods, bleach, detergents, soap, matches, nails, plywood, cigarettes, tea, 
coffee and even nails have all been counterfeited over the years’ (ibid.).
The Independent Consumer and Competition Commission (ICCC) has 
also called on retail shops and supermarkets to stop selling counterfeit 
products, which it described as non-English-labelled products (Kuusa 
2017). It identified a popular product in PNG, Indomie Mi Goreng 
noodles, had been found to have a counterfeit. ICCC commissioner and 
chief executive officer Paulus Ain said both products look the same except 
the label of the counterfeit product is not written in English but another 
language. The ICCC said the English labelling requirement was specific 
and that the ingredients, distributor, importer, country of origin and net 
weight needed to be in English. 
Even traditional items made by Papua New Guineans have not been spared. 
Goods including string bags (bilum) and meri blouses have imitations 
produced in China and imported and sold cheaply in Chinese shops in 
PNG. The government has raided Chinese retail shops and confiscated 
and destroyed such goods. According to Commerce and Industry Minister 
Wera Mori, bilum weaving is a reserved activity as a cottage industry for 
Papua New Guineans only (Eri 2018). Popular PNG rugby league team 
the PNG Hunters has also had imitations of its merchandise produced and 
sold illegally by Chinese shops, resulting in police raids in Port Moresby 
confiscating and destroying some of the goods. League administrators 
have called on the authorities to investigate and punish shops that carry 
out such activities (Badui-Owa 2018).
Another illegal activity by Chinese-owned businesses is the piracy of 
popular local music, which has widely affected the PNG music industry. 
Music piracy is a global menace, and PNG has its share of complaints 
that Chinese shops illegally copy local music onto flash drives and sell 
them to the public. The practice has severely impacted the fledgling local 
music industry, with artists and recording studios losing out on revenue 
from sales of recorded music. Local artists now depend on performances 
to generate revenue, while recorded music is only used to promote the 
artist. In 2012, popular local music artist Gedix Atege took a Chinese 
businessman to court, accusing him of illegally selling his musical works 
on flash drives to customers (Safihao 2012). National Court judge David 
Cannings found that while there was sufficient evidence the accused 
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had downloaded songs onto a flash drive and sold them, Gedix had not 
provided evidence to prove that the downloaded songs were in fact his 
musical works that he had not authorised the reproduction of; thus, the 
case was dismissed.
PNG’s incapacity to police and protect its borders is giving smugglers of 
drugs, weapons and other illegal items access to the country and posing 
security threats to PNG and its neighbours Australia, Indonesia, New 
Zealand and the Pacific countries. These threats require Australian police 
and border security to work closely with PNG authorities to secure the 
borders of both countries, which has been happening for years.  
A challenge for investors, including 
the Chinese
PNG’s persisting law and order problems, together with its deteriorating 
infrastructure and the incapacity of the government to govern and police, 
will continue to be a challenge to investments in the country. Chinese 
and other foreign investors, whether in large-scale projects operated by 
multinational conglomerates or in retail industries in townships, need the 
guarantee of security for their operations. While big companies provide 
their own internal security forces that are often backed up by PNG police 
squads strategically located nearby, independent retailers have to  make 
their own arrangements. Armed police officers are also assigned to 
investors operating in remote areas such as mining or logging companies. 
These officers have been known to harass and assault local people who 
have grievances with the companies. PNG’s police force has inadequate 
human resources, with an ageing force that has not been sufficiently 
replenished and enlarged to serve the ever-growing population. Assigning 
officers to provide security for projects patronised by the government 
and politicians further weakens and undermines the rule of law in the 
towns and districts. The ratio of police officers to the growing PNG 
population is one police officer to more than 1,000 people, well above 
the United Nations recommended ratio of 1:450. Factors such as a lack 
of police accommodation, as is the case in Madang, has worsened the 
ratio to 1:3000 people (Shisei 2015). Chinese retailers also have to secure 
their investments and need to establish relationships with the police, 
local government officials and local people to guarantee their safety and 
security. Again, providing fuel money, lunch, beer or other incentives to 
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the police is a common practice. In provincial towns, police officers are 
mandated to provide security to the businesses, and often this can extend 
to providing armed escorts for bank runs. A number of Chinese retailers 
have been killed by criminals when banking. Retailers who move into the 
rural areas do so at their own risk and a number have become targets from 
criminal elements.
The integrity of the PNG police was also seriously undermined when 
the former prime minister O’Neill removed successive commissioners to 
prevent them from arresting him following investigations into the Paraka 
case. Paul Paraka is a lawyer whose firm, Paul Paraka Lawyers, was alleged 
to have been unlawfully paid K71.8 million by O’Neill. Prime Minister 
Marape has taken steps to restore the force by appointing Madang MP 
Bryan Kramer, a critic of O’Neill seen as a key architect in engineering his 
downfall, as Minister for Police. Kramer’s first action after taking office 
was to remove the police commissioner appointed by O’Neill and replace 
him with a younger officer, David Manning. Kramer has also vowed to 
keep politics out of the police force and to ensure the police follow up 
on and investigate the list of complaints against senior PNG leaders, 
including O’Neill.  
The Pacific Marine Industrial Zone in Madang, a major project that 
was funded by China and to be developed by Chinese companies some 
10 years ago, has also failed to get off the ground. The PNG Government 
spent K30 million (US$9 million) on the project, but there is nothing 
to be seen for it except a fence covered by bushes and a gate at the site. 
Money from the Export-Import Bank of China was also supposed to fund 
the project; however, mounting opposition to the project by local people 
halted its development. The project was one of the things discussed by 
former prime minister O’Neill and President Xi Jinping when he went 
to sign on to the BRI. The Secretary for the Department of Commerce 
and Industry Andrew Liliura said that the revised Export–Import Bank of 
China loan will be US$156 million (K484 million), which will be drawn 
down to start the project (Post-Courier 2018). The money will be used 
to build the fishing and container wharves. The project was originally 
planned to house 10 canneries and provide 30,000 jobs. 
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Conclusion
PNG’s development progress to achieve its Vision 2050, a national strategy 
for the country to become fully developed by 2050, is not on target as 
its leaders envisioned. Already the country has failed to achieve any of the 
United Nations millennium development goals it had set (PNG Government 
2015). Tensions with Chinese traders and other Chinese investments are 
not likely to ease in the near future as PNG struggles with its rampant 
corruption, chronic law and order problems and governance issues affecting 
the economy, politics and the delivery of services. The change of government 
in 2019 brings some hope that these issues will be addressed; however, it will 
require a huge commitment from the government and the people. PNG 
landowners and stakeholders involved in major investments by the Chinese 
and other foreign companies continue to have issues that disrupt operations 
and have to be addressed or dealt with by the government and the investors. 
As Papua New Guineans become better educated and experienced in 
dealing with investors, they are questioning and challenging investment 
agreements, including new ones being planned. Major investments 
planned for the country such as the Pacific Marine Industrial Zone are 
yet to get off the ground despite vast amounts of money already spent 
on them. China is seeking natural resources to feed its massive industries 
and offering attractive loans in return that allow it to export not only its 
expertise and technology but plants, equipment and labour as well. While 
PNG has received some attractive infrastructures that are visible evidence of 
development, other projects— like the K40 million (US$12 million) six-
lane boulevard to the parliament, which was appropriately dubbed the road 
to nowhere—are useless to the people. The reality is that people are unable 
to access basic government services, are dying from poor health services and 
drug shortages, are struggling to educate their children and are deprived of 
economic opportunities to support themselves. The Marape Government’s 
reactivation of the parliamentary Public Accounts Committee began with 
an inquiry into the health department that revealed widespread corruption 
and breaches of process in the acquiring and distribution of medical drugs 
as well as in appointments to key positions. Institutions that are supposed 
to serve the people lack the capacity, with shortages of funding, human and 
material resources allowing corruption to spread as people desperately seek 
services. PNG’s Catholic bishops were scathing when criticising the hosting 
of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) in 2018, saying that all it 
showed was the rich getting richer while the poor were getting poorer: 
THE CHINA ALTERNATIVE
470
APEC seems to be a manifestation of this gap as the whole of 
PNG watches billions being spent on appearances in Port Moresby 
while we experience teachers and health workers without pay and 
health centres without medicine (CBC 2018). 
These serious issues are creating tensions every day in PNG, and this is 
the reality that Chinese traders and investors are both contributing to 
and being impacted by. If China really wants to help PNG and Pacific 
countries, it should be critical about whether the aid it is giving is 
benefiting the people of the country or just creating white elephants. 
China should be more concerned about what its citizens are doing in 
PNG and take steps to control their movements and prevent them from 
breaking the laws. Vanuatu’s Foreign Minister Ralph Regenvanu echoed 
similar sentiments when he recently warned that ‘Chinese investment 
in the region is fuelling corruption and causing resentment among local 
people’ (Packham 2019). Former prime minister O’Neill nurtured a close 
relationship with China and signed on to the BRI with promises of more 
Chinese funding for development, but he was forced out of power soon 
after. If China truly wants to make the world a better place by engaging 
nations through the BRI to expand trade links, it needs to show more 
interest in the affairs of the countries it is signing on and make sure the 
relationship is mutually beneficial.
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Laurentina ‘Mica’ Barreto Soares
Introduction
Over the past decades, people-to-people diplomacy, also known as 
public diplomacy, has become one of the cornerstones of international 
relations between countries around the world. Countries often use public 
diplomacy2 as a soft power instrument to build relationships with other 
countries. Joseph S. Nye defines soft power as the ability to get what you 
want through attraction rather than coercion or payments … Soft power 
arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals and 
policies’ (Nye 2004:256). Conversely, hard power, defined as ‘the ability 
to coerce, grows out of a country’s military and economic might’ (ibid.). 
Now enshrined as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), people-
to-people diplomacy is part of China’s soft power toolkit. The Chinese 
1  This chapter is part of the author’s research project for her PhD studies on China–Timor-Leste 
relations at Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne. The empirical data used in this chapter 
derive from the author’s fieldwork from 2014 to 2018.
2  Paul Sharp defines public diplomacy as ‘the process by which direct relations with people 
in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being presented’ 
(d’Hooghe 2007:5). This definition suggests a broader interaction beyond the state level, and thus 
includes non-state actors’ involvement in public diplomacy.
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Government considers its overseas communities important assets in 
promoting and strengthening China’s presence in and relationships 
to countries with which it engages. The term ‘overseas Chinese’ refers to 
two categories: huaqiao and huaren. The most widely accepted definitions 
of these terms by academics and policy circles are huaqiao as overseas 
Chinese  who reside outside China and have obtained permanent 
residency abroad but still maintain their Chinese nationality, and huaren 
as ethnic Chinese who reside in and become nationals of other countries 
(Tan 2013:311).
In May 2017, China and Timor-Leste celebrated 15 years of bilateral 
relations. China was the first country to present its credentials and establish 
diplomatic relations with the newly independent government of Timor-
Leste in May 2002.3 Over the past 15 years, the relationship between the 
two countries has been cordial, and China’s presence in Timor-Leste has 
been on the rise. Material indications of their close relationship include 
a series of public buildings in the Timorese capital Dili built with grants 
from China Aid, as well as technical assistance in the agriculture, health 
and military sectors. This highly visible support is a cornerstone in China’s 
soft power efforts in Timor-Leste.
While providing development assistance to the country, China also 
stressed people-to-people relations as a pillar of its foreign relations with 
Timor-Leste. This was manifested in an April 2014 high-level joint 
statement by the two countries establishing a ‘Comprehensive Partnership 
of Good Neighbourly Friendship, Mutual Trust and Mutual Benefit’ 
(Timor-Leste Government 2014). A year later, in April 2015, China’s 
Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s 
Congress, Chen Zhu, visited Timor-Leste and reiterated the importance of 
people-to-people relations as part of China’s overall practical cooperation 
with Timor-Leste towards broadening Beijing’s 21st-Century Maritime 
Silk Road initiative (Xinhua 2015). Though there have been few reciprocal 
3  Record of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of Timor-
Leste on the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Full Diplomatic Relations between the 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and the People’s Republic of China on Monday, 20 May 2002.
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visits and exchange programs,4 a practical manifestation of this diplomacy 
has been an influx of Chinese migrants to Timor-Leste. It is estimated 
that between 4,500 and 5,000 recent Chinese migrants currently reside 
in Timor-Leste.
This chapter argues that the Chinese Government tries to use overseas 
Chinese in Timor-Leste as public diplomacy agents to promote officially 
approved narratives of China’s cultural values and advocate for Taiwan’s 
diplomatic isolation. As the Chinese in Timor-Leste are known for their 
entrepreneurial spirit and business acumen, the increased presence of new 
Chinese migrants has changed Timor-Leste’s economic landscape. Thus, 
China’s people-to-people diplomacy may foster good relations between 
the two countries; however, it is not always mutually beneficial. This 
public diplomacy predominantly benefits China through its overseas 
community’s engagement as intermediaries between the two countries, 
which fosters China’s economic advancement through access to Timor-
Leste’s markets, resources and public funds. Such engagement has created 
tensions, both between the Chinese-Timorese and the new Chinese 
migrants and between new Chinese migrants and the local community.
This chapter presents an overview of Chinese migration to Timor-Leste. 
The analysis touches upon the migration history of the overseas Chinese 
community and the recent influx of new Chinese migrants. The second 
section examines the role of overseas Chinese as public diplomacy agents 
in China’s strategy for building people-to-people relations and illustrates 
how the Chinese Government attempts to use overseas Chinese to promote 
the Chinese state’s soft power goals. The third section analyses the overseas 
Chinese community’s engagement in social and economic activities, 
including Chinese–Timorese interactions. The chapter concludes by 
highlighting a series of issues that are creating cultural and racial tensions 
around Chinese migrants and their business interests in Timor-Leste.
4  Reciprocal visits involve government officials including military officials, representatives of political 
parties, and public and private enterprises. There have been frequent visits by the Chinese business 
community to Timor-Leste. Some have been facilitated through the Macau Forum for Economic and 
Trade Co-operation between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries. Since 2003, the Chinese 
Government has dispatched three to five Chinese medical doctors to Timor-Leste on an annual basis to 
provide medical treatment. The Chinese Government also provides scholarships for Timorese students 
and short training courses for Timorese government officials in China. As of mid-2017, the total 
number of Timorese students and public officials, including military officials who have received short 





China has a long history of contact with Timor-Leste. Previous research 
suggests that Chinese traders were sporadically visiting Timor long before 
the first Portuguese in the 16th century to trade in sandalwood, beeswax 
and honey (Berlie 2015; Durand 2016; Gunn 2016; Pinto 2014a, 2014b; 
Ptak 1987). Most of these Chinese merchants, like other Asian traders, 
stayed temporarily, and very few of them settled and established businesses 
in Dili. By the 18th century, many overseas Chinese arrived from Macau 
and started to settle in Timor. They initially settled in the Portuguese 
colony of Lifau, but moved to Dili in 1769 when the capital moved there 
from Oecussi (Berlie 2015:40). However, it was only in 1906 that the 
Portuguese colonial government started to facilitate the arrival of a large 
number of Chinese labourers into the territory. They sought male labour 
from Guangdong and Fujian provinces in particular, as well as Macau 
(Kwartanada 2001:7; Telkamp 1979:7). The decline of the Qing Empire’s 
social and economic power led large numbers of Chinese from rural areas 
to leave in search of a new life (Chew and Huang 2014:306).
The early arrival of Chinese migrants was welcomed by the Portuguese 
colonial government to help increase local economic activities and fill gaps 
in local skills such as masonry, carpentry and other trades (Gunn 2010:56; 
Saldanha 1994 in Kwartanada 2001:4). The Portuguese authorities 
acknowledged the skills of the Chinese, including their economic 
entrepreneurship, and encouraged the immigration of Chinese families, 
not just male labourers (Pinto 2014b:276). The colonial government 
declared that Chinese migrants were not allowed to be involved in local 
markets. This policy restriction was designed to reserve opportunities 
for Timorese vendors to sell local goods and agricultural products such 
as rice, cassava and beans once a week. In the predominantly Catholic 
territory, this was usually on Sundays after mass. Conversely, apart from 
lack of capital to begin with, Portuguese authorities did not encourage 
Timorese involvement in any large-scale commerce and provided more 
opportunities for the Chinese and other outsiders such as Arabs and 
the Portuguese themselves to participate (Kwartanada 2001:4). This 
policy demonstrated that, unlike in many Pacific colonies, the Chinese 
community in Timor-Leste was granted privileges under the colonial 
system. In return, many Chinese businesses became firm supporters of the 
colonial regime (Wise 2011:147).
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As political turmoil in China increased between the Nationalists and the 
Communists, more people left for Southeast Asian and Pacific countries, 
including Portuguese Timor (Chew and Huang 2014:306). By 1975, 
it was estimated that around 25,0005 overseas Chinese resided in Timor-
Leste (Berlie 2015:40). Half of them were Portuguese citizens and the 
remainder were Taiwanese (Capizzi et al. 1976:385). Despite some being 
married to local women and settling in different parts of the territory, the 
Portuguese colonial government had discouraged them from assimilating 
into indigenous life. This policy was similar to the anti-integration policy 
pursued in the Dutch East Indies, which was continued after Indonesia 
gained independence (Turner 2003:340). 
Just before the Indonesian invasion in November 1975, the Fretilin6 
government—which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the first to 
recognise—promised to give citizenship rights to the ethnic Chinese and 
allow them to officially become part of Timor-Leste society (Capizzi et al. 
1976:385). Prior to Fretilin’s declaration of independence, most ethnic 
Chinese were Taiwanese citizens, and only a few of them held Portuguese 
nationality. However, in January 1975, the Portuguese Government issued 
a diplomatic communiqué stating its recognition of Taiwan as part of the 
PRC (Gonçalves 2003:58). This left the nationality of the ethnic Chinese 
uncertain. Today, these ethnic Chinese identify themselves as Chinese-
Timorese or Timorese-Chinese and Hakka speakers. The common expression 
for Chinese who arrived before 1975 is Xina-Timor. During field research 
in Dili, however, a respondent of Chinese background strongly defended 
her social identity as Timorese-Chinese, not Chinese-Timorese. She was 
third-generation Chinese in Timor-Leste; both her maternal and paternal 
grandparents came from Canton in the mid-19th century. However, not all 
Chinese-Timorese share her concerns about this ambiguous term.
Ethnic Chinese in Timor-Leste’s homogeneity as Hakka speakers contrasts 
with ethnic Chinese groups in Indonesia, where Hokkien and Teochew 
backgrounds predominate (Hoon 2008:4). Chinese-Indonesians are 
classified as Indonesian citizens, but culturally are divided into peranakan, 
ethnic Chinese who no longer speak Chinese languages or dialects, and 
totok, ethnic Chinese who continue to speak Chinese. The identity of 
5  Other sources reported that up to 1975 there were around 20,000 Chinese Hakka living in 
Portuguese Timor—see Chew and Huang (2014). Others still stated there were 13,500 (Kwartanada 
2001:5).
6  Fretilin was formed in 1974—originally named the Associação Social-Democrata Timorense or 
Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT)—as an independent movement against Portugal.
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ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was severely politicised, with restrictive laws 
imposed during almost 35 years of the Suharto regime (Koning and 
Susanto 2008:161; Purdey 2003:425). They were subject to suspicion, 
particularly by the military, of having a tendency to lean towards the 
Indonesian Communist Party, which had links to the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). By contrast, Chinese-Timorese ethnic identity was never 
problematic, neither before nor after independence.
Following the 1975 Indonesian invasion, many Timorese nationalists and 
Chinese-Timorese were killed by the Indonesian military. Around 700 
ethnic Chinese were murdered in 1975 alone (Berlie 2015:40). Over the 
next few years, many Chinese-Timorese left the territory due to economic 
hardship and political pressure from the Indonesian Government towards 
pro-independence groups. A year before the Indonesian invasion, a number 
of wealthier ethnic Chinese left the territory following the Lisbon revolution 
of April 1974.7 By April 1975, around 600 ethnic Chinese had departed 
Dili with support from the Taiwanese Government. This group dispersed 
to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macau and Australia. Dispersal to Australia was 
largely due to its proximity to Timor-Leste and reflected warnings from 
the Taiwanese consul Huan Yinchuan not to return to Taiwan due to the 
sophisticated and competitive business practices there. Most Chinese-
Timorese were considered to have limited capacity to do business outside 
the territory and did not invest their money outside Timor. Taiwan only 
opened its door to the wealthiest ethnic Chinese (Nicol 2002:61).
In the 1980s, the Australian Government’s Special Humanitarian Program 
also encouraged many Chinese-Timorese to immigrate (Chew and Huang 
2014:310). According to the 2011 Census, there were 5,522 Timor-
Leste-born ethnic Chinese living in Australia (Australian Government 
2014). The departure of Chinese-Timorese from the territory created 
an economic vacuum in Timor-Leste. The  Indonesian Government 
facilitated the arrival of around 1,000 Chinese-Indonesians with Hokkien 
origins during the early years of occupation (Kwartanada 2001:5). They 
were drawn from various urban centres, including Kupang, Surabaya 
and Jakarta. Along with these Chinese-Indonesians were merchants from 
Makassar (Sulawesi) and other military-backed Indonesian businessmen. 
7  The Lisbon revolution is also known as the Carnation Revolution and was led by the Portuguese 
armed forces in April 1974 to overthrow the dictator regime, or Estado Novo/New State, under 
António de Oliveira Salazar. The fall of the Estado Novo also led to the end of Portuguese colonial 
power in Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe) and Timor-Leste 
and only then was Timor-Leste invaded by Indonesia and occupied for 24 years.
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These groups formed joint ventures for large-scale business activities such 
as coffee and sandalwood trading (Dunn 2003:221–22). The arrival of 
Chinese-Indonesians in Timor-Leste not only filled an economic gap, 
but they also became intermediaries for the Indonesian Government, 
similar to the role performed by Chinese-Timorese during the colonial era 
(Kwartanada 2001:1). Following the 1999 referendum for independence, 
the Chinese-Indonesian community left with the Indonesian regime. 
Normalisation of Timor-Leste–Indonesia relations has allowed some to 
return and resettle in Timor-Leste. This includes the owners of the two 
largest printing shops in Dili, Sylvia and Xeros. In the post-independence 
period, some Chinese-Timorese have also returned, mostly from Australia 
as well as Macau and Hong Kong. The returnees who decided to resettle 
include families associated with Jape, Lita Store, Leaders and Kathleen 
Gonçalves. Today, some 4,000 Chinese-Timorese live in Timor-Leste.8
During the United Nations transitional administration from 2000 to 
2002, few Chinese citizens from mainland China or other Asian countries 
entered Timor-Leste, apart from a small number of Chinese police officers 
and sojourners who stayed temporarily. In the post-independence period, 
following the official establishment of China–Timor-Leste relations in 
2002, the number of new Chinese migrants increased, with large numbers 
arriving from 2004 onwards. This contemporary wave of migration 
follows the pattern of Chinese migration in other parts of the world since 
the ‘open door’ policy was launched by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. 
Chinese government officials and academics refer to this wave of Chinese 
migrants as xin yimin (new migrants) (Siriphon 2015:148).
The recent migration of overseas Chinese to Timor-Leste is mainly from 
rural areas of the coastal province of Fujian. Fujian has been a source of 
overseas migrants for several centuries (Liang and Morooka 2004:145). 
Most Chinese who migrated to developing countries from the 1990s 
onwards are from Fujian (Pieke and Speelman 2013:12). Fujian migrants 
are known for their resilience in the face of hardship, notably being drawn 
to work in Fukushima, telling Chinese researchers, ‘All you need is courage. 
The one thing the earthquake and radiation zones have is work, and wages 
are higher’ (cited in Smith 2016:147). Despite an interruption during the 
2006 political crisis where the Chinese embassy in Timor-Leste evacuated 
around 250 residents to China, along with a few Chinese-Timorese who 
8  Fieldwork interview with author, 22 August 2014. Dili.
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sought refuge, many elected to stay behind.9 Those who left went back 
to Timor-Leste when the security situation returned to normal. Since 
then, the number of newly arrived Chinese migrants has increased yearly. 
It is reported that around 4,000–5,00010 new Chinese migrants currently 
reside in Timor-Leste, and some of them are married to local women and 
have children. Their numbers remain relatively small compared to the 
7,000 Indonesian citizens currently living and working in Timor-Leste 
(Aritonang 2015).
Early migration from China to Timor-Leste was mostly driven by political 
turmoil and economic hardships in China and the colonial government’s 
migration policy. The recent wave of migration from Fujian to Timor-
Leste also reflects both push and pull factors (Liang and Morooka 2004; 
Thuno 2007). These include a desire for a better chance to improve life 
and easy access to economic opportunities as well as social pressures 
and rising economic competition in China. The similar experience of 
other developing countries suggests that some Chinese migrants have 
used the opportunity as a stepping stone to settle in other developed 
countries after economic success in the first host country (Zhuang and 
Wang 2010:177–78). The reality of Timor-Leste as a young country 
became a  pull factor, attracting overseas Chinese to chase new market 
opportunities, especially for China’s cheap products.11
Today, the Chinese community in Timor-Leste comprises Chinese-
Timorese (or Timorese-Chinese), new Chinese migrants from the 
mainland and other ethnic Chinese from Macau, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Despite all 
being considered overseas Chinese, there are complex differences amongst 
the groups given their very different origins, tenures and ideological and 
political stances (Liu 2005). For example, the Chinese-Timorese consider 
themselves to be local and view the new Chinese migrants and other ethnic 
Chinese as foreigners. They do not share their cultural backgrounds, speak 
different languages and have different lifestyles. Most Chinese-Timorese 
9  Chinese-Timorese named Afuk, 28 September 2014. Interview with author.
10  According to a research report conducted by the Office of President in 2014, 1,000 new Chinese 
migrants arrived in Timor-Leste that year. The Immigration Office reported around 3,000–4,000 new 
Chinese migrants arriving in Timor-Leste between 2002 and 2014. Some of them left the country 
after their contracts with Chinese companies terminated. However, the number of new arrivals has 
continued to increase annually.
11  In an interview with a new Chinese migrant in Dili, the respondent said: ‘Timor-Leste has 
[a] bright future … the country has great opportunity for conducting business … it has enormous 
potential for future market because there is not much economic competition on the ground’ 
(New Chinese migrant, 25 September 2014. Dili. Interview with author).
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have adopted some elements of local culture whilst maintaining their 
Chinese traditions. For the purpose of this chapter, I focus mainly on 
the new Chinese migrants, or xin yimin, and Chinese-Timorese for their 




Public diplomacy has become an important part of Beijing’s foreign policy 
and is considered an essential element of state soft power (Manurung and 
Saudek 2016:4). Over the past three decades, the Chinese Government 
has regarded overseas Chinese as instrumental to China’s public diplomacy 
to promote China’s image around the world (d’Hooghe 2006:26; Ding 
2014:9). China’s public diplomacy through its overseas community’s 
interactions in Timor-Leste is slowly gaining traction. The Chinese 
Government views overseas Chinese in Timor-Leste as key advocates for 
public diplomacy through social and cultural activities. These efforts have 
been directed principally into three areas of strategic public diplomacy: 
cultivating a positive image of China abroad through the promotion 
of officially approved forms of Chinese culture, supporting its political 
diplomacy to isolate Taiwan and promoting China’s economic interests.
To bolster its public diplomacy strategy, one approach China uses is 
embracing the Chinese-Timorese community. The Chinese embassy in Dili 
has supported the Chinese-Timorese in the form of in-kind and financial 
contributions to their social and cultural festivities, such as the Chinese 
New Year celebration and moonlight festival. The Chinese Government has 
also built close relations with representatives of the Chinese-Timorese and 
unofficially considers them to be part of its overseas community12 at large. 
12  Kathleen Gonçalves, former president of the Chinese-Timorese Association and third-generation 
Chinese-Timorese in Dili, confirms that China considers and classifies Chinese-Timorese as part of 
its overseas community, regardless of how long they have been living in and become part of Timorese 
society at large. Nevertheless, the Chinese-Timorese community do not share a sense of common 
identity and cultural values with the new Chinese migrants. Chinese-Timorese are more sensitive 
to local culture and many of them are well adjusted and have adopted Timorese culture as part 
of their culture as well. Most Chinese-Timorese consider themselves more Timorese despite their 
continuous practice of and close attachment to Chinese culture (Fieldwork interview with author, 
8 and 22 August 2014. Dili). This continuing strong attachment and holding onto Chinese culture, 
despite long separations from the mainland and experiencing social and political repression from their 
host countries, is also very common amongst overseas Chinese elsewhere.
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The Chinese Government has capitalised on the Chinese-Timorese’s 
knowledge of the country, social, political and economic networks and 
language ability to promote its public diplomacy in the territory. Often, 
the Chinese-Timorese are asked to facilitate relations between the Chinese 
embassy and local Timorese, between the government of Timor-Leste 
and new Chinese migrants and between local communities and new 
Chinese migrants.
As an example of their efforts to be seen as ‘honest brokers’, the Chinese 
Government is relying on the Chinese-Timorese community to negotiate 
an agreement with the government of Timor-Leste to reclaim the Sional 
building located at the waterfront in Dili. The Associação Comercial 
da Comunidade Shinesa Timor-Oan [Chinese-Timorese Community 
Business Association] has been the leading negotiator in this matter with 
support from various Chinese-Timorese associations abroad, including 
the Chinese-Timorese Association of New South Wales and Victoria, 
Australia. The Sional building was built by the Chinese-Timorese 
community and rented to the Taiwanese Government for its consular 
office until 1975. During the Indonesian period, the building was used as 
the Indonesian Navy headquarters. It is now occupied by the office of the 
Secretary of State for Youth and Sports. However, there is an expectation 
that the premises will be converted into an overseas Chinese centre for 
social and cultural activities.13
China is keen to advance its prestige through cultural promotion and 
the construction of favourable views of the Chinese presence. Previously, 
the Indonesian Government had prohibited the PRC’s influence in the 
territory, as well as terminated cultural links with Taiwan (Berlie 2015:40). 
This was because Chinese–Indonesian diplomatic ties were frozen for 
almost a quarter century until 1990. Nonetheless, the Chinese-Timorese 
community in the territory quietly maintained Chinese traditions and 
cultural practices. Beijing hopes to revitalise and foster Chinese culture 
in Timor-Leste with the involvement of the overseas Chinese community 
in establishing a Chinese cultural centre and a school to teach Mandarin 
Chinese. In the interest of revitalising Chinese culture, the Chinese-
Timorese community is also keen to revive an old Chinese school for 
teaching Chinese language and culture. The Chinese-Timorese Association 
has been attempting to reclaim the former Chinese high school in Dili 
13  President of the Chinese-Timorese Community Business Association, 22 September 2015. Dili. 
Interview with author.
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known as Chun Fá Hok Tong Su Pó Sá. This school was registered under 
the Portuguese colonial government in 1960 and is now one of the public 
primary schools in Dili. During the Portuguese era, there were several 
Chinese schools in the territory, including a high school, all funded by 
the Taiwanese Government (Wise  2011:147). Formerly, the Taiwanese 
Government supported these schools by sending teachers, textbooks and 
all related learning materials as well as scholarships for Chinese-Timorese 
students to continue their study at the university level in Taiwan.14
In 2019, the Chinese Government announced the establishment of 
a Confucius Institute15 in Dili’s National University of Timor-Leste to 
promote Chinese culture (Xinhua 2019). In 2014, China and Timor-
Leste agreed to establish a sister city relationship between Dili and Fuzhou, 
the capital of Fujian province, which aims to facilitate the movement 
of people. This initiative will attract more new Chinese migrants and 
Chinese enterprises to Timor-Leste.
Apart from assisting the state’s attempt to promote Chinese culture, the 
ethnic Chinese community also plays an active role in promoting Chinese 
identity in the Timor-Leste. This can be seen in the continued existence 
of some Chinese places of worship from the Portuguese era, such as 
the Chinese Temple (Kuang Ti Meu) in Dili and Chinese cemeteries in 
several districts. The Chinese Temple in Dili was inaugurated in 1931 and 
has been used as a place for prayer and other ritual observances. It also 
provides a structure to preserve Chinese cultural tradition.
Despite Indonesian authorities’ ban on all public events associated with 
Chinese tradition, they did not prevent the Chinese community from 
visiting the Chinese Temple and cemeteries for prayer (Sambayan). Thus, 
the Chinese community has continued to practice Chinese tradition 
through ritual ceremonies, the celebration of Chinese New Year and the 
use of Chinese names.
14  President of the Chinese-Timorese Community Business Association, 23 September 2015. Dili. 
Interview with author.
15  Confucius Institutes teach Chinese language and promote officially approved Chinese culture 
while spreading China’s soft power abroad. As of 2019, there were a total of 550 Confucius Institutes 
installed in foreign universities, in both developed and developing countries, and 1,172 in classrooms 
for elementary and high school students (Hays 2012; Xinhua 2019).
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With the massive influx of the new Chinese migrants into Timor-Leste, the 
effort to promote the construction of Chinese ethnicity in the country is 
rising. For example, in the past, there was no ‘Chinatown’ in Timor-Leste. 
With the arrival of the Chinese new migrants, there is a concentration of 
their communities along the street of one of the neighbourhoods in Dili 
called Hudi-Laran. The locals have named it the slang term Xina-Laran 
(Chinese neighbourhood) and it is possible the neighbourhood will 
become Dili’s ‘Chinatown’ in the near future. Other visible effects include 
the ubiquity of Chinese goods and Chinese food, as well as celebration 
of Chinese traditions such as Chinese New Year and the Tomb Sweeping 
Festival. For years, the Chinese-Timorese community has been lobbying 
the Timor-Leste Government to consider Chinese New Year’s Day as part 
of the national holidays and official commemorative dates. In 2018, the 
Timor-Leste Government finally granted a holiday on 16 February to mark 
Chinese New Year’s Day celebrations (Timor-Leste Government 2018). 
Both the Chinese-Timorese and the new Chinese migrant communities 
in Dili welcomed the decision. The day was observed with a number of 
cultural events, including dragon dance shows in several places in Dili, 
and a courtesy visit to the Chinese embassy compound in Dili by Chinese 
Ambassador Liu Hongyang and other Chinese diplomatic officials, who 
were warmly welcomed for about one hour (Fieldwork observation, Dili, 
16 February 2018).
Political diplomacy for China’s unification
The question of Taiwan’s unification with mainland China has become 
one of the core principles of China’s foreign policy over the past seven 
decades since Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces fled to the island and 
declared it the Republic of China in 1949. This leads Beijing officials to 
define China’s key political objectives in the 21st century as reunification 
and rejuvenation, and overseas Chinese are considered ‘potential political 
assets’ to accomplish the tasks (Barabantseva 2010:130). In many 
countries, China’s overseas communities establish branch chapters of 
the China Council for the Promotion Peaceful National Reunification 
to facilitate the campaign for China’s unification. As of 2016, there are 
86 such councils around the world. Though many of these councils claim 
to be independent non-government organisations, the overseas councils’ 
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websites are expected to be linked to the Chinese Government’s official 
agencies, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CCP’s United 
Front Work Department (Groot 2017).16
In Timor-Leste, however, there has not been any overseas Chinese 
unification council or other organisation to publicly campaign for Taiwan’s 
unification. The Chinese Government, whilst expecting its overseas 
Chinese to play a significant role in China’s political communication and 
promoting China’s image abroad, is also sensitive to the legacy of Taiwan’s 
influence amongst the Chinese-Timorese community. During the 
Indonesian occupation, the Taiwan link was sustained through Chinese-
Timorese living overseas in places such as Australia and Macau, and this 
was the reason for the Chinese Government’s concern. In Australia, many 
first-generation Chinese-Timorese have strong attachments to Taiwanese 
culture and tradition, and some of them have business links with Taiwan. 
The Taiwanese Government has funded Chinese-Timorese Association 
activities, such as cultural practices and Mandarin classes for Chinese-
Timorese children (Wise 2011:153).
Chinese-Timorese in Timor-Leste, despite echoing the Timor-Leste 
Government’s position in their public acknowledgement of the One China 
policy, do not lose sight of Taiwan. The Chinese-Timorese’s position on 
this matter is in stark contrast to that of the new Chinese migrants, who 
recognise the One China policy without reservation.17 Chinese-Timorese 
have continued to maintain low-profile communication with Taiwan on 
trade and investment opportunities in Timor-Leste, despite the absence 
of Taiwan’s official trade office in the country. Since independence, 
a number of Taiwanese businessmen have been paying frequent visits to 
16  United Front of the People’s Republic of China is a political and popular front under the CCP’s 
leadership. It consists of the CCP itself and eight small political groups (the China Revolutionary 
Committee of the Kuomintang, China Democratic League, China Democratic National 
Construction Association, China Association for the Promotion of Democracy, Chinese Peasants’ 
and Workers’ Democratic Party, China Zhi Gong Dang, Jiusan Society and the Taiwan Democratic 
Self-Government League) as well as the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce. The eight 
small political groups are not opposition parties to the CCP.
17  In my separate interviews with the new Chinese migrants’ coordinator Chenguo Qin and the 
current president of the Chinese-Timorese Association Lay Siu Pan, the former said: ‘We are from 
the mainland, we have to support the central government’s policy and we consider Taiwan is part of 
China’ (Fieldwork interview with author, 4 September 2014, Dili). The latter stated: ‘We see China 
as one … we wanted to see China as one country in the world. We are fully supportive of the Timor-
Leste Government’s policy in maintaining good relations with China and we respect China’s One 
China Policy … but we are more familiar with Taiwan because of our historical relations’ (Fieldwork 
interview with author, 19 September 2014, Dili).
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Timor-Leste on tourist visas looking for business opportunities. Taiwan’s 
link with the Chinese-Timorese business community operates through 
Taiwan’s Trade Center in Jakarta, at one stage covertly inviting Timorese 
members of parliament to visit Taiwan.18 Taiwan uses historical ties 
and economic diplomacy to maintain links with the Chinese-Timorese 
community. Since 2007, however, due to China’s active diplomacy and 
the Timor-Leste Government’s firm commitment to the One China 
policy, Taiwan’s attempts to influence Timor-Leste through the Taiwan 
Trade Center have declined.
Despite the Chinese-Timorese community’s strong attachment to 
Taiwan, the PRC Government continues to consider the overseas 
Chinese community in Timor-Leste as an important asset to advocate 
for Taiwan’s unification in the future. Through its embassy in Dili, 
the Chinese Government communicates with representatives of the 
overseas Chinese community about the importance national integrity. 
As Kathleen Gonçalves, former president of the Chinese-Timorese 
Association, recalled:
The Chinese Embassy frequently invites us to talk about China’s 
national territory … we discuss the border issue between Taiwan 
and mainland China and also Tibet. They want to make sure we 
are aware of the issue and understand their concerns. Every time 
there is tension that involves China and other countries regarding 
territorial issues, they always call us for a briefing and emphasise 
the One China policy. We support the initiative because it is good 
for us.19
The Chinese Government also uses local media to communicate and raise 
awareness about China’s sovereignty. For example, in 2016, as tension in 
the South China Sea escalated, the Chinese embassy in Dili published 
Beijing’s official statement about China’s territorial integrity and historical 
claim in the South China Sea in a local newspaper for three consecutive 
days. Despite the absence of any formal unification group in Timor-Leste, 
the Chinese community’s willingness to accept Chinese Government 
policy indicates their tacit support for Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation. 
18  During my interview with the former president of the Chinese-Timorese Association Kathleen 
Gonçalves, she said that between 2004 and 2006 the Taiwan Trade Center in Jakarta invited Timorese 
members of parliament to Taiwan as part of Taiwan’s people-to-people relations program (Fieldwork 
interview with author, 8 August 2014, Dili).
19  Former president of the Chinese-Timorese Association Kathleen Gonçalves, 8 August 2014. Dili. 
Interview with author. 
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Promoting China’s economic interests
Overseas Chinese have become important economic intermediaries for 
China’s economic development (Pieke and Speelman 2013; Smart and 
Hsu 2004). Their engagement in economic activities has been closely 
linked to China’s 1990s ‘going out’ or ‘going global’ strategy. The strategy 
encourages Chinese citizens and Chinese enterprises, including both state 
and non-state-owned companies, to leave China and venture overseas 
(Xia 2011:214). Overseas Chinese are seen as not only equipped with 
financial capital and technological skills, but able to access wider business 
networks. With the current leadership under President Xi Jinping, China 
expects overseas Chinese to be involved in extending its economic reach 
in the 21st century and promoting China’s economic interests through its 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Wijaya 2016).
The recent influx of new Chinese migrants and Chinese enterprises to Timor-
Leste is arguably part of China’s strategy to expand its economic activities in 
there. The Chinese Government has been facilitating such migration,20 with 
others arriving through informal networks or family links with previous 
arrivals and through the Associação Comercial da Comunidade Xinesa 
Timor-Oan. The exact number of overseas Chinese enterprises is difficult to 
determine due to the absence of official statistics. However, some Chinese 
enterprises, mostly state-owned, are involved in a range of construction 
projects, including the Chinese Nuclear Industry 22nd (CNI22), 
China International Construction Cooperation, Fujian International 
Cooperation, Guangxi International Construction Engineering, China 
Shandong International Economic and Technical Cooperation Group Co. 
Ltd and Shun International Economical and Technical Corporation Group 
Company. The projects are funded by the Chinese Government through 
grants and compete for public tenders in Timor-Leste.21
With regards to the BRI, Timor-Leste is now officially integrated into 
China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative. China considers Timor-Leste 
its ‘traditional friend’ and attaches great importance to Timor-Leste’s 
20  According to representatives of new Chinese migrants in Dili, Chinese authorities include staff 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security and the Overseas Affairs Office of 
the State Council, who work collaboratively in facilitating the migration. Some of the new Chinese 
migrants have been arriving through informal networks and family links.
21  For example, the CNI22 won a more than US$350 million public tender to build power plant 
in Timor-Leste (La’o Hamutuk 2013).
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geographical location within the Southeast Asian region, where Beijing 
is considered part of the good-neighbour policy. In 2017, the Board of 
Governors of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank approved Timor-
Leste’s application to become one of the institution’s regional prospective 
members. To date, Timor-Leste has yet to engage actively with the initiative 
and details about implications on the ground remain limited. However, 
an interesting strategy of engagement emerged long before the BRI was 
announced. China has been using Macau as a platform to increase its 
economic connectivity with Timor-Leste and other Lusophone countries 
since 2003. The Forum on Economic and Trade Cooperation between 
China and Portuguese Countries held its first meeting in 2003 and has 
since been dubbed the Macao Forum (Jansson and Kiala 2009).
But having discussed Chinese economic engagement in the country, it 
is also important to note that there are many countries competing for 
economic opportunities in Timor-Leste through public tenders, such 
as Indonesia, Portugal, Australia, France and South Korea. Indonesian 
state-owned companies are arguably the biggest beneficiaries of Timor-
Leste’s public funds, presumably because of their close connections with 
Timorese businessmen and political elites. There are currently more than 
7,000 Indonesians in Timor-Leste. In an interview with The Jakarta 
Post, former prime minister of Timor-Leste Rui Maria de Araújo stated 
that there were 24 Indonesian state-owned companies and up to 400 
Indonesian private companies operating in Timor-Leste (Aritonang 2015). 
The Indonesian ambassador to Timor-Leste Sahat Sitorus confirmed 
the dominant presence of Indonesian state enterprises in Timor-Leste 
(Simorangkir 2017).22
Overseas Chinese, economic activities 
and positive implications
Most overseas Chinese in Timor-Leste are involved in small to medium 
enterprises. This makes the overseas Chinese community a significant 
player in Timor-Leste’s economy. During Portuguese times, ethnic 
Chinese monopolised the territory’s economy, controlling retail commerce 
22  Indonesian state-owned enterprises include Hutama Karya, Waskita, WIKA, PT PP and Adhi 
Karya and are involved in road construction, houses and buildings as well as cinemas (Simorangkir 
2017).
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and the coffee trade. This, however, does not mean that all ethnic Chinese 
are affluent: one-fifth of them live in poverty. Nonetheless, out of the 
25 largest firms in the Portuguese territory, only two were Portuguese: 
SAPT and SOTA.23 Amongst some 400 wholesale and retail commerce 
businesses in the Portuguese territory, 95 per cent belonged to ethnic 
Chinese. The largest business during the colonial period was run by the 
Sang Tai Hoo family—owned by two brothers (Dunn 2003:38–39). 
The Sang Tai Hoo family extended their business network to other parts 
of Asia, mainly Hong Kong, Singapore and Macau. Today, amongst the 
Chinese-Timorese community, the top three business enterprises are 
AKAM (the owner of Leader, Lita Store and Toyota dealer), the Jape 
family, which owns Timor-Plaza, and the Star King.
New Chinese traders settle across the country, but mainly concentrate 
in Dili, the centre of economic activity. Most of these new Chinese 
merchants occupy strategic locations for easy access along the main 
roads by renting land and properties from local government and private 
individuals, usually for minimum periods of 10–20 years.24 The absence 
of formal statistics on foreign business enterprises in Timor-Leste makes it 
difficult to provide accurate figures for new Chinese migrants’ businesses. 
However, it is estimated that there are currently more than 4,500–5,000 
new Chinese migrants living in the country and up to 300–400 business 
enterprises that are currently owned by new Chinese merchants. They are 
involved in diverse economic activities, from the trading and retailing 
of cheap goods to the wholesaling of construction materials, hotel 
businesses, gas stations, restaurants, internet cafes and brothels. Most of 
the goods and materials sold are directly imported from China, with some 
from Indonesia.
The increased presence of new overseas Chinese and their involvement 
in diverse economic activities have prompted conflicting views not only 
amongst locals and the Timor-Leste Government, but also amongst the 
Chinese-Timorese community. Some Timorese and the Timor-Leste 
23  SAPT (Sociedade Agricola Patria e Trabalho, also known as the Sociedade) was a state-owned 
firm established by Portuguese governor Celestino da Silva towards the end of the 1800s. Meanwhile, 
SOTA (Sociedade Orientale do Transportes e Armazens) was an investment company controlled by 
the Japanese before the Portuguese took over after Japanese occupation during World War II. It was 
a successor to the pre-war Asia Investment Company. These two companies were involved largely in 
coffee plantations and export/import activities (Dunn 2003:38).
24  Renting costs range from US$300 to more than US$1,000 per month (Zhen Jiang, a new 
Chinese merchant, 3 September 2014. Dili. Interview with author.).
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Government welcome these developments, while others are critical of the 
new Chinese migrants’ presence in the country. On the positive side, the 
new Chinese migrants’ presence helps address local needs and contributes 
to the social and economic development of Timor-Leste.25 They 
provide employment, pay taxes, drive down the price of goods through 
competition and many Timorese families benefit by leasing private and 
state-owned lands and properties to them. New Chinese migrants are also 
known as risk-takers, bringing economic activity to remote villages where 
other merchants, including Timorese, are hesitant to venture. This not 
only generates income, especially in the districts, but also improves young 
Timorese’s knowledge of and skills in business development.
Issues and concerns
Despite many positive implications, a number of concerns have arisen 
about social, cultural, economic and political repercussions. Arguably, 
certain practices of the Chinese-Timorese and the new Chinese migrants 
can be considered forms of neocolonialism. This can be observed 
through the influx of new Chinese migrants and their occupation of 
strategic economic sectors, as well as domination of a number of key 
economic activities. The experience of Timor-Leste is not unique, with 
Ogunrotifa Ayodeji Bayo characterising Africa’s recent experience with 
Chinese migrants as neocolonialism through diverse interventions 
(Bayo 2011:228).
Many in Timor-Leste have observed that the interactions between 
new Chinese migrants and locals in certain practices have the perhaps 
unintended effect of distorting local cultural values. For example, during 
All Souls’ Day in early November (loron matebian), Timorese families 
observe the day solemnly by visiting graves, praying, laying flowers and 
25  As a former chief of staff of the president’s office stated: 
I think, like many countries in other part of the world, the influx of new immigrants such 
as newly arrival Chinese and other foreign workers could recreate and create opportunity 
in the part of the local economy to grow. Having rather criminalizing immigration is 
not a solution, or having utterly and strongly xenophobic policy is not a solution either. 
Timor-Leste is hoping to become a member of ASEAN and ASEAN would soon have 
its free mobility of its people … more people coming in from the region. The way the 
Chinese people doing business in Timor-Leste … this is one manifestation of Timor-
Leste’s integration into regional framework … I think what we have to do, rather than 
criminalizing that, we have to make sure that our people become more competitive and be 
more prepared (Fidelis Magalhaes, 2 September 2014. Dili. Interview with author).
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lighting candles in honour of dead ones. New Chinese merchants initiated 
the vending of plastic flowers and candles in front of cemeteries in Dili 
during the observance day. The practice is considered inappropriate as no 
merchants, including the Chinese-Timorese business community, have 
ever done so before. Traditionally, Timorese families prefer to prepare the 
flowers and candles carefully from home. 
Tensions also arise in other ways. Some new Chinese migrants stay 
illegally after their visas expire. Some have married local women in remote 
places in order to have easy access to land and other property26 as a way 
to circumvent the law that does not permit foreigners to own land and 
properties in Timor-Leste. Others operate joint venture partnerships using 
Timorese names for business registration to avoid paying higher taxes.27
The involvement of new Chinese migrants in various economic 
opportunities creates tensions with Chinese-Timorese and locals alike. 
The Chinese-Timorese feel the new Chinese merchants and other ethnic 
Chinese are taking over their privileged role as a major economic player 
in Timor-Leste’s economy. New Chinese migrants’ encroachment into 
local markets has influenced traditional market development, which had 
to date been dominated by locals.28 New Chinese migrants mainly prefer 
to remit their profits to China rather than reinvest them in Timor. This is 
similar to strategies used by the Chinese community during the colonial 
administration, when substantial remittances were channelled to Taiwan 
and Macau (Yong and McKenna 1990 in Cheok et al. 2013:76).
26  As a Timorese senior scholar noted with concern:
With many Chinese newcomers coming into Timor-Leste, their relationship with Timorese 
is also full of risk—they will influence Timorese’s social and cultural domain through inter-
marriage like Chinese people in the past … I see this phenomenon as natural but it is 
not normal. It is natural because we see interracial marriage is everywhere but it is not 
normal because it does not follow Timor-Leste’s cultural norms and as a result, things 
that are supposedly natural become not natural. This will bring risk to Timor-Leste in the 
future. For example, they get married with Timorese and can buy lots of land and own 
properties in Timor-Leste—this will create a lot of problem in the future (Lucas da Costa, 
2 September 2014. Dili. Interview with author).
27  Local newspaper Independent reported information from the Timor-Leste Business Registration 
Center (SERVE) that local Timorese in Dili have facilitated new Chinese traders by giving their 
names and properties for new Chinese traders’ business registration (Dos Santos 2017). Such practices 
complicated the Timor-Leste Government’s control over foreign businesses’ tax payments.
28  In an interview with a Chinese-Timorese, the respondent stated that new Chinese migrants are 
greedy and very aggressive in doing business—their presence destroyed local market development and 
has increased prices for renting land and properties (Chinese-Timorese respondent, 8 October 2014. 
Dili. Interview with author).
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New Chinese migrant engagement has also raised environmental and 
safety issues. The increased presence of new Chinese merchants has forced 
some Timorese families in the capital to move further inland or into the 
hills in search of accommodation, as residential density and real estate 
prices in the city rise. Reports of isolated incidents of fighting involving 
locals and new Chinese migrants in the capital Dili and districts are 
attributed to social jealousies. It may be premature to claim that there has 
been a rise in openly anti-Chinese sentiment in Timor-Leste, but isolated 
incidents have raised tensions and directed racially motivated sentiments 
at new Chinese migrants. Some conflicts have forced the Chinese embassy 
to intervene to protect their nationals. The embassy is also now more 
preoccupied with the wellbeing and security of its nationals than it 
has been in the past. As former Chinese consul Chung in Dili stated, 
‘The growing number of Chinese coming here is really keeping us busy, 
(as) very often they get into trouble with locals’ (Horta 2011). 
Some new Chinese migrants may have been involved in illegal activities, 
including human trafficking, gambling and money laundering. More 
Chinese-run brothels are now open in Dili with women from China and 
Southeast Asian countries. According to a former United Nations Police 
officer who worked in the Investigation Unit, new Chinese migrants have 
supported black market money lending since 2007, directed mainly to 
new Chinese migrants but also some ethnic Timorese.29 On another front, 
a Chinese company named Fuzhou Hoo Long Ocean Fishing Co. Ltd, 
which was licensed by the Timorese Government to fish in Timor-Leste 
seas, was found to be involved in illegal fishing of protected fish species, 
particularly sharks. The exposure of their activities by Sea Shepherd Asia 
prompted public protests and resulted in the suspension of their fishing 
licence (James 2017; Lusa 2017).
These diverse concerns involve not only new Chinese migrants and 
enterprises, but also members of the established Chinese-Timorese 
community who have been accused of ‘land grabbing’. There are 
accusations that the Jape Kong Su family evicted many Timorese families 
to build its modern Timor-Plaza. The eviction case prompted tensions 
among Timor-Plaza developers, local landowners and a local rights 
29  Former United Nations Police officer Jose Brito, 13 October 2014. Dili. Interview with author.
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organisation, which prosecuted the case for evicted families.30 The Timor-
Plaza case also generated public accusations of bribery involving a former 
minister of justice and the charge that Timor-Plaza was permitted to 
use the 5 acres of land in Comoro in return for a large private house 
construction in the Manufahi district. As a top player in property business 
amongst Chinese-Timorese, in 2013, the Jape family, or the Timor-Plaza 
company, also reportedly bought more than 50 acres of prime elevated 
land in eastern Dili at a very cheap price. The land is expected to be rented 
out for hotels and other businesses.31
Conclusion
People-to-people or public diplomacy has become a potent diplomatic 
tool for many countries’ foreign relations. It has served as a soft power 
tool to advance Beijing’s global rise through the engagement of overseas 
Chinese and provides an important asset to promote China’s social, 
cultural, political and economic interests around the world. So far, 
China has benefited greatly from its overseas community’s interactions 
in various ways. Beijing’s views the role of ethnic Chinese in people-to-
people relations, regardless of their nationality, either huaqiao or huaren, 
as a strategic tool to gain access to other countries. For example, prior 
to China’s official establishment of diplomatic relations with Timor-
Leste, one of former president Jiang Zemin’s first questions to Timorese 
leader Xanana Gusmão upon their first meeting in Beijing in 2001 was 
about ethnic Chinese life in Timor-Leste (Wise 2011:150). China’s 
presence in Timor-Leste will continue into the foreseeable future, and 
its overseas community will no doubt become important agents for 
China’s long-term relationship with the country. Timor-Leste has felt 
the impact of this pattern of Chinese public diplomacy. The relationship 
has helped promote the international images of both countries, but has 
also had repercussions that affect the political economy of Timor-Leste 
and Timorese society. Overseas Chinese have taken advantage of policy 
30  A local non-government organisation, Matadalan ba Rai-Haburas Foundation, noted:
In Comoro, a luxury shopping mall called Timor-Plaza has recently been built by a large 
construction company from Darwin called Jape Construction. Many people cite this shopping 
mall as the real signal that Timor-Leste is finally developing. The reality is that Timor-Plaza 
is a business whose objective is wealth accumulation … the project of this private company 
resulted in the forced eviction of many families (Matadalan ba Rai-Haburas Foundation 
2010:73).
31  Timorese worker for the Jape Company, 4 September 2014. Dili. Interview with author.
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and regulatory gaps as well as limited institutional capacity to advance 
their political and economic interests. For many, the vaunted mutually 
beneficial relationship between China and Timor-Leste remains weighted 
heavily in favour of China and its citizens rather than Timor-Leste.
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